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 Introduction 
Although suffering and challenge demoralize some humans, 
others cope and construct instead. Rather than grinding to a halt, 
certain people hurdle the obstacles or creatively maneuver around 
them. They even make something positive out of the negative 
situation. In the face of crisis, they not only survive but also thrive. 
“Resilience” is a concept used to shed light on these phenomena. It 
underlines preventive and therapeutic approaches that reinforce the 
resources of children and adults, families and communities. Resilience 
capacities involve coping well with difficulty, actively resisting 
destructive pressures and rebuilding positively after adversity. 
However, we do not exercise these capacities in equal measure. 
Humans faced with similar situations end up in diverse spots. Some 
people manage destructive life events more efficaciously. Others lose a 
sense of meaning or emotional stability. Certain humans find a positive 
outcome to the negative situation. Others become aggressive and 
abusive, or drug or alcohol dependent. What initiates and sustains a 
resilient use of human resources? What renders some individuals and 
groups more resilient than others? These questions are not only 
pertinent for the psychosocial studies that instigated the use of the 
resilience concept, but also for moral approaches.1 
In this book, I make the case that ethics and moral theology2 
can employ the resilience concept and research to refocus moral 
analysis. They can thus better integrate the potential personal and 
social resources available for building character in the midst of 
vicissitude, trial and loss. I shall address the following questions, in 
                                                 
1 By “psychosocial sciences,” I group together the social sciences, 
evolutionary theory, psychology and developmental theories. Later, I shall 
differentiate their methods and contributions. 
2 When I speak of morality or ethics in general, I posit the basis for 
philosophical ethical theory as well as moral theology, Christian ethics or 
theological ethics. I prefer “moral theology” of the latter three. The substantive is 
“theology” in contrast to the other two whose substantives are “ethics.” I would 
place both Christian ethics and moral theology as a sub-set of theology, as I 
explain in chapter two. I would further specify that this work is moral theology. I 
draw from the Catholic Tradition as a principal and determining source. This 
Christian project is a fitting partner for ecumenical dialogues. Cf. S.-Th. 
Pinckaers 2001d. 
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particular: how does resilience research contribute to a renewal of St. 
Thomas Aquinas’ virtue theory and moral theology? Specifically, how 
does it deepen our comprehension of moral development? Particularly, 
how does it enhance our understanding of fortitude and its related 
virtues? 
This book’s title employs three disciplines: psychosocial 
sciences, ethical theory and moral theology. I put them into 
interdisciplinary dialogue. On the one hand, I engage in an active 
exchange of ideas between resilience research and Aquinas’ moral 
theory. This discussion is philosophical. It employs psychosocial 
studies on human resilience to revitalize Aquinas’ moral anthropology 
and to understand the virtues associated with fortitude. On the other 
hand, I extend this conversation to a theological dimension. In 
particular, I attempt to deepen moral theology from a Roman Catholic 
perspective. This renewal of moral theology requires not only the 
properly theological sources of Scripture and Tradition, but also 
insights found in normative and descriptive sciences, that is, 
philosophical ethics and psychosocial sciences. It reflects upon the 
presence, action and influence of God in human agency and society. I 
have chosen to revisit Thomas Aquinas’ ethical theory and moral 
theology, since his approach to virtue anthropology serves as a 
valuable model for moral theory in interdisciplinary dialogue with the 
findings of not only philosophical and theological sciences, but also 
psychology and social sciences.3 
Aquinas’ experiential and realist metaphysical teaching on the 
virtue of fortitude contributes to understanding how we act in difficult 
situations. Authors translate Aquinas’ term fortitudo as either 
“fortitude” or “courage” in English.4 Contemporary philosophers, who 
                                                 
3 Later I study significant aspects of Aquinas’ anthropology, his use of 
Scripture and Tradition, as well as the way in which he integrates insights from 
other disciplines. I thus reflect from within a tradition that is a living and growing 
reality. At the same time, I also recognize other valuable traditions of moral 
theology within the Tradition of the Roman Catholic Church. 
4 In the compilation of English translations of Aquinas’ works found in the 
Past Masters, “Fortitude” is found 653 times; while “courage” is used 93 times, 
and only for other Latin expressions (i.e. not for “fortitudo”). English-speaking 
contemporary philosophers and theologians split on the use of fortitude and 
courage. The following authors use “fortitude”: R. Cessario (1991), J. Porter 
(1990, 1995a), the ST translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican 
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discuss this cardinal virtue, tend to employ more readily the term 
“courage,” which etymologically finds its origin in old French cuer 
and Latin cor (heart). Nonetheless, other philosophers and theologians 
employ “fortitude,” which finds its roots in the Latin fortis (strong). In 
this work, we shall primarily use “fortitude” in translating Aquinas’ 
fortitudo; yet we shall also use “courage” as its synonym, as well as 
“courageous” and “courageously.” Among the virtues, fortitude is the 
most obvious dialogue partner with resilience research. 
In chapter one, I investigate the resilience perspective per se. 
Physicists have long used the term “resilience” to refer to a material’s 
quality to resist deformation or destruction. This limited usage has 
inspired a more expansive approach in the psychosocial sciences, 
which employ it to describe the individual and social capacities to face 
vicissitude. How do humans successfully face challenges and threats, 
suffering and sorrow, confusion and loss? The psychosocial sciences 
analyze human resilience as having three related facets: first, to cope 
with hardship; second, to resist the possible deformation of the 
competencies and integrity of one’s community, family and self; and 
third, to achieve a new proficiency out of the unfavorable experience. 
Each domain involves an opportunity for positive growth in different 
ways. The three main strengths of the psychosocial resilience 
perspective are that it focuses on the resources on hand, instead of on 
pathology per se;5 it seeks to identify promotable patterns of coping, 
constancy and construction; and it recognizes the import of life-goals. 
Resilience outcomes indicate that developmental and resilience tutors 
(aids that promote resilience) require, more often than not, growth 
through affective, intellectual and spiritual trials. They involve keeping 
in contact with our larger goals, while grappling with intermediate 
ones. 
                                                                                                          
Province (1947 and 1981). Others use “courage,” such as D. N. Walton, (1986), 
Y.-M. Congar (1974), A. Ross and P. G. Walsh (1966, Blackfriars translation of 
ST). 
5 The tendency to focus on illness, disease, deficiency and the like, has been 
prevalent in certain disciplines: e.g. the deficiency model in the history of western 
medicine; the primary interest in pathology in psychology; the focus on sin and 
vice in moral theology manuals, reconciliation (confession) and spiritual 
direction; and so forth. 
4 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
I also review resilience studies in order to identify input for 
virtue-based philosophical anthropology. What are the factors and 
processes that strengthen resilience outcomes? Which ones weaken 
them? Chapter one synthetically presents the resilience insights in the 
domains of human temperament and emotions, as well as cognitive and 
volitional processes. On the social level, it examines correlations in 
and outside the family. Throughout, it distinguishes physical, 
psychological, social and spiritual types of resilience. Resilience 
insights can be counter-intuitive. They can serve to break simplistic 
stereotypes. However, in order to appreciate their potential, we need to 
respect this simple resilience typology. 
In chapter two, I address the challenges and promises that 
resilience research offers for the enhancement of virtue theory and 
moral theology. First, I introduce Aquinas’ virtue-based moral theory. 
Then I examine the way in which the psychosocial sciences’ resilience 
findings can renew virtue theory and moral theology. This section 
investigates some past and current models of collaboration. The 
methodologies of the psychosocial sciences, moral philosophy and 
theology differ. The former grouping is more observational and 
analytical. The latter is more reflexive and synthetic. Nonetheless, both 
groups require supporting anthropological theories that at a 
philosophical level can join each other. I make a case for a method 
inspired by Aquinas. It is a model for the critical appropriation of 
current scientific insights and human experience from within a faith 
perspective that incorporates anthropological and theological insights 
from Sacred scripture and Catholic Tradition. 
In the light of human resilience in adversity, I then analyze 
Aquinas’ position on moral theory and flourishing. He asserts that 
human flourishing serves as the foundation and guide for virtue theory 
and moral theology. Indeed, Aquinas’ understanding of human 
flourishing is key for understanding his virtue approach to finality and 
human agency, duty and obligation, and more generally, his moral 
anthropology. Without exhaustively discussing Aquinas’ philosophical 
anthropology, I nonetheless furnish its major features concerning 
human inclinations and emotions, nature and grace, human finality and 
flourishing. This basis permits me to ask: how can the resilience 
perspective and findings benefit a virtue-based theory? Resilience 
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findings contribute content-charged experience and hypotheses. They 
offer narrative and theorized observations. They both challenge and 
confirm aspects of philosophical anthropology and virtue theory, 
especially about human practices in hardship. In turn, virtue theory can 
deepen the resilience perspective and offer a deeper moral 
anthropology. In particular, it enriches reductionistic notions of 
resilience with insights into the connaturalization of knowledge and the 
development of human character. 
In the second and third parts of the book (chapters three 
through eight), I bring resilience research into dialogue with the three 
virtue groups that confront difficulty: namely fortitude, and the related 
virtues of initiative-taking and endurance. I illustrate how these virtues 
are structurally akin to the three resilience domains. First, the exercise 
of each virtue confronts the adversity itself. Second, it resists loss of 
acquired competencies. Third, it builds something positive out of the 
negative situation. These parts make a rapprochement between the 
resilience findings and each of these virtues through a renewed reading 
of Aquinas’ virtue anthropology. I proceed with this dialogue between 
Thomas and resilience findings in two stages and two distinct methods. 
In Part Two (chapters three, four and five), I address Aquinas’ 
view on the natural virtues that manage situations of danger and 
difficulty. This philosophical effort offers a fitting discussion partner 
for the psychosocial sciences, even though it outstrips them in its 
normative and moral competency. On the natural level, we revisit the 
virtues in terms of resilience research for several reasons. Particularly 
when facing hardships, it is not always personally evident which tack 
to take. Aquinas thus affirms we each need to develop prudent 
discernment. The development of virtue requires time and experience. 
Studies of actual situations of risk and danger inquire how people have 
resiliently succeeded. What do we learn from the resilience outcomes 
for the present and future? How might we strengthen basic human 
capacities in order to promote resilience and diminish vulnerability? At 
this level, I speak of moral, constructive and resisting types of 
resilience. 
In Part Three (chapters six, seven and eight), I examine the 
theological dimension of these virtues and the resilience input. This 
level is admittedly moral theology. It uses psychosocial insights, 
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without co-opting their scientific pretensions. It employs its own 
anthropological reflections on the meaning of these findings. This 
theological standpoint involves separating the efficacy of virtues 
neither from their sources in natural inclinations and capacities nor 
from their sources in God’s constant presence. It identifies how both 
human and divine sources collaborate in particular challenges and are 
present in the resilient results manifest in Christian virtues. At this 
level, I speak of a spiritual resilience, which involves the divine 
support offered in the midst of human agency. 
 
 
 PART ONE. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF 
RESILIENCE AND VIRTUE THEORIES 

 Chapter One 
The Resilience Perspective and Virtue-Based 
Anthropology 
“Bad things can turn into good things.” Helen (age 10)1 
1.1. The Resilience Perspective 
At every level of society, particular situations make or break 
the lives of children, adolescents and adults. Situations of violence, 
loss, indifference and hatred. Some human beings cope well when 
faced with them and others do not. Specialists call this capacity to do 
well in adversity “resilience.” Psychosocial research has documented 
three types of resilience phenomena: good outcomes in the midst of 
high-risk (coping), sustained competence under stress (constancy) and 
recovery from trauma (constructing).2 In order to track these resilience 
phenomena, researchers have changed their perspectives and methods.3 
Moral theologians can benefit by adopting insights of these sciences on 
how humans avoid pathology and develop positively. 
Although specialists must in some way conceptualize 
resilience in relation to human disease, resilience is of interest beyond 
the context of pathology. It aids us to understand and promote the 
positive development occasioned by negative situations and potentially 
destructive challenges. The psychosocial sciences’ resilience 
perspective has two major axes. First, it does not concentrate 
exclusively on human problems and pathologies. Rather, it principally 
                                                 
1 L. Murphy (1987, 104) quoting one of her subjects. 
2 Cf. Consortium on the School-based Promotion of Social Competence 
1994, 268-316, esp. 272. 
3 Resilience as an approach in the human sciences has meant a triple 
paradigm shift: from single causes to multiple cumulative dynamics; from 
simplistic models to complex processes; and from static studies to longitudinal 
investigation of interactional processes. On how the history of resilience research 
has seen a triple enrichment see: Susan Gore and John Eckenrode 1994, 25. On 
the importance of such paradigm shifts for science see: Thomas S. Kuhn 19702, 
and Kopfensteiner 1998, 80-88. 
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focuses on the personal and communal resources on hand. Second, it 
seeks patterns of human coping, constancy and constructing and how 
we might promote them in the interactional context of the individual, 
family and society.4 In this section, I shall concentrate on the insights 
that resilience research offers on human action and development, 
especially concerning human resilience in adversity. 
This chapter outlines key resilience research in the 
psychosocial sciences. It provides a basis for a later dialogue with 
Thomas Aquinas on a renewed understanding of moral agency in 
hardship and difficulty. First, I shall address the resilience perspective, 
its origin, breath and definition, as well as its basic conceptual 
components. While addressing the history and development of the 
concept, I shall identify the principal actors and their respective 
disciplines. This introduction will prepare the interdisciplinary 
dialogue of the next chapters. Second, I shall draw together the input 
that resilience research offers to a virtue-based philosophical 
anthropology. It makes a meta-analysis of resilience findings 
concerning the domains of temperament and emotion, cognitive and 
volitional processes. It likewise examines the social domains of family, 
friends, peers and so on. The next chapters will put these findings into 
dialogue with Aquinas’ treatment of the virtues related to fortitude. 
1.1.1. Origin and Breath of the Resilience Concept 
The reality of human resilience is as old as humanity itself, 
even though its conceptualization in psychosocial sciences dates to the 
1970s. The resilience approach attempts to unearth an aspect of human 
experience that medical and social sciences often have placed solely in 
the context of disease. The search to understand human resilience 
requires a shift in perspective. We must correct research models that 
over-emphasize pathology in order to identify the sources of human 
resilience. We need to look afresh at human experience. 
                                                 
4 Studies on human resilience have focused on interrelated dynamics of life 
that can be identified as individual factors (temperament, age, gender, cultural 
background; including volitional, cognitive and emotional processes); family 
processes (relationships); extrafamiliar processes (concerning peers, extended 
family, workplace, school, and neighborhood). Cf. E. Mavis Hetherington and 
Elaine A. Blechman 1996, viii. 
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Resilience, as a research concept, lies at the juncture of several 
disciplines. It is of special interest for moral theology. It provides the 
basis for dialogue and a further philosophical synthesis. In order to 
understand such a use of resilience, a short history is in order. After 
having laid this foundation, I situate the resilience concept in physical, 
psychosocial and spiritual domains. Then I present the three major 
aspects in human resilience: coping, resisting and constructing. 
1.1.1.1. A Brief History of Resilience: Cultural Origins, and 
Disciplinary Lines 
The human capacities to cope with adversity, resist being 
deformed by hardship and construct further hardiness from the 
experience are as old as humankind. Their thematization, however, is a 
contemporary trend whose early roots are found in Anglo-American 
research on children and families in difficulty. Emmy Werner has been 
described as the mother of resilience, because of her longitudinal study 
of disadvantaged children and youth on the Island of Kauai.5 One of 
the earlier definitions of resilience is that of Norman Garmezy (1976) 
who describes resilient people as having “worked well, played well, 
loved well and expected well.”6 According to M. Rutter (1998), an 
English Child psychiatrist, the mental health sciences have applied the 
concept of resilience progressively in five steps. First, they construe it 
solely as an individual characteristic; what the individual did under 
stress. Second, “resilience” integrates the individual’s interaction with 
the environment, involving also what happened before, during and 
after the stress. Third, certain specialists deem it a balance of good and 
bad experiences. Fourth, in a medical analogy, it is seen as a type of 
immunization, where we attain strengthened health by exposure to 
natural or induced infections. Fifth, researchers recognize that 
psychological challenges and a certain level of stress are useful and 
even necessary for human development; this focus includes emphasis 
on how to aid children weather adversities actively and successfully.7 
                                                 
5 Cf. E. E. Werner and R. S. Smith 1986 and 1992. 
6 N. Garmezy 1976. 
7 Cf. Rutter 1998: 47. 
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The research into resilience has been international and pluri-
disciplinary.8 This brief history of the scientific study of resilience 
should mention the application of the resilience perspective to efforts 
to aid local communities confront their own difficulties, drawing as 
much as possible on local resources. Both developed and developing 
regions benefit from use of the resilience perspective.9 Lastly, 
numerous efforts to popularize the concept have also enriched medical 
and epidemiological models.10 
Next, it can be asked: what disciplines are involved? Who are 
the primary actors? And how do they use the resilience concept? In the 
resilience research done in the human and social sciences, there are at 
least five interrelated models: the genetic model, the personality 
model, the cognitive model, the developmental model, and the human 
relationships model. The genetic model implies the search to 
understand how human personal and social capacities are grounded in 
genetic coding, (as distinguished from the external and internal 
influences of family, society and environment). This approach involves 
sociobiology or evolutionary psychology.11 
The personality model investigates how negative and positive 
outcomes can be attributable to temperamental traits and developed 
characters: e.g. irritability or shyness, sensitivity or adaptability. This 
model draws from psychoanalytical traditions and attachment theory.12 
                                                 
8 There are numerous European (non-Anglo-American) counterparts and a 
host of parallel, preparatory efforts and figures. European figures in resilience 
research include: F. Lösel (Germany), S. Vanistendael (Belgium, Switzerland), 
M. Manciaux (France), B. Cyrulnik (France), M. Tousignant, (Canada), M. 
Perrez (Switzerland), A. Antonovsky (Israel), and so on. Some of the 
predecessors to the resilience include epidemiological efforts, and risk 
calculations (from the insurance industry), which we shall discuss later. 
9 Cf. E. Grotberg 1995. Non-governmental aid agencies like the 
International Catholic Child Bureau, Van Leer Foundation, and so forth. 
10 Cf. S. Vanistendael and Lecomte 2000, B. Cyrulnik 1998, 1999, 2001. 
11 Its actors include: E. O. Wilson 1976 (Sociobiology), Richard Dawkins 
1976 (The Selfish Gene). They hypothesize that evolutionary pressures on the 
natural selection of genes aid their possessors to survive better in given 
environmental histories. 
12 Some of its principal researchers are: John Bowlby 1969, 1973, 1988, 
Mary D. Ainsworth 1978, and Jerome Kagan 1979, 1990, and 1994. Bowlby was 
the first to develop attachment theory, which can be considered a control-systems 
theory of behavior, or an evolutionary-ethological approach. Ainsworth further 
enriched it. 
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The cognitive model, based on developments in cognitive 
psychology, considers emotions as the result of the meaning a person 
attributes to particular interactions with the environment.13 It seeks 
resilience insights based on cognitive resources, linked for example to 
problem-solving capacities. 
The developmental model identifies phase specific reactions to 
developmental challenges over the life span. This approach can be 
found in developmental psychology and developmental 
psychopathology, and is often based on the research of Jean Piaget and 
Lawrence Kohlberg.14 
The social relationships model researches how changes in 
important family, religious and other social relationships either 
contribute to the challenges we face or help us overcome them.15 In the 
pages that follow we shall identify the insights into human resilience 
offered by these five models, drawing from each to the extent that it 
helps us grasp more deeply the role of resilience in human action. 
1.1.1.2. Three Resilience Domains: Physical, Psychosocial, 
and Spiritual 
The disciplines of physics and engineering employ the term 
resilience to refer to a material’s capacity to return to its original form 
after being bent, compressed or stretched.16 For example, after 
                                                 
13 These studies have been mainly conducted by: Arnold 1960; Richard S. 
Lazarus 1968 and 1991; Meinrad Perrez 1994a; Hamilton I. McCubbin and Anne 
I. Thompson, et alia 1998. 
14 Cf. L. Kohlberg, 1971, 1976, 1980; L. Kohlberg, J. Lacrosse and D. 
Ricks, 1972. Its key resilience researchers are: Norman Garmezy 1976, 1994; 
Michael Rutter 1981, 1994; Ann S. Masten 1990; Thomas M. Achenbach 1990; 
Dante Cicchetti 1983 and 1990; Dale F. Hay 1988; Albert F. Osborn 1990; Jon 
Rolf 1990. Viktor Frankl can also be counted among thinkers in a developmental 
perspective. 
15 Its principal researchers include Emmy E. Werner and Ann R. Smith 
1986 and 1992; Arnold J. Sameroff and Ronald Seifer 1993; Michel Tousignant 
1997 and 1998; Clifford Geertz 1968.  
16 This meaning of resilience is the first identified in popular dictionaries. 
For example, Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, (1989) says “1. 
The power or ability to return to the original form, position, etc. after being bent, 
compressed, or stretched; elasticity;” and Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 
“1. The capacity of a strained body to recover its size and shape after deformation 
caused especially by compressive stress.” The Oxford English Dictionary (19892) 
gives it as the second definition: “2. Elasticity; the power of resuming the original 
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compressing an iron bar either it returns to its original shape or it does 
not. The iron bar’s resilience is its quality to flex under pressure, and 
return to its original form.17 When the stress exceeds the iron bar’s 
elastic limit, however, the bar remains bent; its resilience capacity was 
surpassed. Furthermore, a certain type of pressure has a “steeling” 
effect on metal.18 Stretching or heating hardens metal. In sum, the 
literal sense of resilience refers both to a material’s quality to resist 
deformation and to be strengthened through contact with certain type 
of stress.19 
The human sciences20 employ the concept of resilience to 
describe the physiological and psychosocial resources for facing 
personal and communal challenges.21 This second type of resilience has 
three aspects:22 (1) good outcomes despite actual risk, (2) resistance to 
                                                                                                          
shape or position after compression, bending, etc.; spec. the energy per unit 
volume absorbed by a material when it is subjected to strain, or the maximum 
value of this when the elastic limit is not exceeded.” It gives the following 
formula: “resilience per cubic inch in direct tension or compression may be 
expressed in the form f2/2E, where f is the intensity of stress induced and E is the 
modulus of elasticity” (J. A. Cormack, Definitions Strength of materials 1965, 
iii:67). 
17 Metal might nonetheless analogously have a “memory” of its minor past 
stresses (cf. metal fatigue and aging; or entropy—the dissipation of energy). If it 
did have a memory, metal would then be an even more helpful illustration in 
what follows concerning the human psychosocial application of the resilience 
concept. 
18 The “steeling” image of resilience has been employed by Anthony 1987, 
180; Felsman and Valliant 1987, 305 (who quote studies done on children of 
schizophrenics by Bleuler 1978); Rutter 1994b, 354. 
19 It should be noted that the term “resilient” has Latin roots meaning “to 
jump, leap or bounce back”: resiliens, resilire, re- salire. 
20 According to the perspective of M. Radke-Yarrow there are three levels 
to successful coping (or resilience) behaviors. 1. Biological level: “contribute to 
one’s chances of physical survival and health, and the continuation of the 
species.” 2. Social level: “contribute to the survival and well-being of others.” 3. 
Psychological level: “contribute to the well-being of one’s self” (Marian Radke-
Yarrow and Tracy Sherman 1990, 100). Rutter says that in order to understand 
the processes involved in stress and coping three complementary levels—social, 
psychological, and neuro-chemical—need to be addressed (cf. Michael Rutter 
1994b, 356). 
21 Werner and Smith (1986) did a longitudinal study of disadvantaged 
youths on the Island of Kauai. F. Lösel et al. (1990) conducted their study in 
Germany. 
22 Concerning this second level of meaning, Webster’s Encyclopedic 
Unabridged Dictionary, (1989) says “2. ability to recover readily from illness, 
depression, adversity or the like; buoyancy;” and Webster’s New Collegiate 
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destruction and (3) positive construction.23 It is possible not only to 
resist the disordering of the integrity and skills of a human person, 
family or community; but also to achieve a new kind of competency, 
turning the negative experience into an opportunity for positive 
growth. The psychosocial sciences observe a resilience-effect rooted in 
human physiological and psychosocial capacities; they attempt to 
identify the various internal and external (personal and communal) 
factors, mechanisms or processes that strengthen or weaken the 
resilience effect.24 This second level of physiological and psychosocial 
resilience is of a different nature than the first. It is organic and 
psychic. For example, at the biological level, muscles not only perform 
physical labor, but also resist self-disintegration and become stronger 
through the effort.25 At cognitive, volitional and emotional levels, 
likewise, we overcome challenges by solving a particular problem, as 
well as by resisting personal and social de-structuring. We gain 
                                                                                                          
Dictionary, “2. An ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or 
change.” The Oxford English Dictionary (19892) gives it as the third one: “3. fig. 
Of persons, their minds, etc.: Rising readily again after being depressed; hence 
cheerful, buoyant, exuberant.” 
23 F. Lösel (1992, 8) identifies three resilience phenomena, from a 
developmental psychopathology perspective, resilience “refers to: (1) good 
outcomes despite high-risk status, for example, overcoming cumulated stressors 
and strains; (2) sustaining competence under threat, for example, effective coping 
with divorce; and (3) recovering from trauma, for example, child abuse. All three 
phenomena may be present simultaneously in cases with multi-level problems.” 
Cf. A. S. Masten, K. M. Best and N. Garmezy 1990, 2:425-444. 
24 Rutter (1994b, 373-4) has identified an extended range of possible 
mechanisms: “(1) possible neural effects, as are evident in studies of visual 
deprivation in infancy (Blakemore, 1991); (2) neuroendocrine effects as have 
been shown in animal studies of acute physical stress (Hennessy and Levine, 
1979); and (3) linkages by which one form of adversity predisposes to another 
(Quinton and Rutter, 1988) (4) cognitive variables such as self-esteem, self-
efficacy, and internal working models of relationships (Bretherton, 1987, Harter, 
1983; Rutter and Rutter 1993). Certainly it is clear that all of us think about the 
experiences that we undergo and develop mental sets about them. It is quite 
plausible that these cognitive sets play a major role in the carry forward of 
experiences.” (cf. Rutter 1994b, 356; Garmezy and Masten 1994; Clark and 
Clark 1992). In this regard, Wilson and Gottman (1996, 204) hold that the 
underlying physiological processes (like those important for attention—the vagal 
process and cardiovascular reactivity) are malleable and strongly influenced by 
the environment and family. 
25 Muscle growth also depends on the organism’s overall health, which 
requires proper nutrition and rest and so forth, as well as freedom from 
oppressive circumstances. 
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something from the effort as well; we acquire understanding, problem-
solving skills, self-confidence and so forth. 
A third type of resilience depends on spiritual resources. It 
metaphorically extends and transcends the original literal meaning of 
resilience, as well as its physiological and psychosocial insights. At the 
philosophical and theological levels, we employ skills, resist 
destruction and positively construct in the face of difficulty. In order to 
understand spiritual resilience though, we must employ different 
methods of analysis. Indeed, we need to explore deeper levels of 
personal experience, relational assistance and divine support. However, 
we can confuse the meaning and extent of insights drawn from 
different levels. These disciplines have different scopes and foci. The 
carry over of insights from the physiological and psychosocial sciences 
demands that we consider the limits and tentative nature of their 
research. In order to discern and appropriate their spiritual 
significance, we must evaluate an insight’s import, based upon a 
philosophical anthropology. The difficulties of observing and 
evaluating spiritual resilience though should not deter us from seeking 
to understand it. 
1.1.1.3. Three Aspects of Resilience: Coping, Resisting and 
Constructing 
A resilient act is a whole. It is not however understood without 
analyzing its three facets: coping, resisting and constructing. In the rest 
of this section, I shall analyze descriptions and definitions of resilience 
found in the scientific literature. My goals are two in number. First I 
would like to illustrate the three dimensions of resilience: good 
outcomes despite risk, human resistance to destruction and positive 
construction. The contrary dimensions involve risk, stress and 
vulnerability. These facets and elements are ambiguous when taken 
outside of a personal and social whole, which leads to the second aim: 
to establish a composite definition that includes the physiological, 
psychosocial and spiritual resilience of individuals and communities. 
N. Garmezy’s early description of resilient people, as having “worked 
well, played well, loved well and expected well,”26 sets a positive goal 
                                                 
26 N. Garmezy 1976. 
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for human living and dying. It gives wide parameters for understanding 
resilience research. The general and vague breath of this definition 
makes it only a starting point. Nevertheless, it enables us to establish 
the basic meaning of resilience as “doing well in adversity.” I shall 
formulate a more composite definition after exposing the resilience 
perspective and research. 
Most researchers construe resilience as the individual and 
social capacity to cope positively with stress and adversity, as a good 
outcome despite risks and stress. The resilience-pioneers Werner and 
Smith describe resilience as follows: it is the “capacity to cope 
effectively with the internal stresses of vulnerabilities (such as unstable 
patterns of autonomic reactivity, developmental imbalances, unusual 
sensitivities) and external stresses (such as illness, major losses, and 
dissolution of the family).”27 Psychology often interprets coping as 
successful behavioral adaptation. Masten et al. say: “Resilience refers 
to the process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful adaptation 
despite challenging or threatening circumstances. Psychological 
resilience is concerned with behavioral adaptation, usually defined in 
terms of internal states of well-being or effective functioning in the 
environment or both.”28 Some researchers describe resilience as a 
                                                 
27 Werner and Smith 1986, 4. M. Rutter (1990: 181) uses the notion of 
resilience “to describe the positive pole of the ubiquitous phenomenon of 
individual difference in people’s responses to stress and adversity.” 
28 Masten, Best and Garmezy 1990, 426. There are also other researchers, 
in studies grounded in a meticulous study of strengths and weaknesses, express 
optimistic views about the human capacity for change and adaptation. Pilling 
(1992, 88) says, “there is always the possibility of an individual change, 
improving in intellectual and personality characteristics.” On the more cautious 
side, Rutter (1994b, 356) says that while it used to be assumed that “because 
negative life events provoked or precipitated the onset of psychiatric disorder, 
they necessarily involved an increase in developmental discontinuities. It is now 
clear that this assumption is unwarranted. The biological “norm” is neither 
continuity nor discontinuity, neither change nor stability (Rutter, 1994a). Both are 
expected and both require explanation. Depending on circumstances, negative 
life experiences may either accentuate preexisting psychological characteristics, 
be they adaptive or maladaptive, or alter them. However, the former is more 
common than the latter (Caspi and Moffit, 1993).” Likewise according to 
Sameroff and Seifer (1990, 52), developmental psychopathology assumes neither 
continuity (as does developmental psychology) nor discontinuity (as do the 
clinical psychiatrists). Rather, developmental psychopathology is “concerned 
centrally with both the connections and lack of connections between normality 
and disorder.” 
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“generally resourceful” composite of characteristics.29 Others speak of 
a sense of coherence,30 manifest social competence, the integration of 
cognitive, affective and behavioral levels,31 or more simply as an active 
attempt to manage stress.32 In spite of various disciplinary accents, 
coping is a universal resilience characteristic. 
Second, resilience defies destructive pressures. It protects our 
health and skills. It resists ruptures to basic relationships. It does more 
than simply maintain our integrity, as if it were a static object. Indeed 
when we call upon our skills and resources in adversity, we must not 
exceed the limits of our health and strength. We need to maintain 
equilibrium, reestablish it, or find a new one. Rutter thus defines 
resilience as: “the phenomenon of maintaining adaptive functioning in 
spite of serious risk hazards.”33 This aspect of resilience does not 
promote an illusion of invincibility. It does not construe resilience as 
an extreme competence or limit it to exceptional achievements. 
Instead, it underlines how we avoid failure or pathology,34 and how we 
minimize or prevent negative outcomes.35 
                                                 
29 Radke-Yarrow (1990, 99) for example says: “to show more ‘umweg’ 
[roundabout] solutions when faced with a barrier, to be able to maintain 
integrated performance under stress, to be able to process simultaneously two or 
more competing stimuli, to be able to resist sets or illusions, to be able to both 
‘regress in the service of the ego’ when task requirements favor such a form of 
adaptation and, conversely, to be able to become adaptively obsessive and even 
compulsive under certain other environmental presses.” They attribute the origin 
of the notion of resilience to Lewinian, Wernerian, Murphian and psychoanalytic 
concepts. Cf. Block and Block 1973, 5. 
30 According to A. Antonovsky (1998a, 8), the “sense of coherence” 
construct distills the core of coping and resistance resources, which are based on 
one’s sense of comprehensibility (ability to understand situations in life), 
manageability (capacity to manage demands), and meaningfulness (ability to find 
meaning in life). Cf. McCubbin et al. 1998. 
31 According to the Consortium on the School-based Promotion of Social 
Competence (1994, 275), “social competence [also] involves the capacity to 
integrate cognition, affect, and behavior to achieve specific social tasks and 
positive development outcomes. It comprises a set of core skills, attitudes, 
abilities, and feelings given functional meaning by the contexts of culture, 
neighborhood, and situation. Thus, social competence can be viewed in terms of 
‘life skills for adaptation to diverse ecologies and settings.’” Cf. Masten, Best and 
Garmezy 1990, 236-256. 
32 Cf. F. Lösel 1994, 9. 
33 M. Rutter 1990, 209. 
34 Albert F. Osborn (1990, 62:24) rightly points out the importance of 
definitions: “Decisions about the definition of competence can also result in a 
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Third, resilience describes how strengths, resources and skills 
not only enable us to cope with hardship or to defy ruin, but also to 
adapt positively in hardship. Resilience involves not only holding the 
line, but also making headway. Garmezy notes “the actualizing power 
of stressful experiences via the ameliorating force of identifiable 
‘protective factors.’”36 He describes them as patterns of both positive 
potential and adaptive outcomes. They involve increased fitness and 
vigor. For Cowan et al., resilience describes: “the idea that some 
individuals or families possess physiological strengths, psychological 
resourcefulness, and interpersonal skills that enable them to respond 
successfully to major challenges and to grow from the experience.”37 
Bloom discusses growth-producing experiences in the midst of stress, 
and resilience as a balance of strength and stress.38 Especially in the 
developmental perspective, researchers note that resilience is not a 
fixed attribute; indeed changes in circumstances and risks alter our 
resilience.39 Murphy nonetheless describes it as a type of learned 
                                                                                                          
different concept of resilience if the focus is on avoidance of failure rather than 
the achievement of an exceptional level of success. When competence is defined 
in terms of avoidance of failure, it is usually the case that a greater proportion of 
vulnerable children, with respect to a given pathology, are resilient than actually 
develop the pathology.” I believe that most resilience studies have a wider notion 
of resilience, conceived as the capacity to avoid failure and pathology, or build 
something positive in spite of the adversity. Resilience is needlessly restricted if 
focused either on success in face of exceptional difficulties (addicted, psychotic 
or depressed parents, survivors of war, genocide, concentration camps, the 
abandoned and orphaned), or on those who have achieved an exceptional level of 
success. 
35 According to E. Grotberg (1995, 7), “Resilience is a universal capacity 
which allows a person, group or community to prevent, minimize or overcome 
the damaging effects of adversity.” 
36 Cf. N. Garmezy 1994, 10. 
37 Philip A. Cowan, Carolyn Pape Cowan and Marc S. Schulz 1996, 14-15. 
38 According to Martin Bloom (1996: 98) resilience finds important roots in 
the concept of strens and in the salutogenic perspective: “Many years ago, 
Hollister (1967, 197) introduced the terms strens to mean growth-producing 
experiences. It was a term that was intended to be parallel to the concept of stress. 
Poser and King (1975) introduced the term salutogenesis. Both these terms refer 
to the same important phenomenon, that there exist in nature and society many 
growth-promoting experiences, some of which may be intentionally introduced to 
target groups. [...] Resilient children may be hypothesized to have more strens 
than stresses. There needs to be a balance between strens and stresses.” Werner 
and Smith (1986, 136) and M. Rutter (1998: 47) also use this image of balance. 
39 As Michael Rutter (1990 183; cf. 184) specifically points out, “resilience 
is concerned with individual variations in response to risk factors.” 
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optimism about our capacity to manage problems and turn the bad 
experiences into something good.40 Individual differences draw 
attention to how we develop resilience in the midst of suffering and 
adversity.41 This facet of resilience highlights the steeling effect of 
trials that render us more able to master life’s challenges. 
1.1.2. Risk, Stress, and Vulnerability versus Protection, 
Coping and Buffering 
Although some humans do well despite their at-risk status, 
resilience is not absolute. No one is simply resilient. Resilience 
researchers seek to explain why some humans neither acquire disorders 
nor under-develop when faced with a common threat. This approach 
draws upon but outstrips an epidemiological focus on risk, stress and 
vulnerability. The resilience perspective considers specific challenges 
that humans have mastered, the actual context of their stress and 
protection, as well as their personally or socially accumulated 
vulnerability and protection (buffering). We need to address the 
contrasting concepts of risk and protection, stress and coping, 
vulnerability and buffering in order to explain departures from 
epidemiological-oriented statistical calculations. I shall briefly 
investigate these concepts here, but wait to expand the notions of 
causality, health and development until the next chapter. 
1.1.2.1. Risk and Specific Outcomes 
Risk research finds its roots in epidemiology, as well as in the 
calculations of commerce and insurance.42 Epidemiological studies of 
risk originally attempted to document health and disease patterns and 
the factors associated with them. Who gets sick, who does not, and 
                                                 
40 L. Murphy (1987, 104) quotes one of her subjects, Helen (age 10) as 
saying: “Bad things can turn into good things.” 
41 Although certain resilience qualities might be based on or closely 
connected with predispositions, other related skills and qualities are lost or 
acquired, diminished or bettered. As Wills et alia (1996, 108) say: “resiliency 
effects are based on the development of coping skills among children.” Cf. F. 
Lösel 1994, 9. 
42 In the eighteenth century, merchants’ efforts to determine the risk of 
losing their cargo at sea gave birth to the insurance industry (cf. Cowan et alia, 
1996, 2-3). 
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why? The question of “why” addresses issues of causality, originally 
the causes of mortality and physical disease. Researchers had to adapt 
the meaning and measure of causality and risk when they applied these 
concepts to mental health and illness.43 From dichotomous definitions 
of risk—the ship returned to port or it did not; people developed 
typhoid or they did not—investigators have concerned themselves with 
a wider notion of outcomes: not merely the presence or absence of 
disease, but also issues of a disorder’s duration, and the number and 
severity of symptoms. 
Psychosocial approaches have construed risk to involve both 
individual and social hazards, which increase negative developmental 
outcomes. Risk researchers identify factors that accentuate or inhibit 
disease and deficiency states. They also examine the underlying 
processes.44 They observe that risks predispose individuals and groups 
to specific negative outcomes.45 M. Rutter nonetheless resists a 
                                                 
43 According to Musick et al. (1987, 230) in psychiatry, the term “‘risk’ 
denotes a statistical concept indicating that a child of a parent with a major 
psychiatric disorder (e.g. manic-depressive illness or schizophrenia) has a greater 
probability of subsequently developing mental disorder than the child of a well 
parent. For example, 10-15% of the offspring of schizophrenic parents become 
schizophrenic, while 30-35% have some form of emotional disturbance.” 
44 The study of risk identifies factors, processes and mechanisms that both 
accentuate and inhibit disease and deficiency states, and their related underlying 
processes. In a perspective of prevention, this research has become bipolar: on the 
one hand, seeking to identify what accentuates disease and disorder, i.e. 
vulnerability; and on the other hand, seeking the risks that may be overcome and 
even lead to positive adaptive behavior, i.e. resilience. Cf. Garmezy 1994, 9; cf. 
9-12; Werner and Smith 1992, 3. 
According to Garmezy (1994, 9-10), risk research has embraced a wide 
range of studies “emphasizing potential biological and behavioral precursors; 
personality predispositions of both positive and negative attributes, including 
genetic and environmental predisposing factors; the actualizing power of stressful 
experiences via the ameliorating force of identifiable ‘protective factors’; the 
study of coping patterns, including their origins and developmental and 
situational contexts; and the evaluation of outcomes ranging from signs of severe 
biobehavioral and social deficits to patterns of resilience and adaptation amid 
disadvantage.” 
Researchers have identified specific risks, for example, in the case of 
adolescent drug use and other forms of antisocial behavior: “physiological 
factors, early and persistent conduct problems, alienation and rebelliousness, 
attitudes favorable to drug use or crime, and early onset of drug use or crime” 
(Consortium 1994, 271). 
45 According to Cowan et al. (1996, 9): “Risks predispose individuals and 
populations (identifiable groups of people) to specific negative or undesirable 
 
24 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
simplistic outlook. He observes that risks also involve the opportunity 
to overcome the difficulty and to develop adaptive behaviors.46 Rutter 
argues first that risk factors do not produce a direct result; and second 
that they do not have the same high rate of effect when one factor is 
present alone, as when two or more risk variables operate together.47 
Risk is risk for a specific outcome, and a particular risk can be 
defined only in terms of an outcome. Rutter illustrates that the same 
variable functions differently in dissimilar circumstances. For example, 
shyness may be a risk for depression, but neutral concerning academic 
achievement, and protective in regards aggression and delinquency. 
Thus we should not define shyness as a risk in abstraction; it is only a 
risk for depression. In general, “at risk” children or adults are not 
simply at risk, they are at risk for something.48 Further studies suggest 
that strategies that work for one high-risk group will not necessarily 
work for a low-risk group. For example, family policies of 
restrictiveness tend to function successfully in homes when there are 
patent risks that are understood by both parents and children.49 On the 
contrary, restrictiveness is not operative as pervasively in successful 
families that are in low-risk situations. 
Researchers often correlate risk with stress or stressors. 
According to Norman Garmezy and Ann Masten, the presence of a 
stress stimulus event modifies our equilibrium; it has 
neuropsychological, cognitive and emotional consequences, which can 
                                                                                                          
outcomes.” Concerning the statistical measuring of risk, he states: “The 
magnitude of risk is measured as the probability of a specific negative outcome in 
a population when the risk is present, compared with the probability when it is 
absent, or as a correlation between risk and outcomes measured as continuous 
rather than categorical variables.” 
46 Cf. N. Garmezy 1994, 9-12. 
47 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 184; and 1979a. D. Pilling (1992, 95) has found that 
we experience more difficultly to manage or to escape from multiple risks or 
disadvantages. According to Felsman and Valliant, (1987, 307), “it is the 
multiplicity of stress factors that most determines a child’s psychiatric risk. With 
only one major stress factor present (even if chronic), a child’s psychiatric risk 
remained at the same level as that of the control group. However, with two or 
three stress factors operating simultaneously, the level of psychiatric risk 
increased fourfold.” 
48 In this perspective, “risk is not an accumulation of life stressors in which 
negative life events are associated with any manner of diseases or disorders” 
(Cowan, Cowan and Schulz 1996,10). 
49 Cf. Baldwin, et al. 1990, 277-9. 
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disrupt our adaptation.50 Although the danger of such a disruption to a 
person’s adaptation can hinder his development, it can also promote 
development. Indeed in the midst of crisis, we find opportunity as well 
as danger.51 This ambiguity—the negative and positive potential of 
stress—complicates research efforts. Stress in general is difficult to 
quantify, contextual stress even more so, and stress-related opportunity 
the most.52 Stress and risk studies nonetheless provide a basis for 
promoting health and resilience. They contrast positive targets for 
educative and social interventions. For example, better knowledge of 
adolescent problem behavior identifies one hurdle to overcome on the 
way to promoting health.53 Furthermore, as we shall see, some research 
                                                 
50 Cf. Garmezy and Masten 1990, 462-3; cited in Yule 1992, 190. 
51 Ernst Kris’s (1950) discussion of “optimal stress” highlights “the notion 
that stress can promote as well as hinder development. The two-part Chinese 
symbol of ‘crisis’ is represented by ‘danger’ and ‘opportunity,’ suggesting that 
recovery from the threat of defeat and resignation can deepen an individual’s 
wisdom and resolve” (cited in Felsman and Valliant 1987, 307). But at the same 
time, other researchers consider that in ordinary circumstances “stress” leads to 
maladaptive outcomes (cf. M. Rutter 1990, 185; Werner and Smith 1992, 5). 
52 Empirical researchers continue to struggle with problems of 
conceptualization and measurement as well as the generation of empirically-
based models for “contextual stress.” Pianta et alia (1990, 231-3) claim that 
researchers should not consider stress as a “nonspecific entity subsuming any and 
all experiences requiring coping or adaptation,” which would lead to 
heterogeneous measures of stress (total scores). Stressors in any given 
populations overlap and share variance among each other. For example, 
significant relations exist between specific stressors such as family violence and 
chemical dependence. An alternative approach identifies the rational relations 
between types of stressors, giving more specific, gender-related outcomes. More 
lucid specification of stressors “can assist in a clearer conceptualization of the 
processes underlying the predictive relation by identifying a class of events that 
could meaningfully fit into existing theories of development in a way in which 
general, nonspecific notions of stress cannot.” 
53 Social-psychological theory (Bandura 1977; Jessor and Jessor 1977) and 
etiological research on adolescent problem behavior (Perry and Kelder 1992) 
have suggested “three levels of social-psychological risk factors that serve as the 
targets of intervention. These include environmental risk factors (such as role 
models, norms, opportunities, and social support), individual risk factors (such as 
levels of knowledge, values, self-efficacy, and functional meanings), and 
behavioral risk factors (such as social skills, intentions, existing repertoire, and 
reinforcements). The creative modification of these risk factors provides the basis 
for the content of health promotion programs” (Consortium 1994, 297). For 
example, the impact of risk can be reduced by changing its meaning, as when a 
child who has been prepared for a hospital stay can reduce the felt stress in 
evaluating the situation differently (cf. Cowan, Cowan and Schulz 1996, 33; 
Lazurus 1991; Lazarus and Folkman 1984). 
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has gone beyond the original conceptions of risk as individual 
adaptation to analyze family adaptation. 
1.1.2.2. A Continuum of Vulnerability? 
The notion of vulnerability complements that of risk. It does 
not constitute a statistical analysis of risk indicators, but rather an 
underlying process that functions only in the presence of a stressor.54 It 
increases the probability of negative outcome and becomes apparent 
only under the influence of a specific risk.55 But the result is not 
determined beforehand. The study of vulnerabilities leads to questions 
like: How can we decrease susceptibility to risk? How can we promote 
development and resources that diminish vulnerability?56 
Resilience researchers have defined vulnerability as: “an 
individual’s susceptibility to a disorder;”57 “an amplifier of the 
probability of negative outcomes in the presence of risk.” 
Vulnerabilities are of internal or external sorts.58 Inner vulnerabilities 
include: genetic predispositions or constitutional factors, as well as 
conditions such as low self-esteem and depression. External conditions 
include: ineffective parenting, socio-environmental hazards, as well as 
the internal frailties of those in the surrounding. Vulnerability accounts 
for how the negative effects of some variables are only precipitated by 
a degree of risk. 
                                                 
54 Furthermore, investigations of risk and vulnerability have developed 
from tending to focus on attentional and cognitive capacities, to notions of 
competence, including developmentally appropriate measures of childhood 
adjustment, interactive behavior and motivation for learning (cf. Musick et al. 
1987, 230-1; Anthony 1974; Garmezy 1974). 
55 According to Cowan, Cowan and Schulz (1996, 11; cf. 14), “In the 
statistical language of analysis of variance, the influence of a risk is a main effect, 
whereas the influence of a vulnerability depends on an interaction with another 
variable—it makes a difference to outcomes only at high levels of risk.” Werner 
and Smith (1992) say that “vulnerability ‘denotes an individual’s susceptibility to 
a disorder,’ while risk factors are ‘biological or psychological hazards that 
increase the likelihood of a negative developmental outcome in a group of 
people.” 
56 Cf. Petit et alia 1996, 3044. 
57 Werner and Smith 1992. 
58 Cowan, Cowan and Schulz 1996, 14. According to Rutter (1994b, 373), 
vulnerability can also take the form of a persistence of psychopathological effect. 
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Vulnerabilities spell creative potential as well. On the one 
hand, vulnerability can spell the occasion for positive growth. When 
we overcome risks or crises, we develop a further strength and reduce 
future vulnerability. On the other, what has been a resource can 
become a vulnerability, when pressed too far or developed in 
extremis.59 For example, a premature child’s capacity to support pain 
can lead to not resisting dangerous limits. 
Vulnerability can be understood as a non-static continuum. It 
is the opposite pole of protection,60 rather than of invulnerability. 
During the mid 1970s, the language of “vulnerability” gave rise to that 
of “invulnerability” and even of “invincibility” to describe children 
who had managed to achieve emotional health and high competence 
despite adversity and stress.61 These terms however were abandoned 
for the more relational concepts of resilience and stress-resistance.62 
Most people perform with a checkerboard of weaknesses and strengths. 
To view vulnerability and protection as a continuous dimension of 
behavior displays their extension to cognitive, volitional and emotive 
phenomena. This perspective is more suggestive than viewing them as 
                                                 
59 A psychodynamics perspective accents these personal interactions in a 
complex system of relationships. Vulnerability is thus conceived as a lack of 
adaptation and flexibility in the passage from one system to another, from one 
relationship to another. The opposite of this vulnerability is the healthy flexibility 
of psychic functioning, which permits an active attitude of adaptation (cf. Petit et 
alia, 1996, 3045-6). 
60 According to M. Rutter (1990 185), “It will be appreciated that in this 
regard vulnerability and protection are the negative and positive poles of the same 
concept, not different concepts” Cf. Murphy and Moriarty 1976, 202-203. 
61 Anthony (1974) describes his attraction to “invulnerability” as two fold. 
First, since “‘invulnerability’ makes the point of psychological invincibility much 
more strikingly than the term resilience” (Anthony and Cohler 1987, xi). Second, 
because “the ideal of invulnerability, like the idea of immortality, has haunted the 
human race through many and varied interpretations of mysteries appertaining to 
origin and extinction, to the relationship of the natural to the supernatural order, 
and to the apparent immunity from the disasters of illness and injury granted to 
certain individuals” (Anthony 1987 41-2). He gives the examples of the Greek 
heroes Achilles and Hercules; Scandinavian god Balder; Indian man-god 
Krishna. 
62 As M. Rutter (1985) notes, this phenomenon is relative and not as 
absolute as the terms invulnerable or invincible would lead one to believe. The 
degrees of resistance vary over time and in accordance with circumstances and 
are both personal (constitutional) and social (environmental). Cf. Werner and 
Smith 1992, 4; Luther and Zigler 1991; Masten and Garmezy 1985; Werner and 
Smith 1982. 
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threshold phenomena. For a threshold perspective would mean that we 
expect either a massive breakdown in the individual’s behavior from 
confronting a certain level of stress, or stable perfection if it is 
overcome. Such threshold cutoffs are unstable grounds for judging 
what is healthy or acceptable, according to Radke-Yarrow.63 However, 
a continuum perspective on behavior entails that we move 
developmentally between more and less successful adaptations to 
stress. 
1.1.2.3. Protection, Coping and Buffering 
The triad—protection, coping and buffering—offers 
counterparts to risk, stress and vulnerability. Protective mechanisms 
modify our responses to stressful situations. Risk and vulnerability 
produce new limitations to internal equilibrium, social integration and 
life-goals. They provoke obstacles to learning and expectations of 
negative outcomes. For example, when we fail to overcome a risk 
environment, we develop blockages to adaptation, learning and hope.64 
Yet, protective processes, like a catalyst, modify our responses to risk; 
they counter the risk, or change our life path toward adaptation.65 
Protection in general is more than a passive or defensive idea. 
It involves proactively employing our skills and stretching them in new 
applications. Research suggests that prevention-mediating processes 
reduce the impact of risk and negative chain reactions; they promote 
self-efficacy and self-esteem, and initiate new opportunities.66 First, we 
can reduce risk by altering the risk itself. For example, we can 
neutralize a threat to our self-image through humor. We can alter its 
impact by putting distance between the bad situation and ourselves. 
Sometimes though, we must confront the source of risk. Second, in 
                                                 
63 Radke-Yarrow (1990, 98) explains that “when investigation involves a 
search for mechanisms or processes, threshold models lose a tremendous richness 
of information and may conceal as much as or more than they reveal.” Cf. S. 
Gore and J. Eckenrode 1994, 55-6. 
64 Cf. Murphy and Moriarty 1976, 202-203. 
65 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 209. 
66 According to M. Rutter (1994b, 373), resilience entails changing, 
overcoming or getting out of the situation, rather than becoming simply 
accustomed to it. We acquire resilience through planning, good school experience 
and success, which can all give the sentiment of personal efficacy and capacity. 
Cf. N. Garmezy 1985. 
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similar ways we can reduce negative chain reactions, such as vicious 
circles of coercive or anxiety-producing exchanges. Third, we can 
maintain self-esteem and self-efficacy through supportive personal 
relationships and successful task accomplishment. Finally, the way in 
which we handle the key turning points in life can reduce a risk 
trajectory to a more adaptive path.67 
Protection pertains to an individual’s genetic temperament, 
acquired character, communal support, and the interaction between all 
three. The developmental psychologists Chess and Thomas analyze 
protective interactions in terms of “fit.” Goodness of fit entails the 
compatibility of an individual’s temperament, character and abilities 
with the demands and expectations of the social environment. Such a 
fit should lead to “healthy development and resiliency.” Poorness of 
fit, however, involves that these demands and expectations are 
excessive or incompatible with the individual’s resources. A stress-
producing fit can jeopardize our healthy development. We can 
nonetheless increase or reduce fit through felicitous or infelicitous 
interventions, of both external and internal sorts.68 
Coping and adaptation are key aspects of resilience. A more 
detailed typology of coping operations completes the definition 
previously provided. First, Perrez and Reicherts identify three coping 
orientations: situational, representational and evaluational.69 Situation-
oriented coping involves a person’s response to the stress-inducing 
situation itself (by changing it, fleeing it or putting up with it). 
Representation-oriented coping concerns the person’s relationship to 
information about the situation, whereby the individual either seeks or 
suppresses pertinent information. Lastly, evaluation-oriented coping 
                                                 
67 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 203-10 and 1989; Maughan 1988, 214; Werner and 
Smith 1992, 5. There are also studies that establish a conceptual and empirical 
foundation for preventive intervention programs and prevention science. Cf. 
Coie, et alia 1993, 1013-1022. For pedagogical insights see: B. Hamburg 1990. 
For evaluations of training programs see Masten et al. 1990, 251-3; Grotberg 
1995. 
68 Chess and Thomas (1992, 73) give the following examples of change of 
fit: parent guidance, unpredictable adventitious influences (death of parent), 
emotional distancing (in the wake of unhealthy parent-offspring interaction), self-
insight (anger control). They also note that a similar concept is “match / 
mismatch,” which is found in other developmental psychologists. 
69 Cf. Perrez and Reicherts (1992: 29). 
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entails reevaluating one’s goals or one’s initial judgment of the 
situation. These specialists evaluate the adaptive adequacy of these 
coping processes in terms of: (1) how realistically the individual 
perceives the relevant stressor factors; (2) how adequately he or she 
converts these perceptions into effective coping practices; (3) how 
available are appropriate instrumental beliefs or “behavior rules;” and 
(4) how effective is the coping practice in the short-term, and what is 
its long-term relationship to well-being.70 This evaluation of coping 
should recognize its social dimension. As Werner and Smith assent, 
optimal adaptive development entails a balance between a people’s 
capacities and their influences on the social environment.71 This 
balance is dynamic: if families that adapt their behavior to cope with 
disadvantaged circumstances are not able to change their aspirations 
quickly when circumstances change, they will not be able to seize new 
opportunities.72 
Specialists also describe resilience in terms of competency. 
Resilience competencies are multivalent. They involve personal and 
social levels, as well as internal and external foci. On the personal 
level, emotional competencies engage a person’s ability to express and 
regulate his or her emotions. This ability is present at birth,73 but must 
develop throughout an individual’s emotional history. This 
development always occurs in the context of family and friends, social 
standards and cultural practices.74 Volitional resilience competencies 
involve attentional processes, self-efficacy, self-worth, an internal 
locus of control, as well as guarding or re-establishing emotional 
homeostasis and serving higher goals.75 Intellectual resilience 
                                                 
70 They also give examples of adequate and inadequate coping behavior; 
the former of which includes: (1) palliation of strong emotions; (2) active 
influence on stressors perceived as controllable; (3) reevaluation of the stressor, 
or evasion when possible, if the stressor is uncontrollable. Cf. Perrez and 
Reicherts 1992, 35. 
71 Cf. Werner and Smith 1986, 136. 
72 Cf. D. Pillings 1992. 
73 Cf. K. Durkin 1995, 296, 256, 315. 
74 On the related cognitive factors, see: Consortium 1994, 276; Clarke and 
Clarke 1992, 153. For the 
75 Cf. F. Lösel 1994, 9; M. Rutter 1990, 206; Werner and Smith 1986, 59. 
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competencies involve problem-solving capacities, especially being 
able to handle cognitive complexities, as we shall later see.76 
On the social level, pro-social support systems reinforce 
personal skills.77 First, our sense of well-being and satisfaction with 
family life underlie coping competencies.78 Second, emotional and 
cognitive supports from others aid our efforts to manage stress and 
difficulty. They serve to establish and practice social skills; they also 
compensate for deficits when they provide role models and cooperate 
in coping activities.79 
1.1.2.4. Positive Stress and Stress Buffering 
To define resilience in terms of those who thrive on stress is an 
exaggeration. Even though some humans display resilient ways to face 
stress, not all stresses are the same nor are all forms of stress 
management. “Good stress” mobilizes and motivates people. Good 
stress and bad stress are two distinct neurological happenings. The 
brain functions differently when stress presents a positive challenge, 
versus when it involves an overwhelming or demoralizing threat. The 
two kinds of stress parallel the operation of two distinct biological 
systems. When faced with good stress, the brain chemistry generates 
enthusiasm for a challenge. It produces a level of catecholamines, 
adrenaline and noradrenaline that is proper for concentration and 
action. Good stress even promotes a sort of peak performance, which 
D. Goleman describes as “a balance point when the sympathetic 
nervous system is pumping (but not too much), our mood is positive, 
and our ability to think and react is optimal.”80 
Bad stress, however, triggers a different neuro-chemical 
response (cortisol). The amygdala, the brain’s alarm, signals the alert. 
A lack in the prefrontal inhibitory circuitry means we let impulses run 
free. In this case, resilience demands that we reestablish balance 
                                                 
76 Cf. H. Reich 1995. Significant intellectual capacities include: 
observation-analysis, memory and judgment-discernment. 
77 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 182; 189-202; N. Garmezy 1985. 
78 Cf. M. Perrez 1994b, 11. 
79 Cf. Clarke and Clarke 1993, 149; F. Lösel 1994, 9; M. Tousignant 1998, 
67. 
80 D. Goleman 1998, 89; who cites Salvatore R. Maddi and Suzanne C. 
Kobasa 1984. 
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between the opposing neural systems that initiate action and those that 
inhibit it. Stress resilient and stress vulnerable people coordinate 
differently these two counter-poised tendencies.81 Brain imaging 
research demonstrates that resilient individual’s start to inhibit the 
distress during the initial stressful event. By inhibiting the amygdala’s 
alert, the prefrontal lobes are able to preserve clarity of thought and 
steady action.82 I shall investigate the other factors of this type of self-
regulation in the next section. Here it suffices to note that one type of 
resilience involves recovery from (bad) stress, and another, an 
optimized concentration and clarity in action when faced with (good) 
stress. 
Although researchers do not fully understand how we acquire 
psychosocial resilience against stress and adversity, they describe the 
acquisition of protection as a type of stress buffering or immunity, 
which decreases the probability of a negative outcome in the presence 
of a risk.83 Stress buffering should not be confused with conditions of 
low risk. A buffer variable reduces the severity of anticipated 
undesirable outcomes in the face of risk; it works on the risk before, 
during or after we experience it.84 M. Rutter has observed that negative 
                                                 
81 Goleman (1998, 77-8, 88-9) describes these two groups as follows: “one 
identified as highly resilient to life’s ups and downs, the other easily upset by 
them. […] The resilient people had a remarkably rapid recovery from stress, with 
their prefrontal areas starting to calm the amygdala—and them—within seconds. 
The more vulnerable people, by contrast, saw a continued escalation of their 
amygdala’s activity, and their distress, for several minutes after the stressful 
activity ended.” 
82 D. Goleman (1998, 78) says in this regard that: “This inhibitory circuit 
between prefrontal lobes and amygdala underlies many of the self-regulation 
competencies, especially self-control under stress and the ability to adapt to 
change, both of which allow calm in the face of those existential facts of work 
life: crisis, uncertainty, and shifting challenges.” Goleman, without citing it, 
refers to Richard Davidson’s brain-imaging research at the University of 
Wisconsin’s Laboratory for Affective Neuro-science. 
83 M. Rutter (1990, 186) speculates that stress buffering may happen like 
the adaptive changes produced through immunization to acute physical stress, for 
example: through electric shock that structurally and functionally alters the 
neuroendocrine system and through parachute jumping which induces 
anticipatory hormone changes. 
84 For example, in the case of women who have had insecure working 
models of early attachment (the risk), a buffering mechanism may be a secure 
working model of attachment with a husband (who has secure working models), 
which may forge another behavioral pathway (warm and structuring relation with 
children), thus avoiding the potential negative outcome (repeated insecure 
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experiences can either sensitize or steel us; they can increase or 
decrease our vulnerability to future stressors.85 The medical metaphor 
of resilience as immunity or buffering illustrates that we acquire 
enhanced competency through managing successfully challenges, 
through engaging small doses of potential risk.86 M. Rutter employs a 
medical metaphor of immunization to describe how involvement with 
real (instead of fabricated) trials can serve to strengthen humans 
through active engagement in the risk. He suggests that active 
immunization efforts are more efficacious than facing artificial risks, 
or simply avoiding them. Confronting risks demands pro-active 
construction of new competencies, rather than simply holding on to 
existing ones. Success, even in small trials and difficult initiatives, can 
thus lead to a kind of immunization to the risks involved. Through 
such mastery experiences, life may not become less difficult or painful, 
but we become more apt to live well in the midst of it because we can 
successfully manage the challenges.87 Successful adaptation may mean 
avoiding, changing, or overcoming the difficulty rather than simply 
becoming accustomed to it. A warning is in order as well: just as we 
can acquire resilience competencies, so can we acquire contrary 
vulnerabilities.88 
                                                                                                          
working model of early attachment). Cf. Cohn, Silver, Cowan and Pearson, 1992; 
Cowan, Cowan and Schulz 1996, 14. 
85 In order to understand more fully this sensitizing and steeling, M. Rutter 
(1994b, 354) explains that we need to comprehend resilience on social, 
psychological and neurochemical levels. 
86 In discussing the search for protective processes, M. Rutter (1990, 186) 
says: “like medicines that work, these are often of the type that tastes bad! Thus 
immunization does not involve direct promotion of positive physical health. To 
the contrary, it comprises being exposed to, and successfully coping with, a small 
(or modified) dose of the noxious infectious agent. Protection in this case resides 
not in evasion of the risk but in successful engagement with it.” According to 
Cowan et al. (1996, 15): “resilience can be enhanced by mastery experiences that 
develop and refine new coping skills, or can be eroded by cumulative adverse 
circumstances or developmental failures.” They furthermore say (1996, 33), 
“Rutter (1987) suggested that the best protection for individuals at risk is to help 
them cope with small doses of the potential risks so that they can become more 
resilient by dint of their own efforts. That is, the best preventive effort may 
involve some degree of ‘inoculation’ with a ‘live risk virus.’” Cf. Garmezy, 1985. 
87 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 186 and 1987; Cowan, Cowan and Schulz 1996, 15; 
N. Garmezy 1985. 
88 We can acquire vulnerabilities in two ways: either cumulative adverse 
circumstances or developmental failures can erode existing coping skills, or we 
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Researchers have described stress-buffering processes and 
factors in various ways,89 such as competence or mastery,90 and 
hardiness, including family hardiness.91 This last point highlights the 
social nature of buffers, which can give a sense of control over 
hardship, the possibility and benefit of change, and direction in active 
stress management. A. Masten has suggested however that stress 
immunity is not a general quality, but rather depends on a stress 
response’s adequacy in regards to context, circumstances and 
developmental stage.92 A buffer-related phenomenon is the 
“neutralizing” event, which negates or counteracts the negative impact 
of earlier threatening events. M. Rutter confirms this insight, adding 
that we may compensate for a lack in one life-domain by a relevant 
experience in another. For example, school and relationship-sources of 
self-esteem and self-efficacy can serve to complement a person who 
has not received adequate support from home.93 
1.1.3. Religious and spiritual resilience 
Resilience research and literature rarely refer to spirituality and 
religion. In the next chapter, I shall explain why. As we shall see, there 
are the methodological, cultural and historical reasons. Here, however, 
I suggest that spiritual resilience stands at the intersection between 
applied and academic perspectives. It stands between preventing 
problem behaviors and promoting optimal development. Even though 
                                                                                                          
can acquire tendencies to fall prey to later stress and adversity; cf. Cowan, Cowan 
and Schulz 1996, 33; N. Garmezy 1985; M. Rutter 1994b. 
89 E. J. Anthony (1987; 13; cf. Redl 1969) distinguishes four types of 
buffer; there are: first, protection from stimuli that can be overwhelming; second, 
the internal management of threatening stimuli; third, social protection (like a 
caregiver for a child, an elderly or ill person); fourth, ego-resilience (both 
resisting pathogenic pressures and recovering from temporary collapse). 
90 T. A. Wills 1996, 127; Cowan, Cowan and Schulz 1996; M. Rutter 1990. 
91 H. I. McCubbin (1998, 54) says, “Hardiness functions as a mediating 
factor or buffer, mitigating the effects of stressors and demands and facilitating 
family adjustment and adaptation over time. Family hardiness specifically refers 
to the internal strengths and durability of the family unit.” 
92 Ann Masten (1990, 249) notes two patterns: first an internalizing pattern 
of stress response (disengaged but not disruptive), which is more common to 
girls; and second an externalizing pattern of stress response (disengaged but 
disruptive), which is more common to boys. 
93 M. Rutter (1990, 197) points out that not all positive events are 
“neutralizing.” 
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spiritual and religious resources are not standard psychosocial 
resilience research categories, they play a role in overcoming 
difficulty; several psychosocial studies establish a positive correlation 
between human well-being and religion/spirituality.94 
First, several empirical studies indicate that religion is a 
positive factor. It provides protection inasmuch as religious practices 
facilitate coping with difficulty.95 It conserves protective resources and 
aids one to build in the wake of difficulty. However, empirical research 
also indicates that religion can serve as a source of risk. For example, 
fundamentalist religious notions of fate lead to indifference about the 
outcome of one’s actions.96 
Second, theoretical psychology recognizes potentially 
positive97 and negative98 associations between religion and health. It 
                                                 
94 As a wider backdrop for more specific resilience research, general 
literature on religion and mental health includes: J. F. Schumaker 1992; Hood et 
al. 1996. Furthermore, Chamberlain and Zika (1992) raise the question of 
relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being. 
95 For other empirical studies which link human well-being and religious 
foundations, see: Lösel 1994; Chamberlain and Zika 1992; Ellison et al., 1989; 
George and McNamara 1984; Wright et al, 1993; cited in Garbarino and Bedard 
1996, 468. 
96 Andersen (1991, 375-398) has observed that girls can become indifferent 
to the possibilities of pregnancy, and boys to the effect of violence (such as war 
and gang activities). 
97 J. F. Schumaker (1992, 3) presents a number of positions claiming that 
religion is beneficial to health, because it: (1) orders chaotic world by offering 
cognitive structures and pacifying narratives; (2) offers hope, meaning, and 
purpose with a sense of emotional well-being; (3) provides a reassuring fatalism 
that makes suffering and pain bearable; (4) affords solutions to conflicts; (5) 
solves the problem of mortality through afterlife beliefs; (6) gives a sense of 
control through an omnipotent force; (7) establishes self-serving and other-
serving moral guidelines; (8) promotes social cohesion; (9) unites people around 
shared understandings; and (10) provides cathartic rituals. 
98 J. F. Schumaker (1992, 3-4) also claims that some types of religion are 
potentially detrimental to mental health, because religion can potentially: “(1) 
generate unhealthy levels of guilt; (2) promote self-denigration and low self-
esteem by way of beliefs that devalue our fundamental nature, or aspects of our 
nature; (3) establish a foundation for the unhealthy repression of anger; (4) create 
anxiety and fear by way of beliefs in punishment for ‘evil’ ways; (5) impede self-
direction and a sense of internal control, while acting as an obstacle to personal 
growth and autonomous functioning; (6) foster dependency, conformity, and 
suggestibility, with a resultant over-reliance on forces or groups external to 
oneself; (7) inhibit the expression of sexual feelings, and pave the way for sexual 
maladjustment; (8) encourage the view that the world is divided into camps of 
mutually exclusive ‘saints’ and ‘sinners’ which, in turn, increases hostility and 
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illustrates a diversity of positions. Indeed some extreme empirical, 
clinical and theoretical psychosocial critiques directly address spiritual 
and religious teaching, resources and practices. Nonetheless a 
substantial well-reasoned middle ground maintains that religion is 
potentially positive. Its effects on mental and physical health depend 
on the content and appropriation of beliefs at personal and social 
levels.99 
In order to further introduce this section of the empirical 
findings and the theoretical positions, I shall highlight several 
difficulties that resilience research has in integrating human spiritual 
resources. General semantic snags include conflicting psychosocial 
notions of religion and spirituality. They also involve the ways in 
which resilience findings correlate to contrasting types of religious 
orientation and practice. I shall argue for a type of spiritual resilience 
that widens reductionistic conceptions. This spiritual resilience 
integrates sociological observations on religious practice. But it 
appropriates theological reflections and narratives as well. 
1.1.3.1. Semantic Issues 
Numerous semantic difficulties underlie the disparity between 
psychosocial notions of religion and spirituality. The meaning of 
religion and spirituality often differs in theoretical, clinical and 
experimental psychology, and sociology. The conception of religion 
and spirituality is important not only in searching for their 
relationships with resilience and health or normality and normativity, 
but even more fundamentally with human flourishing and happiness. 
In empirical research, I have found five semantic tendencies. 
First, secular philosophical notions tend to override religious and 
spiritual ones. For example, the”‘spiritual” and “faith” are defined 
solely in altruistic or humanistic terms, without reference to divinity or 
                                                                                                          
lowers tolerance toward the ‘other’; (9) instill an ill-founded paranoia concerning 
malevolent forces that threaten one’s moral integrity; and (10) interfere with 
rational and critical thought.” 
99 Cf. Garbarino and Bedard 1996; Masters and Bergin 1992; J. F. 
Schumaker 1992; Pargament et al. 1990; Levin and Markides 1986. 
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religion.100 Gina O’Connell-Higgins conceives of spirituality and faith 
in terms of a “benevolent kingdom,” a “faith in a larger future.” It is 
thus that she identifies two overarching resilience themes, which are 
more philosophical than theological: “faith in surmounting and faith in 
human relationships as the wellspring of overcoming.”101 
Second, there is a propensity to conceptualize uncritically 
religion or spirituality and related data. Thus what is said about “prayer 
and faith” tends to be statistically analyzed without further distinctions 
in religious typology.102 E. Werner and R. Smith’s research has 
identified faith and prayer as one of three major sources of support for 
the resilient children as adults;103 they also note a certain correlation 
between mental illness and fundamentalist religion.104 
Third, psychosocial empirical research that does explicitly 
focuses on spirituality and religion tends to be minimalist, selective 
                                                 
100 An example of a secular philosophical spirituality is found in Nye and 
Hay’s (1996, 3:145-151) set of three interrelated categories of spiritual 
sensitivity. These are: (1) awareness sensing: Here and Now, Tuning, Flow, 
Focusing; (2) mystery sensing: Awe and Wonder, Imagination; (3) value sensing: 
Delight and Despair, Ultimate Goodness, Meaning. These categories have certain 
parallels with resilience themes. Cf. John Bradford 1994. 
101 Gina O’Connoll-Higgins (1994, 171-2) sees faith as not depending on 
religion, thus following R. Neibuhr (1972, 39), who says, “So wherever and 
whenever we see [persons] giving themselves for that which is greater than 
themselves and greater than all the particular forces impinging upon them, there 
we meet the faithful human being.” O’Connoll (1994, 175) furthermore follows 
Sharon Parks perspective: “Faith isn’t something that only religious folks have; 
its something that all human beings do.” Cf. Werner and Smith 1992, 207. 
102 Concerning the scope of Werner and Smith’s methodology (1992, 251-
256), the questionnaires used to interview the cohort at age 31/32 shows a lack of 
reference to religious or spiritual realities. Although the research conclusions note 
that faith and prayer were significant protective factors, there are no specific 
questions that would systematically question the cohort on this issue. This is 
surprising since specific questions focus on the other factors (stressful events, 
relationships and protection), while the only passing reference to this domain is 
the inclusion of “minister” in a list of sources of aid when having a problem (cf. 
1992, 256). 
103 Concerning prayer, Werner and Smith (1992, 71) report “nearly half of 
the resilient women and one out of five among the resilient men relied on faith 
and prayer as an important source of support in times of difficulties” (M: 17.4%; 
F: 41.2%). 
104 In regards to faith and prayer in Werner and Smith’s (1992, 138-41) 
study, they noted that a significant minority of the sub-group with mental health 
problems as teenagers turned to “fundamentalist religions” for a sense of meaning 
in life in adulthood, particularly, to Jehovah Witnesses. 
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and incomplete. This bias is due to the nature of experimental studies; 
in particular, their observation-based methods and statistical analysis 
lend themselves to reductionistic findings. For example, researchers 
commonly correlate attendance at a religious service to health or 
behavior outcomes.105 Attendance at religious services is an inadequate 
experimental factor; it does not consider intention or faith 
considerations. However, recent studies have introduced corrective 
nuances; they illustrate a greater awareness of the depth and breath of 
the subject. They thus render the insights on resilience and religion 
more valuable.106 
Fourth, the spiritual and physical realms are often opposed in 
order to affirm the multidimensionality of existence. The researcher 
intends to acknowledge that humans have a non-materialistic, spiritual 
dimension, which has a certain primacy. The danger is to 
compartmentalize human experience using dualistic conceptions of 
spiritual and physical realms.107 
                                                 
105 Other empirical literature makes the following correlation between 
religion and health: fear of death negatively associated with religious faith; sleep 
disturbance negatively associated with identification of the church as a major 
source of support; higher self-esteem and less emotional upset (and depression) 
when patients reported God in control of their lives; lower levels of reported pain 
and greater flourishing; more favorable evaluations of coping with death of a 
loved one; prayer as coping response to difficulty; positive change as result of 
crisis; support in the face of the trauma of the death of a loved one (cf. Pargament 
1990, 797-8). 
106 Levin and Markides (1986: 31-38) have recognized two problems in 
sociological studies relating religious attendance to health: (1) The 
multidimensionality of attending religious services relates to the multitude of 
reasons for attendance, which vary by gender, stage of the life cycle, generation 
and/or cohort. In some research it is used as a one-dimensional operational 
construct. (2) Religious attendance has frequently been used in uncontrolled 
analyses. They suggest the need to control for: social support, physical capacity, 
social class and subjective religiousness. In order for health-related research to 
find meaningful relations concerning religious attendance (and not just 
statistically significant ones), they make three suggestions: (i) add variables like: 
subjective religiousness, belief in God, belief in an afterlife, and frequency of 
private prayer; (ii) control for confounding influences; (iii) consider 
complementary measures representing differences in religion. 
107 Garbarino and Bedard (1996, 470) suggest that “the core of spirituality 
[and addressing the problem of trauma, suffering, and evil] is the recognition of 
oneself as being more than only a physical being, i.e. as a multidimensional 
person with a physical as well as spiritual identity or existence. This recognition 
includes awareness of the primacy of spiritual existence.” 
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Fifth, in the name of neutrality or objectivity of empirical 
science, some researchers neglect or reject the possibility of religious 
and spiritual significance.108 As I argue in the next chapter, theoretical 
and clinical psychologies (and experimental ones to some degrees) are 
mixed disciplines that have religious, spiritual and ethical 
presuppositions and dimensions.109 These terms’ definitions orient a 
good deal of how research correlates resilience, health, normativeness 
and so on. These five semantic issues highlight the challenges for 
considerations of religion and spirituality in empirical studies and 
theoretical reflections. Nonetheless, these considerations aid us to 
identify the resilience resources found in religion and spirituality. 
1.1.3.2. “Religion” and “Spirituality” 
Psychosocial specialists tend to agree that “religion”110 is not a 
homogeneous or one-dimensional construct. The multifaceted nature 
of religious experience causes problems for analysis. Indeed 
psychological research needs to address “whether” people are 
religious. However, it must also specify “how” they are religious.111 
The composite notions of religiousness satisfy more readily 
than simple definitions. C. Y. Glock,112 King and Hunt have generated 
                                                 
108 This positive methodology not only concerns a Comtean critique of 
religion, but it also involves to some extent empirical psychology, as well as 
clinical and theoretical psychology. For example, Freud is well known for 
associating religion and obsession neurosis. This association is not a diagnosis 
resulting from his psychoanalytical practice, but rather a result of his theory of 
religion and interpretation of culture. Freud has had great influence on both 
secular and religious culture through his “scientific myth” about how religions 
developed in terms of: an archetypal Father, collective life, fraternal pact, sexual 
energy, ego, id, and superego. Although clinical and psychoanalytic movements 
have also drifted into the realm of religio-ethical judgments, they have not always 
followed Freud’s particular negative interpretation of religion (cf. F. Watts 1997). 
109 Browning (1987, 8) makes a noteworthy analysis of modern 
psychologies and their ethical-religious foundations. His thesis is that “significant 
portions of the modern psychologies, and especially the clinical psychologies, are 
actually instances of religio-ethical thinking. They are, in fact, mixed disciplines 
which contain examples of religious, ethical, and scientific languages.” 
110 The etymology of the word “religion” is found in the Latin religare (to 
be tied to, to fasten or bind). 
111 Cf. Masters and Bergin 1992. 
112 In a social psychology perspective, C. Y. Glock (1962; cited in Watts 
and William 1988, 10) employs a five-facet model of religion, as having 
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two of the more complete conceptions of religion;113 in simplified form, 
they propose the following religious domains: belief (a person’s 
faith—confessional or ideological religion); intellectual (information, 
knowledge and meaning concerning faith, scripture and tradition); 
motivational (volition, goals and commitment); emotional (affectivity 
as passive and active, implicit and explicit judgments); ritualistic and 
prayer (signs, symbols and sacraments); social and cultural 
(community environment and interactions); experience (direct 
knowledge of ultimate, spiritual reality); consequential (related 
behavior and moral action). 
This collection of interacting facets offers an extensive, even 
though unordered working notion of religion. It aids in evaluating the 
psychosocial findings. At the theoretical level, they approach the 
richness of religious and spiritual phenomena. At the empirical level, 
however, we cannot expect definitive conclusions from psychosocial 
studies because of the methodological difficulties faced in observing 
and measuring the inter- and relational-domains of religion.114 For these 
reasons experimental approaches tend make to more modest analyses. 
Typologies of religious orientation115 provide another way to 
investigate “how” we appropriate religion. First, one of the most useful 
typologies distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic religious orientation.116 
                                                                                                          
theological (beliefs), ritual (practices), intellectual (knowledge), experiential 
(emotion) and consequential (effects) dimensions. 
113 King and Hunt (1975) develop a 21 factor analysis of religiosity. A fine 
summary of this and other definitions of religion are found in Schumaker 1992, 
4-6; cf. Hood et al. 1996. 
114 Instead of completeness, there is a modest, but helpful, constellation of 
variables relating religion to resilience and health. Cf. J. F. Schumaker 1992,11. 
115 J. F. Schumaker (1992, 7-9) gives an overview of typology of religious 
orientation:   
(a) healthy / unhealthy. William James (1902) “healthy-mindedness” and the 
“sick soul;” Pruyser (1977) healthy versus neurotic;   
(b) mature / immature. Allport (1950); Batson and Ventis (1982) adding 
“quest” type = open minded and questioning; 
(c) serious / neutralized. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford 
(1950);  
(d) humanistic / authoritarian. Erich Fromm (1950);   
(e) committed / consensual. Allen and Spilka (1967);  
(f) functional / dysfunctional. Spilka (1989). 
116 This distinction is generally attributed to Allport and Ross (1967). Over 
the last thirty years it has given rise to numerous discussions and changes in 
research parameters; some of the most important publications include: Batson and 
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Belief and sincere commitment guide intrinsic religious orientation, 
which in turn serves as a person’s most fundamental source of 
motivation. Intrinsically motivated people internalize their beliefs and 
attempt to live by them regardless of the consequences. On the other 
hand, extrinsic religious orientation is a “utilitarian,” pragmatic and 
more self-centered approach. Some people thus use religion to obtain 
status, security, self-justification and sociability.117 
A wide range of research supports the thesis that intrinsic 
religiousness and mental health positively correlate.118 According to 
Schumaker, for example intrinsic religiousness has been shown to 
positively correlate with seven sets of mental health criteria: 
“appropriate social behavior, freedom from worry and guilt, personal 
competence and control, and open-mindedness and flexibility;” while 
extrinsic religion has a negative relationship to them.119 The intrinsic-
extrinsic typology furthermore has served both to dispel the 
“uniformity myth,” that all religious beliefs and practices have equal 
                                                                                                          
Ventis 1982; M. Donahue 1985; Pargament et al. 1990; Masters and Bergin 
1992; J. F. Schumaker 1992; Meyer and Lausell 1996; F. Watts 1997. After 
experiencing criticism of and finding incoherencies in the original bipolar 
typology conceived as a continuum, Allport expounded a fourfold typology by 
adding indiscriminately pro-religious and indiscriminately antireligious types. 
117 According to research by Kirkpatrick (1989), extrinsic religious 
orientation may take two orientations: “(1) extrinsic-social (i.e., using religion 
toward social gain); and (2) extrinsic-personal (i.e., using religion toward gaining 
comfort, security, and protection)” (Masters and Bergin 1992, 222). M. Donahue 
(1985, 416) construes extrinsic religious orientation to represent the type of 
religion that gives it a bad reputation. 
118 They have loosely organized this research into the following two major 
categories: freedom from pathology, and positive mental health (competent 
perception and expression of feelings; freedom, autonomy and responsibility; 
integration and coping; self-awareness and personal growth; mature frame of 
orientation). Cf. Masters and Bergin 1992, 224-226. Using this same typology 
Meyer and Lausell (1996, 123-4) have identified some gender specific findings 
concerning adolescents. They say that: “Boys were more likely to have beliefs 
and attitudes about religion that viewed religion as a set of rules and guidelines 
that one followed to achieve particular rewards. Benson et al. refer to this as 
‘extrinsic’ religious belief. ... In contrast, girls were more likely to see religious 
belief as an end in itself, to find more of a sense of freedom in their beliefs, and to 
report a more intimate relationship to God and others through their faith. This 
type of belief the authors refer to as ‘intrinsic’ religious belief.” The researchers 
view intrinsic belief as indicative of greater maturity (cf. Donahue 1985). 
119 J. F. Schumaker 1992, 15. 
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impact on psychosocial processes.120 It also corrects over-simplified or 
erroneous interpretations in experimental and theoretical psychology.121 
A second current typology analyzes the social dimension of 
religion and spirituality regarding their “control” and “support” 
functions. Researchers argue that we misconstrue the influence of 
religion and spirituality if these complementary social dimensions are 
not both utilized.122 The “control” and “support” typology corrects 
narrow-sighted research.123 Thomas and Carver use this typology to 
help assess religious influence upon social competence. They critique a 
good part of the existing research on the influence of religion as 
focusing almost exclusively on the control construct (described as 
social control theory) to the detriment of the support and motivational 
one.124 These two typologies will be employed in further analyses later 
in this section. 
                                                 
120 Cf. R. Payne 1991; J. F. Schumaker 1992; Masters and Bergin 1992. 
121 For example, Batson and Ventis’ (1982) study of religion and mental 
health posits a third type of fundamental religious orientation, namely a “quest,” 
open-minded, non-dogmatic orientation (their Deweyan philosophical 
perspective establishes religious maturity in terms of final acceptance of the 
ambivalence in life). Their study found in turn that religion has positive effects, 
when mental health is defined in the traditional sense as an absence of 
psychological symptoms, and conversely that religion is more likely to be 
associated with negative effect (impaired psychological functioning), when 
mental health is defined according to “(1) personal competence and control; (2) 
self-acceptance or self-actualization; and (3) open-mindedness and flexibility.” 
(Cf. Batson and Ventis 1985) Several researchers have questioned this 
interpretation of religion and health (cf. Donahue 1985, 411-14). In critique of 
Batson and Ventis’ position, Master and Bergin (1992) have offered another 
interpretation of the data, based on a conceptual framework for the intrinsic and 
extrinsic religious orientation that employs another notion of finality. For Batson 
and Ventis, intrinsic religious orientation is not the final stage of development, 
but rather an intermediate stage, on the way to the “quest” mode. For Master and 
Bergin on the contrary the “quest” mode is only a transitional stage between 
extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientation. This example demonstrates that the 
flux in semantic fields (not only of religion, but also of health, etc.) is cumulative 
in effect. 
122 Cf. Meyer and Lausell 1996; Thomas and Carver 1990. 
123 The more popular one-sided emphasis has been on the control function 
of religion, which is the problem for example in the otherwise interesting research 
by R. Jessor and S. Jessor, (1977). 
124 Thomas and Carver (1990, 202) report that “virtually all of the extant 
research that sees religious involvement as inversely related to antisocial behavior 
is best described as social control theory. ... One searches almost in vain for 
analyses of the possible role of religion as socially supportive, motivational, or 
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The term “spirituality,” like “religion,” has numerous 
interpretations. It is popular, even fashionable, to speak of spirituality. 
But it is difficult to understand. Indeed there is no universally 
recognized definition, and many approaches to spirituality exist. 
Inasmuch as spirituality is positively associated with religion, many, if 
not all, of the above-mentioned comments about religion apply to 
spirituality as well. Nonetheless, in order to appropriate better the 
richness of spiritual experience, and to avoid problems in empirical 
and theoretical psychosocial studies, we can identify definitions and 
developmental perspectives on spirituality. 
Meyer and Lausell propose a tripartite definition of spirituality. 
First, spirituality implies a belief in the existence of a higher power 
that provides inspiration, guidance, replenishment and comfort. 
Personal experience with “a personal deity or an impersonal force” 
supports belief. Second, spirituality provides a cognitive framework 
for answering life’s major questions regarding: origin, identity, and 
relationships to others and to the world itself. Third, it involves a code 
for personal and collective attitude and behavior. The knowledge of 
and ability to uphold this code relies on surrendering to the higher 
power.125 They claim that empirical studies, which do not take all three 
of these levels into account, will produce anomalies. 
Developmental perspectives on spirituality (and religiousness) 
describe spirituality in terms of a spiritual search for meaning. Viktor 
Frankl, for example, interrelates spirituality with the somatic and the 
psychological dimensions of life.126 He calls the spiritual quest for 
meaning the noetic dimension, which has roots in childhood, but 
primarily develops in adolescence. Reason and conscience exist in the 
noetic realm, through which we go beyond particular influences 
(including parental and societal influences) and transcend training; we 
                                                                                                          
facilitative.” In a balanced fashion they also describe the positive aspect of 
control in terms of restricting and guiding. 
125 Meyer and Lausell 1996, 119. I recall here that these three levels relate 
to the other domains of religion. 
126 According to Frankl, the somatic (physical) dimension is the instinctual 
level of motivation, which helps the individual and species to survive. It exists 
throughout life. The psychological dimension underlies the personality, which 
begins to form at birth and develops throughout as a result of instincts, drives, 
capacities, and interactions with the environment. (Frankl 1967; found in Dacey 
1992, 585-6). 
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thus aspire to higher levels of spiritual thought and behavior. In 
addition to Frankl’s views, other theories address how and why 
spirituality develops with age.127 The sociobiology perspective of E. O. 
Wilson, for example, explains spirituality and religious practice as 
enhancing the gene-survival of its practitioners.128 Religion in itself, 
according to Wilson, is not an absolute value however, since not all 
religions have survived, e.g. the Shakers (who practiced complete 
celibacy). Spirituality or religion has two roles in Wilson’s perspective. 
First, it reaffirms and renews the community’s moral values. Second, 
through early learning it subverts natural self-interests to the interests 
of society, which require that the majority of people be “controllable.” 
The genes that favor both the willingness to be controlled and the 
potential for self-sacrifice have been favored by natural selection, 
according to Wilson’s theory.129 
What challenges do psychology and sociology’s approaches to 
religion and spirituality pose for theology? They often identify religion 
with extrinsic religious orientation and spirituality with intrinsic 
religious orientation, or religion with its control function and 
spirituality with the function of support and guidance. Spirituality is 
also opposed not only to religion but also to ethics. The relationship of 
both religion and ethics to spirituality depends on how we define and 
articulate religion, spirituality, and ethics. 
In the midst of these challenges and nuances, how can we treat 
spirituality and religion in this section? First, I shall try to make 
apparent the coverage of the terms in the research. Terminological 
clarity should permit us to avoid confusing observations made on 
                                                 
127 Spiritual development views of psychology include those the Viennese 
psychoanalyst Carl Jung, the sociobiologist E. O. Wilson, and the theologian 
James Fowler (cf. Dacey 1992, 585-6). 
128 E. O. Wilson (orig. 1975—1978, 188; cited in Arnould 1996, 233) 
illustrates his positive vision of the role of religion in human adaptive efforts for 
survival when he says: “The highest forms of religious practice, when examined 
more closely, can be seen to confer biological advantage. Above all they congeal 
identity. In the midst of the chaotic and potentially disorienting experiences each 
person undergoes daily, religion classifies him, provides him with unquestioned 
membership in a group claiming great powers, and by this means gives him a 
driving purpose in life compatible with his self-interest. His strength is the 
strength of the group, his guide the sacred covenant.” 
129 Cf. E. O. Wilson 1978, 179. S. J. Pope 1998a has judiciously critiqued 
Wilson’s work. 
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different levels. Second, I shall use religion and spirituality more or 
less interchangeably in my analyses, recognizing their rich domains 
mentioned above. This attempt to recognize the spiritual basis for 
religion will not out of hand favor amorphous spirituality to 
institutional religion. 
1.1.3.3. Spiritual Resilience 
Based upon these discussions of resilience, religion and 
spirituality, we can now ask: what is spiritual resilience? As a third 
level of resilience, spiritual resilience does not simply involve a 
separate domain that has no commonality with the first two. Indeed, 
while it relates metaphorically to the resilience of inanimate material, it 
has a closer relationship with the psychosocial type. It is a human 
reality. In order to understand spiritual resilience, we need to 
understand human nature and agency. Psychosocial sciences and 
philosophical studies aid in this regard. Yet while the spiritual-
religious domain extends human experience, it is in continuity with it. 
To understand this type of resilience, the following chapters address 
the correlation of nature and grace. At present, we can say that spiritual 
resilience concerns the ethical, religious and spiritual dimensions of 
human resilience. 
Beyond the psychosocial observations of human sciences, to 
recognize spiritual resilience requires two changes in perspective. First, 
we need to not merely study the weakness of individuals and groups, 
but concentrate on their resources, practices and potential. This enables 
us to identify the strengths rooted in human spiritual character and 
community. These are the qualitative levels of human experience: 
ethical, spiritual and religious, as well as emotional, cognitive, 
motivational and social.130 Second, we should investigate the effect of 
                                                 
130 Religion and spirituality serve in forming additional resilience 
competencies or vulnerabilities. On the positive side, certain “intrinsic qualities” 
of religious beliefs are: mindfulness of other people and of oneness with creation, 
or an internalized code of behavior involving firmer control, higher maturity and 
greater acceptance of personal responsibility for one’s own behavior (cf. Meyer 
and Lausell 1996, 125-6). Such intrinsic qualities contribute to increase personal 
strengths and to reduce vulnerability to risky situations (cf. Meyer and Lausell 
1996, 125-6; Masten, Best, and Garmezy 1990, 425). Religious conceptions and 
support contribute to competency or vulnerability through their involvement in 
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what we teach and express, which involves personal contacts, 
institutions and culture. A concern for resilience-effects goes beyond a 
simple scrutiny of external behavior.131 Consequently, spiritual 
resilience does not merely concern those who live in “at risk 
situations.” It involves each human being. We all inevitably face 
challenges due to maturation, change and loss, cycles of which humans 
continually pass throughout our lives. 
We tentatively define “spiritual resilience” as the capacity, 
when faced with hardship and difficulty, to cope actively using 
religious resources, to resist the destruction of one’s spiritual 
competencies and to construct something positive in line with larger 
theological goals. This abstract definition finds more concrete 
expression. For example, according to the French Child Psychiatrist 
Michel Manciaux, spiritual resilience is empowered by a life-project, 
which serves to orient our life.132 Empirical studies, theoretical 
reflections and intervention efforts,133 furthermore, address spiritual 
resilience processes in terms of meaning, motivation, hope, friendship 
and caring; these realities also have both religious and secular senses. 
In this section, I have introduced the forms of spiritual resilience. The 
next section’s treatment of the research findings and theoretical 
considerations integrate spiritual and religious considerations in 
regards: temperament and emotion; cognitive and volitional processes; 
                                                                                                          
appraisal and coping processes. They are part of the coping process, either as 
contributing to it or as a product of the coping process (cf. Pargament et alia, 
1990, 796-7, and 813). 
131 How is or is not the teaching, counseling, or preaching being translated 
into a person’s whole life? For example, do the lived expressions of faith, hope 
and love make people spiritually resilient? In this perspective, resilience is a 
qualitative criteria (albeit a metaphorical one) for judging our efforts in virtue 
education. 
132 Cf. M. Manciaux 1995 and 2001. 
133 Addressing the spiritual dimension of risk and trauma, as well as 
accessing and developing spiritual resources are important, not only for the 
affected individuals and groups, but also for those responsible for intervention. In 
this regard, Meyer and Lausell (1996, 130) suggest two strategies: (1) “allow and 
support a dialectic in which youth can critically examine and explore their belief 
systems;” and (2) “provide adolescents with opportunities to develop their 
personal spiritual belief systems and supportive relationships with others who 
have similar values.” Cf. Garbarino and Bedard 1996, 474-475. 
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and social support and resources.134 However, before starting the more 
in-depth investigation, I shall draw some conclusions. 
1.1.4. Conclusions 
1.1.4.1. Resilience’s limitations 
Before I venture a composite definition of resilience, it is 
fitting to mention the confines of its psychosocial conceptualization. 
The constructive and promising nature of the resilience concept does 
not override it limits and dangers. Several restrictions correlate to the 
use of positivistic methodology. Nonetheless, correctives are possible; 
the next chapter will highlight them. Current research sometimes lacks 
a trans-situational systematic exploration of resilience and coping; this 
constraint is inherent to an inductive method applied to a complex 
reality—human individuals interacting with social groups.135 
Furthermore, the popularity of the concept of resilience constitutes a 
fourfold peril. First, we can simplistically construe it as 
invulnerability136 or to mean that everyone can succeed in fame and 
wealth when faced with difficulty, like the so-called “American 
dream.”137 Second, some might mistake resilience as a replacement for 
                                                 
134 Garbarino and Bedard (1996, 468) trace similar aspects of religious 
resilience: human well-being; personal control against problem behavior; sense of 
meaningfulness and depression-buffer; positive coping with stress; and recovery 
from trauma. 
135 It is not unusual for resilience researchers to highlight the limits of 
resilience and coping research; for example N. Garmezy (1990, 532) says: “But 
coping as a construct leaves much to be desired. Its limitations reside in the 
quality of the instruments for measuring coping, their lack of sound psychometric 
properties, the failure to develop adequate standardization data, and the 
questionable assumption of transitional generalizations that can be drawn from 
test responses to hypothetical or eventual situations.” 
136 Felsman and Valliant (1987, 304) say, “While the term ‘invulnerability’ 
as metaphor captures much of the enthusiasm and spirit of this inquiry, it is all too 
easily seized upon as myth, especially by the popular press. One repeatedly reads 
and hears misguided reports of ‘superkids’ and references to ‘invulnerability.’ 
[...] If unqualified, our vision becomes myopic; human vulnerability is equated 
with weakness and invulnerability equated with strength.” They (1987, 310-11) 
limit the term “invulnerability” to metaphorical use, as a lifelong adaptive 
process. 
137 One notable version of the American dream is the Horatio Alger legend, 
inspired by the Unitarian Minister (1834-99) who wrote numerous juvenile 
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social change (at policy and intervention levels). Thus the question: “If 
some disadvantaged people have been able to develop healthily and be 
happy, why cannot everyone?” Facile answers do not withstand 
scrutiny. Third, we risk forgetting the hidden costs paid for successful 
survival.138 Psychological scars often if not always accompany the 
resilience that individuals attain in the most difficult situations; indeed 
even when we integrate and accept a harsh event, it does not disappear 
as if it never happened; and we need also to face dangers of relapses 
under stress. Fourth, resilience research cannot content itself with only 
focusing on positive features (e.g. social competence), without also 
addressing the absence of negative ones (emotional and volitional 
disturbance).139 
1.1.4.2. A Composite Definition of Resilience 
In summary, I propose a definition of resilience with three 
interrelated but non-exclusive axes, which each traverse the 
physiological, psychosocial and spiritual dimensions of human life and 
society. First, resilience is the ability to cope in adverse conditions; it 
endures, minimizes or overcomes hardships. Second, it consists in 
resisting destructive pressures on the human person’s physiological, 
psychosocial and spiritual life; that is, it maintains capacities in the 
face of challenges, threats and loss. Third, resilience creatively 
constructs and adapts after adversity; it implies recovering with 
maturity, confidence and wisdom to lead a meaningful and productive 
life. This composite definition emphasizes not only the coping and 
constancy aspects of the patterns of resilience amid disadvantage, but 
                                                                                                          
novels, in which the characters attain fame and wealth through practicing virtues 
such as honesty, diligence and perseverance. This “American mythology” can 
take on an individualist flavor, that one is solely responsible for one’s own 
progress and success. Cf. Felsman and Valliant 1987, 304; N. Garmezy 1994, 13. 
138 The idea of “hard growing,” according to Radke-Yarrow (1990, 114) 
comes from the “extra challenges and developmentally inappropriate demands 
embedded in [children’s] special valued traits. Furthermore, in aspects of their 
styles of coping, we suggest that there are hidden costs that continuing life 
stresses or the tasks of normal developmental transitions may make manifest.” 
Felsman and Valliant (1987, 304) highlight that sometimes the psychological 
pain (to the individual, family and community) is simply accepted as an 
inevitable aspect of such individual triumph. 
139 Cf. M. Rutter 1994b, 359-60; S. S. Luthar 1991, 600-16. 
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also the constructive outcomes expressed in growth, strength and 
increased adaptation in personal and social domains. 
After having established a basic understanding of resilience, as 
well as some of its underlying conceptual components, I now turn to 
address the resilience research itself. In so doing, I recall that the status 
of this research is tentative, a consolidation of hypotheses of differing 
certainty, which nonetheless lead to helpful insights into human nature 
and agency. 
1.2. Resilience Input for a Virtue-Based Philosophical 
Anthropology 
In this section, I investigate further research on protective and 
risk processes.140 I interpret the insights within a classic anthropological 
schema: temperament and emotion, cognitional and volitional 
processes, and familial and social contexts.141 At the same time, I 
employ an overlapping division that differentiates natural 
characteristics from religious and spiritual ones. This meta-analysis of 
the resilience findings inductively identifies resources that make some 
difference in resilience outcomes. It examines resilience research per 
se. The following chapters put these resilience insights into dialogue 
with Thomas Aquinas’ virtue-based anthropology and moral theology. 
In particular, they seek to enrich his theory of moral agency and virtue 
                                                 
140 Some of the studies are gender-specific. Sometimes the gender-related 
findings seem contradictory. For example, some of them show more disadvantage 
to girls than to boys in families with difficulties. (Cowan, Cowan and Schulz 
1996, 31); while others find that boys exposed to serious disorder in the family 
are more likely to develop emotional or behavioral disturbances (Rutter 1990, 
189). 
141 Although I do not outline Thomas’ anthropology until chapter two, it 
already serves as the basis for the division of this present section. One of the more 
complete attempts at structuring resilience findings is S. Vanistendael’s (1995) 
who analyzes the resilience research-action findings as follows: social networks 
and unconditional acceptance; the capacity to discover some order and sense and 
meaning in life; a variety of skills (competencies); self-esteem; humor; contact 
with nature. He recognizes the importance both to care for elementary material 
needs, and to be ready to add other undiscovered experiences to this list. 
Furthermore he regroups these elements in a useful pedagogical model, the 
“casita.” Other attempts at resilience summaries include F. Lösel (1992) and E. 
Grotberg (1995). 
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development in hardship: how we act before, during or after stress and 
difficulty. 
1.2.1. Temperament 
This section addresses temperament. What temperament 
characteristics have researchers posited as more readily fostering 
human resilience? It presents a general definition of temperament, and 
discusses the debate on whether temperament traits originate in nature 
or nurture. It then identifies the correlations between temperament, 
resilience, context and gender. 
1.2.1.1. Temperament: definition and origins 
In general, “temperament” and “personality”142 are used to 
identify what differentiates human beings at the level of psychosocial 
make-up and activity,143 or mood.144 Although definitions vary in this 
field, researchers generally agree that personality differences exist at 
an early age and that they influence development in character and 
social involvement. Following Allport,145 most psychologists concur 
that temperament is a dynamic organization of behavioral, attitudinal, 
emotional and cognitive patterns.146 Kagan has identified four primary 
                                                 
142 We should not confuse “personality” and “person.” The former is a 
psychological term, while the later is theological and philosophical. I shall use 
“temperament” and “personality” and “personality features” interchangeably 
throughout this section, as do researchers such as Rutter (1990, 182). 
143 A standard dictionary defines temperament as: “n. 1. the individual 
peculiarity of physical organization by which the manner of thinking, feeling, and 
acting of every person is permanently affected; natural disposition” (Webster’s 
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 1989, 1461). 
Ancient physiology considered temperament to be due to an individual’s 
particular proportion of the four cardinal humors (or bodily fluids: blood, phlegm, 
black bile and yellow bile), which determined physical and mental constitution.  
144 According to Paul Ekman (1992), emotions, moods, temperaments and 
emotional disorders all interrelate as a nuclear core to its derivative expressions; 
emotions (the various families of emotions) are the basic emotional core that are 
expressed in moods, temperaments and emotional disorders. Cf. D. Goleman 
1995, 215 and 290. 
145 Cf. G. W. Allport 1937/1961; K. Durkin 1995, 71. 
146 A widely accepted typology temperament distinguishes: easy, slow and 
difficult temperaments. (1) “easy” infants adapt well to novel experiences, are 
cheerful and easily pacified when distressed; (2) “slow to warm up” infants adapt 
slowly, cry and fuss more, are irregular in daily routines; (3) “difficult” infants 
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temperament types: bold, timid, upbeat and melancholic.147 For 
example, by temperament some humans are more choleric than others; 
they must live with a propensity to be wrathful, testy, irritable, 
impatient and touchy. We do this in different ways, through acquired 
personal strategies or skills, and more or less successfully at personal 
and interpersonal levels. 
The inequality of personality qualities at an early age and 
throughout the life cycle poses questions about the origin of and 
influences on temperament. Researchers attribute some aspects of 
individual differences to the “raw material” (Allport 1961: 33), or 
“inherited basis” (A. H. Buss 1992) that infants and children first bring 
to their interaction with the social world. The running debate concerns: 
What is the extent of the genetic origin? What is the influence of 
primary caregivers? In other words, to what extent is temperament 
hereditary? How stable is it? And to what extent can it be changed?148 
Non-deterministic research indicates that both nature and 
nurture contribute something; that is, both genes and individual neuro-
psycho-social factors. This latter one includes influences of family, 
educators, media and the surrounding environment. Most researchers 
recognize an interaction between endogenous attributes and 
environmental factors without naively distinguishing each ones 
contribution.149 Moreover, they cautiously affirm that temperament 
qualities translate into behavior or action, which in turn further shapes 
                                                                                                          
withdraw in front of novelty, have more negative moods and intense reactions, as 
well as irregular sleeping and eating habits (Thomas and Chess 1989; cited in K. 
Durkin 1995, 71). Another common temperament typology identifies four 
tendencies to interface with environmental experiences: activity, reactivity, 
emotionality, and sociability (McCall 1987). 
147 J. Kagan (1994; cited in Goleman 1995, fn. 14.1) also associates various 
patterns of brain activity with temperamental moods. 
148 This running debate about the interaction of nature and nurture on 
temperament has extreme positions that attribute the developmental outcome to 
biological factors (temperament theorists, cf. J. Kagan, 1994; Kagan et al. 1990) 
or to environmental factors (e.g. Behaviorists, cf. B. F. Skinner). Twin studies 
demonstrate the inheritability of temperamental characteristics, by showing 
higher correlations between monozygotic twin’s temperaments than that of 
fraternal twins. The study of stability and mutability of temperament is also rather 
complicated by the proximity of temperament, with emerging competencies and 
self-organization (cf. K. Durkin 1995, 72-3). 
149 Cf. K. Durkin 1995, 97, who cites L. A. Sroufe 1985. 
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the development of temperament and future behavior in the form of 
character. 
1.2.1.2. Resilience, Temperament and Context 
Resilience researchers posit various relationships between 
particular temperament qualities and resilience outcomes. They 
analyze these qualities at different levels. First, some temperament 
qualities elicit positive social responses from parents, peers, teachers 
and the like. These resilience engendering personality traits include: a 
certain culturally appropriate level of activity, sociability and 
emotionality;150 responsiveness to others and an outgoing nature;151 
flexibility and approach orientation (inasmuch as they favor effective 
coping);152 attitudes such as optimism, problem-solving confidence, 
and perceived control;153 autonomy, self-esteem and a positive social 
orientation.154 
Children with an “outgoing nature,” for example, express a 
more pleasant, positive mood to their caregivers. These children tend 
to be quicker with a smile and laughter, or to be engaged in and 
maintain eye contact. They more readily join in activities and take on 
                                                 
150 In other words, researchers describe these characteristics in terms of: 
“dispositional attributes that elicited positive responses from family members and 
strangers, such as robustness, vigor and an active sociable temperament” (Werner 
and Smith 1992, 192); “attractiveness to peers and adults” (Masten, Best and 
Garmezy 1990; cf. Garmezy 1994); “sociability, problem-solving ability, and 
planning ability, leading gradually to an internal locus of control. Such children 
are likely to attract the positive attention of teachers in school; to acquire self-
esteem and self-confidence; and to believe in their own ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances and in their ability to change circumstances themselves” 
(Clarke and Clarke 1992, 153). 
151 Cf. Booth and Booth 1997, 113. 
152 Cf. F. Lösel 1994, 9. 
153 Here we include what are considered “basic” attitudinal dimensions of 
coping that are more a basis or overall approach to coping rather than a 
mechanism or process per se. Wills (1996, 128) formulates the hypothesis that 
“an important factor lies in basic attitudinal dimensions that influence the course 
of the coping effort. There are several good candidates, including optimism 
(Scheier and Carver, 1987), problem-solving confidence (Heppner, 1989), and 
perceived control (Wills, 1994). Some evidence for each of these mechanisms is 
available in retrospective or prospective research, and leads to the prediction that 
efficacy orientation or generalized outcome expectancies are a crucial factor in 
predicting the course of the coping effort.” 
154 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 182; N. Garmezy 1985. 
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responsibilities. Such temperamental qualities may elicit not only 
positive responses from the care-giver, but also facilitate stronger 
attachment relationships, which in turn can be significant for one’s 
self-image and confidence; they can particularly aid us to face 
difficulty and challenges even from an early age. Temperament can 
play a more central role in certain early childhood activities, while 
interpersonal characteristics become more predominant in adolescence 
and afterwards. In particular, infants moderate stress using more 
constitutional factors, they count more on interpersonal interactions, 
such as play, later in life.155 These indications of resilience promoting 
temperamental qualities need further investigation: How do they 
interact with the development of emotional, volitional, cognitive and 
spiritual resources, as well as interpersonal relationships? 
Secondly, some temperament characteristics elicit negativity 
and aggression.156 Such characteristics explain in part individual 
differences in risk exposure, and how in the same situation people have 
varied experiences, some positive and others negative. For example, 
less interactive children may tend to be less stimulated and socialized 
by their care-givers, who must put more time and effort into engaging 
the child in visual, verbal, or play contact; such children have as a 
result weaker attachment bonding.157 Clarke and Clarke hypothesize 
that growing up in large, chaotic, discordant families promotes 
temperamental irritability and lack of sociability.158 In general Rutter 
notes that difficult children’s temperaments can cause individual risk, 
since they tend to be scapegoated; for example they attract the 
                                                 
155 Cf. W. Yule 1992, 189. 
156 Researchers note that underlying physiological factors can contribute to 
antisocial behavioral problems, such as drug and alcohol abuse (Consortium 
1994, 271), as well as to depressive behavior (cf. S. J. Pope 1998). 
157 There is a whole range of such interactivity (the lower range being 
caused by various disabilities). The Spangler study (1990, a longitudinal study of 
24 German mother-child pairs) showed that the mothers who perceived their 
infants as difficult became less responsive to them by 24 months. Furthermore, 
reduced interactivity in turn negatively effects the attachment between mother 
and infant, according to Bowlby 1969 and 1973 (cf. Durkin 1995,99). 
158 Clarke and Clarke (1992, 153) speculate that in this situation children 
do “not have the opportunity to gain an understanding of social cause and effect, 
nor to develop planning ability or knowledge of the desirability of delayed 
gratification and an internal locus of control.” 
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hostility, criticism and irritability of a depressed parent.159 Furthermore, 
aggressive or anti-social children tend also to elicit negative responses 
from people outside the family: from neighbors, educators and 
venders. Such behavior and responses can bring about a vicious cycle 
of negative experiences.160 It can also explain further how in the same 
situation people have varied experiences, and how concrete behavior is 
continuously involved in shaping such experiences. 
Research demonstrates the context-specificity of resilience 
outcomes. The De Vries African famine study illustrates that 
particular, temperamental characteristics put a group of children at risk 
in one situation, but rendered them more resilient in another. In 
particular, the difficult and demanding temperamental characters 
survived (alive) an extreme draught in Zimbabwe. Because of their 
persistence (in crying and demanding food), they received the scarce 
food that existed. The temperament that elicits negative outcomes in 
one situation, might promote survival in another.161 This counter-
intuitive insight suggests that we need to delineate resilience findings, 
as well as prepare for context-specific outcomes. 
Researchers have also identified a variety of temperamentally 
risky or protective relationships that seem gender-specific.162 Pianta et 
al. have noted differences in the way in which children relate to their 
parents and the home environment when confronted with stress. Boys’ 
competence and coping skills were especially linked to their 
relationship with their mother and home environment. Girls’ 
competence however was distinguished by their mother’s positive 
                                                 
159 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 189-202. 
160 Cf. M. Rutter 1994b, 371-2. 
161 Cf. The De Vries study on child survivors of the Zimbabwe famine 
(cited by M. Rutter 1998, 48). 
162 As with a good deal of resilience research, we must employ these 
findings in other cultural and age contexts with care. Conflicting gender-specific 
findings in violent environments invite caution in extrapolating from one high-
risk setting to another. Nonetheless, given that certain risks are perhaps more 
normal than one might think, we look to the high-risk examples as sometimes 
counter intuitive insights about human nature and culture, that might bear fruit in 
pedagogical applications. According to M. Rutter (1990, 189-202), males are 
more vulnerable to a number of physical hazards; discord impinges on them more 
directly, and they have biological susceptibility to psychosocial hazards. Females 
on the contrary might have a lesser exposure to risk factors in violent 
environments. 
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social and problem-solving characteristics. More specifically, they 
observed that: “‘protective’ environments for boys were structured, 
organized, emotionally supportive, and distinguished by good teaching 
by mothers.”163 Girls conversely did not need the same active 
environmental support to develop competently within a stressful 
household; for them, it appears as minimally important that the 
mothers’ characteristics shield the girls, foster their independence, and 
be transmitted through observation and identification. Werner and 
Smith moreover noted that in high crime settings the tendency for 
shyness of unaggressive boys acts as a protective factor against 
delinquency and crime, while the opposite is the case for aggressive 
boys.164 The identification of such a factor itself does not directly 
correspond to a universal psychological or sociological process for 
avoiding delinquency. Such a single-variable analysis leaves open 
questions that demand the consideration of other variables, in this case, 
aggressiveness. This example suggests that a temperament disposition 
(e.g. shyness) in one type of situation protects one boy while leaving 
another boy vulnerable, because of further differences in temperament 
(e.g. aggressiveness). 
1.2.2. Emotions 
Are human emotions disruptive and irrational? Or are they also 
functional and in some way rational? Theories vary. Much of 
contemporary culture promotes an inherited dichotomy between 
emotion and reason. Its proponents, both philosophers and 
psychological theorists, construe emotions as inherently irrational, as 
disruptive and maladaptive. However, other classical thinkers offer a 
more positive view; and some current psychological theories 
emphasize emotions as functional and adaptive.165 Indeed emotions 
                                                 
163 Pianta, et al. 1990, 232. 
164 Werner and Smith (1992) employed the Cambridge Study of Delinquent 
Development (Farrington 1983, 1987, 1989), a longitudinal survey of working 
class males from London’s inner city, born in the early 1950s. They judged 
success by the nature of employment history and family relations, and the 
absence of criminal convictions and deviant behavior. 
165 Recent psychological theories (e.g. cognitive psychology and 
attachment theory) emphasize the cognitive and functional value of even negative 
emotions, e.g. anger, sadness, guilt and disgust. Nonetheless, emotions are not 
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demonstrate a rapid appraisal of the situation. They can facilitate 
adaptive responses. Both trying and uplifting emotions contribute to 
human experience. Yet they are not the whole of it. Sadness, fear and 
disgust, as well as joy, peace and love tell us something about reality. 
But what? In order to avoid a false dichotomy in emotional analysis 
and to understand the role emotions play in promoting resilience, we 
need to acknowledge the way that emotions interplay with cognitive 
and volitional processes; and we need to insist on the basic unity of 
human experience and agency. 
In order to understand the relevance of emotions for resilience 
outcomes, I examine them at four levels: first, as types of judgment; 
second, as influences on perception and action; third, as tied to social 
bonds, fourth as in need of training. This fourfold foundation prepares 
our presentation of divers perspectives on religious emotions and the 
role that religion plays in emotional management strategies. 
1.2.2.1. Emotional Judgments, Perceptions, and Social 
Bonding 
First, according to some thinkers, emotions are judgments. 
They provide us ways to perceive the situation in terms of its meaning 
and future action. Cognitive psychologists construe attraction or 
aversion-eliciting emotions to result from human perception and 
appraisal processes. They describe emotions as the felt tendency 
toward anything intuitively appraised as good or beneficial, or away 
from something sensed as bad or harmful.166 The attraction and 
repulsion of emotion entails a judgment about the organism and the 
environment, or response to meaning at felt (conscious) and unfelt 
(unconscious) levels.167 On the one hand, as a type of unconscious 
judgment, emotions identify meaning as an instinctive, automatic, non-
                                                                                                          
always rational, probably because “maladaptive assumptions and excessive 
sensitivities” distort the appraisal of the situation (F. Watts 1997, 252). Major 
schools of psychology have been less than generous in their study of human 
emotions. For example, Piaget’s studies focus almost exclusively on cognitive 
development (cf. K. Durkin 1995, 20). 
166 Cf. M. Perrez 1992, 182; who refers also to Arnold 1960, Lazarus 1968, 
1991. 
167 Cf. R. Lazarus 1968, 1991a; 1991b; J. Bowlby 1969; M. Ainsworth, et 
alia, 1978, 19. 
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intellectual appraisal of the situation.168 As conscious judgments, or a 
result thereof, on the other hand, emotions imply a more deliberate and 
conscious appreciation of meaning. 
We are more or less aware of the sources of our emotions. 
Confronted with the suffering of refugees, we might not know why we 
are angry. Anger unconsciously arises from the suffering found in the 
situation; we empathize with others in their hunger, illness, separation 
from family and homeland. But we also experience a conscious level 
of emotional awareness when we attribute the suffering to particular 
historical, political, and economic causes. Rational deliberation about 
the situation alters the felt anger, which then no longer simply springs 
from general empathy, but is also generated by conscious adjudication 
about the source of suffering and injustice. This type of emotion is not 
simply a passive reaction to stimuli, even though these emotions may 
unfold in experiences that we encounter more as a passive than as an 
active subject. As emotive situations advance, our emotions constantly 
interrelate with preceding and consequent perceptions, thoughts, 
decisions and actions. 
Second, emotions alter our rational and volitional processes. 
They can facilitate or hinder the perception itself, as well as contiguous 
thoughts, judgments and action. For example, an experience of 
justified anger, when moderate, can aid us to think through a situation. 
It pushes us toward a concrete corrective action. Blinding wrath, on the 
contrary, deforms our perception and confuses our decisions and 
behavior. 
Emotions are stepping-stones to action. Etymologically, 
emotion, which comes from motere, involves a movement or change in 
the person’s “action readiness;” we approach or withdraw from an 
object.169 Attachment theory explains these movements. The affective 
appraisal process first interprets personal and environmental 
information. It then compares internal “set points” (established by 
                                                 
168 A. Damasio (1994, 17) has found neurological links between 
unconscious emotional judgments and conscious decisions. His research 
concludes “that observing social convention, behaving ethically, and making 
decisions [...] require knowledge of rules and strategies and the integrity of 
specific brain systems” underlying the emotions (cf. Wallwork 1999, 174). 
169 Cf. Paul Ekman 1992, 6:169-200. 
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similar or related past events) in order to select certain behaviors and 
prepare action. Feelings—both “positive” and “negative,” pleasant and 
unpleasant—correlate with behavior.170 Our appraisal processes, 
including emotions, prepare and condition resulting coping 
responses.171 Furthermore, following an evolutionary psychology 
perspective, D. Goleman defines emotions as impulses to act according 
to plans that evolution has instilled in us. He also discusses their source 
in “the emotional mind,” which involves a system of knowing.172 
Third, networks of affectional support fashion emotional 
behavior,173 and conversely, emotions underlie our social bonding. In 
particular, feelings of attachment and competency, of self-esteem and 
efficacy promote emotional proficiency and social resilience. On the 
one hand, according to the social development model, social bonding 
to family and positive groups provides protection; it regulates behavior 
and motivates us to live by social standards.174 Protective 
developmental processes, such as opportunities for participation, 
participation-facilitating skills and group recognition, support social 
bonding.175 Resilience research has found that substitutes can 
supplement the loss of primary attachment figures. Resilient 
                                                 
170 Cf. J. Bowlby 1969; M. Ainsworth, et alia, 1978, 19. 
171 Cf. M. Perrez 1994a 347. 
172 Goleman refers to two minds: an emotion (feeling) mind and a rational 
(thinking) mind. He says that: “these two fundamentally different ways of 
knowing interact to construct our mental life. One, the rational mind, is the mode 
of comprehension we are typically conscious of: more prominent in awareness, 
thoughtful, able to ponder and reflect. But alongside that there is another system 
of knowing: impulsive and powerful, if sometimes illogical—the emotional 
mind” (D. Goleman 1995, 8; cf. 1995, 6). Concerning the influence of evolution 
on human emotions, Goleman (1995, 6) adds: “In our emotional repertoire each 
emotion plays a unique role, as revealed by their distinctive biological 
signatures.” 
173 Cf. Clarke and Clarke 1992, 153. 
174 The Consortium (1994, 300) claims that four elements of social bonding 
that inhibit drug use and delinquency are: “strong attachment to parents (Brook, 
Brook, Gordon, Whiteman, and Cohen 1990; Hundleby and Mercer 1987; Jessor 
and Jessor 1977); a high degree of commitment to schooling; active involvement 
in church activities (Schlegel and Sanborn 1979; Wechsler and McFadden 1979); 
and belief in the standards and norms and values of society (Akers, Krohn, 
Lanza-Kaduce and Radosevich 1979). In the social development model, 
attachment or emotional closeness, commitment or personal investment, and 
belief in the values of the social unit are seen as elements of the social bond.” 
175 Consortium 1994, 301-2. 
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adolescents, for example, overcome the risk of lost access to parental 
bonding through enforced attachment to an aunt or uncle, a friend or 
neighbor. However, they face danger if they bond with unresilient or 
destructive figures.176 Since attachment with others brings heightened 
identification with their behavior, vulnerable youth multiply their risks 
through negative modeling. 
Specific resilience research identifies the resilience-value of 
self-esteem, self-efficacy177 and confidence,178 as well as the contrary 
risk related to a sense of incompetence.179 Positive self-esteem can 
enable motivation and action, while negative self-images can underlie 
difficulties in emotional processing. When we feel worthwhile—that 
our actions make a difference, that our participation in a particular 
social setting brings added value—then our motivation and acts are 
more likely to withstand external and internal negative pressures. M. 
Rutter finds it difficult to identify the source of self-esteem and self-
efficacy; emotional processes have two bases: emotional 
predispositions (temperament), and acquired dispositions (conscious 
and unconscious). Each feeling results from this dialogue. Researchers 
have furthermore found a source of felt self-esteem in each successful 
event. We gain this sense not only in hard won achievements but also 
in minor feats. As children grow their accomplishments in emotional 
management and other social experiences tend to give rise to stronger 
                                                 
176 Tousignant (1998, 65-66, 68-69) has found that street children after the 
age of twelve become less adaptive once they enter into criminality. Key 
ingredients in effective interventions are the promotion of self-esteem and self-
efficacy through responsibilization. He has found that giving age appropriate 
responsibilities to children and youth has many positive effects, such as helping 
youth: become responsible for themselves and others; feel self-confidence, pride, 
and find a sense of meaning and purpose in life, motivate their actions (instead 
remaining passive); commit to family and community. They can develop their 
sense of responsibility through giving themselves in committed volunteer 
activities, part time employment, extra-scholastic activities and so forth. Cf. 
Werner and Smith 1992, 5, 205, and 255; Cowan, Cowan and Schulz 1996, 32; 
Coie et al. 1993, p. 1013; Petit et alia 1996, 3045. 
177 Cf. M. Rutter (1990, 197-207) and W. Yule (1992, 191) highlight the 
research findings that suggest the importance of feelings of self-esteem and self-
efficacy. 
178 Cf. F. Lösel 1994, 9. 
179 Cf. W. Yule 1992, 191. 
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feelings of self-efficacy and higher self-esteem.180 Such felt confidence 
appears to be a central component that enables resilient children and 
adults to cope effectively. Werner and Smith say this source of coping 
pertains not to a vague confidence, but rather a confidence that we can 
surmount the odds, that difficulty does not spell defeat.181 
1.2.2.2. Emotional Management Strategies 
Do we necessarily gain control of our emotions with time? 
Emotional competency develops with our capacity for emotional 
expression and regulation. At an early age, humans express 
emotions.182 Some quickly gain competence in expressing them; others 
struggle with emotional composure for the rest of their lives. At the 
neuro-physical level, emotional development relates to the supporting 
brain regions and synapses which grow and whither according to 
emotional experience and intensity. Although emotional development 
continues throughout life, according to J. Kagan, critical stages 
punctuate the rest of our emotional life.183 The abilities involved in 
managing our focus of attention are fundamental to emotion regulatory 
processes.184 Moreover the emotional styles of primary caregivers leave 
an impact especially during the “formative years.” Indeed emotional 
competency develops not only through an individual’s ways of 
experiencing and expressing feelings, as well as through interactions 
with mother, father, siblings and peers, and with social norms and 
cultural practices. Both cognitive and social factors help fashion 
emotional behavior.185 
                                                 
180 Cf. T. A. Wills (1996, 115) has found an interrelation between family 
emotional support and their communication experiences. He says: “In a family 
where emotional support is high, youths participate in communication 
experiences that boost their sense of self-esteem and validate the acceptability of 
their feelings.” Cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996, 220. 
181 Cf. Werner and Smith 1992, 207. 
182 A straightforward example is cross-culturally recognized infant facial 
reactions to water, and sugary, salty and sour tastes. These facial displays of 
emotion are so universal that they are thought to be a genetically encoded trace 
left by the evolutionary pressures of natural selection. Cf. K. Durkin 1995, 296, 
256, 315. 
183 Cf. J. Kagan 1994; D. Goleman 1995. 
184 Cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996. 
185 “These factors include the encoding of relevant social cues (as in 
attending to others’ facial expressions and to the norms of a social context); the 
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Research has identified that certain strategies are effective, 
especially in palliating strong emotions. One strategy of regulating 
emotion involves “self-talk,” through which an individual can soothe 
negative affect and focus on problem solving. Labeling emotions shifts 
attention away from the physiological arousal associated with the event 
in order to perceive it better and then cope with it. Positive uses of 
humor also serve as tools in managing emotions.186 Negative “self-talk” 
and destructive humor, on the other hand, distract people from their 
particular goals and impede their performances.187 In general, 
inadequate coping behaviors, when faced with strong affect and 
emotion, include simple passivity, self-blaming or other-blaming.188 In 
order for behavior to be adequate (responsive to our goals and criteria), 
we must learn to master emotions, at least to palliate the strong ones. 
Research has identified that promoting feelings of self-esteem 
and self-efficacy is a prime strategy for resilience interventions.189 No 
easy recipes exist though. Having to face age and capacity appropriate 
responsibilities and challenges can have positive effects on children 
and youth, including increased feelings of self-confidence, pride, a 
sense of meaning and a purpose in life. On the contrary, negative 
emotional effects emerge when we are forced into crushing situations 
or left alone in the face of overwhelming tasks. Protectionist and 
isolationist policies can reinforce these phenomena. What effects can 
positive emotions have on human agency? They strengthen motivation 
                                                                                                          
accurate interpretation of the encoded social cues (as in perspective taking, 
reading intentions and empathy); the generation of effective solutions to 
interpersonal problems; the realistic anticipation of consequences of, and 
potential obstacles to one’s actions (as in delaying immediate gratification for 
long-term rewards and in understanding that some behaviors might have negative 
consequences for oneself or others); the translation of social decision into 
effective behavior (as in being able to approach and converse with peers and 
adults, showing appropriate eye contact, using an appropriate language); and the 
expression of a positive sense of self-efficacy (as seen in a general optimism 
about outcomes of one’s personally initiated actions).” Consortium 1994, 276; 
which cites Dodge 1986; Dodge and Feldman 1990; Elias 1990; Kendall 1991; 
Jason et al. 1992; McFall 1983; Weissberg Caplan, and Sivo 1989. 
186 Although humor has a strong cognitive component, it is also considered 
an emotional reaction and a judgment. Cf. Berger 1997; Vanistendael and 
Lecomte 2000. 
187 Cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996, 216. 
188 Cf. M. Perez 1994. 
189 Cf. Maughan 1988, 214. 
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for action instead of simple passivity or discouragement when 
confronted with challenges. They facilitate commitment to family, 
community and one’s own self.190 
1.2.2.3. Religious Emotion 
The previous two sections highlight four levels of emotion’s 
relevance for resilience outcomes: as a judgment of meaning; as 
facilitating or hindering perception and action; as drawing from and 
establishing social bonds; and as more or less trainable, adaptive and 
rational. As in the case of emotion in general, personal and social input 
shape religious feelings.191 What do the theories and findings of 
psychosocial science tell us about the role religion plays in managing 
emotions? 
Several modern thinkers establish a link between religion and 
emotion. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) places the essence of 
religions as the feeling of absolute dependence.192 William James’ 
(1842-1910) psychology of religion emphasizes the biological aspect 
of religious emotion.193 Rudolph Otto for his part adds a cognitive 
counterpart to Schleiermacher’s notion of a sentiment of dependence.194 
Social constructivist views of emotion moreover pay special attention 
to emotion’s social aspects, in particular to how social relationships 
                                                 
190 Tousignant (1998: 68-9) speculates that these positive effects are not so 
much a change in personal temperament (character development), but rather a 
result of deeper commitment in a concrete milieu. He describes how this can 
happen with adolescents through committing themselves through volunteer 
activities, part-time employment and extra-scholastic activities. 
191 F. Watts (1997, 246-251) investigates emotion as a model for religion. 
192 See his Addresses on Religion to Its Cultured Despisers (orig. 1799). 
193 According to William James, biological changes associated with 
emotion produce religious feelings. He effects a sort of biological reductionism 
(cf. The Varieties of Religious Experience, “Religion and Neurology,” Lecture I, 
1907, 1-26). He notes the variety of emotions involved in religious intention and 
tied to the unconscious: “religious fear, religious love, religious awe, religious 
joy, and so forth.” He (1907, 31) nonetheless defines religion (or more 
specifically the “personal religion” that he treats there) as “the feelings, acts, and 
experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend 
themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.” 
194 Rudolf Otto (1923) recognizes the “tremendous and fascinating,” the 
“wholly other” aspect of the Holy. Such analyses of the cognitive aspects of 
emotion suggest that religious emotion mediates a new type of knowledge. 
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give rise to religious emotions.195 Gordon W. Allport’s influential 
psychological view on religions sentiment holds that all positive 
sentiments involve a sort of “belief,” and that specific “faith” in God 
carries an even warmer affection than bare “belief.”196 It can also serve 
several functions including: producing consequent conduct and 
research to discover good and truth that issue from faith.197 According 
to Burhoe, religion’s role in evolution and social cohesion passes 
through religious sentiment, which serves a selective and adaptive role 
in the appearance and development of human societies.198 
This incomplete survey provides a foundation for a further 
typology. We can categorize attitudes and approaches towards 
religious emotions, and especially strong emotions, according to three 
main trains of thought: (1) strong emotions are a sign of strong 
religious life; (2) emotions need to be controlled; and (3) sensibility to 
emotions should be refined.199 The first position construes strong 
emotions as a hallmark of robust religious life. The Hebrew Bible thus 
positively appraises early Israelite prophecy and dancing to ceremonial 
music. Christianity likewise supports emotive outpouring in the 
charismatic movement, and in spiritual exercises and devotions. 
                                                 
195 James R. Averill (1980) represents this view of emotion. 
196 As for religious orientation, Gordon W. Allport (1950, 1967) 
distinguishes types of religious emotion: immature or mature, extrinsic or 
intrinsic. Religious emotion takes differing forms, from a preliminary desire of 
fear, curiosity or conformity, through question and doubt, to mature self-
differentiated religious sentiment. Furthermore, Allport (1950, 10-11; cf. 141) 
notes that the development of religion is reflected by an individual’s: “(1) bodily 
needs, (2) temperament and mental capacity, (3) psychogenic interests and 
values, (4) pursuit of rational explanation, and (5) response to the surrounding 
culture.” He recognizes that for most psychologists, religious sentiment is more 
the intentional focusing of the experience, than the characteristic of the religious 
experience itself (a divergent set of experiences that may be focused on a 
religious object). 
197 According to Allport (1950, 161; cf. 141), “a man’s religion is the 
audacious bid he makes to bind himself to creation and to the Creator. It is his 
ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own personality by finding the 
supreme context in which he rightly belongs.” 
198 According to Burhoe (1986, 469), religion is the missing link in 
evolution. But in addition to the universal source of harmony and cooperation in 
society; religion—in sectarian and fanatical forms—threatens peace. 
199 Freud focuses more on a lack of awareness of emotions, although he has 
been interpreted as supporting uncontrolled expression (cf. F. Watts 1997, 254). 
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The second position, sometimes alongside the first, emphasizes 
calming the emotions. The Hebrew Bible, and Buddhist and Christian 
contemplative traditions promote this position, which nonetheless has 
two approaches to calming the emotions. On the one hand, we need to 
repress emotions. They endanger spiritual development. They tempt us 
toward a voluptuous style of life. According to St. Paul, the flesh seeks 
to override the spirit.200 Thus, Watts and Williams label Henri Suso and 
John of the Cross’ works as repressive approaches to the passions.201 
On the other hand, a more positive approach to calming emotions 
exists.202 It holds that we need neither to repress nor necessarily to 
release emotions. It opposes a common notion that emotion is a kind of 
energy that we need to discharge. Energy models of emotions 
misconceive emotional states as homeostatic. Indeed, expressed 
feelings often increase instead of decrease the desire to express them 
again. Expressing emotions neither always makes us feel better nor 
does not doing so always make us feel worse. Psychological research 
has shown for example that anger does not normally reduce in intensity 
when we express it.203 
Third, a mild ascetic perspective draws upon religions 
resources to refine emotions. This perspective requires a greater 
emotional sensitivity and awareness, instead of a simple forced-control 
of strong emotion.204 The positive side of emotions illustrates that 
religious life can heighten emotional experiences. We can positively 
express joy and sorrow.205 The goals of heightened emotional 
                                                 
200 See St. Paul’s letter to the Romans, chapter 8. 
201 Cf. Watts and Williams 1988, 79-85. 
202 According to Watts and Williams (1988), constructive approaches to 
calming the emotions include those of Augustine Baker (a 17th century 
Benedictine monk); and Rudolf Steiner (founder of Anthroposophy). 
203 Cf. Watts and Williams (1988, 83). 
204 Stocker and Hegeman (1996, 1-2) argue for the value of emotions using 
psychological and philosophical insights, and affirm that: “An absence of 
deficiency of affect is a characterizing feature of many neuroses, borderline 
conditions, and psychoses, as well as such maladies of the spirit as 
meaninglessness, emptiness, ennui, accidia, spiritual weakness, and spiritual 
tiredness.” Cf. Watts 1997, 255; Averill and Nunely 1992; D. Goleman 1995. 
205 Watts (1997, 255) suggests that emotional sensitivity can enhance the 
religious person’s awareness of God. He highlights the positive approach of 
Jonathan Edward’s A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections ([1746] 1959). 
Watts quotes Cherry’s (1966, 167) analysis of Edward’s theology of emotion: 
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sensitivity and focused emotion expression are compatible with 
emotional composure and enhanced powers of concentration. A first 
step in educating emotional reaction involves self-observation. To 
name a troubling emotion can make it less troubling.206 The purpose of 
religious techniques for emotional control and refinement has been to 
develop knowledge of and commitment to the “divine,” to know and 
love God better. How do emotions hinder or help access to the divine? 
According to Watts and Williams, both religious meditation and 
psychotherapy can aid in obtaining a right balance of emotional 
distance and engagement, and of cognitive receptivity, which not only 
can alter the quality of attention to the divine object, but can also 
change the way in which it is known and loved.207 
These non-systematic indications of the correlation between 
emotion and resilience provide a foundation for our later study. In 
chapter two, they will return in our discussion of Aquinas, emotions 
and moral development. In chapters three through five, they will serve 
throughout the discussions of fortitude and its related virtues inasmuch 
as through virtues, we manage emotions in natural and religious 
perspectives. 
1.2.3. Cognitive Processes and Meaning 
How do evaluative, planning and problem-solving skills aid 
resilience? A large segment of resilience research focuses on cognitive 
processes and meaning. In the midst of vicissitude and ambivalence, 
we decipher information; we plan for goals; we solve problems; and 
we seek meaning. Cognitive and developmental psychologies are the 
main research protagonists in this domain. Nonetheless social 
psychology and the situation-behavior approach offer other important 
insights. Although native intellectual capacities differ,208 we acquire 
                                                                                                          
“Religious man is not one who subjects passions to the rule of reason but one 
whose reason is passionate and whose affection is intellectual.” 
206 Watts and Williams (1988, 90) offer examples from the Buddhist 
practice of “mindfulness” and clinical techniques for creating space to cope with 
problems. 
207 Watts and Williams 1988, 90. 
208 We should not simplistically equate intellectual capacity with school 
attainment. But Yule’s (1992, 194) studies indicate that lower attainment 
correlates with a high risk, and higher attainment with protection. Furthermore, 
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dispositions and practices that extend or diminish our cognitive 
resilience resources. These theoretical and empirical studies link 
meaning with emotional health;209 and unsurprisingly, they correlate at 
least average intelligence with resilience outcomes.210 
Without presenting a full developmental social psychology of 
cognition, I shall highlight cognitive factors that resilience researchers 
hypothesize play significant roles in resilient action. Resilience 
cognitive factors include: (1) strategies to manage and appraise 
information; (2) ways to construct and adapt meaning in family and 
other social groups; and (3) approaches to religious causal attributions 
and meaning. 
1.2.3.1. Information Management and Appraisal 
How do styles of information management and appraisal affect 
our resilience? Stress challenges our capacities to manage our attention 
and cognitive processes. Proper measure is warranted. In order to act 
with foresight, we need not only to receive information, but also to 
seek and process it. Hardships and stressors can short-circuit our 
thought processes. Especially when under pressure furthermore, we 
need to suppress as well as collect information in order to attain our 
goals. Without restrictions on stimuli, we are overwhelmed and 
distracted. 
How do we use cognitive processes to interpret and overcome 
a quandary? Perrez and Reicherts, in a situation-behavior approach, 
employ stimulus-response chains to reconstruct the process of 
encountering stress. They observe four steps: perceptions of change, 
emotions, cognitions and coping responses.211 The initial stimulus of a 
micro-episode alters the subject’s internal or external world. We 
                                                                                                          
we acquire vulnerability, by limiting the employment of our cognitive capacities. 
The way that we cognitively appropriate and manage experiences, especially 
risky ones, renders them more or less a source of vulnerability or protection. 
209 According to Chamberlain and Zika (1992, 139), V. Frankl (1967) held 
that “the will to meaning was an essential human motive, and that when a 
person’s search for meaning was blocked, existential frustration occurred, leading 
to the pathological condition he called ‘noogenic neurosis.’” 
210 Cf. Werner and Smith 1992, 192; Werner 1989; F. Lösel 1994, 9. 
211 This process in turn forms a new situation and a sequence of segmented 
behavioral units. M. Perrez and M. Reicherts (1992, 19) base their method on the 
research of Lazarus 1982, 1984; and Lazarus and Smith 1988. 
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perceive change by processing information stimuli. What we first 
passively receive, however, cannot be left as such. We need to muster 
reliable coping responses. Our emotions serve as initial judgments. We 
must nonetheless analyze the situation in order to evaluate the object 
involved and determine how to act. What are the pertinent 
circumstances? What similar situations have we faced in the past? 
What alternatives exist? What consequences will come from acting or 
not acting? How does the present situation relate to significant goals 
and larger contexts of meaning? The way that we employ our cognitive 
(and volitional) processes to resolve difficulties serves our resilience or 
on the contrary renders us vulnerable.212 
We limit resilience outcomes by either oversimplifying 
cognitive analyses or neglecting pertinent information and emotions.213 
According to Reich, we hamper our capacity to understand cognitive 
complexity, by restricting ourselves to classical logic that posits only 
bivalent notions of truth. We need complementary logics and cognitive 
skills. Cognitively complex thinking—including analogical, dialectical 
and metaphorical thinking,214 and relational and contextual reasoning—
complete limited cognitive applications.215 The ability to manage 
                                                 
212 Masten, Best and Garmezy (1990) include “problem-solving abilities” 
in their summary of the protective factors. Cf. T. A. Wills 1996, 110. A fuller 
description of problem-solving should also include other unobservable events: 
motivation or emotional support and hindrances, self-perception (in terms of self-
image, efficacy, control), in addition to the subjective appreciation of meaning 
(focusing on the positive dimension of the situation and minimizing distress), 
social influences (family, peers, community and society), and so on. 
213 The effects of nuanced intellectual capacities, and emotional integration 
have been investigated in the context of teaching philosophy to children at risk 
(cf. Sharp and Splitter 1995) and learning “relational and contextual reasoning” 
(cf. Oser and Reich 1987; Reich 1995). 
214 H. Reich (1995, 13-14) says, “Cognitively complex thinking involves 
differentiation (bringing out differences of fact, of possible interpretations, and 
valuing) and integration (attempts at linking various elements in order to arrive at 
an overall assessment). [...] Analogical thinking help to connect the unknown and 
the known. [...] Dialectical thinking is called for when a situation needs to change 
in order to come to a solution.” On metaphor see: A. G. McGrady 1994; P. 
Ricoeur 1981. A bivalent notion of truth entails that everything is either right or 
wrong—A or B—tertium non datur (cf. H. Reich 1995). 
215 “Relational and contextual reasoning” (RCR) involves ways of 
addressing seemingly incompatible aspects of reality. H. Reich (1995, 14-15) 
reasons that “Complementarity (RCR) always involves two or more descriptions, 
explanations, “theories,” acts, etc. ... In all cases at least two classically 
“incompatible” aspects need to be considered in order adequately to describe, 
 
68 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
cognitive complexity favors resilience outcomes not only in academic 
settings, but also in everyday interactions. 
Second, resilience researchers do not agree on the sources of 
meaning. Do we create or discover meaning? Or both? On the one 
hand, some researchers focus on the subjective aspect of meaning. In 
order to cope with stress, we attribute meaning to events.216 We even 
construct shared-meaning in families and other groups.217 On the other 
hand, certain researchers concentrate on the objective aspect of 
meaning. They claim that humans have the capacity to discover 
meaning. Thus humans call upon the order and meaning inherent in 
situations, relationships and life. We rally objective meaning to 
confront and overcome difficulty.218 The resilience research and theory 
that places value on the subjective side emphasizes human 
development. It is an individual person whose understanding grows. 
Emphasis on the objective side posits a reality outside the individual. It 
assumes that we can discover external sources of meaning and goals 
that constitute human fulfillment, well-being and happiness. I shall 
adjudicate this debate in the next chapter, but suggest here that at 
different levels both insights are true. 
Third, what cognitive strategies for coping, consistency and 
construction exist? I mention three here: goals, planning and self-
esteem. The integration of life-goals underlies resilience efforts. 
However not all goals are of equal value. Goals can range from the 
most all-embracing ones (well-being and happiness) to the more 
                                                                                                          
understand or deal with the situation in question, for instance the wave-like and 
the particle-like behavior of light, emotional acts and their moral justification by 
the person concerned, [...] In these cases of strong complementarity, the 
complementary aspects come into view successively. In contradistinction, in the 
case of weak complementarity aspects are perceived simultaneously (at least in 
principle). Instances are: [...] moral demands explained as resulting from absolute 
principles and an individual’s capacities, etc.” 
216 Friedrich Lösel (1994, 9) identifies as a resilience process “the 
assignment of subjective meaning to stress and coping within the framework of 
one’s own development.” 
217 D. Hay’s (1988, 245-54) developmental model posits that children and 
parents “construct” together shared meaning for a life event. He describes five 
constitutive periods in constructing shared meaning: past history, immediate 
antecedents, the event’s occurrence, its immediate consequences, and subsequent 
outcomes. 
218 Cf. S. Vanistendael 1995, 20-22 and Vanistendael and Lecomte 2000; 
cf. Post-White (1998, 281-87) who links meaning with hope. 
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specific and proximate ones. Researchers have identified “planfulness 
and aspiration” as protective factors for goal achievement.219 Werner 
and Smith’s research has found a particular resilience effect when 
youth establish realistic educational and vocational goals by age 
eighteen.220 M. Rutter furthermore documents the resilient effect of 
positive planning styles in regards to marriage (choice of spouse) and 
work situations. When we plan well, we avoid some risky situations.221 
Planfulness has allies in manifest cognitive competencies,222 problem-
solving skills and self-esteem; it is rooted in a goal orientation.223 The 
enemies of aspiration however involve under and over-protection224, as 
well as “learned helplessness.”225 
The cognitive aspect of self-esteem promotes resilience. 
Resilience researchers use various terms: manifest competence and 
perceived efficacy,226 a positive self-concept227 and self-esteem.228 
Research demonstrates that humans establish and maintain awareness 
of self-esteem and self-efficacy through supportive personal 
relationships, successful task accomplishment, and so on.229 How does 
                                                 
219 Cf. Masten, Best and Garmezy 1990; N. Garmezy 1994. On planfulness 
see: Clarke and Clarke 1992, 153. 
220 Cf. Werner and Smith 1986, 59. 
221 Cf. M. Rutter 1990. 189-202, esp. 195-6. 
222 Such competencies include communication competencies. Cf. Werner 
and Smith 1986; F. Lösel 1994, 9; Masten, Best and Garmezy 1990. 
223 In chapter four, I discuss further the relationship between goals and 
hope; cf. Snyder et al. 1991a; Post-White 1998; Erickson et al. 1975; Stotland 
1969; Frankl 1963. 
224 Cf. M. Tousignant 1998, 69-71. 
225 Learned helpfulness produces a mindset in which we believe that 
success and failure is completely independent of our skilled actions, as M. E. P. 
Seligman’s (1975, 38) research demonstrates (cf. Murphy 1987). 
226 Cf. A. S. Masten, Morison et alia 1990, 236-256; Masten, Best and 
Garmezy 1990, 2:425-444; Werner and Smith, 1992, 205; cf. 255. 
227 Cf. F. Lösel, 1994, 9. 
228 Werner and Smith (1992, 205; cf. 1986, 9) say that: “The promotion of 
self-esteem and self-efficacy in a young person is probably the key ingredient in 
any effective intervention process.” They (1992, 185-186; cf. 1986) establish the 
importance for high risk girls to have “a strong internal locus of control and high 
self-esteem.” For other research on self-esteem, see: Rutter 1990, 182; Garmezy 
1985. We discuss the limits of self-esteem interventions in chapter four. 
229 According to M. Rutter (1990, 206), available evidence suggests that 
two types of experiences are most influential in the development of self-esteem 
and self-efficacy: “(a) secure and harmonious love relationships and (b) success 
in accomplishing tasks that are identified by individuals as central to their 
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this work? On the one hand, successful task accomplishment, such as 
positive school experiences, can either reinforce or develop self-
esteem.230 On the other hand, the presence of relevant experiences in 
one domain (e.g. school) can compensate for a lack in another domain 
(e.g. family).231 Although the mechanisms are not fully understood, 
Rutter suggests that we carry forward cognitive sets of negative and 
positive events, which relate to self-esteem and self-efficacy, as well as 
to internal working models of relationships.232 
1.2.3.2. Constructing Social Meanings 
Personal cognitive activities are not devoid of social context. 
In particular, the family can play an integral part in an individual’s 
coping, constancy and construction. In the face of difficulty, our social 
groups influence our adaptive appraisal, deliberation and decision-
making processes. We can illustrate the construction of social 
meanings in two ways. First, family members come to certain 
perceptions, thoughts and decisions together. These shared family 
meanings reduce ambiguity, and contribute to group stability and 
identity. Secondly, our family influences our own cognitive processes, 
inasmuch as each of us comprehend things through social interaction.233 
                                                                                                          
interests.” I have already cited the importance of attentional processes in the 
functioning of self-esteem (cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996, 1991). 
230 Rutter studied two groups of adolescent girls: an ex-institutionally cared 
for group and a control group. He conjectures that the experiences of pleasure, 
success, and accomplishment at school help in the acquisition of knowing one’s 
own worth and ability to control what happens. He finds a difference between the 
two groups. In the ex-care group, the school experience created self-esteem. But 
the control group already had ample sources of reward and support in the family; 
therefore the school experience simply reinforced their self-esteem. 
231 Conjectures about the mediating mechanisms relating task 
accomplishment and school experience to the construction or intensification of 
self-esteem abound. Is it the social success, the opportunities to take 
responsibility, the benefit of self-knowledge, or the feeling of one’s own self-
worth? Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 197 and 206-7. 
232 Furthermore Rutter suggests other possibilities for later investigation: 
neural or neuroendocrine effects; linkages through which one type of adversity 
might predispose someone to another type. Cf. Rutter 1994b, 373-4; Bretherton 
1987, Harter 1983. 
233 Berger and Luckmann’s classic The Social Construction of Reality 
(1966) provides theoretical grounding for the premise that social interaction 
creates and maintains meanings (cf. Patterson and Garwick 1998, 80-1). 
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Family meanings emerge when family members interact. Shared 
experience and dialogue shape understanding. 
Researchers speculate that family types234 influence meaning 
under stress.235 Patterson and Garwick hypothesize that families 
construct and share meanings according to three levels:236 the family’s 
situational meanings, identity, and worldview.237 These meanings 
undergo adaptive pressures in the face of crisis, confusion and conflict. 
For example, research has found that families with a medically fragile 
child first undergo a process of adjustment when the demands of the 
situation surpass their capacities. They need to adapt, to balance the 
demands and their capabilities. In observing the situation, they 
                                                 
234 Patterson and Garwick (1998, 79-80) distinguish two family types: (1) 
consensus-sensitive families, which are high on coordination and closure; (2) 
environment-sensitive families, which are high on configuration and low on 
closure. 
235 The cognitive factors have been present in most family stress theories. 
The earliest family stress model was Reuben Hill’s ABCX Model: A-stressor; B-
family resources; C-family’s definition of stressor; X-crisis (1949, 1958; cf. 
Double ABCX Model of McCubbin and Patterson 1982, 1983a; 1983b, which 
adds the layer of perception of each element, as well as the concept of coping, 
and the more generalized meaning construct (cf. McCubbin et alia 1998). 
236 McCubbin et alia (1998, 43-9) outline a helpful conceptualization of 
various levels of family meaning, as a part of his Resiliency Model of Family 
Adjustment and Adaptation. They recognize a five-level hierarchical ordering of 
family appraisal processes in resiliency and adaptation. Level 5. Family schema: a 
family structure of shared values, beliefs, goals, expectations and priorities. Here 
meaning is assessed through the processes of: classification; spiritualization; 
temporalization; and contextualization. Level 4. Family coherence: the motivation 
and cognitive bases for the family’s transforming of potential resources into 
actual ones. This process involves feeling confidence that the world is 
comprehensible, manageable and meaningful. Level 3. Family paradigms: 
patterns of functioning around specific family domains (work, communication, 
spiritual / religious orientation, child-rearing). Level 2. Situational appraisal: 
family’s shared assessment and management of stressors, hardships and demands 
for adaptation. Level 1. Stressor appraisal: initial family definition of stressor and 
its severity. 
237 Patterson and Garwick’s (1998, 83-6) Family Adjustment and 
Adaptation Response (FAAR) Model (Patterson) emphasizes adjustment in terms 
of family and individual resilience and a salutogenic perspective. The FAAR 
Model differentiates two levels of family meaning: situational and global 
meanings. Situational meaning concerns the family and individual subjective 
meaning; while global meaning concerns transcending the situation, a more 
stable cognitive set encompassing beliefs about the family and relationship to 
larger community. FAAR Model comprises five dimensions: shared purpose; 
collectivity; frameability; relativism (context); shared control (cf. 1998, 72-5) 
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inevitably attribute meaning to the illness. They ascribe meaning at 
three levels. 
First at the situational level, shared meanings emerge through 
the family adaptation process. Family members influence each other’s 
appraisals of the situation; they may find a common definition of the 
crisis.238 The family also develops expectations about who is 
responsible to manage the illness. They employ internal and external 
resources.239 In response to a chronically ill child, parents frequently 
report positive outcomes: growth and development of oneself or the 
family unit in response to the challenge.240 Second at the family identity 
level, they may redefine external and internal boundaries; reassign 
roles for family tasks; and reestablish rules and norms for interaction, 
in order to more effectively manage the illness. Third concerning the 
family worldview,241 some parents modify their goals and global 
meanings (sense of purpose) to fit their behavioral and emotional 
investment in their child. Their search for the cause of the illness also 
influences and is influenced by their worldview, as well as by 
situational meanings and family identity. Further effects evolve from 
such a crisis. On the one hand, some families break down when 
members no longer agree on the purpose of their relationships. On the 
other, some families restructure with added strength; through shared 
social coping and adaptation, their unity is hardened as steel under 
pressure.242 
                                                 
238 Even though there are independent acts (and situational definitions), 
when a coordinated family behavioral response is needed for effective 
functioning, sometimes agreement on the situational definition is more necessary. 
239 Cf. Patterson and Garwick 1998, 84. 
240 Cf. Patterson and Garwick 1998, 75-76. 
241 Patterson and Garwick (1998) focus on the worldview construct as the 
process of relating or orienting to others, rather than about the content of beliefs. 
242 According to Patterson and Garwick (1998, 86), “Disastrous events 
shatter expectations, goals, and even world views, resulting in uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Individuals turn to their significant others in search of emotional 
comfort and an explanation for what is happening. The loss of a sense of personal 
control leads to joining more closely with others. Steinglass and Horan (1987) 
reported that families often pull together, giving up individual worldviews for a 
shared one. Support groups also serve this function for persons experiencing 
major illness.” Perhaps a preexisting synthetic worldview enhances such 
adaptation to chronic stress; or perhaps the nature of this stress is such that some 
families change their worldview. Research on the place of worldviews needs to 
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Studies on children facing family hardships illustrate the 
impact of family meaning strategies on its member’s cognitive 
processes. Tousignant (1998) finds that the perceived injustice of 
parental favoritism is a cumulative factor that renders already 
vulnerable children more so. Injustice demonstrates the dissimilarity of 
experience within the same family; one child receives more, and 
another is “under cared for.” Children are inevitably nurtured 
differently, perhaps in terms of affection, education, or social 
opportunities. Given temperamental, affective and cognitive 
differences, parents treat children in non-identical ways. Such equity is 
more adapted than unnuanced equality. However, children interpret 
differently both measured diversity and outright favoritism. 
Nonetheless, they can even find meaning even in the latter. Tousignant 
identifies that some children recognize co-suffering as a source of 
coping.243 Simply not suffering alone can give a sense of meaning; they 
feel solidarity with others, by realizing “the world is not hard on me 
alone.” Tousignant finds therein the unfolding of morality, a sort of 
common meaning.244 He posits that a sense of morality can render 
people more resilient, strangely enough in the face of injustice. 
1.2.3.3. Religious Causal Attributions, Meaning and 
Spiritual Resilience 
How might cognitive bases of spirituality and religion enhance 
resilience? In general, spirituality and religion involve a worldview 
and direction in life, as well as purpose and criteria for action. They 
provide a basis for moral action and attributions of good and evil.245 In 
                                                                                                          
be done to understand why some families develop positive, adaptive beliefs and 
meanings and others do not. 
243 Cf. M. Tousignant 1998. Rutter (1990, 206) adds that “the reality of the 
bad experiences and less desired attributes as well as the presence of the good 
qualities and happenings” serves the adaptation and coherence of self-concepts. 
244 M. Tousignant (1998, 61-72) recognizes similar findings in the study of 
Norma Haan (1989), namely that children who have a sense of morality are more 
resilient. Tousignant’s analysis of moral action is limited by a Kohlbergian 
reductionistic identification of morality with justice; it nonetheless at least 
employs a conception of justice as a constitutive aspect of morality. 
245 Cf. F. Lösel 1994; and A. Osborn (1994), who says that faith “can” play 
an important role in determining that which is normatively acceptable for society. 
 
74 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
particular, resilience research suggests that religiosity and well-being 
correlate through meaning.246 Especially in trauma and difficulty, 
religion enhances resilient outcomes by contributing meaning and 
coping strategies. This correlation involves two aspects: belief’s 
intellectual facet (information, knowledge and meaning) and its 
consequence (moral aspect). However, we should not forget how the 
other aspects of religion and spirituality (emotion, motivation and 
social dimensions) interrelate with them. What in particular does 
resilience research say about religious causal attributions, meaning and 
spiritual resilience? 
Studies suggest that the type of religious cognitive causal 
attribution of negative or evil events predicts resilience outcomes. 
Such attributions sometimes overlap. We attribute the cause of the 
event to: God (in terms of God’s plan or will, anger, love or lack 
thereof); external causes (economic or social factors); family (its 
member’s personalities or acts); self (temperament, character, choices); 
chance and so on. For example, Shortz and Worthington’s study of 
young adults’ recall of parental divorce highlights the role that religion 
plays in such attributions, related behavioral activities and coping 
outcomes.247 Two of their findings concern the effect of religious 
individuals’ attributing negative events to God. First, ascribing the 
negative event to God’s anger significantly predicted both “religious 
discontent” and pleading coping activities, such as “asking for 
miracles.”248 Secondly, attributing the events to God’s plan or will was 
the clearest contributor to predicting spiritually-based activities and 
positive acceptance of the events, such as “trusting God for protection 
                                                                                                          
In the next chapter, I shall also discuss the foundational level on which religion 
provides the framework to define resilient behavior and well-being. 
246 According to Chamberlain and Zike (1992, 146, 141), well-being has 
three major dimensions: life satisfaction, positive affect and negative affect. In 
addition to the affective bases, they consider life satisfaction a cognitively based 
(rational) evaluation of well-being. We need to include the three dimensions in 
order to study well-being, religiosity and meaning. One problem remains: how to 
distinguish spiritual from non-spiritual well-being; religious well-being from 
existential well-being. 
247 Shortz and Worthington 1994, 178; cf. Pargament et al. 1990. 
248 Pleading activities were a general effect related not only to attribution to 
God’s anger, but also in a lesser degree to God’s will or God’s lack of love, 
according to Shortz and Worthington (1994, 178). 
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and turning to God for guidance.”249 This research identifies one aspect 
of the relationship between an individual’s “concept of God” and the 
resiliency of human agency.250 
Theorists and researchers recognize that religion and 
spirituality serve in discovering meaning, purpose and life goals. They 
emphasize differently nonetheless religion’s role in the creation or 
discovery of meaning. On the one hand, they refer to religion and the 
inner spiritual life as “the cradle for a construction of meaning;”251 and 
faith as involving meaning making,252 in terms of convictional 
knowledge253 and the use of imagination.254 They also say that 
individuals construct their own sense of order out of their choices, 
achievements, commitments, and relationships.255 On the other hand, 
they affirm that we discover meaning through religious experience and 
practice, which give reference to spiritual order and other facets of life 
and the universe.256 
                                                 
249 In this case, Shortz and Worthington (1994, 178) assume that, “those 
who viewed the divorce as being part of God’s plan seemed to use religion to 
cope actively.” 
250 On the concept of God in the psychology of religious cognition, cf. 
Watts and Williams 1988, 128-150. 
251 Garbarino and Bedard 1996, 467. 
252 Gina O’Connell-Higgins (1994, 172) uses “faith” in a more 
philosophical sense. She says: “whether it is found in religious or secular forms, 
faith development theory invites us to recognize that faith is the activity of 
meaning-making in its most ultimate and intimate dimensions—finding pattern, 
order, and significance to our lives.” 
253 O’Connell-Higgins (1994, 173) uses Sharon Parks’ (The Critical Years: 
Young Adults and the Search for Meaning, Faith, and Commitment, San 
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1986) idea of faith as “a unifying pattern that 
organizes a person’s deepest convictions about him—or herself and others—an 
individual’s firmest core understanding of what is true.” 
254 O’Connell-Higgins (1994, 177) furthermore says: “Park stresses that ‘to 
adequately understand and sponsor the journey toward mature adult faith, we are 
compelled by the reflections of [Samuel Taylor] Coleridge and his inheritors to 
attend to the significance of the process of imagination in the composing that is 
faith. For collectively these persons teach us that [...] existence is transcended by 
means of the imagination. We reach for ‘the gates of heaven’—the ‘ideal’—by 
means of images, which infused with spirit have the power to give unifying form 
to the disparate elements of existence. By means of imagination, human beings 
grasp a transcendent wholeness that was the Promise.’” Following Fowler, she 
attributes to imagination the job of creating coherent “master narratives.” 
255 Cf. Baird 1985; cited in Chamberlain and Zika 1992, 146. 
256 Cf. Yalom 1980; Reker and Wong 1988; cited in Chamberlain and Zika 
1992, 146. 
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How do faith development and a religious based meaning 
provide protective potential?257 A spiritual belief system addresses 
questions of purpose and meaning in life. It explains one’s origins 
above and beyond name, ethnicity, family and history. It can contribute 
to self-esteem; inasmuch as it affirms one’s uniqueness (as creation) 
and purpose, and one’s potential to overcome the difficulty, it 
confronts degrading pressures.258 It aids people to set goal and cope 
with fundamental questions, especially about suffering and death. Yet 
religion and spirituality also have negative potential. Researchers 
highlight the risks that they bring to meaning and cognitive processes: 
close-mindedness and identity foreclosure;259 a sense of spiritual 
superiority, blind and unquestioning loyalty, as well as intolerance 
(e.g. wars, ongoing oppression, politicization of religion);260 
fundamentalist notions of fate;261 risk for mental health;262 and 
unreasonable behavioral expectations.263 
The cognitive side of more-than-cognitive realities has been 
examined through developmental questions about faith, religion and 
spirituality. From a dialectical perspective, Meyer and Lausell argue 
that the open discussion of values, beliefs and faith best promotes 
personal belief systems.264 It emphasizes subjective valuation as a 
counterbalance for excessive stress on objective values. They claim 
                                                 
257 Cf. F. Lösel 1994, 8-12. 
258 Meyer and Lausell 1996, 120. 
259 Identity foreclosure “happens when an adolescent makes a commitment 
to a sense of self without exploring alternatives,” according to Meyer and Lausell 
(1996, 120). 
260 Meyer and Lausell 1996, 129. 
261 Andersen (1991) speculates that a fundamentalist religious notion of 
fate might render a girl to become indifferent to the possibilities of pregnancy. 
Andersen, E. 1991, 375-398; found in Haggerty et al. ed. 1994, 168. 
262 In the context of specific sects, F. Lösel (1994, 10) has found that 
religious orientation may become a risk to mental health; cf. Werner and Smith 
1992. 
263 O’Connell-Higgins (1994, 192) says that the Catholicism of 1950s in 
the United States has been experienced by some as promoting “nearly 
unattainable, thus unreasonable, behavioral expectations. Particular thorns 
include the [negative] virtues of infinite self-sacrifice and unreflective 
compliance, unfounded accusations and guilt-engendering admonitions, the tenet 
of original sin, and the perception of sex as sin.” 
264 This includes moral development. Cf. Meyer and Lausell 1996, 118; 
Haan 1989; Kohlberg 1976. 
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that without such a dialectical process youth may not only “lose out on 
the value of hearing the viewpoints of others, they may determine that 
being value-free is optimal and never develop their own spirituality.”265 
Emphasis on narrative also highlights the development of 
resilient capacities. According to Garbarino and Bedard, a 
growing body of evidence [links] the ability to tell a coherent 
and meaningful account of one’s life to the crucial variable of 
resilience in the face of adversity (Cohler, 1991). Indeed, this evidence 
offers support for the proposition that the emergence of this ability in 
children and youth is the most important foundation for resilience.266 
This view is supported by Robert Coles (1990, 100), who finds 
that children for example not only ask questions about what is 
happening to them, but also want to understand why. When young 
people ask such questions, they call upon their experiences of religious 
life and spiritual values in addition to other potential explanations. 
Trauma and difficulty—especially when experienced first-
hand—defy the adequacy of cognitions about life’s spiritual and 
religious dimensions. Trauma is even more disturbing for children. 
Garbarino and Bedard have observed that “the experience of childhood 
traumatization functions as a kind of ‘reverse religious experience,’ a 
process combining overwhelming arousal and overwhelming 
cognitions that threatens core ‘meaningfulness’ for the child.”267 
Trauma can make evident both human vulnerability and our capacity 
for evil. It can shatter expectations of divine protection. Such 
experiences challenge meaningfulness especially for youths, because 
they have not yet had the time necessary to build a solid framework of 
meaning. They need time to develop the cognitive skills employed in 
                                                 
265 Meyer and Lausell 1996, 118. 
266 Garbarino and Bedard 1996, 469 (emphasis in the original). 
267 According to Garbarino and Bedard (1996, 469; cf. 467), “Initially, we 
can see trauma is the reverse of what could be called a positive spiritual 
cognition, the experience of darkness rather than enlightenment, a plunging into 
the shadows of life, coming face-to-face with the capacity for evil in human 
nature, with human vulnerability in the natural world, with the reality of the dark 
side (Herman, 1992). We say ‘initially,’ because upon closer inspection of the 
great spiritual masters we come to see that these experiences of the dark side need 
not be spiritual dead-ends, but rather can serve as the beginning of an even deeper 
spiritual awakening.” 
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making sense of such events.268 In extreme cases like trauma, but also 
in more everyday challenges, we employ cognitive processes related to 
experiences of religion and expressions of spirituality to cope and 
make sense out of life. They provide stability in both troubling and 
comforting changes.269 Inasmuch as sense aids coping, the way in 
which we employ cognitive processes can be weighed in their resilient 
effects. 
In lieu of a conclusion, let us simply highlight some 
suggestions that have surfaced from this research about how humans 
employ cognitive processes in reducing the impact of risk. First, we 
alter the riskiness of an event by altering its cognition. For example, 
we can neutralize or counteract the damaging alteration in our self-
concept:270 by putting the situation in its larger context, by not blaming 
ourselves for what is unforeseeable or for other people’s failures, by 
pardoning self and others, and so forth. Second, we can cognitively 
alter our exposure to risk or modify our involvement in it. We can take 
distance from risk through the cognitive sets associated with humor271 
or through finding alternatives such as physical distance from the 
situation. Furthermore, resilience support can come for the cognitive 
elements of religion and spirituality’s capacity to aid: in establishing 
cognitive perceptions and attributions, including in adjudicating 
between good and evil; and in discovering and creating meaning and 
goals, especially when coping with trauma and difficulty. 
1.2.4. Volitional Processes: Attention and Competency 
Can we choose to be resilient? Do volitional processes underlie 
resilience and vulnerability? Researchers address the volitional 
dimension of resilience and vulnerability in terms of: attention 
                                                 
268 Cf. Garbarino and Bedard p. 471. 
269 Werner and Smith (1986, 105) say that for their cohort “religion 
provided stability in the midst of change.” 
270 M. Rutter (1990, 197) claims that although “the concept of 
‘neutralizing’ life events (Tennant, Bebbington, and Hurry, 1981) [...] 
postulat[es] an effect that relies on a quality that substantially negates or 
counteracts the impact of an earlier threatening event or difficulty,” not all 
positive events are neutralizing; cf. Brown and Harris 1978, also cited in Rutter 
1990, 204. 
271 Cf. Vanistendael and Lecomte 2000; Berger 1997. 
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management and concentration competency, experiences of self-
efficacy and the ability to cope with difficulty. First, they examine 
internal and external sources of motivation. How do we motivate 
ourselves? And what external factors motivate people? Second, we 
need to ask how do motivation, religion and resilience correlate? The 
responses depend on types of motivation and religious experience and 
expression. Third, what do researchers say about spiritual competency 
in coping? How might religious belief aid us to confront difficulty, 
resist destructive pressures and construct a positive outcome? 
1.2.4.1. Managing Attention and Motivation 
First, let us ask: how do humans manage attention and 
concentration in difficulty? Then, what role does motivation play in 
resilience and risk outcomes? B. J. Wilson and J. M. Gottman (1996, 
189-228) suggest that the human capacity to manage attention is basic 
to a number of risk and resilience factors. By “attentional processes” 
they mean a fundamental aspect of human agency: How do we direct 
our mind to an object? What state of consciousness accompanies this 
concentration?272 Attentional processes provide a group of executive 
roles. They organize experience by “shuttling” between the 
perceptions, emotions and cognitions.273 This interaction is elemental to 
the extension, shaping and modification of temperament and character 
in general. In particular, researchers have found that attention 
correlates to the following resilience qualities: active and social 
responsiveness, flexibility, both positive mood and low levels of 
negative emotions, feelings of self-esteem and self-efficacy,274 mastery 
                                                 
272 In this case, it seems that the term “attention” or “attentional processes” 
is not identical to “intention” in the technical sense of classical ethics, where it 
means the end of the agent (finis operantis). Neither is it strictly synonymous 
with the faculty or act of “volition” or “will” as a desire or appetite for the 
perceived good, nor as the efficient intending and enjoying of that good. 
Nonetheless, it illustrates an important aspect of volition. Later on in the 
discussion on Aquinas’ anthropology, I shall examine the similarities and 
differences between such a conception of human agency, in terms of attentional, 
cognitive, and emotional processes from that of will, intellect, and passions. 
273 Cf. M. W. Eysenck 1982. 
274 In particular, Wilson and Gottman (1996, 190-1, and 220) claim that we 
gain feelings of self-efficacy and high self-esteem when we successfully manage 
emotional and social experiences. Cf. Lösel 1994, 9. 
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of basic interpersonal skills (e.g. turn-taking, mutual regulation, 
sharing internal states) and establishment of interpersonal 
relationships. 
Attention affects agency according to personality type. From 
Wallwork’s psychodynamic perspective,275 whether we are obsessional, 
hysterical, borderline, narcissistic (and so on) influences our conscious 
attentional processes. Such personality types also shape our 
interpretation of the world and our replies to it. Given the plethora of 
stimulus and possible interpretations, attention selectivity is inevitable. 
Nonetheless, we interrogate, narrow or widen it, through our 
sensitivity and self-directional capacities.276 
Attentional processes manage emotion regulation, a core risk 
variable according to Wilson and Gottman.277 Emotional arousal alters 
performance through changing our selectivity and distractibility. In 
general, increased attentional selectivity may result from moderate and, 
in some cases, high levels of arousal; it may aid active coping by 
focusing attention on a primary task. However, not all arousal stimuli 
affect performance equally. Incentive and anxiety types of arousal 
influence us differently. For example, high levels of “incentive 
arousal” increase performance on primary tasks, and do not for the 
most part decrease performance of subsidiary tasks. While high levels 
of “anxiety arousal” tend to narrow attention to the primary task at the 
detriment of secondary ones (by decreasing parallel cognitive 
processing), and may lead to greater susceptibility to distraction from 
internal and external events.278 
                                                 
275 The psychodynamic approach attempts to integrate the explicit and 
implicit workings of the mind. Implicit thought is more than the unconscious 
memory; it includes emotional responses and procedural skills (mental and 
motor) involved in “perception, information processing, thought, evaluation, 
choice and action” (cf. Wallwork 1999, 170-1). 
276 Cf. Wallwork 1999, 180. 
277 Wilson and Gottman (1996,193) claim that most current theories in 
cognitive psychology only inadequately treat the interrelation between emotions, 
motivation and attention. They highlight the importance of past experience and 
present goals in directing attention, as well as the detrimental affect of anxiety 
(negative cognitions like self-doubt and fear of failure) on performance. 
278 Cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996, 194-5. The background for this theory is 
found in the Yerkes-Dodson law (1908), which predicts an inverted-U function 
between arousal and performance. This law foresees that performance is maximal 
with moderate levels of arousal, but lowest with very low and very high levels of 
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The intensity of emotion demands two types of attention and 
processing. We effortlessly process some emotions, while others 
require exertion.279 In the case of strong, disruptive or distracting 
emotions, we must consciously focus attention away from the emotion-
arousing event. The need to redirect attention finds partial explanation 
in two opposite physiological abilities of the autonomic nervous 
system, which are a basis for attention demanding cognitive and 
emotional processes and aid in reestablishing internal homeostasis. 
They are the sympathetic “accelerator” of the sympathetic nervous 
system and the vagal “brake” of the parasympathetic nervous system.280 
On the one hand, in the face of emotional stimulation and intellectual 
interest, the sympathetic accelerator mobilizes the body and increases 
the heartbeat; this self-activation prepares us to meet emergency 
situations (e.g. to affront or flee danger). In turn, we need to be able to 
calm the accelerator effect through self-soothing or emotion regulation 
strategies. On the other hand, the vagal brake conserves and maintains 
bodily resources. Since the effort of maintaining attention requires a 
great deal of energy, the organism seeks to decelerate and stabilize 
heart rate during periods of peek attention; this self-calming enables 
longer concentration.281 Indeed physiological relaxation helps sustain 
attention and aids the arousal-lowering process.282 In the face of high 
levels of anxiety, the inability to manage either of these two 
physiological aspects can lead to reduced attention and performance 
levels, heightened selectivity and the negative effects of 
                                                                                                          
arousal. This law has since been nuanced, for it has been found that different 
types of arousal affect performance differently. 
279 Research indicates a close relationship between attention demanding 
processing and physiological arousal Physiological signs of attention include the 
measure of pupil diameter, heart rate and skin conductance, all of which increase 
during input and processing of information; cf. Kahneman et al. 1969 and 1973; 
Wilson and Gottman 1996, 195-7. 
280 Both parasympathetic tone and the capacity to self-soothe from 
sympathetic activation are involved in controlling internal organs such as the 
heart and glands. Wilson and Gottman, 1996, 195. 
281 The heart would beat at 100 RPM (its intrinsic pacemaker rhythm) if it 
were not inhibited by the vagus nerve. “Vagal input to the heart is interrupted on 
a rhythmic basis with each successive respiratory cycle. Heart rate increases 
during inspiration and decreases during exhalation,” according to Wilson and 
Gottman (1996, 198-9); cf. Lacey 1967. 
282 Cf. Watts and Williams 1988, 78. 
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distractibility.283 In general, such a double failure (increased 
cardiovascular reactivity and low vagal tone) may correlate with 
reduced resiliency,284 while inversely effective attention management 
underlies multiple resiliency strategies. 
Second, the psychosocial sciences sometimes consider 
motivation as synonymous with volition or the human will. They thus 
distinguish motivational from cognitive, emotional and temperamental 
sources of resilience. What are the most prevalent models of 
motivation? And what do the resilience studies suggest about the role 
of motivation in human agency? 
In order to understand the resilience research, we need to 
differentiate two approaches to motivation: the homeostasis and 
growth models. The former conceptualizes humans as motivated only 
in order to find a balance, to fulfill a need. We eat because we feel 
hungry. We sleep because of fatigue. The growth-oriented framework 
construes motivation as a human capacity underlying our progressive 
growth toward an aim. We act for reasons and for goals. Contemporary 
psychology grants a central place to motivation in individual’s goal-
directed agency. 
In his humanistic psychology, the American Abraham H. 
Maslow (1908-1970) uses motivation to replace or at least integrate 
notions of instinct, reflexes, behavior and stimuli-response 
conditioning; he thus attempts to explain human conduct, its 
constituent needs and goals.285 
                                                 
283 Attentional problems are linked to various sources: Attention Deficit 
Hyperactive Disorder (the most severe example), intrauterine exposure to alcohol 
and nicotine (cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996, 191). 
284 Research indicates that even at the age of 5 months infants handle stress 
differently in terms of their vagal tone, cardiovascular reactivity and emotion 
regulation strategies. Wilson and Gottman (1996, 221) suggest, as an area for 
further research, that this variability might be related to individual differences in 
nutrition, exposure to stress, or caregiver behaviors. They also note that highly 
reactive infants may be at particular risk of failing to learn strategies for 
regulating emotion and attention because of how quickly they are over-aroused. 
Over-reactivity may increase the risk of social problems throughout development, 
as with children and adults who have difficulty in tolerating frustration and 
controlling private behavior, which adversely affects their social behavior. 
285 A. H. Maslow (1971/1987 and 1962) devised a six-level hierarchy of 
motives that cause an organism to act and through which an individual progresses 
from basic needs like food, oxygen and sexual expression to the highest needs 
concerning self-actualization (the fulfillment of one’s greatest human potential). 
 
The Resilience Perspective and Virtue-Based Anthropology 83 
Some research seeks to find the roots of operative resilience 
that we derive from the efficacy of our volition. It focuses on human 
motivation and its sources. It asks: how does motivation serve coping, 
self-conservation and constructive competency in hardship? 
Human motivation has various dimensions. When asking: 
“what moves a human being?” responses include not only personal but 
also relational motivations and goals. When asking: “what is moved?” 
answers encompass our own internal states, impulses and resources, 
including our thoughts, decisions and choices. 
Human motivation involves self-control efforts that keep 
disruptive emotions in check, delay gratification or stifle 
impulsiveness. It demands conscientious efforts to take responsibility 
for personal performance and social events. It also involves 
maintaining and being maintained by our goals and standards of life. 
This perspective has various names: Maslow calls it self-realization; 
virtue theory calls it flourishing or happiness; we shall address the 
differences between these perspectives in the next chapter. 
Self-motivation involves harnessing cognitions, choices and 
emotions behind an aim. Goal orientation is essential for paying 
attention, self-mastery and even creativity. Mindfulness of goals gives 
the context for the self-control needed to accomplish large and small 
tasks. D. Goleman describes a successful and sustained, intentional and 
attentional focus as a state of “flow.”286 This goal-driven state of 
excellence enables outstanding acts and performances, and even 
contributes to the development of high-quality dispositions. 
On the personal level, positive self-esteem support self-
motivation and action, just as negative self-images undercut them, 
according to Rutter.287 Other research indicates that feelings of self-
assurance and pride, as well as a sense of purpose in life, can 
strengthen motivation for action and appropriate attention skills, while 
                                                                                                          
He ranks these needs as follows: (1) physiological; (2) security and safety; (3) 
love and feelings of belonging; (4) competence, prestige, and esteem; (5) self-
fulfillment; and (6) curiosity and the need to understand. Using group therapy, 
Maslow promoted a humanistic psychotherapy aimed at aiding individuals to 
progress from the basic needs to the higher ones of self-actualization. Cf. Diel 
1947. 
286 Cf. D. Goleman 1998, 26, 43, 105-129. 
287 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 197-207; W. Yule 1992, 191. 
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the contrary promote passivity, distractibility and discouragement.288 
According to the social development model, social bonding underlies a 
protective type of motivation. Feelings of attachment and solidarity 
with family and groups regulate behavior; they motivate us to live up 
to the group’s standards.289 Participation in social groups can promote 
feelings of self-worth and strengthen personal resistance to external 
and internal negative pressures. 
1.2.4.2. Motivation, Religion and Resilience 
The spiritual and religious domain brings further light to 
motivation and resilience. What role does belief and religion-based 
motivation play in the resilience outcomes? 
Theoretical psychosocial science and resilience researchers 
have focused on the importance of religion in motivation. The two 
types of theoretical approaches offer distinct observations about 
religious motivation. The homeostatic approach affirms that activity 
follows a felt need. We seek a balance, a state without stimulation. In 
this perspective, religion is a response to human fear, anxiety, guilt or 
deprivation. Religion manages these needs.290 Although the 
homeostatic model of motivation usefully describes physiological 
belief and religion, we need to inquire about the adequacy of reducing 
religion to emotional stimuli. 
A growth- or realization-oriented research relies on cognitive 
theories of motivation. It claims that humans seek to optimize rather 
than minimize stimulation. This approach explains the human desire 
for variety, aesthetic experience and curiosity. In this perspective, 
religious activity seeks overall growth and self-realization, which 
involves motivational and cognitive growth. In particular, religion 
serves as the basic motivation, which is the human quest for 
meaning.291 Nonetheless, both these perspectives highlight the 
motivational relevance of meaning and control, as well as mastery and 
self-esteem. 
                                                 
288 Cf. Maughan 1988, 214. 
289 Cf. Consortium 1994, 300. 
290 Cf. Hood et al. 1996, 17-20. 
291 V. Frankl (1963) speaks of this motivation in terms of a “will to 
meaning.” 
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Resilience researchers have found that one aspect of the role of 
religion and spirituality in competency and motivation is the intrinsic 
quality of religious beliefs that reduce vulnerability to risky situations. 
This research distinguishes intrinsic and utilitarian bases of belief. 
Intrinsically religious people have a sincere belief and commitment; 
they thus find their most fundamental source of motivation in the 
principles and standards of their religion. In contrast, a utilitarian, 
pragmatic or self-centered approach to religion is motivated from non-
religious operative principles, e.g. the advancement of one’s own 
status, security and self-justification.292 Meyer and Lausell note that 
positive resilience outcomes correlate to intrinsic religious qualities 
like mindfulness (of other people and of oneness with creation) or an 
internalized code of behavior (involving firmer control, higher 
maturity and greater acceptance of personal responsibility for one’s 
own behavior).293 Masten, Best and Garmezy’s research suggests that 
religious practice (the participation in a church community and belief 
in a higher power) builds protective resources in the form of 
“competence and educational attainment.”294 These indications of 
motivation and competence are more than simply descriptive; they 
offer pedagogical insights concerning growth. 
The motivational and control function of religion offer an 
important typology. What is the role of religion in motivating and 
controlling behavior? Religious principles and standards, parables and 
narratives promote personal control and motivation. In the control 
function, we obey law as coming from another (from God, God’s 
ministers and representatives, or another authority). The law is not 
internal to the agent except as blindly willed. We obey the law, 
because it is the law. In the motivational function, we internalize law. 
                                                 
292 Cf. Masters and Bergin 1992, 222; Kirkpatrick 1989; Donahue, 1985, 
416. 
293 Meyer and Lausell (1996, 125-6) establish these theories from a meta-
analysis of research. 
294 According to the research of Haggerty et al. (1994, 168), “Participation 
in a church community and belief in a higher power were particularly important 
in the lives of rural youths, although religion has been identified as a protective 
factor for African-American youths in diverse settings. Reviewing the function of 
religion as a protective factor, Brown and Gary (1991) and Masten, Best and 
Garmezy (1990) report that religion is associated with competence and 
educational attainment.” 
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We do not simply obey it as God’s command or because it is law, but 
we accept it for further reasons: the common good, the kingdom of 
God, and so forth. Motivation and control are sometimes seen as 
opposing dichotomies. While distinguishable, the control and 
motivation functions of religion can complement each other.295 
In sum, religion can assist to motivate coping activities. 
Spiritual goals, meaning and hope move people to seek to overcome 
hardship. Inasmuch as religion serves coping processes, successful 
coping can in turn enforce religious engagement. In the growth model 
of motivation, religion strengthens basic motivation by supporting the 
human quest for meaning296 and flourishing. 
1.2.4.3. Spiritual Competency in Coping? 
Another question. Is there a volitional basis for spiritual coping 
and resiliency? Resilience research has identified religion’s input on 
how we acquire spiritual competency through coping. They suggest 
that religion promotes resilient efforts. Religion offers us means to 
cope according to the type of: participation the religion plays in 
coping; religious variables, which promote positive or negative 
outcomes; and religious hope, commitment and planfulness. 
According to Pargament et al., our religious beliefs affect the 
appraisal of and the coping with negative events in three ways.297 First, 
we can involve religion, faith or spirituality as a part of a coping. A 
stressful event can be religious in nature; or we can appraise it as such: 
we can attribute the cause of an event to the plan, wrath or 
uninvolvement of God. Spilka, Shaver and Kirkpatrick claim that 
religious concepts highlighting orderliness, benevolence and justice in 
the universe aid us to manage negative events.298 Coping activities 
                                                 
295 Cf. Thomas and Carver 1990, 202; D’Antonio, 1983, 81-108; 
D’Antonio and Aldous, 1983, 15-16. 
296 Cf. Frankl, 1963. 
297 Pargament et al. (1990, 796-7) say: “Religious appraisals, coping 
activities, and resources and constraints may serve a number of functions 
important to the resolution of problems.” 
298 Cf. Spilka, Shaver and Kirkpatrick (1985). In this regard, Pargament et 
al. (1990, 799) posit the efficacy of religious beliefs in dealing with dimensions 
of situations that escape personal control and problem solving efforts. Concerning 
religion and coping with stress see Shortz and Worthington 1994 (esp. p. 172). 
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likewise offer religious bases; e.g. prayer, confession or support from 
religious people and clergy. Religious resources, motivation or 
constraints operate in belief systems, norms and congregational 
support. A desire for ultimate happiness or a closer relationship with 
God may guide coping efforts. Second, religion contributes to coping, 
inasmuch as religious involvement decreases the likelihood of 
complicating negative factors like drug and alcohol abuse, non-marital 
sexual activity, and so on. Lastly, it can be a product of a coping 
process, for example because of successful events we may experience 
increased fervor or commitment.299 
Pargament et al. correlate positive coping outcomes with four 
religious variables.300 The first variable is “belief in a just benevolent 
God.” They have observed that positive coping outcomes correlate to 
“appraisals of events as reflective of God’s will, images of a loving 
God, and orthodox beliefs in a just and merciful personal God.” 
Inasmuch as the religious concepts and practices are well integrated, 
and emphasize order in the universe and fairness in the world, they 
serve psychological functions regarding not only meaning, but also 
self-esteem and an external framework of control. On the contrary, 
they have found that negative coping outcomes relate to appraisals of 
the event as a punishment from God or as a threat, which accompanied 
feelings of anger and distance from God and church members. Beliefs 
in an angry unfair God can threaten meaningfulness, self-esteem and 
control in life. A second variable is an “experience of God as a 
supportive partner in coping.” This relationship with God is intimate, 
emotional and problem-focused. It involves both personal effort and 
recognition of limits to personal agency. It is an interactive 
relationship, neither simply passive nor simply active. A third variable 
is “involvement in religious rituals,” which includes aspects of: church 
attendance; prayer; “avoidance efforts” like—Bible reading or focus on 
after-life; attempts to lead more loving, less sinful lives; support from 
                                                 
299 This religious coping can also be analyzed according to the forms of 
religiousness involved in the coping: (1) Interactional. Supportive interpersonal 
relations with others and with God; (2) Behavioral. Good deeds, pleading and 
religious avoidance; (3) Emotional. Feelings of love or anger; (4) Motivational. 
Spiritual purpose, self-development, problem resolution, sharing, restraint (cf. 
Pargament 1990, 813). 
300 Cf. Pargament et al. 1990, 793, and 814-6. 
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church members and clergy. A fourth variable is the “search for 
spiritual and personal support through religion.” Here an intrinsic 
spirituality is found to seek closeness with God who secondarily is a 
guiding force for problem resolution. An extrinsic spirituality and 
utilitarian approaches in contrast use religion primarily for its 
usefulness.301 
Religious competency (appraisal and coping) is fundamentally 
intertwined with the dynamics of motivation and guidance. For 
example, we can derive hope from a sense of competency, insofar as 
the experience of overcoming difficulty spawns hope for doing 
likewise in the future.302 Werner and Smith claim “the experience of the 
resilient children in coping with and mastering stressful life events by 
their actions, appeared to build immunity against ‘learned 
helplessness,’ and an attitude of ‘hopefulness’ instead—even in the 
midst of material poverty.”303 Such hope-based experiences can be 
shared with others.304 Motivation moreover springs from the force of 
spiritual goals and meaning that provide guidance and support, 
especially when facing obstacles. Meyer and Lausell suggest that 
spiritual goals underlie resilience, and that to become attached to them 
demands more than individual effort; they implicate communal and 
intergenerational goals and collaboration.305 
Thomas and Carver positively correlate religious commitment 
and social competence,306 in terms of increased prosocial skills like: 
                                                 
301 Pargament indicates that an extrinsic approach still can have positive 
coping outcomes, even though its primary interest is not closeness to God. 
302 Concerning hope, see: Y. Danieli 1994; C. R. Snyder et al. 1991a and 
1991b; M. E. P. Seligman 1991 and 1995; S. Breznitz 1986. 
303 Werner and Smith 1986, 157; cf. Seligman 1991 and 1975. 
304 Werner and Smith (1992, 209; cf. 202) furthermore promote the sharing 
of this everyday hope. They say, “from odds successfully overcome springs 
hope—a gift each of us can share with a child--at home, in the classroom, on the 
playground, or in the neighborhood.” 
305 As Meyer and Lausell (1996, 125) suggest that “if adults assist youth in 
identifying their spiritual goals, youth may be better able to uphold their personal 
standards when they are challenged.” 
306 Thomas and Carver’ (1990, 195ff.) study conceived of social 
competence using the following assumptions. First, social competence consists of 
a socially valued dimension defined by characteristics such as self-esteem, 
academic achievements, intellectual development, creativity, moral behavior or 
an internal locus of control. In contrast, negative social developments include 
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self-esteem, social commitment, academic achievement; and a decrease 
in the tendency to develop negative attitudes and participate in 
activities devalued by society such as: suicide, truancy, delinquency, 
substance abuse, teenage pregnancy and sexual permissiveness.307 
Moreover, religion’s positive effect on social competence is illustrated 
through the quality of planfulness. Socially competent adolescents are 
characterized by their ability to plan ahead. Instead of only living in 
the present, they anticipate coming stages of life. They make active 
plans for the future concerning education, occupation, family, and so 
on. They also integrate religious values as goals for the future.308 
Negative effects of religion, on the contrary, include misconceived or 
unhealthy notions of self-sacrifice that lead to the self-abnegation 
within minority groups.309 
In sum, psychosocial theory and resilience research findings 
enlighten human volition’s role in resilient and vulnerability outcomes. 
The way that volitional processes relate to resilience involves the 
personal dialogue between sources of stress and attentional processes; 
goals, self-control and motivation; extrinsic and intrinsic motivation; 
and religious law, instruction and spirit. Research suggests that we can 
                                                                                                          
characteristics such as deviance, aggression, substance abuse, teenage pregnancy, 
learning disabilities, or other attitudinal and behavioral problems. 
307 Thomas and Carver (1990, 205) were unable to draw firm conclusions 
about these correlations. They propose a Durkheimian formulation according to 
which “integration into social orders is the critical element in preparing people to 
‘live better.’” This focus on social processes, rather than the dimensions of 
personality and individual attitudes assumes “that as the individual becomes 
integrated into the religious social sphere and accepts the set of values 
surrounding those social relationships, he or she becomes more sensitive to 
interpersonal expectations from significant others, finds it easier to develop goals, 
and more readily identifies personal abilities needed to achieve those goals. We 
see such interpersonal skills as being transferable to an educational setting, which 
assists the religious person in becoming a better student.” In these correlations, 
they highlighted religion’s two functions: providing limits and norms, and 
providing support, guidance or motivation. 
308 Thomas and Carver’s (1990, 212) research findings highlight “the 
supportive and facilitative function that religion provides informing a set of 
values around which the adolescent is then able to create a set of specific goals 
for the future.”  
309 A healthy notion of self-esteem, according to Don Browning (1987, 
160), can “save such groups as women and minorities from suffering oppression 
and exploitation in the name of appeals that they should sacrifice themselves for 
the sake of others--appeals which sometimes lead to self-abnegation rather than 
to truly appropriate forms of self-sacrifice.” 
90 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
develop volitional competencies that underlie a spiritual coping, self-
conservation and positive construction. Religious coping activities 
offer a unique framework for dealing with the limits of personal 
knowledge, control and resources. For the religiously involved, 
religious coping-constructs offer an additional, non-repetitive source of 
potential resilience.310 
1.2.5. Family Interactions 
Finally I shall directly address the resilience input of family 
relationships (in this section) and other social networks (in the next). 
What family dynamics operate when facing challenges to our 
understanding, physical health and faith? A recourse to sociology will 
enrich the intercultural and experiential breath of the study. This 
section will investigate: (1) the role that a family’s internal harmony 
can have on managing stress; (2) issues that confront families, like 
family dissolution and socio-economic pressures; and (3) the positive 
and negative influences of religion and spirituality on family 
resilience. 
This search for the social context of resilience moves beyond a 
focus on the individual’s internal sources of protection and risk, and 
beyond a narrow focus on the mother’s influence on the child.311 It 
includes the larger environment, the social world. A systems approach 
offers some insights into social relationships; however it has its limits 
as well. We cannot simplistically translate concepts from the individual 
to the family or other social systems. A collective characterization is 
not independent of its individual members, but at the same time it is 
                                                 
310 Pargament et al. (1990, 816-8) argue that religious coping constructs 
can make additive (related but not redundant) contributions to nonreligious 
coping constructs. 
311 A dominant pre-1970 view was that child development is largely 
explained by whatever it is that mothers do to children: (1) mother is principal 
(even sole) influence in the family; (2) there is a direct causal relationship 
between her child-rearing practices and child behavior; (3) early experience 
impacts later personality characteristics and behavior. Bowlby’s (1969) concept 
followed this line. His monotropism entails that children can form but one 
emotionally meaningful attachment, which is normally with the mother, based on 
feeding situation. This view was not supported by empirical data. Children from 
the beginning are embedded in a network of social relationships, diversity of 
individuals with differing influences: fathers, siblings, grandparents, peers, 
daycare and teaching staff, neighbors, and so forth (Cf. Schaffer 1992). 
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not a simple aggregate of them. We cannot simply consider families, 
schools or neighborhoods resilient in terms of attribution of collective 
meaning or competency, as we would an individual.312 Furthermore, 
psychological studies and theories attain less certainty when analyzing 
social dynamics than intrapersonal ones. Last, the social realm is not 
without its ambiguities. For example, some resilience studies 
demonstrate that certain people exhibit a rather antisocial resilience.313 
These challenges demand a deeper analysis of the observations, 
empirical studies and underlying psychosocial theories. 
1.2.5.1. Family Resilience Interactions 
Specialists have observed four types of family314 resilience 
interactions: (1) family fit and harmony; (2) family stress management; 
(3) family disruption; (4) family socio-economic status. First, 
researchers have observed the effects of the family interactional styles 
in terms of fit and harmony. How does the family fit together at 
temperamental, emotional and functional levels? How do they 
complement each other, one’s strength serving the other’s weakness? 
In the midst of routine growth opportunities and challenges, as well as 
more poignant but less usual crises, parent-child fit and harmony 
                                                 
312 Sagy and Antonovsky (1998, 222) highlight the limits of a systems 
approach: “however, empirical application of systems principles in family 
research has been found to be very complex and to date has produced no 
adequate measures (Jahoda 1989). [...] A family collective characterization is not 
independent of its individual elements, but it is also not a simple aggregation of 
these elements. [...] A collective orientation is an abstract concept, which cannot 
be examined or observed as clearly as an individual orientation (Steinglass 1987). 
The family as perceiver, thinker, or possessor of a cognitive orientation is, in the 
last analysis, a concept only in the mind of an observer.” 
313 According to Werner and Smith’s (1992, 69) “career and job success 
was the highest priority on the agenda of the resilient men (39.1%) and women 
(64.7%), but the lowest priority on the agenda of their peers with problems in 
adolescence. Also high on the priority list of the resilient individuals were self-
development and self-fulfillment (M: 34.8%; F: 38.2%). The more traditional 
goals of a happy marriage, children, and having a home of one’s own were 
mentioned by only about one out of four in the group. The lowest item in priority 
among their life goals was close relationships with family and friends (M: 8.7%; 
F: 2.9%).” 
314 The diverse uses of “family” have caused much ink to be spilled. It is 
not always clear that the studies analyzed have the same understanding 
(assumptions about the functioning) of the family. We shall note when possible 
the conception of family used in the different studies. 
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underlie the resiliency of the family and its members. A good family fit 
does not necessarily mean an idyllic, picture-book family or the 
possession of all desirable temperament and character qualities.315 It 
does mean however that a family establishes balanced goals that 
promote the well-being of its members. 
Protective qualities for families facing difficulty include: 
“family cohesion, warmth, and an absence of discord;”316 “stability and 
security;”317 reliable care and identification with competent roles 
models encouraging constructive coping;318 “an open, supportive, and 
controlling educational climate [and] dosed social responsibilities and 
achievement demands,”319 as well as friendship promotion among 
siblings.320 The notion of family support regroups a good deal of these 
qualities and processes; it includes but should not be restricted to 
emotional support. Wills has predicted that parental support leads 
children “to more adaptive coping, less maladaptive coping, and 
development of academic and social competence.”321 His study of 
                                                 
315 Simply composing such a universal list would sidestep the difficulty of 
applicability (and verifiability) across socio-economic and cultural environments. 
We are only able to make limited observations about some of the more evident 
resilience findings. Nonetheless, according to Jerry Lewis and Robin Skynner 
(1993, 29) exceptionally healthy families exhibit the following characteristics: 
affirmative attitude, respect of the individuality and difference of others, open 
communication based on acceptance of the negative and the positive, balance 
between freedom and order, high level of spontaneity, fun and enjoyment, 
capacity to cope with loss and change, a sense of meaning and purpose (based on 
a transcendent value system: religious commitment or humanitarian philosophy). 
316 N. Garmezy 1985; cited in Rutter 1990, 182. 
317 In the context of parents with disabilities, Booth and Booth (1997, 113) 
assess these qualities in the following ways: warmth and mutuality (shown, for 
example, by feelings of having been loved as a child and of having done things 
together as a family), stability (shown, for example, by having at least one parent 
alive throughout childhood and an absence of separations or the loss of a close 
relative), and security (as provided, for example, by having grandparents who 
live near, a supportive uncle or aunt at home, parents who can manage money). 
318 Masten, Best, and Garmezy (1990), quoted by Garmezy, 1994. 
319 F. Lösel 1994, 9. 
320 J. Dunn (1988, 233) identifies that family friendship or friendliness can 
help in various difficult, but normal life transitions, for example the birth of a 
sibling. She notes “certain features of the mothers’ behavior at this time were 
systematically linked to the development of a particularly friendly relationship 
between the siblings.” 
321 T. A. Wills 1996, 117. Such competencies, qualities or skills need to be 
considered as more inclusive and complex than simple cognitive judgments (cf. 
Consortium 1994, 275). 
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family support has found that families expert at coping through 
effective information exchange were perceived by adolescents as 
supportive, and promoted their competence through emotional 
affirmation (boosting the youth’s sense of self-esteem and validating 
their feelings); through disposing of challenge- and transition-coping 
assistance; and through modeling useful support and communication 
skills (attitudes and expectations). He affirms that supportive family 
environments promote successful adolescent integration in larger 
communities322 and deter negative life events. Thus, strongly bonded 
families exhibit clear standards and norms for behavior, which reduce 
the incidence of problem behavior. For example, this helps to diminish 
“precocious sexual activity, leaving school early, interpersonal 
violence, criminal activity, and tobacco, alcohol, or other drug use by 
children and adolescents.”323 
A good mother-child relationship during the first year of life is 
one of the key environmental factors in developmental resiliency 
among children at risk.324 According to Werner and Smith, teenage 
girls especially find a benevolent role model in the type of competent 
mother, who holds a steady job and delegates household 
responsibilities to the daughter.325 In high delinquency-risk 
environments, they also found that buffers against criminogenic 
stresses seemed to include the father’s esteem for the mother, the 
mother’s self-confidence, education and maternal affection, while 
paternal aggressiveness and maternal permissiveness coincided with 
higher levels of youth criminality.326 When the mother is unable to 
provide this good relationship herself, Musick et al. note the value of 
                                                 
322 Wills’ (1996 115-6, 127) study claims to have shown that the higher 
levels of coping and competence in children correlate with family support, and 
that “this relationship is not attributable to a third factor (socioeconomic status).” 
323 Consortium 1994, 300-1. The social development model hypothesizes 
the same role for standards and norms in schools and larger communities. 
Furthermore, Werner and Smith (1992, 185-87, and 198-200, 1986, 134-135) 
have found that shared values, a sense of coherence, structure and rules in the 
household serve to support resilience. 
324 Cf.Anthony (1983); Musick et al. (1987, 249). 
325 Cf. Werner and Smith 1992, 185-186; also see Werner and Smith 1986. 
326 Cf. Werner and Smith (1992, 9) base their conclusion on the 
Cambridge-Somervile Project (McCord 1979, 1982, 1986), a 30-year follow-up 
of 506 children identified between the ages of 8 and 15 as “predisposed to 
delinquency.” 
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her enabling her child to use a “growth-enhancing alternative care-
taking environment.”327 Other studies—less numerous, though growing 
in number—highlight the importance of the father or another male role 
model.328 
Second, family support and competency underpin family stress 
management styles. Researchers define “family stress” as a macro-
event, as a critical life episode disturbing the homeostasis of the 
family.329 Nonetheless, they emphasize differently the individual’s part 
in coping with family stress. In the previous section on cognitive 
processes, I presented the position of Patterson and Garwick (1998) on 
the cognitive processes underlying the appraisal of family stress. Now 
in a larger context, I shall call upon a stimulus-response approach to 
understand stress-management better in the midst of troubled family 
homeostasis. 
Perrez (1994b, 7-8) identifies coping as the adaptive responses 
produced by an individual, in terms of perceiving a stressor, appraising 
it, and expressing related emotions and coping behavior. When family 
members coordinate their coping reactions, the coping effect is more 
efficacious. Bodenmann and Perrez (1993) illustrate how couples and 
families manage stress. First, inevitably one partner’s stress touches 
the other.330 Someone living in a couple thus will have more exposure 
to stress. However, an intimate relationship also offers resources to 
                                                 
327 Musick et al. (1987, 250) describe this “second chance” through which 
the child appropriates the benefit of good parenting from a surrogate. 
328 “For high risk boys, it was the presence of a male mentor or role model 
and the advantage of having been a first born son” that seem to be noteworthy, 
according to Werner and Smith 1992, 185-186; cf. 1986. 
329 On the history of family stress analysis see Perrez 1994b, 7-8. 
330 Studies document the typology of support within the couple. Werner 
and Smith’s (1992) research identifies it as one of the three major sources of 
support for resilient children as adults, (M and F: more than one third); Rutter 
(1990, 189-202) finds that the adult status of institutionally raised girls correlates 
with their marital situation at the time of risk. These researchers suggest that 
different family styles emphasize different centers of strength under pressure. 
Single-parent families underline the importance of its hardiness, which means 
“having a sense of control, commitment, confidence, and challenge over and 
above that of positive problem-solving communication.” This phenomenon is 
perhaps based on the need for self-sufficiency of a single adult in charge of the 
family. While the two-parent household “underscores the importance of family 
problem-solving communication over and above family hardiness” (McCubbin et 
al. 1998, 64). These differences translate into different educational opportunities. 
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better manage the stress together. Studies of dyadic stress resolution 
positively correlate satisfaction of the couple and the way in which one 
partner communicates stress to the other.331 
Family styles of cohesiveness and adaptability correlate to 
coping efficacy. Not every type of dyadic management of stress is as 
effective as others.332 Bodenmann and Perrez (1993) make the 
following theoretical assumptions concerning coping with risk in 
families. The objective intensity of stressors and the members’ 
personal qualities (e.g. hardiness) influence family stress. Coping 
competence also affects family stress. In the second case, capacities to 
reestablish emotional homeostasis and to move forward to solve 
problems and achieve goals build upon one’s satisfaction with family 
life and one’s sense of well-being.333 The style of emotional causal 
attribution influences the quality of emotional reactions and coping. 
Emotional bonding can be a possible positive result of shared stress; so 
can emotional estrangement when stress is poorly managed.334 
1.2.5.2. Family Disruption and Socio-economic Status 
Research hypotheses and findings suggest that family 
disruption is detrimental to support and competence processes, and 
                                                 
331 According to Bodenmann and Perrez (1993, 3-4; also 1991), “While 
love and positive sentiments that one feels for the partner correlate with conjugal 
satisfaction and signify a protective factor, the level of stress and its inadequate 
management do the opposite.” According to Hansen (1992, 191), when the 
couple is committed to each other, the spouses are more likely to better manage 
their stress. 
332 Dyadic stress management can take different forms: 1. common stress 
management; when the two partners manage the stress together; 2. support from 
the other partner; i.e. emotional and practical support from one partner for 
another; and 3. delegation of stress management from one partner to the other. Cf. 
Bodenmann and Perrez 1993, 7. 
333 Common activities (such as family rituals, cf. M. Morval 1986) build up 
inner family resources, according to the hypothesis that “positively experienced 
common activities correlate positively with the parameters of individual and 
familial well-being” (Perrez 1994b, 11). 
334 Limited complexity and specificity negatively influence individual and 
familial social well-being. For example, anger is a more frequent response of 
families with external causal attribution (e.g. blaming other family members, 
scapegoats); while internal causal attribution (blaming self) relates more to 
anxious and depressed emotions (cf. M. Perrez 1994b, 11). 
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may contribute to other adverse outcomes.335 Common sense tells us as 
much. However, empirical research provides needed details, according 
to types of disruption. Early parental loss favors vulnerability to 
psychiatric disorders, especially when accompanied by a serious lack 
of affectionate care in childhood and other direct risk variables, like a 
cognitive set of helplessness and a related concept of low self-
esteem.336 Effects associated with marital conflict include a child’s 
lower self-esteem, negative self-images and troubled relationship with 
the custodial parent.337 Unfair parental treatment of children causes 
imbalances to the family environment; for example, Tousignant has 
found parental favoritism is a cumulative factor that renders already 
vulnerable children more so.338 Although seeming obvious, it has been 
found that good parent-child relationships can decrease risk associated 
with family discord.339 An important social resource has proved to be a 
stable emotional relationship with at least one parent, or another 
adult.340 
The family disruption experienced in divorce demonstrates 
more evident risks. Empirical studies correlate divorce with numerous 
important stressors, many of which are associated with increased risk 
of psychological problems for children. Parental divorce during 
preadolescence is additionally linked with serious difficulties involving 
social and parental relations, as well as scholastic and emotional 
adjustment.341 For the most part, children identify feelings of distress, if 
not disturbance, as a result of their parents’ divorce. Children’s social 
development can be impaired, in particular peer relations can be 
limited in terms of: intimacy, satisfaction, reliable alliance, conflict, 
affection and companionship.342 According to Emery, on the average, 
                                                 
335 Cf. T. A. Wills 1996, 127. 
336 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 200. 
337 Cf. N. Watt et al. 1990, 300. 
338 Cf. M. Tousignant 1998, 64. 
339 According to Rutter (1990, 189-202), there are two directions of 
causation. Family discord can cause further problems for parent-child 
relationships; and negative parent-child relationships can cause further family 
discord. On the contrary family harmony and good relationships can contribute to 
more extensive harmony and good relationships. 
340 Cf. Lösel 1994, 9; Muscik 1987, 250; Werner and Smith 1992. 
341 Cf. N. Watt et al. 1990, 297. 
342 Cf. M. Rutter 1983; N. Watt et al. 1990, 297-8. 
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children function competently after divorce.343 This competency finds 
its roots in numerous protective processes. Preadolescent girls tend to 
find support in peer friends; boys on the contrary do so less than 
girls.344 A good rapport with the custodial parent furthermore has been 
associated with positive self-esteem and social relations at school, 
while a bad rapport was associated with poorer peer relationships.345 
Indeed non-parental substitutes and other reference persons can 
provide important social resources. 
Other risks correlate with the family’s specific socio-economic 
status (SES). Yet risk cannot simply be conflated though (as it 
sometimes is) with lower SES per se. On the one hand, evidence 
indicates that greater affluence and improved living conditions 
accompany increases in certain forms of psychosocial disorder. Young 
people in higher SES groups suffer a greater prevalence of suicide, an 
increase in crime rates, and higher incidences of drug and alcohol 
problems.346 Questions about the correlation of risk and higher or lower 
SES need to address the constituent components of the SES linked to 
actualizing or escaping from risk. Issues related to lower SES include: 
overcrowding, inadequate nutrition, poor health care, the absence of 
positive role models, the compounding of anxieties;347 while those for 
higher SES concern: parental absence, lack of participation in 
meaningful household work and family activities, over-protection, 
over-abundance (including availability of abusable substances).348 
                                                 
343 According to R. Emery (1994, 93), “‘Resilience, not risk, is what most 
clearly characterizes children whose parents divorce.’ Such a counter intuitive 
statement or observation is common to resilience research. The human spirit is 
such that it can overcome a good deal of obstacles, which are not promoted 
simply by the fact that we know that we can for the most part overcome them.” 
344 This social factor may account for why preadolescent boys are more 
vulnerable under the stress of parental divorce. Cf. N. Watt et al. 1990, 298. 
345 Cf. M. Tousignant 1998, 64. 
346 To this list, M. Rutter (1994b, 355-63) adds depressive disorders. 
347 According to Rutter (1994b, 363), poverty itself is a risk factor rather 
than the risk mechanism, which is the family disorganization and breakup 
associated with poverty. Cf. Garmezy 1990, 530.  
348 Significant social and economic changes in the family, school and 
neighborhood contributing to increased health and behavior problems for 
children and youth (USA) are: increased poverty, breakdown of traditional 
neighborhoods and families, reduced support from positive role models, 
inadequate housing and unsafe neighborhoods, economic and educational 
disadvantage, health-damaging media messages, societal attitudes and behaviors 
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1.2.5.3. Family, Religion and Spirituality 
The resilience influence of family, religious and spiritual input 
has been found: (1) to be rooted in faith and moral education and 
modeling; (2) to be important for marital adjustment and happiness; 
and (3) to correlate to a balance between the control and support 
functions of religion and family. First, research has widely recognized 
that values transfer is more effective when parents act congruently and 
offer a warm, supportive atmosphere at home and in church. Several 
studies have identified the importance not only of consistently 
demonstrating values, but also discussing them in order for this 
transfer to occur.349 
Second, the level of family religiosity positively correlates to 
marriage adjustment, understood as marital quality, satisfaction and 
happiness. According to Hansen (1992: 189), in 50 years of this 
research “religion has consistently been identified as a factor 
associated with adjustment.” Religion mediates adjustment through a 
meaning-structure, which includes a normative system with specific 
ideals about marital relationships.350 Although secularization has 
weakened the general link between religion and family, the 
relationship is thought to depend on whether the family has a high or 
low level of religiosity. There are reasons why. Highly religious 
couples report higher levels of marital satisfaction and adjustment than 
less religious ones.351 This correlation also occurs when comparing 
same-faith and interfaith marriages. Hansen explains the reports of 
higher satisfaction and adjustment through the greater faith-social 
network, and the greater consistency both in faith education with 
children and in family faith practices. Mixed marriages, on the 
                                                                                                          
that hurt ethnic minorities (Cherlin 1988; National Commission on the Role of 
the School and the Community in Improving Adolescent Health, 1990). Cf. 
Consortium 1994, 270. 
349 Cf. Meyer and Lausell 1996, 124. Masters and Bergin (1992) also stress 
the importance of synchrony between belief and behavior for beneficial mental 
health consequences (cf. Williams 1989; Pargament et alia 1979). 
350 “According to Berger (1967), whatever else it may be, religion, from a 
sociological perspective, is a humanly constructed universe of meaning. As such, 
it is a normative system that includes specific ideals about the structure of 
marriage and marital interaction” (G. L. Hansen 1992, 190). 
351 Cf. G. L. Hansen 1992; Thomas and Cornwall, 1990; Filsinger and 
Wilson 1984; Wilson and Filsinger 1986. 
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contrary, may have a secularizing effect, or be the result of lower 
religiosity.352 
Third, several factors affect the relation between the control 
and support functions of family and religion. The level of doctrinal 
certitude influences the control impact of the doctrines and related 
actions. When families doubt faith-based doctrines, these teachings 
have less of a control effect. At the same time, a cultural context that 
embodies such a doctrinal critique without proposing a meaningful 
solution leads to an even greater need for the support function of 
religion.353 For example, clergy have traditionally served a caring 
function, which is all the more needed when families suffer from 
cultural disturbances (challenges to religious meaning).354 According to 
D’Antonio and Aldous (1983: 15-16), although there can be a struggle 
over the primacy and focus of the social control and social support 
functions of religion and families, the way in which family and 
religion collaborate in these functions strengthen each other. A 
separation, on the contrary, tends to weaken each of them.355 
1.2.6. Interactions Outside the Family 
After having treated issues of relationship and resilience in 
terms of familial interactions, I now turn to extra-familial interactions. 
                                                 
352 Previously some social scientists ignored this positive relationship, they 
thought that it was explainable in terms of marital conventionalization or social 
desirability (cf. Hansen 1992, 191). 
353 J. Aldous (1983, 63) identifies some of these difficulties as concerning 
sexuality, separation, divorce, abortion, and contraception. Furthermore, 
hedonism and materialism has weakened the control function of religion. She has 
found that because of longer lives (and less contact with death), people have less 
of a sense of the fleetingness of life and less call upon the churches (religion and 
clergy) for comfort in times of grief and for aid in finding meaningfulness in loss. 
Aldous (1983, 68) says, “Thus the hold on people religion once possessed, 
because of their fear or hope of what followed death, the control function, has 
been weakened. Long life leads people to look for happiness in this world and to 
discount warnings of how their present conduct will affect their fate after death.” 
354 These difficulties concern the areas of: sexuality, separation, divorce, 
abortion, and contraception. Aldous (1983) notes that the search for religious 
comfort amidst these conflict areas can also include “non-traditional” 
organizational approaches to these problems such as: charismatic movements, 
Bible study groups, and support groups (for the divorced). 
355 In the case of particular historical emphasis on religious control (e.g. in 
the United States), D’Antonio (1983, 106) highlights the need to develop further 
the love and caring features of religious teachings. 
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The overlap between these two social influences renders inevitable 
certain gaps on one side and repetitions on the other. Nonetheless, this 
section addresses resilience and risk qualities specifically associated 
with relationships outside the home. How does involvement in the 
wider community and environment render one more or less resilient? I 
shall address two interlacing circles of support: first, friends and peers; 
and second, care givers, adult substitutes, the wider community, as 
well as play opportunities and contact with nature. Lastly, I shall 
address the resilience and vulnerability influences that religion has on 
social relationships. 
1.2.6.1. Friends and Peers 
Friends and peers influence us positively in numerous ways. 
Resilience research often makes at least fleeting reference to them.356 
Studies on the development of friendship and friendliness include the 
genetic and environmental factors that interrelate in the formation of 
social networks. As discussed in relation to temperamental qualities, an 
individual’s social support progresses in a dialogue between genetic 
and environmental factors.357 Prosocial temperament characteristics 
include: affability, attractiveness (physical, emotional and 
psychological), sociability, outgoingness, and so on, while negative 
social qualities include higher levels of irritability, timidity, depression 
and melancholia, and so forth.358 Moreover, friendship networks protect 
against depression, while lack of such support can lead to it. 
According to a study conducted in Washington, DC, highly 
competent youth tend to put friendships to good use. Their friendships 
help them to acquire a deeper understanding of themselves and to 
clarify their career possibilities. They share information and pool their 
skills. They face academic and interpersonal challenges together by 
                                                 
356 Cf. Bahr, Hawks and Wang 1993; Bainbridge 1992; Clarke and Clarke 
1992; Dunn 1988; Gottlieb 1998; Meyer and Lausell 1996; Rutter 1994b; 
Tousignant 1998; Watt et al. 1990; Werner and Smith 1992; Wills 1996. 
However, we have not found any extensive studies on the resiliency and risks 
associated with friends and peers. Related, more detailed psychosocial studies on 
friendship include: Kon and Losenkov 1978; Berndt 1981. 
357 Neither genetic nor environmental factors determine the outcome of 
friendship development, according to M. Rutter (1994b, 367-8). 
358 Cf. J. Kagan 1994.  
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drawing from each other’s strengths and complementary points of 
view.359 Moreover, J. Dunn suggests that friendship mediates resilient 
outcomes in various difficult but normal life transitions, such as the 
adjustment to school.360 Wilson and Gottman suggest that friendship 
networks help transform failure experiences, which frequently occur in 
a peer context. In effect friendships provide the resources needed for 
regulating negative arousal of moderate failure experiences and thus 
may lead to greater resiliency.361 Certain studies have found that 
resilient women are more eager than resilient men to help friends who 
encounter problems. Although strongly career oriented, the women (in 
the study) found more sustenance through networks of social 
relationships that included family, friends and coworkers.362 
There is also a dark side to friendships. Friends and peers do 
not unconditionally provide a positive influence to each other. They 
may offer a source of risk for adolescent drug use and other forms of 
antisocial behavior, especially when combined with the negative 
modeling from drug using or delinquent peers, more general peer 
rejection in the elementary grades363 and a low level of adult support.364 
In the context of high risk, Werner and Smith have found that a fairly 
high proportion of resilient males acknowledged: being loners, not 
having much interaction with friends, tending to focus on their own 
work and withdrawing from other’s problems.365 Conversely, their less 
resilient peers depended more often on friends for emotional support in 
adulthood. The low levels of friendship for the resilient group and 
higher levels for the non-resilient suggest that certain friendship 
environments correlate with risk and vulnerability. This correlation 
                                                 
359 Werner and Smith (1986, 104-105) refer to the studies of Hamburg and 
Adams 1967 and Hamburg et al. 1974. 
360 Concerning adjustment to school, J. Dunn (1988, 236) speculates that: 
“it seems likely that friendship and support from other children will be of 
significance during the period of adjustment to school.” 
361 Cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996, 216. 
362 Cf. Werner and Smith 1992, 68-69. 
363 Cf. Consortium 1994, 271. 
364 T. A. Wills (1996, 121) has found that without adult support youth may 
be more vulnerable to modeling effects of peer substance use.  
365 Werner and Smith (1992, 68-69; and cf. 46) found that “while more of 
the resilient women (63.6%) were eager to help their friends who encountered 
problems, the majority of the resilient men (66.7%) tended to withdraw from 
others’ troubles.” 
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does not mean that on a larger scale resilience negatively correlates 
with friendship. Nonetheless the ambivalence of friendship networks 
indicates the need to evaluate the quality and specificity of a resilience 
factor (in terms of normativity, health and happiness) and the presence 
of risk factors. 
1.2.6.2. Care Givers and Beyond 
Caregivers and adult substitutes outside of the nuclear family 
offer resilience support that the family sometimes cannot provide. 
Numerous researchers identify that they can instrumentally build up an 
individual’s resilience and aid in adulthood recovery. They compensate 
for deficits in the family’s emotional and cognitive support, and 
promote social competency through serving as role models.366 A 
primary resilience support involves the interaction of children with a 
non-parental adult, who supplements deficiencies in guidance, 
nurturance, knowledge, and even cognitive, social and affective 
support.367 
The care-giving environment can include extended family 
members (such as grandparents, or cousins), relatives of a close friend, 
or teachers and ministers.368 These people can foster trust and a sense of 
coherence, give “second chance” opportunities to acquire competence 
and confidence, and provide emotional support encouraging autonomy 
and initiative.369 Involvement with the wider community provides 
support in other forms, such as: schools that value children and 
encourage them to learn; teachers who act as role models assisting the 
youths with realistic educational and vocational plans; involvement in 
employment and local clubs and societies; and participation in a close-
knit neighborhood.370 On the contrary, risk variables include: 
                                                 
366 Cf. Clarke and Clarke 1993, 149; Fisher 1987, 226-7; Lösel 1994, 9; 
Tousignant 1998, 67.  
367 Cf. Vanistendael (19953); Musick et al. (1987, 249). 
368 Werner and Smith (1986, 97) found “The resilient youth, however, 
sought and received help from a great number of informal sources of support. 
Peer friends (35%), including siblings and cousins; and older friends (30%), 
including older relatives and parents of boy- or girlfriends, ... parents (25%), 
ministers (11.5%) and teachers (11.5%).” 
369 Cf. Werner and Smith 1992, 185-87, 192, 198-200; and 1986, 134-135. 
370 Cf. Clarke and Clarke 1992, 153; Werner and Smith 1986, p. 97; Booth 
and Booth 1997, 113.  
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experiences of academic failure, low commitment to school, low 
expectations from teachers; availability of abusable substances, 
extreme neighborhood deprivation and disorganization;371 and larger 
problems underlying particular cultures.372 
We face another serious matter: play. As mentioned earlier, 
Eisen has found that play serves serious roles in the lives of children 
and adults.373 Playful activities aid in information processing, problem 
solving, coping, learning survival techniques and parent-child 
contact.374 In extreme and normal situations, play serves in adaptation 
(for suffering loss-death) and promotion of survival.375 Moreover, D. 
W. Winnicott posits that play positively correlates with a sense of self. 
He hypothesizes that the “relaxation in conditions of trust based on 
experience [gives way to] creative, physical and mental activity 
manifested in play [so that finally there is a] summation of these 
experiences forming the basis for a sense of self.”376 Numerous 
                                                 
371 These are risk factors for adolescent drug use and other forms of 
antisocial behavior (cf. Consortium 1994, 271). 
372 For example, Garmezy notes the prevalence of major problems found in 
the USA such as: depression as a widespread mental disorder, family break up, 
racial disharmony, limitations in treating chronic childhood illnesses, effects on 
behavior of social class variations, school difficulties in insuring children’s later 
well-being through education and socialization (cf. Garmezy, 1994, 6-7). 
373 G. Eisen (1988, 7) has studied children at play in the Shoah. He noted 
that a unique set of rules governed children’s play. He observes that play displays 
a higher order than seriousness, since it can include the latter, but seriousness 
cannot include play. 
374 In difficult situations, these activities can aid us to understand the 
absurd, forget hunger, face fear, relieve stress and find a person-environment 
balance (cf. Eisen 1988, 98). 
375 Survival behavior learned through play can include: resistance, protest 
and defiance. Cf. Eisen 1988, 11 and 88f. 
376 D. W. Winnicott 1971, 56. MacIntyre argues that the unqualified trust 
of a caregiver can serve in releasing the creative physical and intellectual powers 
that we express in forms of play and result in a larger sense of self-sufficiency 
and independence in practical reasoning. In addition, he demonstrates that play 
permits us to explore reality. Play releases us from the pressures of felt need. It 
enables the pursuit of a range of activities that are worthwhile, pleasant. It allows 
the exercise and expansion of one’s intellectual capacities. A. MacIntyre (1999, 
85) says that “play is important because it is exploratory, because it releases those 
who engage in it from the pressures of felt need, because it extends both the range 
of activities found worth pursuing for their own sake and the range of pleasures 
that can be taken in such activities, and because in moving from the kind of 
playfulness exhibited both by human and dolphins to more sophisticated forms of 
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anecdotal indications suggest that play and contact with nature 
positively correlate to mental and physical health. They also serve as a 
psychological buffer and reestablish social stability and order in the 
face of crisis.377 
1.2.6.3. Social Relationships and Religion 
Several questions aid a more direct treatment of the social 
dimension of spiritual and religious resilience.378 How do religious 
groups offer support or motivation (social bonding and relationships), 
control or guidance (religious and moral principles and codes)?379 How 
does religious belief correlate with social competence and planfulness? 
What contributions do ritual and prayer make to social interaction?380 
These questions invite a closer look at the religious dimensions of 
community, peer and family contexts. 
Fundamental issues for social support and resources in 
resilience concern the principles and processes of social relationships 
that engender the religious community. According to Meyer and 
Lausell, a spiritual belief system provides a sense of community 
among believers, as well as principles that direct and govern not only 
personal behavior, but also relationships with others and joint efforts.381 
                                                                                                          
play we move from animal intelligence to specifically human reasoning.” Cf. D. 
W. Winnicott 1987. 
377 Cf. G. Eisen 1988, 41. Eisen (1988, 60) tells of how children, deprived 
of contact with the city parks in the Warsaw Jewish ghetto, expressed a keen 
desire for contact with plants, flowers and animals; even on their death-beds. For 
a philosophical approach to drug-abuse rehabilitation using nature (through: 
pilgrimage, mountain climbing, and desert survival) and ritual, see Albrecht and 
Zermatten 1994. 
378 In various ways, resilience research has found that faith and spiritual 
resources are relational, social matters; this relational quality is perhaps clearer 
for “religion,” which by definition more often than “spirituality,” includes 
relationships with other people and with God. According to G. O’Connell-
Higgins (1994, 175): “From its inception at a person’s birth, when the most 
fundamental meanings about life are shaped within early care-taking 
relationships, convictional faith is forged with others.” Fowler and Parks also 
interrelate faith and relationships. 
379 Cf. D’Antonio and Aldous 1983; D’Antonio and Cavanaugh 1983. 
380 In the section on cognitive processes and meaning, we already outlined 
the roles of religious rituals and religious social support concerning positive 
coping outcomes, cf. Pargament et al. 1990, 814-6. 
381 Notions like “the Christian concept of brothers and sisters in Christ,” or 
the Hindu Ashram can build up that sense of community; while principles like the 
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These principles sometimes conflict through diverse interpretations of 
religion’s control and support functions.382 These foundational 
relationships and principles of action have special import when 
adolescents seek support from beyond the family. 
The religious influence in society or culture has been found to: 
(1) strengthen the “moral community;” (2) contribute to overall 
(average) mental health; and (3) deter delinquency and criminality. 
First, sociologists have found that religion significantly strengthens the 
moral community, both in terms of moral and social integration. It 
facilitates unity through shared beliefs and social bonds.383 Second, 
sociologists have identified a relationship between mental health and 
the strength of a community’s cohesion. Naroll calls this the “moral 
net,” which is mediated through social bonds, shared religious beliefs 
and rituals.384 Third, studies positively correlate moral-religious society 
to the deterrence of delinquency and criminality; they distinguish 
between the roles of religious belief and social bonds, as well as 
different types of criminality. Sociologists posit religion’s social basis 
for deterrence in the social bonds of the community context (society 
                                                                                                          
Ten Commandments of the Judeo-Christian tradition and the Four Noble Truths 
of Buddhism underlie religious agency. Meyer and Lausell (1996, 121) have 
investigated these issues regarding adolescent violence prevention and optimal 
development. 
382 As a control, religion offers direction for human action through divinely 
legislated law. As motivation, religion offers support, while leaving the 
interpretation to one’s conscience. According to D’Antonio and Aldous (1983, 
15-16), there is a struggle over the primacy and focus of the social control and 
social support functions of religion that manifests itself differently depending on 
particular cultures. According to D’Antonio and Cavanaugh (1983, 160), 
American Catholics have switched the emphasis for moral and religious guidance 
from dependence on legislation from above, to dependence on the personal 
conscience. 
383 Sociologists following Emile Durkheim (1898, 1915) have postulated 
that religion contributes significantly to the strength of moral community. Cf. 
Stark 1989, 202; Bainbridge 1992, 207.  
384 Concerning religion’s place in a society’s moral net, according to 
Schumaker (1992b, 66), “Naroll (1983) demonstrated that average mental health 
varies greatly from one society to another. He explained this in terms of his 
concept of the “moral net,” and theorized that societies with intact moral nets 
should have better mental health, on average, than societies in which this net is 
weakened. According to Naroll, socially sanctioned religious beliefs and rituals 
are an important feature of the moral net. Consequently, erosion of conventional 
religious systems serves to unravel the moral net, one effect being lessened 
psychological health in all members of that society.” 
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and city, neighborhood and family). When a community is highly 
religious, certain crimes (assault, robbery, burglary, and larceny) are 
deterred, although no statistically significant deterrence correlates with 
others (murder and rape).385 In “irreligious” cities (where there are low 
rates of church attendance) this deterrence functions to a lesser 
degree.386 
In high-risk homes, studies have found that participation in a 
faith-community is a feature of success and resilience. According to 
Baldwin et al.’s (1990) research on stress-resistant families and 
children, the successful families put particular importance on the 
religious community in their lives. In a psychosocial perspective, they 
conjecture that the church community contributes to the stress-
resistance of children by reinforcing parental policy and providing peer 
influences consonant with parental values.387 Anthony has furthermore 
found that intense religious affiliations can aid in overcoming 
disadvantage. This effect occurs most prevalently when the religious 
community wholeheartedly accepts individuals who are extremely 
vulnerable or alienated from society at large.388 However, Meyer and 
                                                 
385 This latter observation is thought to hold since it is a crime of “passion.” 
W. S. Bainbridge (1992, 205-7) tries to distinguish hedonistic and larceny types 
of deviance. He (1992, 203) says “to deter larceny and similar crimes, individual 
religiousness must be immersed in a religious community, while it can deter 
hedonistic deviance even in communities where religion is weak.” Problems exist 
in establishing the social difference between the two types of deviance. The 
hedonistic deviance studies were all social (drug and alcohol use, extra-marital 
sexual intercourse), while larceny was not necessarily so. Although religion is an 
important factor in determining crime rates, it needs to be controlled for 
geographic mobility, poverty, social discrimination, and divorce, which all have 
some correlation with crime (especially larceny). 
386 Bainbridge (1992, 208) also found both that religious individuals in 
irreligious communities contribute to crime rates, and on the contrary that 
individually irreligious people embedded in moral communities may be 
somewhat deterred by the religion of the people with whom they have social 
bonds. 
387 Cf. Baldwin, et alia 1990, 277-8. These findings need to be put in the 
context of the study on different social standings and the impact of religion. 
388 E. J. Anthony (1987, 38) found in the St. Louis Risk Research Project 
(1984), “where several children who seemed at risk within a disadvantageous 
milieu climbed to success and health through intense affiliations with religious 
groups, especially those on the fringe of established religions. In the more 
esoteric sects, eccentricities and vulnerabilities seem more acceptable, more 
tolerated, and better supported by the faithful community; furthermore, purpose 
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Lausell have found negative correlations with church involvement. For 
example, it leads to the avoidance of dialogue under certain 
conceptions of the separation of church and state.389 
Other studies concentrate specifically on the religious and 
spiritual dimensions of friends and peers. As in the earlier 
observations, here both positive and negative correlations between 
friendship and religiosity are found. This ambivalence highlights the 
need for further nuances,390 two of which concern the operative social 
process and the individual’s interior affiliation with the religious 
beliefs. The first point stresses the influences of friends. According to 
Stark and Bainbridge, since religious beliefs are not automatically 
salient for human action (behavior), the influence of friends can 
reinforce or undermine the moral import of these beliefs.391 The second 
point however is the crucial issue: whether religion becomes 
internalized. Indeed its impact on human agency occurs only when 
someone freely brings religious beliefs into one’s own motivations and 
decisions. 
In sum, resilience researchers primarily focus on the 
availability and quality of external support systems. How do these 
                                                                                                          
and meaning are added to lives that are lived somewhat tenuously.” Cf. Watt et al 
1990, Anthony et al. 1984; Murphy and Moriarty 1976, 37-8). 
389 Cf. Meyer and Lausell 1996, 129. 
390 Thomas and Carver’s (1990) study positively correlates resilient 
behavior with religious peers and mentors, while Bahr, Hawks and Wang (1993) 
found a negative correlation between religious friendship and deviant behavior. 
In particular, their study focused on substance abuse, the influence of friends, and 
the bonds of religion; it found no relationship between “religious conformity” and 
drug use. However, it has been considered inconclusive in that it did not 
adequately treat the influence of religion in regards to friends and peers. 
According to Meyer and Lausell (1996, 123), Bahr et alia’s conceptual error is 
two-fold. First, they conceptualized religion only in terms of a code of behavior 
and as a sense of identification, without including the intrinsic value of 
spirituality as a personal experience concerning one’s relationship with a “higher 
power.” Second, they in effect also left out study of the motivational, support 
element in religion and the friendship relationships. 
391 According to Stark (1984) and Bainbridge (1992), the major influence 
of friends and peers is a significant force in deterring or promoting delinquency. 
Bainbridge (1992, 201) says: “if a majority of a juvenile’s friends are religious, 
then religion will become a part of their shared experience and deter delinquency. 
But if a majority are not religious, then the personal beliefs of the individual will 
not be rendered salient, and religious individuals will be as likely as others to 
commit delinquent acts (Stark, 1984)” (Cf. Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 325-45). 
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systems: encourage and reinforce our coping efforts and competency; 
open instead of close opportunities at life’s turning points;392 
communicate a sense of optimism and trust in interpersonal 
relationships; and provide a spiritual framework of meaning and 
motivational support?393 These researchers describe sources for social 
resilience as: a stable, emotional relationship; supportive relationships 
outside the home; and involvement in an external support system 
which rewards competence and provides a sense of coherence. On the 
other hand, they describe social risk in terms of: family discord and 
conflict, a lack of emotional security and strong affective ties;394 and 
negative influences (e.g. criminal) from family, neighborhood and 
environment, and socio-economic status.395 The interrelated social 
systems and the physical environment give another dimension of 
meaning to the term resilience. They suggest a sort of ecological theory 
composed of pertinent individual dispositions, social and religious 
support, as well as the physical, historical and cultural environment.396 
                                                 
392 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 182; 189-202; N. Garmezy 1985. 
393 According to T. A. Wills (1996, 128), “With respect to social aspects of 
coping, there are many questions about how basic schemas of the self and social 
relationships develop. In research on resilience, the anecdotal reports emphasize 
how some children in adverse life circumstances nevertheless emerge with a 
sense of trust in interpersonal relationships; the assumption, bordering on a 
generalized expectancy, is that people (or at least some people) are trustworthy 
and that being involved with and relying on other people will lead to positive 
things (Sarason, Pierce, and Sarason 1990).” 
394 Cf. Clarke and Clarke 1992, 153. 
395 A summary of the risk factors in the family environment and 
interactions for adolescent drug use and other forms of antisocial behavior are: 
“poor and inconsistent family management practices, family discord and conflict, 
drug behaviors and substance abuse—supportive attitudes of family members 
parental criminality, and low bonding to family” (Consortium 1994, 270-1). 
396 M. Bloom (1996, 102) claims that according to the general model of 
Albee, any significant social behavior is some function of the following: “the 
strengths of persons, primary and secondary groups, the society, and subcultures, 
as these operate in some physical environment and historical time, and as these 
strengths are reduced by the weaknesses of persons, primary and secondary 
groups, the society, and subcultures, as these operate in some physical 
environment and historical time.” 
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1.3. Transition: Resilience Insights for Philosophical 
Anthropology 
As a transition to the upcoming dialogue with Aquinas’ 
understanding of the emotions and virtues that arise in response to 
difficulty, we should now summarize the key insights from the 
representative sampling of psychosocial theories and resilience 
research. At the same time, we can start to ask: what is the significance 
of the resilience insights for a philosophical anthropology? How do 
these analyses help us to understand better human perception, emotion, 
intellection and agency in adversity? 
First, the developmental nature of temperament makes it 
difficult to define. Temperament is the product of both our genetic 
heritage and our social interactions. In turn, temperament contributes 
to our character, which includes emotional, cognitive, volitional and 
spiritual resources. Thus we should resist seeing temperament as the 
product of only one factor. Indeed, human action involves personal 
unity and social context. In this vein, contemporary temperament 
studies can serve a virtue-based anthropology and moral theory to 
understand better the unique characteristics of each individual in 
society. When the individual becomes aware of his own temperament, 
particularly his own strengths and weaknesses, resources and 
shortcomings his behavior becomes more personally responsible. This 
knowledge contributes to his freedom and success. Nonetheless, 
empirical studies surprisingly suggest that a person’s individual 
situation alters resilience outcomes related to temperament. In the face 
of a specific type of adversity, temperament traits that promote 
resilience in another situation can on the contrary open us to a new 
vulnerability. Difficulty does not affect each temperament type 
uniformly. 
Second, psychosocial approaches evoke the significance of 
emotions for resilience. Emotions involve a type of judgment about 
meaning, insofar as they express emotional intelligence or contain 
cognitive content. They thus can either facilitate or hinder further 
perception and action. In a routine situation, they serve to appraise 
meaning. In a strenuous challenge, they can either help or hinder the 
tripartite coping, self-protective and constructive responses. How do 
emotions serve resilience and risk outcomes at the social level? Studies 
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demonstrate that social bonds (which are emotionally, as well as 
volitionally based) reinforce behavioral modeling and emotional 
competency. For example, well-attached people exhibit greater 
confidence under certain kinds of stress. 
One key questions is: How can we manage or train emotions? 
Studies suggest that the physiological reactions underlying emotions 
are more or less educable. Through rational behavior and social 
support, we can train to some degree our emotional reactions. 
However, differing perspectives on the value and management of 
emotions give diverging resilience and risk prognoses. Thus, various 
religious and spiritual perspectives evaluate emotions as either 
benevolent or malevolent. They promote different strategies for 
managing emotions; some encourage the expression of emotions, 
others the calming or refining of them. The upcoming chapters will 
discuss how particular resilience insights on emotions help to evaluate 
and nuance classical stances on emotion and moral agency. In 
particular, emotions are significant for a virtue-based moral theory that 
attempts to engage emotional energies for moral ends. Emotions are 
pertinent when either an adverse or favorable situation elicits them; 
they are partners with our reflections and choices in human agency. 
Third, we ask: how do cognitive processes underlie human 
resilience? They serve our search for meaning and purpose. In order to 
appraise ways to overcome risk or to solve problems, we rely heavily 
but not exclusively on cognition. Challenges of all kinds engage our 
comprehension of meaning. More serious ones even threaten our 
understanding of life-goals and fulfillment. 
Cognitive strategies and skills involve conscious appreciation 
of our self-esteem and self-efficacy, the exercise of planfulness and 
problem-solving competencies, as well as avoidance or modification of 
risk. They often demand the aid of other social actors. They invite the 
participation of families and peers, culture and society in order to 
understand a situation and plan a solution. We experience both stress 
and loss in a social context; we construct and adapt meaning with the 
help of family and friends. The cognitive capacities of our social 
environment help us to overcome adversity. Likewise, religious and 
spiritual resources offer insights into ultimate meaning, purpose and 
flourishing; they provide cognitive foundations and support to face 
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difficult questions concerning evil and suffering. These psychosocial 
insights offer complementary observations and reflections for a 
Thomistic framework that acknowledges not only functional, but also 
moral and spiritual roles for cognitive capacities in overcoming 
hardship. 
Fourth, resilience outcomes draw tangibly from volitional 
processes, such as attention, motivation and coping. Research indicates 
that the type of attention contributes either to resilience or 
vulnerability. Attention processes do not only involve physiological 
influences (lowering physiological arousal and acquiring a capacity for 
sustained concentration), but also positive and negative interactions 
with cognitive and emotional processes. Studies suggest that we can 
acquire attention-related stress regulation strategies and both promote 
homeostasis and serve higher goals, including human flourishing and 
social relations. Coping and motivation are other key aspects of 
resilience and risk. Religion can play a resilience-promoting role, when 
it serves as part of coping processes. In turn, successful coping can 
strength religious engagement. Religion motivates human beings and 
communities, insofar as spiritual goals, meaning and hope move them 
to act. Unfortunately, religious sentiments and associations can be 
manipulated. Recognizing the resilience value of attention, motivation, 
coping and other volitional processes sheds complementary light on a 
virtue-based understanding of human nature, agency and competency. 
Other resilience insights involve how these competencies are not single 
deeds, but dispositional patterns acquired through past acts and ready 
for future use. 
Fifth, in regard to family interactions, contrasting family styles 
combine with individual distinctiveness to make for a diversity of 
resilience pathways. Intersections of culture, family tradition and 
personal history form a particular family fit. Family support and 
acquired coping-competency constitute elements of effective family 
stress management. However, the dangers that family disruptions or 
socio-economic status represent do not determine individuals to 
failure. Nonetheless, they may occasion vulnerability or resilience 
outcomes. Furthermore, the effects of religion and religious 
communities on families are particularly salient for facing hardship. 
Religious commitment, practice and instruction in the family can 
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provide its members with spiritual and ethical support. They can also 
supply control and guidance in developing social-awareness 
competence and planfulness, in addition to a sense of satisfaction and 
well-being. 
How does our social environment influence our actions? The 
way in which friends and peers at certain periods of life take on greater 
importance than family indicates something of their potential as agents 
of protection and vulnerability. Without denying the potential of 
accentuated risk, an individual’s interaction with the wider community 
and environment provides opportunities for positive development and 
sources of strength in difficulty. The larger community can aid to 
strengthen the moral and religious resolve of individuals and to deter 
delinquency. However, without moral and religious criteria and 
support, humans interact in ambivalent ways. Social groups ingrain 
their resilience or vulnerability in individuals. We need to consider 
their moral and spiritual context in order to evaluate how communities 
influence human flourishing. Aquinas’ philosophical anthropology 
promises several benefits for resilience research; it provides a nuanced 
moral and spiritual framework, as we shall see. 
Psychosocial research in turn offers practical considerations 
that are pertinent for moral reflection. Multidimensional, socio-
religious insights complete more one-dimensional (philosophical, 
sociological or theological) treatments. This input contributes to a 
Catholic perspective that already has a coherent doctrinal and moral 
tradition, and a deep theological anthropology. The interplay of 
doctrine and practice is not unimportant for Church members’ spiritual 
and moral development and their spiritual resilience. Typically social 
virtues, such as justice and fortitude, charity and piety, exemplify such 
resilience that is formed through faith and family practices. 
The interrelation and unity of resilience processes express 
parallels to the doctrine of the unity of the virtues. Protective and risk 
factors and processes are not independent from each other. They 
require a whole range of linked processes overtime. A single cause or 
operation is inadequate. They interrelate on social and personal levels. 
Social resources can strengthen personal ones; and personal factors and 
processes may trigger constructive reactions from support networks. 
For example, the “easy-tempered” child can elicit positive reactions 
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from her family. Nonetheless, certain resources and processes are more 
central to facing danger and difficulty. Some researchers and 
theoreticians emphasize stable emotional relationship(s), which 
express acceptance and care. Others put a priority on experiences of 
structure and meaning, including religious and spiritual purpose. Still 
others accentuate human competencies, particularly the capacity to 
control our attention processes and to cope with hardship. In any case, 
this tripartite backbone of resilience processes adds observations that 
are significant for comprehending the unity of Christian virtue. 
Sixth, what can we say about promoting individual and 
communal resilience? The two sides of the coin involve risk reduction 
and protection promotion. In the case of crisis or simple difficulty, 
when we restore balance or attain a goal, we establish an increased 
capacity for future adaptation and goal pursuit. We resiliently adapt to 
a situation by either decreasing our exposure to risk and stress, or 
increasing personal and social protection. To reduce risk, we need to 
break the link between stressors and adverse outcomes. We can 
influence environmental, individual and behavioral risk. To increase 
protection, we can promote rehabilitation and preventive policy and 
practices, at social and cultural levels. Prevention efforts cannot 
eliminate problematic outcomes or risk however. Even if they could it 
may not be wise to do so. Indeed human development depends upon 
challenges. Nonetheless, by preparing to face challenges, we can 
reduce potentially destructive effects and facilitate the incidence of 
potential outcomes, like personal, moral and spiritual development. 
The promotion of protective factors and processes likewise cannot 
eradicate risk. It can nonetheless reduce its impact and related negative 
chain-reaction, which contribute to human dysfunction. It can open up 
positive opportunities as well. Both risk reduction and protection 
concern personal and communal dimensions, as well as physical, 
psychosocial and spiritual ones. These issues contribute to 
understanding the development of and education in virtue, as we shall 
see. 
Lastly, a major question in resilience and vulnerability 
research concerns the staying power of these qualities. If either or both 
of them are acquirable, how do we account for subsequent change? If 
there is change, is any acquisition a stable life pattern? A common 
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position in this research is that neither resiliency nor vulnerability are 
absolute. Both change, although we can expect stability. Nonetheless, 
both change and stability in resiliency and vulnerability need 
explanation. Negative experiences do not inevitably precipitate 
negative outcomes. According to M. Rutter (1994b, 356; 1994a), 
negative life events have a tendency to accentuate rather than redirect 
human characteristics. Adaptive characteristics tend to persist, 
maladaptive ones as well. What resilience and vulnerability therefore 
do have in common is that we acquire them in the face of difficulty. 
Resilience entails that we acquire emotional, volitional, cognitive and 
social competencies that are won in the midst of the challenge, threat 
or loss. While the contrary entails that we acquire a tendency to carry 
forward vulnerability to later stress and adversity. 
Some vulnerabilities and resilience persist for a short time; 
others are long-term. Most youth resolve their transitory problems 
without profound consequences for their lives. However, an 
individual’s chronic stress and disorder or persistent resource deficits 
can contribute to a long-term burden of distress and dysfunction. Such 
susceptibilities correlate with the early inability to develop adequate 
protective resources. These factors enhance our exposure to stress and 
vulnerability to dysfunction, which we acquire through acts and events 
over time. Psychosocial explanations of the staying power of resilience 
and vulnerability bring both support and challenge to Aquinas’ 
theories on how humans acquire and develop, as we shall see 
concerning fortitude and its related virtues. 
These resilience findings concentrate on human nature and 
society. What does the study of humans under stress tell us about their 
hardiness? What are the origins of human resources that aid our 
response to difficulty? This chapter has offered a systematic, yet open-
ended psychosocial synthesis. It portrays empirical research that awaits 
correction, confirmation and completion. It contributes towards a 
renewed anthropology. In this chapter, we have laid a foundation for a 
dialogue, which leads to the following questions. How can we 
philosophically and theologically treat resilience insights? How might 
resilience research enrich Thomas Aquinas’ moral anthropology and 
virtue theory, in general? And how can it deepen our understanding of 
fortitude and its related virtues, in particular? 
 Chapter Two. 
Renewing Moral Theology: 
Aquinas’ Virtue Theory and Resilience Research 
In order to contribute to the renewal of moral theology, I shall 
assess, contrast and integrate two views on human agency: a resilience 
perspective and Thomas Aquinas’ virtue theory. Previously, we saw 
how resilience research offers insights to enhance philosophical 
anthropology. These scientific and descriptive approaches of the 
psychosocial sciences propose insights on human nature and agency. 
They treat extreme cases of adversity, as well as more typical 
development. In this chapter, I widen the focus. Aquinas’ virtue 
anthropology and moral theology offer a qualitative vision of human 
agency that incorporates further reflections on its origin and finality. 
They also involve a philosophical psychology and social theory that 
need to integrate contemporary reflections. 
My approach differs from historical approaches to Thomas’ 
moral theory. Although more limited in its study of his sources, it is 
more expansive in its exchange with contemporary sciences. In order 
to establish a dialogue between Aquinas’ virtue-based moral theology 
and the resilience findings, in this chapter, I shall address two types of 
questions: on method and on anthropological content. First, 
methodological concerns raise questions like: How does Aquinas’ 
approach to moral theology draw resources from descriptive, 
normative1 and theological sciences? And how can the various domains 
of resilience research—psychology, evolutionary and developmental 
theories, and social sciences—contribute to develop ethical theory and 
moral theology? Second, on the anthropological level, we shall ask: 
What is the status of pleasure and happiness in the virtue-approach? 
What is the place of emotion and virtue in moral development and 
anthropology? And how can resilience findings and theory enhance our 
understanding of them? Through this investigation, I seek to establish 
                                                 
1 I should distinguish the duty or obligation-based perspective from 
normative ethics. Some normative ethicists construe their project as reevaluating 
and developing norms (as well as exceptions to them) in order to treat 
contemporary moral quandaries (cf. Todd Salzmann 1995; L. S. Cahill 1980). 
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the methodological basis of this study, to enrich Aquinas’ moral 
anthropology and to contribute to the renewal of Catholic moral 
theology. At the same time, I intend to prepare the following chapters’ 
more specific dialogue concerning human responses to difficulty. 
2.1. Aquinas’ Moral Theology and Resilience Research 
How can a virtue approach aid to renew moral theology? 
Without giving an overview of all the currents working toward this 
renewal, I presently revisit Aquinas’ sources and method to establish 
the import of a constructive virtue theory.2 This approach finds its roots 
in a tradition within the larger Catholic Tradition. The task here is not 
apologetic, but expository. I intend to present the assumptions and 
principles used to forge this thesis. These assumptions and principles 
underlie a non-exclusive Thomistic model.3 It does not however deny 
that other methods use some of the same assumptions and fit into the 
larger Tradition. I shall interrogate Aquinas’ texts and teachings in the 
light of contemporary critiques and resilience research. This dialogue 
with psychosocial research on human agency in hardship aims to 
contribute constructively to ethical theory and moral theology.4 
We need to recognize that both virtue theory and resilience 
research are mixed disciplines. They each contain scientific, ethical 
and religious concepts and language. Nonetheless, each has its own 
specificities.5 First, they have distinct primary focuses for research: one 
external, the other internal. Second, they generate two types of 
                                                 
2 Pinckaers (1993, 439) suggests first reading the sources of Aquinas’ 
thought, beginning with Scripture, while employing the historical method. This 
positive method consists “in interpreting his text, no longer by materials that 
came after him in time, but rather by what came before; not so much by 
consulting his commentators, in a chiefly speculative reflection, but rather by 
reading his sources, beginning with Scripture, thus using the historical method.” 
3 Throughout this book, unless the context dictates otherwise, I use Thomist 
to refer to the person and work of St. Thomas Aquinas himself, not to a particular 
Thomist or Thomistic school. 
4 A comprehensive, systematic, historical study of Aquinas would require 
me to address as well: (a) the university context of his day, (b) development of 
doctrines in twelfth and thirteenth centuries, (c) Aquinas’ progress through his 
successive works. I shall not do this here. 
5 Cf. D. Browning 1987, 8. 
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knowledge: one a-personal, the other personal.6 Each human science 
attains a particular dimension of human agency’s complexity and 
depth. It is “limited” or “focused,” however, inasmuch as its methods 
inhibit it from adequately approaching human agency’s moral, 
religious and spiritual dimensions. They are reductionistic however, 
only when the method denies the relevancy of the other dimensions.7 I 
intend to approach these deeper dimensions as much as possible 
through resilience research, ethical theory and moral theology. 
Aquinas beneficially provides a theoretical, ethical and theological 
standpoint to integrate insights found in other human and psychosocial 
sciences, especially concerning resilience. The wisdom of his approach 
involves the capacity to integrate the truth and relevance of apparently 
divergent positions. 
                                                 
6 See S.-Th. Pinckaers’ (1993, 48-82) section on “The Difference Between 
Moral Theology and the Behavioral Sciences.” 
7 Lumsden and Wilson (1981, 381) define “reductionism” as an 
“oversimplification in the explanation of a complex system owing to the attempt 
to account for the system solely on the basis of the properties of its components. 
Usually ascribed by social scientists to biologists, by biologists to chemists, and 
by chemists to physicists.” G. Cottier (1980, 164-5) says that when a scientific 
method leads to an ever more precise delimiting of the object, “scientific” 
becomes synonymous with a restricted field of investigation. This limitation leads 
to a reductionist tendency because of (1) this specialization; (2) one insight 
becoming the all-encompassing key to interpretation; and (3) the imperialism of 
one method. According to James Blachowicz (cf. Byers 1986, 126), reductionism 
is “the effort to treat phenomena at one level as explainable in terms of a lower 
level.” E. O. Wilson (1996, 128) says: “To coin a phrase, ‘Reductionism is the 
opiate of the scientist.’ The triumph of science has come largely through the 
reductionist enterprise. It has always been accompanied by resynthesis. […] 
Reductionism works extremely well as a methodology, especially if combined 
with a resynthesis that takes into account positive effects. On the other hand, 
reductionism fails as philosophy, especially when defined strictly. […] A strict 
reductionism holds that everything can be explained by simple reference to the 
constituent units studied on their own terms, without reference to the higher 
systems into which they can be assembled.” Steven Rose (1998, 273), besides 
demonstrating the inadequacy and seduction of reductionist explanations, 
critiques ‘reductionism as ideology,’ which is “the tendency, very marked in 
recent years, to insist on the primacy of reductionist over any other type of 
explanation, and to seek to account for very complex matters of animal—and 
above all human—behavior and social organization in terms of a reductionist 
precipice which begins with a social question and terminates with a molecule—
often a gene.” Rose (1998, 295) goes so far as to say that “by its very nature, 
reductionism [as ideology] is all or none, while an eliminative reductive 
philosophy fails to account for the new meanings of phenomena which emerge at 
each successive level of organization of matter.” 
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First, I examine Aquinas’ virtue-based ethical theory and 
moral theology. This exploration demands that I investigate briefly the 
nature and method of his theology in general, and moral theology in 
particular. Then I ask: What is the theological and pedagogical import 
of his moral theory? And can a dialogue with resilience research enrich 
it? Finally, I suggest several opportunities and challenges that 
resilience research offers. 
2.1.1. The Specificity of Aquinas’ Virtue-Based Ethical 
Theory 
In order to tighten the focus of this research, we shall identify 
the specificity of moral theology in general, and Aquinas’ approach in 
particular. Does moral theology, for Aquinas, have its own proper 
nature and specificity, sources and methods? And how can it dialogue 
with resilience research and incorporate psychosocial insights? 
Aquinas neither gave a definition of moral theology nor used the term 
resilience. Theology was not yet so subdivided as to require such a 
definition, and the human reality of resilience was not yet 
conceptualized as such. Nonetheless, the Secunda pars of his Summa 
theologiae harbors the method and content of his moral theology. At 
the same time, it addresses the deeper issues of human resilience. 
The structure of the Secunda Pars expresses the order of 
discipline that Aquinas uses in morality, which we need to understand 
as a dynamic whole rather than as disjointed parts.8 It is both faithful to 
the tradition and original in its approach to human agency.9 It 
emphasizes movement: the human movement of being created in the 
                                                 
8 The prologues in the Prima secundae introduce the structure and content 
of his moral study (moralis): ST I-II 1 prol., 6 prol., and so on. Aquinas also 
refers to moralis in other prologues of his Summa theologiae: ST I 22 prol. and 
ST I 84 prol. In addition to scientia moralis, he uses other phrases to denote moral 
science: e.g. philosophia moralis, doctrina moralis, consideratio moralis, 
moralia (cf. Jordan 1994, 82-3). 
9 In the Prima secundae, Aquinas offers a fourfold innovation in textual 
arrangement and emphasis; he: presents the soul’s powers in a differentiated way; 
places beatitude up front; treats extensively the passions; and postpones the 
treatment of law and grace until the end (cf. M. Jordan 1994, 84-91). In the 
Secunda secundae, he innovates by applying a philosophical structure to a rather 
unruly theological tradition of sententiae, exhortations, exempla and pastoralia 
(cf. Jordan 1994, 91-95). 
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image of God (ad imaginem Dei).10 Aquinas announces the depth and 
extent of this movement, when he identifies the heart of his moral 
teaching, which treats “of the rational creature’s advance towards 
God.”11 
Aquinas starts the Prima Secundae with a treatise on happiness 
or flourishing that we can only understand in the context of the 
evangelical Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount (Mt 5-7).12 His 
masterful analysis of human acts and voluntariness, goodness and evil, 
and the emotions prepares the way for him to treat human habitus, 
virtues and vices. More rationalist approaches have taken his treatment 
of law and natural law, which follows, as the heart of morality. But this 
sub-treatise and the whole treatment of morality are incomplete 
without their apex: the New or evangelical law. The New law is an 
interior law (the grace of the Holy Spirit) that serves as the unifying 
element in the Summa.13 
In the Secunda Secundae (the larger and more detailed of the 
two parts), he addresses the particular virtues. He gives preeminence to 
                                                 
10 For an intelligent creature, growing into this image involves free will and 
self-movement. The movement involved in being created “ad imaginem Dei” is 
not always evident in translations of and commentary on Aquinas’ text (I-II 
prologue). In order to understand his teaching, we need to recognize that he 
distinguishes two types of image (I 35.2 ad 3): first, an image of the same specific 
nature, or second, an image of a different nature. While Christ alone is properly 
the Image of the Father (first sense), a human is an image of God only in an 
imperfect way (second sense). Although imperfect, this image present in a human 
person expresses a dynamic movement of its tendency toward its perfection, who 
is God. As Aquinas says: “Et ideo ad designandum in homine imperfectionem 
imaginis, homo non solum dicitur imago, sed ad imaginem, per quod motus 
quidam tendentis in perfectionem designatur.”  
11 English Dominicans for the Prologue to the second question of the ST: 
“de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum.” The Blackfriars edition translates it as: 
“of the journey to God of reasoning creatures.” 
12 S.-Th. Pinckaers (1997, 24-6) goes so far as to say that the Secunda Pars 
as a whole is a theological commentary on the Sermon on the Mount. Cf. St. 
Augustine “De Sermone Domini in monte;” CCC 1965-70. 
13 Cf. ST I-II qq. 106-108. As Pinckaers (1993, 434-5) says: “Behind the 
natural law the treatise on the New or evangelical Law, that brief masterpiece 
composed by St. Thomas [can be seen] as the capstone in the vault of his edifice. 
To its definition all the lines of the Summa converge: the New Law understood as 
an interior law, as the grace of the Holy Spirit received through faith in Christ and 
working through charity. The Sermon of the Lord on the mountain provides the 
text of the law, like a summary of the Apostolic catechesis. It is purveyed through 
the sacraments.” 
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faith, hope and charity as the roots of Christian moral action, and 
considers the other virtues in their theological dimension.14 While 
ethicists commonly recognize that Aquinas is a theologian, many do 
not comprehend the significance he grants to the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit and the Beatitudes in moral theology. The way that he links them 
to each major virtue illustrates that, for Aquinas, Christian moral action 
involves a spiritual, even mystical quality. Aquinas thus anchors 
Christian morality in grace, charity and justice. 
As sacra doctrina or theology in general, morality has two 
dimensions: connaturality (habitual and practical knowledge and 
judgments) and science (separated, abstract knowledge of judgments 
and principles).15 How are these two dimensions of morality sources of 
resilience? They offer us sources of resilience inasmuch as they 
involve our practical and speculative capacities and dispositions. First, 
through the gifts of the Holy Spirit, we connaturally judge about divine 
things through wisdom, counsel, piety, reverence, fortitude, and so on. 
Aquinas speaks of an instinctus of the Holy Spirit, which firmly and 
surely establishes our moral judgment. We employ this type of 
practical morality like an art (ars) that requires our intimate 
involvement. Although to act precisely depends on our participation 
and mastery, we can act accurately without manifesting technical 
cognitive precision (scientia). Second, through the study of the 
principles identified in revelation and nature, we gain knowledge of 
moral judgments. We discover a source that we need to apply in moral 
acts. We discern this second aspect of the two-fold nature of moral 
knowledge and judgment through the study of morality (ethical 
theory), where we gain knowledge of right and good judgments and 
principles. We acquire the first aspect of moral knowledge however in 
the virtues, through which we have connatural knowledge and 
inclinations to judge well.16 
                                                 
14 B. Ashley (1996, 34) explains that, while the virtue of faith, hope and 
charity have the Triune God as their direct object (he calls them “theologal” 
virtues), the other virtues can also be “theological” in their scope and 
development, and as an object of theology. 
15 Cf. M. Jordan 1994. 
16 Cf. ST I 1.5 ad 2. Study does not suffice in itself, for two reasons: first, 
because one needs to be able to judge rightly and not simply know about a 
subject matter; second, the virtue that we acquire through personal virtuous 
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Without analyzing a host of Thomistic definitions of moral 
theology,17 we shall content ourselves with a summary definition given 
by S.-T. Pinckaers. He says that moral theology “is the branch of 
theology that studies human acts so as to direct them to a loving vision 
of God seen as our true, complete happiness and our final end. This 
vision is attained by means of grace, the virtues, and the gifts, in the 
light of revelation and reason.”18 Pinckaers highlights Aquinas’ notion 
that theology is speculative or contemplative, not as opposed to being 
practical, but as the basis for the relationship with God that underlies 
the practical life of believers. To behold the face of God is the final 
end of the moral life. This communion is the reason and goal for 
human life. Inasmuch as we love, we act for someone and seek to be 
united to him or her. God’s love empowers all other true loves. 
In the widest sense and at different levels, Thomas’ moral 
theology offers a model that draws upon a plethora of sources. They 
include philosophical, scientific and properly religious sources. Each 
offers us information and perspective to understand our acts. These 
                                                                                                          
experience can serve abstract knowledge, and vice versa; and both can serve 
theology. For example, charity implies first a graced relationship with and 
experience of other persons (including God), through which we receive the form 
of connatural knowledge that is living charity and friendship. From such an 
experience, we can even more fully understand the theology of charity. 
17 In passing we can quote the following definitions. Veritatis Splendor 
(1993, no. 29): “‘moral theology’ [is] a science which accepts and examines 
Divine Revelation while at the same time responding to the demands of human 
reason. Moral theology is a reflection concerned with ‘morality,’ with the good 
and the evil of human acts and of the person who performs them; in this sense it 
is accessible to all people. But it is also ‘theology,’ inasmuch as it acknowledges 
that the origin and end of moral action are found in the One who ‘alone is good’ 
and who, by giving himself to man in Christ, offers him the flourishing of divine 
life.” J.-L. Bruguès (1995, 26) says: “La théologie morale se propose de parvenir 
à une connaissance pratique de la vie humaine et une considération régulatrice 
de l’agir humain dans le mystère du Dieu révélé, au sein de son projet créateur et 
sauveur.” 
18 Pinckaers 1995a, 8 (cf. pp. 8-13, 44). He extensively explains this 
definition calling upon its Scriptural foundations. His more complete definition 
(1985, 55) is: “La théologie morale est cette partie de la sagesse théologique qui 
étudie les actions humaines, pour les ordonner à la vision aimante de Dieu 
comme au bonheur plénier et à la fin ultime de l’homme, sous la motion des 
vertus théologales et morales, en particulier de la charité et de la justice, avec les 
dons du Saint-Esprit, à travers les expériences de la condition humaine comme la 
souffrance et le péché, avec l’aide des lois morales et des commandements qui 
nous indiquent les voies de Dieu.” 
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sources play complementary roles in his ethical theory and moral 
theology. Aquinas uses these sources in to complete his ethical theory 
and moral theology, while trusting that faith and reason give 
harmonious witness to the unity of truth. The properly religious 
sources encompass Scripture and Tradition. They include not only 
Conciliar, magisterial, Patristic and explicitly theological Tradition, 
but also less thematized personal and communal religious experience 
and sensus fidelium. Through these interior sources, Aquinas 
recognizes that morality is more than making judgments and applying 
external principles. It demands an internal knowledge, experience and 
involvement. Aquinas’ not-specifically-religious sources involve 
philosophical approaches to human nature and agency. In the spirit of 
his pursuit of truth, we furthermore can embrace contemporary 
disciplines such as psychosocial sciences, history and literature, 
including resilience findings and narratives. In their own domains, 
each of these theological and philosophical sources has its own 
particular principles and methodologies, types of knowledge and 
competency. These sources (scientific, philosophical and theological; 
external and internal) account for human resilience in their own ways. 
Treating the nature and method of Thomas’ theology in 
general within a work of moral theology may surprise people. First, 
this method may seem curious in contrast to a current tendency in 
Christian ethics that restricts itself to normative issues: what is right 
and wrong; what is allowed and forbidden. Because of this tendency I 
need to confirm and explicate the theological nature of moral teaching 
in the Catholic Tradition. Second, this approach may seem curious in 
contrast to much of the resilience research that is silent or minimalist in 
regard to spiritual resources for resilience. If there is a spiritual-
religious component to human resilience, how can we investigate it? In 
order to explore spiritual-religious resilience, I propose to use 
Aquinas’ approach to sacra doctrina (theology), in the context of his 
moral theology. He provides a model (albeit theological and moral) 
through which we can appropriate and account for resilience 
experiences in general, and in particular their spiritual dimension. 
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2.1.2. Resilience Research: Opportunities and Challenges 
for Moral Theology 
Although Aquinas did not have access to the psychosocial 
sciences as conceived today, we shall ask whether and how his model 
of moral theology can assimilate this research. The psychosocial 
sciences have brought important insights on human experience (e.g. 
concerning human resilience). At the same time, they have brought 
challenges for theology (e.g. concerning its relevance and normativity). 
We shall ask: what are the potentials and limits of the psychosocial 
sciences in the context of moral theology? 
In order to employ resilience research in moral theology, we 
should be aware of the psychosocial sciences’ evolution and 
distinguish their various methods. However, we do not have the space 
in this study to execute this task fully. At present, resilience 
approaches are riding the crest of an anti-reductionist wave, as we shall 
see. What are some of the principle elements of this movement? First, 
this scientific renewal recognizes that scientific laws have limited 
depth and applicability. A search for scientific laws, factors or 
mechanisms using a scientific method (or rather the various scientific 
methods according to particular disciplines) itself cannot explore the 
whole of the human person and society. The positivist method cannot 
approach the very origin of life and spirit. When specialists restrict the 
term “science” and “objective knowledge” to the realm of natural and 
social sciences, a triple misunderstanding occurs: (a) they exaggerate 
these sciences’ comprehensiveness (due to sort of determinism or 
materialism);19 (b) they overstate their scope (attempting to be a-
subjective through external observation, detached from presupposed 
theories, feelings, and creative imagination); and (c) they deny 
“scientific” status to the interior, reflective, moral and spiritual aspects 
of human life and society.20 
                                                 
19 Cf. S. Rose 1998. 
20 C. Osiek (1989, 275-7), for example, has reservations concerning the use 
of social analysis in Biblical hermeneutics. Social analysis in itself poses 
questions about: (1) the historical distance between the present and the target 
group; (2) the uncertainty of the sampling; (3) the purpose of the Biblical texts 
(not sociological data, but faith documents); (4) the problematic of using modern 
categories in a comparative way; (5) reductionism and determinism; (6) problems 
of objectivity and subjectivity (text and interpreter). 
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Second, this renewal acknowledges that a method based on 
external observation alone implies several limits. The very process of 
observation exerts an effect on the object. Physicists now commonly 
hold that on the sub-atomic level we can “accurately” study either 
velocity or position (of an electron, for example), but not both at 
once.21 Critical and post-modern perspectives transfer this finding to 
philosophy and social sciences. They seek to bolster claims that human 
observers cannot be absolutely “objective;” they can abstract or escape 
neither from their own presumptions, ideas and emotions, nor from 
effects of the observation process on the observed person or 
community.22 Moreover, statistical analysis further reduces observation 
in order to correlate particular phenomena. Difficulties arise when 
attempting to find and interpret statistically supported patterns in 
behavior (by using constants, variables, factors, mechanisms, laws and 
so on). Nevertheless, researchers seek to overcome various types of 
determinism that inevitably linger.23 
Finally, certain approaches attempt to compensate for these 
weaknesses. For example, narrative and evocative approaches to 
resilience in its various manifestations can enrich social science 
statistical research and psychological clinical observations.24 We 
should therefore neither equate the resilience perspective with 
                                                 
21 This theory is known as the Heisenberg indeterminacy or uncertainty 
principle. In contrast to the confident worldview spawned by Newtonian physics, 
Quantum Mechanics introduced a degree of uncertainty into knowledge about the 
physical world (cf. Heisenberg’s principle, and wave-particle dualism). Three 
interpretations of the nature of the uncertainty intrinsic to theories of physics 
involve the source of uncertainty, which is either rooted in: (1) temporary human 
ignorance (Einstein, Bohm); (2) unavoidable experimental or conceptual 
limitations (Bohr); or (3) the uncertainty of nature itself (Heisenberg; cf. Mannoia 
1980, 109-111; M. Polanyi 1958; J. Puddefort 1998, 1076-77). Nonetheless, 
specialists still seek a unified theory for all the fundamental interactions of matter 
that would amend Newtonian physics by Quantum Mechanics and Relativity 
Theory and even incorporate Chaos Theory better to describe the tendencies of 
ordered systems to breakdown (cf. George Gamow, 1995). 
22 See K. Popper’s Objective Knowledge (1972) for a realist, fallibilist 
theory of scientific knowledge, which grows through critical selection and seeks 
an objective theory of essentially conjectural knowledge. 
23 Cf. S. J. Gould 1980/1996; S. Vanistendael and J. Lecomte 2000; S. 
Rose 1998. 
24 Cf. S. Vanistendael and Lecomte 2000; M. Manciaux 2001; F. Rüegg (in 
press). 
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statistical psychosocial research on resilience nor all resilience findings 
with reductionistic or deterministic approaches. Thus, complementary 
efforts in resilience research attempt to remain more open to spiritual-
religious experience. Although they attempt to provide “thicker” 
accounts of human experience,25 the unobservable or unquantifiable 
aspects of spiritual-religious experience will continue to escape the 
measurements of the psychosocial sciences. 
The limits and opportunities of resilience research will become 
clearer when we identify the insights that the psychosocial sciences 
offer moral theology and philosophical anthropology. Nevertheless, we 
do not intend to contrast two approaches simply: one that more 
adequately appropriates spiritual-religious experience (theological 
reflection, narrative observation and so forth), the other that 
reductionistically compartmentalizes theology and its primary sources 
of Scripture and Tradition, theological reflection and religious 
experience. Rather, our inquery centers on how to identify (and 
control) the limits of each method, and how to integrate psychosocial 
science insights in theological reflection, without importing 
reductionistic effects. 
What opportunities and challenges does resilience research 
offer to ethical theory and moral theology? As we mentioned earlier, 
moral theory seeks to explain rational human agency. Resilience 
research concurs, at least partially, by exploring the cognitive 
dimension of human coping, self-conservation and positive 
construction in difficulty. On the theological side, sacred doctrine 
involves religious purpose and meaning, and moral theology explores 
                                                 
25 Clifford Geertz for example enriches the tradition of Weberian 
sociology. He re-opens science to semiotic/semantic, “thick descriptions” found 
in narrative, religion, literature and art in order to understand better such cultural 
systems. He (1973, 30) says that: “to look at the symbolic dimensions of social 
action—art, religion, ideology, science, law, morality, common sense—is not to 
turn away from the existential dilemmas of life for some empyrean realm of de-
emotionalized forms; it is to plunge into the midst of them. The essential vocation 
of interpretative anthropology is not to answer our deepest questions, but to make 
available to us answers that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have 
given, and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has said” 
(cf. Geertz 1973, 87-125; Rüegg, in press). Geertz cites Gilbert Ryle as the source 
of “thick description,” which is found in two of Ryle’s essays: “Thinking and 
Reflecting” and “The Thinking of Thoughts” (reprinted in vol. II of his Collected 
Papers). 
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theologically based normative and motivational goals and meanings in 
human agency. However, the unresilience of certain people of faith 
raises a piercing question: how can we affirm the role of religious 
meaning, when we cannot externally observe or independently verify 
religious faith? Another challenge arises from theological sources of 
meaning. The normative and descriptive sciences pose questions about 
how reasonable a moral theory is that accords a normative place to 
faith, and sources such as sacred Scripture and sacred Tradition, as 
does Aquinas’.26 
Indeed, the fuller meaning that sacred doctrine draws from its 
first principles (God’s action in creation and promises of happiness and 
redemption) counts on faith and not on knowledge acquired through 
“scientific method.”27 Nonetheless, a more reflexive approach to sacred 
doctrine and moral theology cannot neglect scientific, philosophical 
and even metaphysical domains.28 
A long-standing Catholic practice in moral theology ascribes 
an important place to philosophical sources, their reflections and 
findings.29 To confirm this insight, we shall call upon further nuances 
                                                 
26 Another challenge involves how we can employ non-theological 
theories, findings and insights within moral theology. We shall treat other more 
precise questions in the next section on collaboration between moral theology and 
psychosocial sciences. 
27 If one does not believe in their veracity (through theological faith), such 
principles hold no sway, and theology can only attempt to answer difficulties 
posed by the non-believer. But for those who believe, we can offer further 
“demonstrations,” as when St. Paul argues for belief in the general resurrection 
from belief in Christ’s resurrection. These demonstrations include indicating how 
revealed truths do not conflict with human reason and experience (Cf. ST I 1.8; 1 
Cor 15:12ff). 
28 Aquinas would underline the pride of place that divine reason and grace 
play in moral adjudication, without ignoring the importance of metaphysical and 
(philosophical) anthropological, epistemological and psychological domains (cf. 
ST I-II 91.1, concerning divine reason—divina ratio). Not all of these domains 
are necessarily addressed in certain contemporary approaches. For example, W. 
Schweiker (1996, 77) recognizes (only) three domains concerning how 
philosophy participates in “theological ethics”: (1) epistemological / the nature of 
moral knowledge: the relation of self and others in an account of human 
understanding and meaning; (2) axiological / the source of moral value: how to 
account for the source of moral value; and (3) anthropological / how one defines 
the moral agent: using hermeneutics to interconnect human self-understanding 
and to search for meaning by interrelating value, self and others. 
29 This tradition is traced to St. Paul, for example, who employs Epicurean 
and Stoic wisdom to attract the Athenians to believe in the Gospel of Jesus 
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from Aquinas. Indeed, while scientists employ reason in non-
theological searches to understand the human person and society, not 
every rational perspective on moral anthropology or agency has the 
same compatibility with theology. We risk two extremes: (a) a 
suspicion that reason cannot have any role in Christian faith,30 and (b) 
an over-zealous affirmation of reason’s capabilities in the realm of 
faith.31 While affirming the superiority of reason illuminated by faith,32 
various magisterial teachings highlight the place of reason in seeking 
to understand the Church’s deposit of faith and moral teaching.33 What 
                                                                                                          
Christ; Acts 17:16-34. The encyclical Fides et Ratio (FR) gives a history of the 
use of wisdom in seeking God (in OT, NT, Justin, Clement of Alexandria, 
Origen, Dionysius, Augustine, Tertullian, Anselm, Aquinas, as well as 
magisterial teaching, in addition to a host of modern and contemporary 
philosophical schools). FR nonetheless does not directly address the place of 
reason in moral theology. 
30 St. Paul expresses a suspicion concerning a type of Greek “wisdom” that 
judges the Christian message of the cross as “folly” (cf. 1 Cor 1:22ff.). This view 
of natural reason’s limits and weakness finds its roots in the Fall, one of the 
consequences of which is ignorance (cf. Augustine, De nat. et grat. 21, 403). 
Protestant thought (for example, Luther, Calvin and their followers) generally has 
harbored a hostility to natural theology, preferring a theology organized around 
revelation. There are notable exceptions, especially in more recent Protestant 
theology, which has shown an interest in fundamental theology (e.g. E. Brunner, 
W. Pannenberg, W. Joest). Cf. J-Y. Lacoste 1998, 973-4. 
31 For example, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, “rationalist” models have 
proposed that reason alone measure valid science to the detriment of revelation 
and limiting theology to purely human bounds of reason. 
32 The credo ut intelligam of Augustine furthermore implies that faith 
provides a light, an intellectual light, in understanding human life and salvation. 
In an Augustinian (and Thomistic) perspective, Scripture has a special role in 
belief and understanding. When believing what is proclaimed by the Gospel, and 
by the Scriptures at large, one is lead by the superior light which is God’s self 
revelation in human history. 
33 The First Vatican Council affirms that “the one and true God, our Creator 
and Lord, can […] be known certainly by the natural light of human reason” (in 
its negative form: “Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, creatorem et Dominum 
nostrum, per ea, quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci 
non posse: anathema sit;” Denzinger 3026). Various nineteenth and twentieth 
century Roman declarations affirm that natural reason can know, for example, the 
soul’s existence, immortality and freedom (Denzinger 2766, 2812); and the 
natural moral law (Denzinger 2866, 3875). The antimodernist oath goes so far as 
to affirm that the existence of God is “demonstrable” to reason alone (Denzinger 
3538). More recently VS and FR have made important contributions; FR opens 
by saying: “Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises 
to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to 
know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that, by knowing and loving 
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does Aquinas have to say about the use of reason in moral theology? 
And what difference does it make for understanding resilience 
theologically? 
Thomas’ approach to faith and reason provides us several 
bases for integrating resilience insights. First, it advocates a unified 
theory of truth and wisdom (whose one source is God—divine ratio). 
Aquinas affirms that reason and faith have the common foundation of 
truth, and that the Holy Spirit serves a unitive role as source of all 
truth.34 One’s perspective on truth, as we shall discuss, is significant for 
the meaning dimension of resilience. 
Second, Thomas views reason as “perfective” of faith. Reason 
aids faith to uncover a further level of understanding, knowledge or 
science, and in turn to expound a theological measure. Sacra doctrina 
benefits from the clarity brought by other sciences as handmaidens 
(ancillae), in particular by philosophical reflection.35 
                                                                                                          
God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves 
(cf. Ex 33:18; Ps 27:8-9; 63:2-3; John 14:8; 1 John 3:2).” 
34 “Omne verum a quocumque dicatur a Spiritu Sancto est.” ST I-II 109.1 
ad 1; (quoting Ambrosiaster, In Prima Cor. 12:3: PL 17, 258.). In his 
commentary on 1 Corinthians (In 1 Cor. Ch. 1, lect. III, no. 43), Aquinas puts 
truth, in all its sources, into the service of the faith: “Utitur autem saptientia verbi 
qui suppositis verae fidei fundamentis, si qua vera in doctrinis Philosophorum 
inveniat, in obsequium fidei assumat.” Aquinas finds three levels of truth and 
wisdom taught by the Holy Spirit: wise teaching acquired through philosophical 
and theological study (intellectual virtues), and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Cf. ST 
II-II 45.1 ad 2; and 45.2; FR, 44. On the unity of truth, the Declaration on 
Christian Education (Gravissimum Educationis, no. 10) promotes the 
investigation of the different sciences, which have their own proper principles 
and methods, in order “to promote an ever deeper understanding of these fields, 
and as a result of extremely precise evaluation of modern problems and inquires, 
to have it seen more profoundly how faith and reason give harmonious witness to 
the unity of all truth.” Cf. SC, art. 68. 
35 Aquinas says: “sacra doctrina […] accipere potest aliquid a 
philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed ad maiorem 
manifestationem eorum quae in hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit sua 
principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediae a Deo per revelationem. Et ideo non 
accipit ab aliis scientiis tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam 
inferioribus et ancillis” ST I 1.5 ad 2; see also the rest of article especially the 
corpus. Aquinas says that reason’s role does not prove faith but clarifies it in 
three ways: (1) to demonstrate the preambles of faith that natural reason 
enlightens, e.g. that God exists, and is one; (2) to manifest or gain understanding 
of the faith through analogies; and (3) to resist or refute attacks on faith (cf. ST I 
1.8 ad 2; Geenan 1952, 115; (1) De Trin. 2.1 ad 5 (persuasive reasoning); SCG 
I.8-9; ST II-II 1.5 ad 2; ST II-II 2.10 ad 2; (2) Aquinas’ theological use of analogy 
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Third, Aquinas’ approach considers faith as “perfective” of 
reason. In their collaboration, sacra doctrina perfects philosophy 
(normative and descriptive sciences) as grace perfects nature.36 Faith 
can inform both fundamental presuppositions and rational 
investigations, as we shall see. 
Fourth and lastly, Thomas explores a conception of reason that 
finds its prime analogate in divine reason. Through this metaphysical 
conception, he examines the meaning of ultimate happiness, moral 
finality, human agency, liberty, virtuous and vicious acts, nature and 
grace. According to Aquinas, reason more broadly conceived as 
including divine reason (ratio) and grace constitutes the criterion for 
adjudicating whether an action is good, done for a fitting purpose and 
in a suitable way. It exposes and establishes the meaning of the act. If 
the action diverges from right reason it is judged an evil act, even if it 
promotes short term, “resilient” survival.37 A dialogue with resilience 
insights offer hope to renew Aquinas’ virtue-based ethical theory and 
moral theology. However, we have not yet addressed the challenges it 
presents concerning the types of resilience input that can enrich his 
philosophical anthropology and the adequacy of models of 
collaboration between descriptive, normative and theological sciences. 
2.2. Employing Psychosocial Resilience Findings in Moral 
Theology 
At what level can the psychosocial science resilience findings 
collaborate in the project of moral theology? The breadth of the social 
sciences requires a nuanced response to this question.38 At the risk of 
over-simplifying a complex field, I shall first identify samples from 
                                                                                                          
advances according to causality, negation and supereminence; (3) De Trin. 2.3; 
Persson, 1970, 230-232. 
36 “Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod 
naturalis ratio suberviat fidei; sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur 
caritati” (ST I 1.8 ad 2; cf. De Trin. 2.3). This insight relates and reconciles “the 
secularity of the world and the radicality of the Gospel, thus avoiding the 
unnatural tendency to negate the world and its values while at the same time 
keeping faith with the supreme and inexorable demands of the supernatural 
order.” (Lumen ecclesiae, Apostolic letter, 20 Nov. 1974, 8; quoted in FR 43). 
37 Cf. ST I-II 4.4, and ST I-II qq. 18-20; W. Woods 1998, 315. 
38 For a treatment of how moral theology can collaborate in the social 
sciences, see: P. J. Philibert 1980. 
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key types of resilience research that behavioral (social) science, 
sociobiology, psychology and developmental theories contribute. 
Within each, differing schools of thought offer challenges as well as 
opportunities for dialogue. While addressing the way in which these 
psychosocial sciences contribute to the project of moral theology, 
secondly, I address how moral theology can incorporate resilience 
research. In particular, how can resilience findings enrich our 
understanding of natural virtues? And what is the scientific status of 
such enrichment? Thirdly, I ask: what normative relevance do 
resilience findings harbor? This issue involves the problem of 
“normativity,” the “naturalistic fallacy” and in turn leads to a last 
question on the role of prudence in normative sciences, moral theology 
and resilient acts. Throughout this section, I identify a collaborative 
method that enhances Aquinas’ moral anthropology mustering insights 
concerning human nature, agency and society. 
2.2.1. Types of Resilience Input from the Psychosocial 
Sciences 
What resilience input do the various psychosocial sciences 
offer? As I already stated in the earlier critique of reductionistic 
approaches, psychosocial science’s goals of precise observation and 
statistical analysis of human behavior operate at a different level than 
moral theology’s observations and reflections. The former seek the 
factors that underlie resilience and vulnerability, health and illness, 
social support and isolation, and so forth, while the latter refers also to 
finality and flourishing, norms and virtues, nature and grace, which 
outstrip the psychosocial sciences. 
How can this radically different approach contribute to moral 
theology? In this section, I do not go into the content of resilience 
research (presented in chapter one) but outline simply the distinctive 
methodological characteristics of several of these sciences. I seek to 
identify their convergences and complementarity in regards to moral 
theology. Although other important domains exist, I shall focus on: (1) 
social or behavioral sciences, (2) sociobiology, (3) psychology and (4) 
developmental theories. 
Social or behavioral science (sociology) supplies concepts, 
data and narratives about behavior and institutions, gender 
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relationships and class structure. They provide us opportunities to 
apply these insights in moral theology.39 Sociological research offers 
particular resilience insights concerning the family: harmony, stress 
management, disruption and socio-economic status. It also investigates 
interactions outside the family: the quality of the larger environment, 
in particular relationships with friends and caregivers. The study of 
social support and resources tells us something about how we interact 
in social and religious relationships. What behavioral patterns surface 
in regards to friends, peers and the faith-community, or the family and 
its members’ religion and spirituality? Notwithstanding their 
limitations, these types of insights concerning human society can 
enrich moral theology with thematized observations. They at least aid 
us to reconstruct a “thicker” moral anthropology.40 
Behavioral biology, evolutionary psychology and sociobiology 
claim to provide insights about human nature’s biological ends. They 
seek to answer questions about the evolved constitution of human 
emotions and the place of humanity in the midst of other living 
beings.41 How can this type of account contribute to moral theory? 
Although E. O. Wilson has conflated sociobiology accounts and 
normativity,42 other specialists tend to differentiate between the 
descriptive and normative domains. They distinguish the biological 
ends of human nature from its properly moral ends.43 What do studies 
                                                 
39 According to C. Osiek (1989, 278) social analysis when employed “in 
conjunction with historical, literary and liberation methods, […] promises to yield 
good fruit for the harvest of Biblical interpretation.” Cf. J. M. Gustafson 1971, 
122-137. 
40 Cf. G. Cottier 1980; S. J. Pope 1994, 1996; C. Geertz 1973. 
41 According to Arnould (1996, 223): “Evolutionary biology in general and 
sociobiology in particular can […] aid theology in giving to humanity a renewed 
comprehension of the place it occupies in the midst of living reality, as well as 
concerning its nature—finite, limited and created.” Cf. S. J. Pope 1996, 177. 
42 Wilson’s earlier work entitled Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975, 
53) offers a biological theory of morality; he goes so far as to say that “genes hold 
culture on a leash;” in this work, he claims to establish a code of ethics that is 
“genetically accurate and hence completely fair” (Wilson 1975, 575; cf. Rose 
1998, 278). 
43 According to S. J. Pope (1996, 177; cf. 179) while behavioral biologists 
and evolutionary psychologists need to distinguish the biological from moral 
ends of human nature, we can only discern the properly moral ends of human 
nature through moral and religious reflection. In this regard he quotes J. M. 
Gustafson (1994, 104): “we look to an ordering of nature as one basis, but not a 
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of natural human constitution offer for moral theory? According to 
MacIntyre, it is an error to suppose that an ethics independent of 
biology is possible. On the one hand, accounts of the good, rules and 
virtues need to consider the way in which human beings are 
biologically constituted and progress. On the other hand, we can better 
understand human development when we compare it with other 
intelligent animal species and, perhaps surprisingly, with human 
vulnerability and disability.44 
Psychology and developmental theories address other issues 
related to moral agency and norms, as well as to happiness, fulfillment 
and well-being.45 We cannot correlate psychology, which generally 
employs rigorous observation, with the narrower reductionistic 
approaches.46 The various types of psychology (modern experimental 
and clinical psychologies, as well as philosophical psychologies)47 are 
mixed disciplines. They all contain more or less explicit instances of 
                                                                                                          
sufficient one, for deciding what goods, for whom, and for what, ought to be 
pursued.” Furthermore, while evolutionary biology aids in understanding human 
reality, “the capacity of the human brain for reflective self-consciousness adds a 
new dimension that can accent either the destructive or the redemptive 
possibilities of biological directedness,” according to Nessan, (1998: 444). The 
human being is capable of “bottom-up” behavior based on drives and instincts, as 
well as “top-down” behavior, based on conscious intention and decision. The 
latter involves a reflective self-consciousness that integrates self-awareness, 
awareness of other human self, symbolic language, culture, religion (myth and 
ritual), art and so on. 
44 Cf. MacIntyre 1999, x. 
45 Cf. Gustafson 1971, 122-137. 
46 A more complex notion of scientific method acknowledges three 
processes of scientific activity: discovery, prediction and confirmation. The logic 
and character of each of these three processes are distinct: (1) discovery confronts 
a particular problem with abductive logic in order to find (or create) a general 
theory; (2) prediction puts the general theory to a particular test/experiment 
through deductive logic; and (3) confirmation is an inductive (cyclical) exercise 
where particular experiments either confirm or disprove a general theory (cf. V. J. 
Mannoia 1980, 5-29). This conception of science relies on a balance between the 
scientist’s careful observation and imaginative thinking. It highlights the personal 
and social factors that figure in all science (both natural sciences and humanities). 
47 These three kinds of psychology are an amalgam of observation and 
theory. Empirical psychology tries to restrict itself more than others to the 
findings of experimental observations. The psychoanalytic or clinical schools that 
follow Freud for example are less strictly positivistic, even though they can be 
reductionistic because of the limitations imposed by their foundational theories. 
Lastly, philosophical psychology draws upon metaphysical and anthropological 
theories to describe the human psyche and its agency. Cf. Dent 1984. 
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scientific, ethical and religious languages. They resemble ethical 
theory and moral theology, not only in this way, but also inasmuch as 
they each provide concepts and techniques for ordering the interior 
life,48 and in using hypotheses, imagination and heuristic models in 
their research and explanations.49 Psychologists no longer claim to 
completely induce their science from experimental observations;50 and 
those that still attempt this approach tend to use more reductionistic 
methods.51 We can recognize the compatibility of psychotherapy and 
moral support, when psychosocial health—or its reestablishment 
                                                 
48 Browning (1987, 3-8) distinguishes modern (experimental or clinical) 
from philosophical psychologies. Philosophical psychologies are philosophical in 
accounting for a rather wide range of human experience. Clinical psychologies 
seek concepts to account for their clinical observations, without achieving the 
predictive levels that experimentalists do. Experimental psychologies aspire to 
derive their concepts from controlled observations, isolating variables, 
statistically analyzing causes or correlations, and approaching publicly repeatable 
verification. 
49 Sciences of all types, including psychology, do not differ from ethics and 
moral theology in using imagination, assumptions, hypotheses and heuristic 
models for conceptualizing research, findings and therapies. Such models can 
include metaphors and analogies, which imply important cognitive processes for 
scientific, ethical and theological thinking. According to Ian Ramsey (Models and 
Mystery, Oxford, 1964): “neither scientific models nor religious analogies are just 
useful fictions. They are taken seriously as a pointer to the truth, though they are 
not accepted as literally true. However, this assumed similarity between religious 
and scientific “analogical” thinking clearly cannot be pressed too far before it 
breaks down.” (cited in Watts and Williams 1988, 52). 
50 Models that claim to be founded entirely on external observation have 
lost credit. For example, the behaviorism (in the mold of B. F. Skinner) that 
dominated American academic psychology during the middle decades of the 
twentieth century held that we could study only externally observable behavior 
with scientific accuracy (cf. D. Goleman 1995, 40). 
51 Although such psychologies may have some predictive value, they tend 
to have less therapeutic utility. In distinguishing scientific from non-scientific 
aspects of psychological theory, Vitz (1997) identifies three different conceptual 
levels. At the first level, terms and categories are closely tied to observation, such 
as those of clinical psychology (e.g., extroversion/introversion, separation 
anxiety). At the second level, he distinguishes conceptual and theoretical 
concepts for the various theories (Oedipus complex, Jungian archetypes—
persona, shadow, animus/anima). At the third level, general presuppositions, 
which are often religious, metaphysical or ethical in nature, underlie the theory. 
Because of the importance of levels two and three for most psychological 
theories, they involve more an applied philosophy of life than the result of a 
scientific investigation. According to Vitz (1997, 20-21): “in general, there is 
little reliable scientific evidence for any Level Two concept.” Furthermore, Level 
Three concepts are clearly assumptions, neither provable nor disprovable by 
empirical science. 
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through some therapy—is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
the capacity to chose good and to avoid evil,52 and to develop moral 
virtue. Among the schools of moral development rooted in 
psychology,53 let us now turn to cognitive development models, which 
provide input for both resilience and virtue perspectives. 
Cognitive theories of developmental psychology, based on the 
groundbreaking work of Jean Piaget, have influenced schools of moral 
and faith development.54 They provide a basis for enriching our 
understanding of virtue theory, especially human development in 
virtue. Lawrence Kohlberg’s structural-developmental approach, for 
example, proposes a six-stage theory of development, based on 
philosophical studies (Kant and Rawls), as well as intuitions and 
empirical studies. Kohlberg’s sixth and highest stage concerns 
“universal, ethical principles,” in particular justice understood as 
“equality and reciprocity,”55 as respect for other persons as ends, not 
means.56 Notwithstanding its potential for aiding our understanding 
growth in virtue and resilience, Kohlberg’s approach draws critiques.57 
The critiques raise questions about the way in which developmental 
                                                 
52 Cf. Höffe 1983, 162. 
53 Cf. Durkin (1995, 463-503) identifies four such schools of moral 
development: (1) Biological Theories of Morality/Sociobiology: Wilson; (2) 
Social Learning Theory and Morality: positive reinforcement, punishment, 
observation and modeling; (3) Cognitive Development Theories of Moral 
Development: Piaget, Kohlberg, Gilligan, Damon; and (4) Social Contexts of 
Moral Development and Behavior: family, gender ideology and culture. 
54 James Fowler (1974, 1975, 1981, 1982) has established a developmental 
theory of faith; cf. Crossin 1985, 94-100. 
55 Kohlberg claims that “no principle other than justice has been shown to 
meet the formal conception of a universal, prescriptive principle.” Kohlberg 
1971, 221; cited in Crossin 1985, 86. 
56 Kohlberg’s structural criteria, which are more general than truth-value or 
efficiency, are “increased differentiation and integration.” Kohlberg 1980, 42; 
cited in Crossin 1985, 85. 
57 P. J. Philibert (1975, 455-479) compares and contrasts Kohlberg’s 
approach to classical Aristotelian-Thomistic traditions of virtue ethics. According 
to Crossin (1985, 87-91), Kohlberg’s approach is limited by its invariant 
sequence of stages, its over-reliance on Kantian deontology, and its segregation 
of the religious dimension. Crossin also critiques its inadequate treatment of 
human affective, behavioral and symbolic capacities, and its oversimplified focus 
on logic. He critiques its inadequate treatment of human affective, behavioral and 
symbolic capacities, and its oversimplified focus on logic. C. Gilligan (1982 and 
1992; cf. M. J. Larrabee 1992) notably critiques its lack of appreciation of the 
experience of women and other cultures. 
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theories, and psychosocial science in general, can collaborate with 
moral theology, which is our next question. 
2.2.2. Models of Collaboration and Scientific Pretensions 
To formulate a model of collaboration, we need to establish the 
standards that accredit its scientific character. What goals and 
principles authenticate our use of psychosocial science insights in 
moral theology? Previously, I mentioned that Aquinas’ approach to 
moral theology calls upon the probable authority of experience and 
observation, philosophical reasoning and science in seeking to 
understand moral life more fully.58 In this perspective, the sciences’ 
accounts of human nature, agency and society serve, as does “strictly” 
philosophical reflection, to deepen our theological understanding of 
moral anthropology.59 Nonetheless, we need to ask further questions. 
Inasmuch as grace perfects nature, how might moral theology employ 
the insights provided by these sciences? Does a theological 
interpretation of insights found through non-theological sciences do 
violence to these findings?60 
Aquinas’ thought sustains a natural law approach, which 
asserts a critical realism about knowledge of moral agency and affirms 
                                                 
58 Philosophical-scientific sources are the third source for sacra doctrina. 
According Aquinas, there are: first, the authority of canonical Scripture as 
“proper and necessary” arguments (proprie, ex necessitate argumentando); 
second, the authority of doctors of the Church “as proper, but probable” 
arguments (quasi arguendo ex propriis, sed probabiliter); and third, the authority 
of philosophers as “extrinsic and probable” arguments (quasi extraneis 
argumentis, et probabilibus). Cf. ST I 1.8 ad. 2; Geenan 1952, 128; Waldstein 
1994, 81. 
59 Gustafson suggests that the empirical sciences can assist moral 
understanding in the following four domains: the nature of persons as moral 
agents; the context in which decisions and actions occur; the potential 
consequences of action (and their predictability); and the identification of moral 
norms; cf. Gustafson 1971, 122-137. 
60 For a worthwhile study on interdisciplinary models of science and 
theology, see Van Huyssteen (1999 and 1998), who attempts to avoid relativism 
and foundationalism (universalism), proposing a “postfoundationalist” way of 
interpreting the claims of science and theology, rationality and tradition. He bases 
this interdisciplinary dialogue in human rationality’s deep and significant 
biological origins, which he explains in terms of evolutionary epistemology. 
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God’s collaboration in it.61 Thomas conceives the natural law as the 
“rational creature’s participation in the eternal law.”62 In following his 
method, we can turn to science for insights about human nature and 
behavior.63 We need to examine how we can ground our ethical 
reflection in knowledge of fundamental human goods and in the proper 
ends of human life, intelligently grasped through human natural 
inclinations, intuition and reason.64 In this regard, what scientific 
authority do psychosocial resilience findings bring to moral theology 
in a critical realist tradition? Specialists have employed various 
models: consequentialist models,65 disclosure models,66 bricolage 
                                                 
61 Concerning different interpretations of natural law and the relevancy of 
medieval notions of natural law for contemporary Christian Ethics see, R. 
Cessario 2001, J. Porter 1999, S. J. Pope 1998b. 
62 ST I-II 91.2. 
63 For example, S. J. Pope (1998b, 551) argues that evolutionary 
psychology (cf. Buss) can provide material for ethical reflection inasmuch as it 
assesses and orders (a healthy expression of) the full range of natural desires in 
the project of a good moral life. Pope says that “theologians might associate 
Buss’s observations about the relatively indiscriminate nature of sexual desire in 
males, for example, with the sensitive account of ‘concupiscence,’ or disordered 
sexual desire, classically depicted in Saint Augustine’s Confessions [1992, trans. 
Chadwick, Oxford, pp. 24-34].” 
64 S. J. Pope (1996, 180) holds that through the exercise of the virtue of 
prudence (phronesis), abstract knowledge of universal human goods is 
complemented in the concrete. He says: “the content of the more general kind of 
moral reflection no doubt includes various beliefs about which aspects of our 
natural human inclinations and our inherited behavioral repertoire ought to be 
approved of, acted upon, and promoted, and which ought to be inhibited, 
sublimated, or closely monitored.”  
65 For example in L. S. Cahill’s (1980/1989, 551-562) consequentialist 
model, the behavioral sciences (as well as personal narratives) contribute 
descriptive and normative accounts of human experience that, along with 
Scripture and Tradition, compose the primary sources of moral theology. Cahill’s 
(1980/1989, 551) interdisciplinary approach calls for correlating the 
interdependent reference points with the goal of attempting “an appropriate and 
critical hermeneutic of each in relation to all;” that is of Scripture, Tradition, 
descriptive and normative accounts. She (1980/1989, 557) generalizes the 
narrative contributions and behavioral studies and seeks a consensual 
adjudication of ethical issues. 
66 Disclosure models relate scientific and religious knowledge as analogies 
pointing toward truth, giving “insights” about truth: (1) scientific insights entail 
discovery; (2) psychotherapeutic insights impact and transform the emotions and 
motivation (feeling and commitment); (3) religious insights illuminate truth, as 
well as arouse feeling and commitment (more often than science). Cf. Watts and 
Williams 1988, 151-2. 
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models,67 as well as concordat ones.68 I shall focus on the critical 
appropriation model of S. J. Pope. 
In the context of dialogue with evolutionary theory and 
sociobiology on the altruism and the ordering of love, S. J. Pope offers 
a model for the critical appropriation of current scientific insights.69 He 
relies on arguments from scientific authority, as a theologian and not 
as a scientist.70 For example, he recognizes that his employment of 
provisional scientific findings gives only tentative “nonscientific 
conclusions,” which are modest in scope and open to revision in light 
of new findings and theories. He attempts not to confuse speculative 
hypotheses with more definitive explanations. In interpreting the virtue 
tradition, he recognizes that sociobiology provides insights or 
hypotheses rather than axiomatic truths because of its own 
methodological restrictions.71 Following J. M. Gustafson, Pope holds 
                                                 
67 Cf. J. Stout 1988, 74-77; P. A. Lewis 1991, 6-9. 
68 S. Gould’s (1999, 9) principle of NOMA (Non-Overlapping Magisteria) 
advocates “a respectful, even loving, concordat between the magisteria of science 
and religion.” In short, he (1999, 6) specifies that: “the net, or magisterium, of 
science covers the empirical realm: what is the universe made of (fact) and why 
does it work this way (theory). The magisterium of religion extends over the 
questions of ultimate meaning and moral value. These two magisteria do not 
overlap, nor do they encompass all inquiry (consider, for example, the 
magisterium of art and the meaning of beauty). To cite the old cliché, science gets 
the age of rocks, and religion the rock of ages; science studies how the heavens 
go, religion how to go to heaven.” 
69 His “common conversation” with these sciences seeks to better 
understand the foundations of human nature and matters of utmost importance for 
Christian ethics, such as the ordering of love (ordo amoris) and its roots found in 
the evolution of human altruism (cf. S. J. Pope 1994 and 1996). Others who use 
an appropriation model include: P. Philibert 1980. 
70 S. J. Pope (1996, 167) holds that science is only one of numerous sources 
needed to support ethical positions; science itself is not sufficient for ethics. His 
position “is that moral claims tend to be supported as part and parcel of a 
complex and interdependent “web of beliefs” (cf. Quine) rather than as moral 
conclusions produced by a self-contained, logical system or by simple and 
straightforward procedures of deduction or induction.” 
71 S. J. Pope’s (1994, 9) philosophical anthropology recognizes the 
complexity of the human person and society, and therefore can draw upon 
sociobiology in order to investigate how in “human life, genetic influence and 
biological inclinations are always mediated, for example, through culture, 
intelligence, and personality.” He recognizes “functional equivalences” between 
evolutionary theory’s ordering of attachment and assistance giving, and the 
thought of Aquinas on the ordering of love. While vindicating Aquinas’ method 
of dialoguing with the best current science, Pope (1994, 77-98) does not however 
retain outmoded scientific formulations and related theological parallels. At the 
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that we can make a stronger or weaker claim. Either we claim to 
employ the “scientific” authority established by the source (such as 
Freud or Skinner),72 or we make a weaker claim, that the findings of 
science serve as sources of “insight” about human nature and behavior. 
In the second case, the authority depends on the moral theologian’s use 
of the sources and the coherence of his own arguments, implicit 
empirical reference73 and anthropology. Pope advocates the second 
model. He neither opposes nor identifies Christian ethics and the 
human sciences. Rather he considers these disciplines as mutually 
interdependent; his approach contrasts with others that reduce morality 
to a human adaptive capacity, or that construe morality as independent 
of evolutionary developments.74 
In order to integrate resilience findings into virtue theory and 
moral theology, I shall employ S. J. Pope’s critical appropriation 
model75 as a guide throughout this work. Space does not allow us to 
explore more of the contrasts and collaboration between ethical and 
psychosocial sciences (on human agency and knowledge, for example) 
implied by this model. Nevertheless, we shall attempt to demonstrate 
that the tasks and visions of the empirical scientist and the moralist 
                                                                                                          
same time, he (1994, 99-105) criticizes current shortcomings in sociobiology and 
evolutionary theory, especially when applied to ethics in reductionistic or 
deterministic ways. 
72 In this case, we must put forward scientific grounds for such employment 
as well as adjudicate between the differences of the various sources used. Cf. J. 
M. Gustafson 1981, 251-279. 
73 J. M. Gustafson (1971/1989, 430-1) says that the choice of sources and 
perspectives is rendered more difficult, since “it involves not only some selection 
of empirical data, but also the selection of certain concepts and principles of 
explanation.” Moreover, each author’s position (inasmuch as it is coherent) 
systematizes the data, concepts and principles of explanation, which entails the 
isolation of data considered significant and the ruling out of other findings. Cf. S. 
J. Pope 1994. 
74 From the perspective of theological ethics, S. J. Pope (1998b, 545) 
rejects reductionistic and independent approaches to relating evolutionary 
theories and morality. He supports an interdependence approach through which 
“morality reflects the influence of evolution to the extent that the latter shapes 
human emotional capacities and predispositions.” This approach, he says, can 
account for how “natural desires can be ordered to serve morality.” 
75 S. J. Pope (1996 and 1994) discusses three important issues: (a) whether 
ethics can seek ethical justification in science; (b) the types of warrants possible 
in scientifically established facts; and (c) the degree and type of ethics’ 
epistemological dependence on science. 
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enrich each other; each needs the other to sharpen its specific method. 
They both contribute to a fuller understanding of the richness of human 
agency. A constructive effort seeks to master both the wealth of 
observations and reflections though, as well as their limitations. We 
shall neglect neither the richness of personal observations about human 
action found through statistical analyses nor their limits. Likewise, we 
shall neglect neither the “thicker” narrative descriptions of internal 
aspects of human nature and moral agency nor their imprecision. Even 
if these scientific methods focus on different specific domains of 
human action, we need an overarching perspective, which integrates 
and synthesizes the others. This method does not mean however that 
the overarching approach assumes the accumulated “scientific” 
prerogative of the others. Indeed, moral science attempts to examine 
human agency through these tools, while integrating a deeper 
reflection on the moral life. 
How do these different sciences examine an act, for example, a 
robbery? Psychosocial specialists can study the pick pocketing of the 
unsuspecting pedestrian, through theoretical observations and clinical 
analyses. Artists can describe and re-represent the event in evocative 
ways. The agent (thief) himself can recount his choices, motives and 
the circumstances that led up to the robbery. Moralists however 
attempt to draw together these accounts to understand the moral 
dimension of the act. They need to know about them all, including the 
account of the agent and his underlying dispositions. Nonetheless, they 
must go further. As an engaged-observer, moralists (and other non-
reductionistic thinkers) also reflect upon their own internal personal 
and communal experience. In addition to the specifically moral realm, 
the moral theologian recognizes the influence of communion and 
grace. He considers theological virtues and gifts, especially 
knowledge, understanding and wisdom. Our next question asks how 
Aquinas’ theological approach elevates and completes psychosocial 
observations, information and explanations. 
2.2.3. Resilience Findings, Ethical Normativity and 
Moral Theology 
What normative claims can the psychosocial sciences in 
general and resilience findings in particular make in regards to moral 
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anthropology and theology? Even if (as I do hold) we cannot derive 
moral norms from the psychosocial sciences, one can ask whether their 
concepts and findings contribute to understanding better the normative 
dimensions of human anthropology, goals and society. In order to 
employ psychosocial sciences in Thomas’ virtue approach and moral 
theology, at least three problems remain: (1) how do we determine the 
relevancy of the data and concepts; (2) how do we adjudicate the 
“scientific” authority of the psychosocial sciences; (3) how do we 
identify the normative and value biases of particular studies.76 A fuller 
treatment of these questions would demand that we address the place 
of finality and norms in moral theory, which I shall do shortly. In this 
section, I shall illustrate briefly the debate on the normativity of 
psychosocial sciences. We shall start with some pertinent issues raised 
by the resilience perspective, and then in the next section suggest that 
Aquinas’ approach to prudence and norms offers a normative 
framework to incorporate resilience findings and explorations of 
spiritual resilience. 
Each resilience approach employs notions of normality or 
normativity in order to establish whether an individual has exhibited 
resilience or not. When can we affirm that a person or group has coped 
well in difficulty, resisted self-destruction in a fitting way or 
constructed in an acceptable fashion? What are the standards or norms 
                                                 
76 Gustafson (1971/1989, 437) identifies these three major problems 
involved in employing the empirical sciences in moral thought. First, ethicists 
have problems judging the relevancy of data and concepts. For how can we 
delineate what is empirically at issue? How does the moral theologian translate 
empirical studies that were not designed to resolve moral questions? And what 
relevant issues have been foreclosed by the way the research was conducted? 
Second, questions arise concerning the principles of interpretation. A moralist 
cannot judge an empirical science study’s scientific adequacy, unless it is 
evidently inconsistent or internally incoherent. However, on the basis of 
understanding man and society, they can identify which research is “adequate, 
accurate, or at least plausible.” This perspective then must philosophically justify 
the research chosen and why it would be more adequate than other types of 
research. Moreover, “eclectic moralists,” based on what makes “sense” to them, 
use “empirical research for sources of ‘insight’ into the nature of man and 
society.” Such moralists must assume the full responsibility for their arguments, 
without claiming the authority of the research. Third, ethicists have difficulties 
identifying the normative or value biases in empirical studies. For ethical 
principles and arguments, rather than empirical studies, serve as the deepest 
foundation for resolving moral issues. 
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for survival or human flourishing? Without such notions, resilience 
would mean “survival at all costs.” If norms were simply a function of 
convention, then the sole criteria for inclusion or exclusion would be 
ideological or pragmatic agreement. And if statistical analyses were to 
provide a normative understanding of human resilience, then the 
psychosocial sciences would establish norms directly from 
observation-based calculations. 
In order to adjudicate whether or not these sciences can 
determine a normative framework, we shall outline the two main 
positions in the running debate. On the one hand, E. O. Wilson claims 
that science, sociobiology in particular, can identify the norms behind 
human behavior based on the explanatory power of causal chains.77 
Critics have found fault with Wilson’s headlong fall into a “naturalistic 
fallacy.” He claims in Sociobiology that social facts can establish 
social norms, and in Consilience that natural science methods can 
obtain unified knowledge.78 S. J. Pope criticizes this type of 
                                                 
77 Wilson (1975, 201) construes this causal basis of law (including 
normative laws) in terms of scientific materialism and evolutionary theory: “The 
core of scientific materialism is the evolutionary epic. Let me repeat its minimum 
claims: that the laws of the physical sciences are consistent with those of the 
biological and social sciences and can be linked in chains of causal explanation; 
that life and mind have a physical basis; that the world as we know it has evolved 
from earlier worlds obedient to the same laws; and that the visible universe today 
is everywhere subject to these materialist explanations. The epic can be 
indefinitely strengthened up and down the line, but its most sweeping assertions 
cannot be proved with finality.” Furthermore, as regards sociobiology and 
religion, Wilson holds that science and religion are of two different realms, each 
with their own values and purposes. Religion has motivational importance for 
human survival (even if there is no transcendental foundation for it). The roles of 
religion and science differ and converge in most areas of moral reasoning. He 
(1987, 89-90) furthermore claims: “The role of religion is to codify and put into 
enduring poetic form the highest moral values of a society consistent with 
empirical knowledge and to lead in moral reasoning. The role of science is to test 
remorselessly every conclusion about human nature and to search for the bedrock 
of ethics—by which I mean the material basis of natural law. Science faces in 
religion its most interesting challenge, while religion will find in science the 
necessary means to meet the modern age.” 
78 E. O. Wilson first expressed his unabashed advocacy of sociobiology’s 
ability to provide norms for moral agency in Sociobiology (1978). Afterwards he 
retracted this position, and then reaffirmed it in a more glaring form in his 
Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (1998). His (1998, 8) theory of consilience 
is “an integration, literally a ‘jumping together’ of knowledge by the linking of 
facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork of 
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sociobiology in general when it moves simplistically from factually 
describing behavior to a normative approval of it. This reductionistic 
tendency in some cases construes human behavior exclusively in 
organic, chemical and genetic terms, and reduces culture to an 
expression of genetic influences.79 
On the other end of the spectrum from Wilson, the English 
social scientist Albert F. Osborn claims that resilience cannot be a 
good in itself: that is, simple coping, self-conserving or constructing 
cannot be an uncontrolled norm. Otherwise one would have to praise 
and promote “resilient” survival due to thievery, murder or terrorism, 
as well.80 He says, on the contrary, “the means by which an individual 
avoids the potential consequences of adversity must be socially 
acceptable. [...] Survival itself is not sufficient. It must be socially 
approved survival.”81 What can the psychosocial sciences tell us of 
what is “socially acceptable”?82 Osborn claims that to determine social 
normativity is not the role of the social sciences, whose task stops at 
the level of discipline, specific theories and explanations of 
observations.83 As mentioned earlier, he is not alone.84 Other specialists 
                                                                                                          
explanation.” According to Van Huyssteen (1999, 25), this project exhibits 
Wilson’s “massive and reductionist scientism.” 
79 According to Pope (1998a, 281), sociobiology attempts to observe the 
“opinions of good and evil” and falls into the naturalistic fallacy (neglecting the 
fact-value gap), while further applying itself to the domains of law, psychology 
and sociology. 
80 Here we distinguish thievery and murder from: (1) taking food in order 
to survive when someone has no other viable options; and (2) an act of self-
defense which incidentally (non-intentionally) involves the death of the unjust 
aggressor. 
81 A. F. Osborne 1992, 13. 
82 According to the report of the Consortium on the School-based 
Promotion of Social Competence (1994, 275): “Social competence can be viewed 
in terms of ‘life skills for adaptation to diverse ecologies and settings.’ This 
perspective incorporates the possibility that in certain cultures, neighborhoods, 
and situations, so-called undesirable behaviors (e.g. aggressiveness, selfish, or 
passive behaviors) may be required if one is to be perceived as ‘well adjusted’ or 
to avoid being subject to harm.” 
83 As a social scientist, Osborne (1992, 13) has nonetheless recognized that 
religious faith may play a significant role in establishing what is socially 
acceptable. The French Neurologist, Bernard-François Michel (1998, 91-108) 
moreover holds that it is for ethics, moral theology and religion to provide the 
normative and spiritual framework for resilience. Geertz (1973, 30) furthermore 
expresses a similar view. 
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recognize that empirical observation cannot provide such standards. 
These researchers hold that empirical resilience studies, which employ 
notions of adjustment, survival and fulfillment, need further 
justification, preliminary presuppositions or foundational theories.85 
To concede that the ethical framework must come from 
elsewhere than external observation denies a “naturalistic” solution. It 
does not however so simply solve the problem of naturalism in ethics 
and moral theology. The “naturalistic fallacy” or the “is/ought” 
controversy surfaces due to confusions between fact and value, 
between what is and what ought to be.86 First, terminological and 
technical issues arise. On the one hand, specialists use the word “good” 
differently in “good economics” and “good ethics.” On the other hand, 
within morality, terminological and metaphysical differences emerge 
when we seek to adjudicate between moral goods.87 
                                                                                                          
84 For instance, according to the Swiss psychologists Perrez and Reicherts 
(1992, 163-4), coping behavior is “adequate or appropriate if it corresponds to 
several criteria of rationality.” They state that the means we use to cope and to 
reduce stress must be “ethically acceptable” and effect, and must positively 
correlate the cost with the benefit. American psycho-sociologist Lois Barclay 
Murphy (1987, 101), for her part, adjudicates resilience in terms of recovery over 
a shorter or longer time, which “involves global aspects of the whole child—
growth and growth drive, equilibration after disequilibrium.” She envisions 
resilience as “an evaluative concept” that we need to understand in the context of 
more fundamental psychological notions, which are not empirical but which 
provide a normative setting for understanding her conception of resilience. 
85 Cf. Wolin and Wolin 1993 (on resilience and morality); Stinnet and 
Defrain 1985 (on resilience, faith, values, and community consciousness); 
Benson 1994: (on resilience, pro-social, non-hedonistic orientation). 
86 Concerning the debate about the “is-ought” question in moral 
philosophy, see: D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1888; G. E. Moore, 
Principia Ethica 1903, Hudson et al. 1969; Gustafson 1971/1989; Bruening 
1978; A. Flew 1978, A. MacIntyre, 1983. Concerning the naturalistic fallacy and 
theology, see: S. J. Pope 1994, 1998a, 1998b; Arnould 1996 (esp. 230-232); J. 
Porter 1999. 
87 For instance, some proportionalists (B. Schüller, F. Böckle and others) 
differentiate the categories “morally right” from “morally good,” and premoral, 
ontic or physical good from moral good; they argue that these distinctions permit 
them to derive a moral claim by “weighing” the goods involved. This approach to 
distinguish goods seems to fall into a naturalistic or physicalistic error inasmuch 
as it claims that we can simply adjudicate moral rightness by optimizing premoral 
goods. This issue is beyond the scope of my treatise. I merely pose the question 
of whether foundational insufficiencies of such proportionalist systems lead to 
mistaken and overly technical notions of morality. The following critiques also 
attest to problems with these positions: VS, Pinckaers 1995b. According to 
Rhonheimer (2000, 365-400 and 582), the proportionalist systems of B. Schüller 
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Second, problems arise in statistical methods, such as those 
that attempt to develop scientific notions of what is “statistically 
human.”88 What limits do they face in studying normality? Serious 
reasons inhibit us from simply elevating statistical averages of 
externally observed human behavior and social patterns to the level of 
moral and spiritual norms. The psychosocial sciences study people and 
societies in the past. They cannot say more than the research has 
already demonstrated. Epistemological (and metaphysical) problems 
arise concerning our relationship to the future; that is, if life projects, 
goals and finality can motivate moral acts. Much psychosocial research 
cannot appropriate the future-tending dynamic inherent to a person or 
community’s action. 
The resilience testimony expressed in narrative, on the 
contrary, highlights how humans build toward the future, in view of 
past experience and present convictions. According to Child 
Psychiatrist Stanislas Tomkiewicz, scientists can never forget that they 
(as scientists using the model of positivist science) do not know the 
future.89 Specialists sometimes do project statistical analyses into the 
future; they thus predict rates of suicide, mental health and illness, and 
so on. Yet on the individual level, we cannot clearly predict the future 
of a particular person. Even though a sociological survey might 
quantify personal opinions concerning good and evil, it neither 
establishes norms nor creates a normative framework. It can also tend 
to evaporate the notion of the human person in its richness; that is, 
unless the specialist compensates for methodological limitations in the 
analysis and provides more comprehensive reflection. 
                                                                                                          
and F. Böckle fall into the “naturalistic fallacy” when attempting to “optimize” 
premoral goods. They attempt nonetheless to establish a foundation in value 
(Böckle) or a love ethics (Schüller), which remain unsatisfactory frameworks 
inasmuch as they do not provide the way to hierarchize adequately actions and 
values, nor to correlate moral rectitude and goodness. 
88 Gustafson (1971/1989, 433-5) says for example that we cannot equate 
economic science and policy with morality; good economics in contemporary 
usage is not necessarily equivalent to good morals (that is, when “good 
economics” refers to success from a particular point of view, but devoid of 
distributive justice). Furthermore, he identifies problems related to statistically 
developed notions of normality, especially when used as norms to employ life-
taking measures (abortion, infanticide) or to stop life-prolonging treatments. 
89 Cf. S. Tomkiewicz, 2001. 
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Resilience researchers, thus, can neither establish norms nor 
create a normative framework through psychosocial empirical studies 
per se. Nevertheless, we need moral norms in order to be resilient and 
to adjudicate resilience phenomena. Although Aquinas’ moral theory 
does not attempt to extract moral norms from scientific findings, it 
does philosophically investigate the normative input that we rationally 
attain through prudent adjudication, which offers the means to 
integrate resilience insights in moral anthropology and action. 
2.2.4. Prudence, Norms and Resilience 
How does Aquinas’ virtue theory and method help us to 
understand the ways in which, prudence and moral norms offer a moral 
framework for resilience research and motivate resilient lives? As we 
already stated, resilience findings cannot create moral norms; but can 
they aid to identify or ameliorate them? I shall offer a few suggestions 
to these questions and will complete them in the upcoming chapters. 
Thomas argues that the norm of human action is prudence, 
through which we use practical reason in a free moral act to apply the 
goals of the virtues and precepts to personal action in concrete 
circumstances.90 Prudence perfects practical reason either through 
acquired or infused means. He affirms that humans need to develop the 
virtue of prudence in order to face challenges with intellectual and 
moral fidelity and creativity. Prudence especially helps us to act 
resiliently when we meet acute complexity in evaluating the nature of 
the act’s object and the applicability of moral principles.91 Prudential 
                                                 
90 As an intellectual virtue the seat of prudence is the practical intellect, in 
terms of “rectified judgment about things to be done” (I-II 56.4), while as a moral 
virtue its seat is “practical intellect charged with good will” (I-II 56.3). Westberg 
(1992, 290) argues convincingly in this regard that “prudence was described by 
St. Thomas as the perfection of practical reason, requiring the development of 
other moral virtues, but not a notion of law as obligation.” He furthermore 
stresses that Aquinas’ understanding of law is such that it does not introduce “the 
concept of obligation into the motivation for action.” Likewise, the moral 
paraclesis of the New Testament is a word of encouragement, that is not spoken 
in the imperative mode, as one would command servants, but as an exhortation as 
when speaking to a friend or sibling, cf. John 15:15; Pinckaers 1997, 25-6. 
91 Aquinas describes how practical reason attends to human action’s 
contingent matters, which lack the necessity of speculative matters. Furthermore, 
in matters of action, all humans do not arrive at the same rectitude; practical 
reason risks defects as we enter into practical details. He says: “In operativis 
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judgment entails a global act that transforms the agent in his decision 
to act. It comprises intelligence, experience, effort and vigilance, 
which involves human reason and will (including faith-informed 
reason). 
While Aquinas recognizes intrinsic and extrinsic principles in 
prudential agency,92 the key to human morality is that intelligent agents 
act for an end.93 At both internal and external levels, providence (and 
divine law) provides the ultimate source and goal of this intelligent 
ordering.94 A commonly supposed dichotomy between practical reason 
and law (especially providential law) is resolved if we understand that 
humans choose freely to participate in divine providence;95 this 
participation involves practical reason in the form of virtue. Through a 
virtuous disposition, as an interior principle of action, we develop our 
natural inclinations and their related capacities, so that we can act with 
more spontaneity, ease and freedom. Law, for its part, serves two 
roles.96 As an external principle of action, law leads us to attain goals 
                                                                                                          
autem non est eadem veritas vel rectitudo practica apud omens quantum ad 
propria, sed solum quantum ad communia: et apud illos apud quos est eadem 
rectitudo in propriis, non est aequaliter omnibus nota.” ST I-II 94.4. 
92 The intrinsic principles are potency and habitus (cf. dispositions, virtues, 
character). The extrinsic principles of action include law, which is “the rule and 
measure of actions, according to which someone is led to, or drawn away from, 
the doing of something” (ST I-II 90.1). Furthermore Aquinas says that “law is in 
all things which are inclined to something from some law” (ST I-II 90.1 ad 1). 
93 “omnia agenta necesse est agere propter finem” ST I-II 1.2. It is 
necessary to refer to flourishing as the human telos when involved in practical 
reasoning (cf. A. MacIntyre 1999, 111-112). 
94 Cf. ST I 22.2 corpus and ad 4. And as Westberg (1992, 288) confirms: 
“The function of law then is to inform the mind with principles by which to judge 
particular actions, so that they are correctly directed to the ends. This right 
ordering of action to an end implies correctness in counsel, judgment, and 
execution; and since they are all required for the right ordering of action, they 
come within the purview of providence.” 
95 A law/practical reason dichotomy is rooted in contradictory approaches 
to ethics and moral theology. It depends on whether the ethical foundation is 
based on law or practical reasoning (cf. Westberg 1992, 279ff). Aquinas’ 
correlation between practical reason (using Aristotle) and theology of law (using 
Augustine) is difficult to understand completely, since he treats these themes in 
different places; and his vocabulary of law does not enter into his description of 
the psychological processes of agency. Cf. Pinckaers 1978b, 105-6. 
96 Aquinas defines law, as “definitio legis, quae nihil est aliud quam 
quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis 
habit, promulgata” ST I-II 90.4. This definition is supple enough to apply to 
natural and eternal law, human and divine law, as well as the Old and New Law. 
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and avoid extremes. The New Law, on the contrary, demands that we 
internalize the principle. Or rather, it is the presence and action of the 
Holy Spirit that transforms the believer’s heart according to the 
principle. 
How can a law—especially the New Law—become an internal 
source of human agency? How can it promote human freedom and 
spiritual resilience? Aquinas defines the New Law (lex nova) precisely 
as an interior law, which the Holy Spirit writes in the hearts of the 
faithful and works through love.97 The full array of law crowned by the 
New Law moves us to participate in God’s plan of wisdom.98 Through 
these laws, God reproduces the image of his Son in human beings. 
However, does God’s involvement in our inner lives conflict with our 
freedom? Aquinas’ view of the New Law neither exaggerates human 
autonomy nor overrides it. The eternal law is the source in which 
                                                                                                          
It is only from within such a wide spectrum of law and moral norms that we can 
adequately formulate Aquinas’ teaching on natural law (as well as the New Law). 
Nonetheless, such a simple distinction inadequately resolves disputes concerning 
natural law per se, and nature in general. These terms have undergone numerous 
mutations, dismissals and reformulations. Confusion concerning natural law and 
its interaction with practical reasoning cause a good deal of the contemporary 
crisis in moral theology. In general, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas give 
the classical teaching on natural law. Marked developments have come from: 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes (De Homine), and Locke. Outright dismissals have 
been given by: Sextus Empiricus (c. AD 200, and other ethical sceptics); D. 
Hume (1740. A Treatise of Human Nature); Reformulations include: the “new 
classical natural law theory” (G. Grisez 1965; G. Grisez, J. Boyle and J. Finnis 
1987, J. Finnis 1997;). Of particular interest in the revival of moral theology are 
the contributions of Pope John Paul II’s Veritatis Splendor and the CCC (no. 
1950-52, which considers moral law, according to its species, including natural 
law and the New Law, as modes of divine pedagogy). Cf. J. Porter 1999; R. J. 
Dougherty 1999. Furthermore, movements such as positivism and nihilism deny 
long standing notions of “nature.” On counter resurgences in notions of nature 
and natural law, see: Dougherty 1999, 582; S. J. Pope 1997. 
97 The New Law is the perfection of charity (cf. ST II-II 23.2 ad 1; VS 45). 
In the human active participation in the New Law, Thomas offers a coherent 
vision of how through the acquired and infused virtue of prudence we actualize 
natural and divine law. Aquinas’ teaching on the New Law permits us to 
appreciate more completely how humans participate in, and God contributes to, 
morality (cf. Pinckaers 1989, 1978b). It highlights how nature correlates with 
grace, how we put natural and divine law into practice. 
98 According to Aquinas, natural law participates in the eternal law, serves 
as a foundation for civil law, corresponds to the Decalogue (the epitome of the 
Old Law), and is fulfilled in the New Law of Christ taught in the Sermon on the 
Mount (cf. ST I-II qq. 106-108, esp. 108.3 sed contra and corpus; Matt 5:1-7:27; 
Luke 6:17-49; S.-Th. Pinckaers 2000b). 
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human beings freely participate through the use of reason. God is the 
author of this law, which sets the norms and goals for true freedom and 
resilience. The human mind goes on to make new rules (norms), 
because it is first ruled. 
This participation in a higher norm is the standard human 
condition and the basis of a freedom for excellence. For Aquinas, 
human beings can direct themselves only because they are first 
directed.99 In this context, we can construe (1) conscience more as a 
witness to natural law (as participating in the eternal law) than to 
human power, and (2) liberty, more in terms of excellence, than 
indifference. In a parallel way, a spiritual resilience will bear witness 
in action to natural law as participating in eternal law, and will have a 
qualitative dimension (excellence), rather than merely a quantitative 
one (survival). 
In order to understand how the natural law and the New Law’s 
participation in the eternal law correlates with human virtue and 
resilience, we shall examine the normativity of law, precepts and 
virtue—and whether they can serve as norms for spiritual resilience. 
For lack of space, I shall focus on two questions: in Thomas’ virtue 
theory and moral theology, what roles do moral norms play? And how 
might moral norms serve human resilience? 
First, we shall not equate the employment of norms with an 
obligation perspective, which would posit that the duty to fulfill norms 
is the most basic aspect of moral life.100 In Aquinas’ view, morality is 
not simply a science of obligations, duties or norms. Nonetheless both 
rules and virtues are an integral part of morality.101 Secondly, the need 
                                                 
99 John Paul II speaks of this idea of natural law as “theonomy, or 
participated theonomy, since man’s free obedience to God’s law effectively 
implies that human reason and human will participate in God’s wisdom and 
providence” (VS 41.2). His position recalls the Scholastic adage, “the human 
reason is a measuring measure (mensura mensurans) only insofar as it is first a 
measured measure (mensura mensurata),” as relayed by Hittinger (1999, fn. 48). 
100 For example, Aquinas does not construe obligation as the ultimate basis 
of motivation, or the imperium to act. Love, in particular friendship-charity, 
moves us to act. Cf. ST I-II 99.2; Pinckaers 1995a, 14-17. 
101 According to MacIntyre (1999, 109-111), a community (network of 
givers and receivers) needs both virtues and rules. “The types of action required 
by a particular virtue can never be specified exhaustively by any list of rules. But 
failure to observe certain rules may be sufficient to show that one is defective in 
some important virtues.” In particular virtues (e.g. truthfulness), no rule delivers 
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for prudent (wise) application of principles and norms causes us 
neither to discredit moral norms nor to deny intrinsically evil acts nor 
to promote moral relativism. Rather a rational study of the way in 
which the moral law unfolds through time explains how the underlying 
norms remain true in substance while needing to be specified in the 
light of historical circumstances.102 Inasmuch as norms help us to build 
desirable self-attending and social-behavior, they promote resilience. 
We shall explore this idea in the upcoming chapters. 
According to Thomas, we make prudent judgments inspired by 
the primary precepts of natural law and the Decalogue,103 the 
normativity of Gospel narrative and New Testament paraclesis, and 
the myriad variables in practical actions. These norms play a 
pedagogical role. They aid us to actualize virtuous dispositions and 
acts. On the one hand, through prudence, we employ reason to unite 
the moral life under right judgment, employing operative principles 
(norms) of right practical reason such as: do good and avoid evil. 
Infused prudence, on the other hand, offers a further rational measure 
that is informed by faith and its operative principles such as; forgive 
others as you would have them forgive you; aid the poor; do not lead 
astray one of these little ones, and so on.104 Thomas’ pedagogical 
approach seeks to identify, establish and promote moral norms that are 
useful for mature Christian lives, for growth in virtue. If Scriptures (as 
spiritual narrative and moral paraclesis) and the living Tradition of the 
Church serve as a source of virtue narratives and moral-spiritual norms 
                                                                                                          
an answer in particular situations; rule following is only a part of what we need 
for virtuous activity. 
102 John Paul II takes such an approach to norms in Veritatis Splendor (no 
53), where he says: “The truth of the moral law, like that of the “deposit of faith,” 
unfolds down the centuries. The norms expressing that truth remain valid in their 
substance, but must be specified and determined in the same sense and the same 
meaning (eodem sensus eademque sententia) in the light of historical 
circumstances by the Church’s Magisterium, whose decision is preceded and 
accompanied by the work of interpretation and formulation characteristic of the 
reason of individual believers and of theological reflection.” 
103 Cf. ST I-II 97.4 ad 3; and 100.8. 
104 In order to master fear with the virtue of fortitude in the face of mortal 
danger, we: rationally measure the situation, find guidance in Scripture and 
tradition, and call upon examples of Christ and the movement of the Holy Spirit. 
This guidance includes the following: “Greater love has no man than to lay down 
his life for his friends” (John 15:13); turn the other cheek; the example of the 
martyrs, and so on. 
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then both the content and the motivation of moral theology will differ 
from moral philosophy; that is, if the latter excludes these theological 
sources.105 Likewise, the content and motivation for parallel sorts of 
resilience will differ. Spiritual resilience will differ from philosophical 
or psychosocial resilience, if the latter do not support a spiritual 
framework, content and motivation. 
In concluding this section, I recall that we have rejected a 
naturalistic approach that would directly draw a normative framework 
from the psychosocial sciences, from any aspect of the tripartite 
resilience findings: coping with difficulty, resisting destruction or 
promoting construction. We cannot derive ethics (and core ethical 
principles) in a direct way from nature (from a scientific description of 
human behavior or natural ends). Rather we need a basis of 
anthropology, ethical theory and reflection in order for normative 
science to integrate descriptive observations.106 Aquinas’ thought on 
prudence and law aids us to understand better reason’s role in both 
moral theory (and natural resilience) and moral theology (and spiritual 
resilience). Although resilience studies need such a larger normative 
framework, in turn, they offer poignant observations about human 
frailty and strength that can aid us to understand moral action and 
anthropology. In order to understand the way in which resilience and 
Aquinas’ virtue approach can collaborate further toward an enriched 
moral anthropology, we shall next explore the role that flourishing 
plays in human action and resilience. 
                                                 
105 Aquinas’ virtue approach claims to add more than motivation to secular 
norms. In this perspective, we establish and identify our fundamental goals 
(beatitude and virtues) and the means to achieve them (concrete moral norms and 
guidelines) through contact with the basic Christian sources of Scripture and 
Tradition (including magisterium and contemporary ecclesial experience, liturgy 
and prayer, and so forth), which both serve in establishing personal goals and 
moral standards. 
106 While avoiding the “naturalistic fallacy,” S. J. Pope’s (1996) position on 
the relation of descriptive and normative sciences is nuanced and cautious about 
the descriptive generalizations that can underlie normative judgments and vice 
versa. 
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2.3. Flourishing in Aquinas’ Moral Theory and Resilience 
Theory 
Flourishing fascinates everyone. Goals for fulfillment and 
happiness attract and motivate human lives. We ask: What will make 
me truly happy? How can I attain a fulfilled life after a major loss or 
disaster? How can society aid individuals in their flourishing, and vice 
versa, how can individuals contribute to the flourishing of others and 
society? These questions also interest human psychosocial researchers, 
ethicists and theologians. They are anthropological questions, 
questions about being human. Concerns for flourishing, fulfillment and 
happiness traverse resilience research and a virtue-approach to 
morality. To understand and enrich this principal part of Aquinas’ 
moral theology, we contrast and complete it with some historical 
commentary and resilience research on health, normality and 
flourishing. In this section, I first explore the places that incomplete 
and complete flourishing play in Aquinas’ virtue-based moral theory. 
Second, I examine his virtue approach, which does not only concern 
natural human flourishing, but also complete graced beatitude. Lastly, 
I explore the approaches that the human sciences (medicine, 
psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology) take towards human 
flourishing. I draw from the insights of these sciences in order to 
suggest ways to enrich Aquinas’ virtue-approach to flourishing, and to 
appraise how it might serve as a standard and larger framework to 
promote a fuller type of resilience. 
2.3.1. The Goal for Virtue Ethics: Flourishing 
Although space-limits prohibit us to revisit Aquinas’ moral 
anthropology systematically, we have good reason to give an overview 
of the place of flourishing or happiness, as a foundation and capstone, 
in his virtue-based moral theory. Aquinas starts his specifically moral 
treatise in the Summa theologiae (the Secunda Pars) with a question 
neither about what is law, conscience and freedom, nor about what is 
right or wrong. Rather, he first inquires about the finality of moral 
agency. He demonstrates that a person’s ultimate goal is complete 
flourishing or happiness (beatitudo). However, many candidates 
pretend to make us happy. Aquinas explores different variants on the 
ways through which humans seek fulfillment. 
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First, Thomas establishes that humans seek flourishing as the 
primary goal of their moral acts. Understandings of what makes us 
happy differ though. According to Aquinas, the ultimate goal that 
enlightens and motivates moral acts is the virtue of love (friendship-
love with God) and the flourishing that it engenders and promises. The 
relationship of friendship-love and flourishing is based upon the 
human person being created in (toward) the image of God (ad 
imaginem Dei).107 Aquinas devotes his first moral treatise in the Summa 
to human flourishing. He structures the discussion as follows (I-II qq. 
1-5).108 Question One considers the human being’s last end (ultimus 
finis),109 which Aquinas identifies as happiness in God.110 In Question 
Two, he considers a rather exhaustive list of objects as candidates for 
human happiness. Does it consist in: wealth, honor, fame or glory, 
power, any bodily good, pleasure, any good of the soul or any created 
good (aa. 1-8)? He finds that none of these goods can provide complete 
and lasting human flourishing. Question three treats of the nature of 
                                                 
107 Aquinas makes such a claim while drawing from classical 
philosophical, theological and Evangelical sources as well as from current 
discussions on flourishing and moral agency. In his prologue to the Prima 
Secundae, he bases his treatment of the human capacity for moral acts on our 
being created in the image of God (ad imaginem Dei), which implies “an 
intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement.” This insight, which 
he borrows from St. John Damascene (cf. De Fide Orthod. ii.12: PG 94, 920 B, 
cited in his prologue to the prima secundae of the Summa theologiae), will also 
be important later for understanding the type of friendship possible between God 
and a human being (cf. ST II-II 23.1). 
108 Other texts where Aquinas addresses the question of flourishing and 
beatitude are: Com. on Matthew (concerning the Sermon on the Mount, 
especially the Beatitudes); Exposition on the Nicomachean Ethics (esp. books I 
and X); Compendium of Theology (which connects the question of flourishing 
with the virtue of hope, expressed in the “Our Father”); Sermon 12, for the feast 
of All Saints (which is in the process of being published in Leonine edition). Cf. 
S.-Th. Pinckaers 1998b, 34-5; M. Jordan 1994. 
109 St. Thomas addresses (I-II 1.1-8): the fittingness of human finality (a. 
1); its necessity for rational beings (a. 2); how it specifies action (a. 3); the 
uniqueness and globality, universality and efficacy of a last end for humans and 
other creatures (aa. 4-8). 
110 Aquinas structures his arguments around the insights of Aristotle, 
Augustine and others. Thomas (I-II 1.7 sc) cites Augustine’s De Trinitate (xiii.3: 
PL 42, 1018) claim “that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is 
flourishing.” 
Virtue Theory and Resilience Research 153 
flourishing (from its subjective side).111 Thomas distinguishes the 
incomplete flourishing of this life from the complete flourishing that is 
only possible in the vision of God, with the company of the saints and 
angels in the coming new creation. Questions four and five 
successively treat what we require for complete flourishing,112 and how 
we attain it.113 He says that the perfection of charity is essential to the 
happiness found in loving God; he describes this perfection of charity 
in Johannine terms, as friendship.114 
Notwithstanding Aquinas’ striking clarity, his exposition raises 
questions concerning the place of incomplete and complete beatitudo 
in moral theory and theology. What major transmutations has 
beatitudo’s etymology undergone?115 First, when Thomas or the 
                                                 
111 Thomas asks (I-II 3.1-8): Is it something uncreated (a. 1), or an 
operation of human sensitive or intellective faculties, of intellect or will, or of 
speculative or practical intellect (aa. 2-5)? Is it the consideration of speculative 
sciences (a. 6), the knowledge of separated substances (a. 7) or finally the vision 
of the Divine Essence (a. 8)? 
112 Aquinas asks (I-II 4.1-9) whether it is necessary to have: delight (a. 1), 
vision (a. 2), comprehension (a. 3), rectitude of will (a. 4), the body and its 
perfections (aa. 5-6), external goods (a. 7), or the fellowship of friends (a.8)? 
None of these constitute the essence of human flourishing, although they pertain 
concomitantly to flourishing. 
113 St. Thomas asks (I-II 5.1-8): Can a man attain flourishing (a. 1), or be 
happier than another in this life (a. 2)? Can flourishing be attained in this life (a. 
3) or lost once found (a. 4)? Can a human obtain flourishing through his own 
powers (a. 5) or with the help of some higher creature (a. 6)? Are good works 
required to receive flourishing from God (a. 7)? Does everyone desire flourishing 
(a. 8)? 
114 Cf. ST I-II 4.8 ad 3; ST II-II 26.3; John 15:15. 
115 According to the OED (1989, vol. VI, p. 1097), “happiness” or “the 
quality or condition of being happy” can mean: “1. Good fortune or luck in life or 
in a particular affair; success, prosperity. 2. The state of pleasurable content of 
mind, which results from success or the attainment of what is considered good. 3. 
Successful or felicitous aptitude, fitness, suitability, or appropriateness; felicity.” 
This complex definition highlights happiness in terms of: an external, objective, 
desirable situation (n. 1); its subjective appreciation (n. 2); as well as a quality 
that seems more active in promoting the good (n. 3). Happiness and happy have 
the Middle English root of “hap,” meaning fortune, or “hap”-pening by chance. 
Nussbaum’s (1994, 15 footnote 5) reflections on Aristotelian “eudaimonia” is 
pertinent here: “Eudaimonia is often rendered happiness: but this is misleading, 
since it misses the emphasis on activity, and on completeness of life, there is (as 
Aristotle cogently argues) present in ordinary use of the Greek term, and wrongly 
suggests that what is at issue must be a state of feeling of satisfaction. (Pre-
Utilitarian English-language uses of “happiness” had much of this breadth; but in 
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ancients speak of “beatitudo,” they mean flourishing as a reality of 
nature. Human beings naturally seek to flourish. The mature Aquinas 
used the word “beatitudo” to cover both the notions of complete and 
incomplete flourishing.116 For him “beatitudo” can have objective and 
subjective as well as passive and active sides. I have resisted 
translating “beatitudo” as “happiness” when referring to the 
incomplete state and flourishing when referring to the complete one. 
By employing the term “flourishing,” I hope to safeguard the unity and 
correlation between incomplete and complete states of “beatitudo” so 
important for Aquinas and for a fuller understanding of this reality.117 
A fuller notion of flourishing (in the sense of complete 
“beatitudo”) does not always hold a central place in moral theory. 
Since Aquinas’ time, in different circles, “happiness” has undergone 
three substantial modifications. First, some thinkers no longer construe 
morality in terms of a natural tendency of the will toward flourishing. 
Second, others hold that flourishing is a matter of personal choice—
one can choose to be, or not to be, happy. Third, writers have restricted 
flourishing to involve a subjective, egotistical motivator—the 
happiness of one person is thus pitted against that of others. Even 
though Kant’s critique of eudemonism (moral theory based on 
flourishing) does not directly address the moral theory of Aquinas (or 
Aristotle and Plato), it has permeated moral discussions across the 
                                                                                                          
our time the word is unavoidably colored by Utilitarian associations.)” Nussbaum 
thus translates eudaimonia as “human flourishing.” 
116 While this usage holds true for the ST, it does not for the SCG, where 
Aquinas was seemingly searching for the appropriate vocabulary. In the SCG, he 
distinguishes between human incomplete flourishing (felicitas) and complete 
flourishing that originates in God (beatitudo). However in the treatise on 
beatitudo found in the ST (I-II qq. 1-5), he employs “felicitas” only in the quotes 
of Aristotle’s Latin translation (I-II 2.2 obj. 1; 3.2 sc; 3.6 obj. 1; 4.1 obj. 3; 4.5 
obj. 4) or in direct discussions of Aristotle (I-II 4.5; 4.5 ad4; 4.7; 4.8; 5.4). In 
general he uses beatitudo concerning both incomplete and complete flourishing, 
in this way he is able to better safeguard the unity and interrelation of the types of 
flourishing. Cf. R. Busa, IT; J. Pieper 1998, 112, fn. 3.Furthermore, in antiquity 
and throughout the Middle Ages “felicitas” was also used, often as a synonym 
for “beatitudo;” for example see: Augustine De Trinitate VI.10; PL 42.932. 
117 English writers translate “beatitudo” as “happiness” in ethical 
discussions, even though because of restricted notions of happiness, many prefer 
“flourishing.” Writers, in other languages, have tended to shift discourse 
concerning “beatitudo” to keywords with different roots: e.g. “bonheur” in 
French, “Glückseligkeit” in German. Cf. F. Nef and J.Y. Lacoste 1998, 148-153. 
Virtue Theory and Resilience Research 155 
board. Since writers now often focus “happiness” on the subjective 
psychological aspect of ethics as well, we need to use the term 
“happiness” with care, and recall that Aquinas uses beatitudo more 
comprehensively. 
Now let us discuss more in depth the challenges that changes 
in the meanings of flourishing pose to virtue theory and human 
resilience. While addressing particular aspects of Thomas’ notion of 
the role of flourishing in moral theory, we need to ask whether his 
thought can escape not only the Kantian, but also the positivist and 
postmodern critiques. 
Aquinas builds his treatment of finality in human flourishing 
upon his understanding of human rationality, which is anything but 
pre-modern rationalism (although it is sometimes taken as such).118 The 
notion of finality has suffered transformations since Aquinas. On the 
one hand, strains of pre-modern or Enlightenment rationalism have 
exaggerated the capacity of human rationality. On the other hand, 
positivist sciences have rejected finality, and certain postmodern 
critiques have radically questioned rationality itself. Forms of 
determinism and materialism have in certain cases replaced final 
causes. 
In order to understand how Aquinas’ moral theory fares in 
front of these critiques, a question needs to be asked: what does he 
mean by “finality” and “reason”? Thomas claims that we are able to 
act for an end (a goal) thanks to our capacity to reason. However, this 
finality is continuous. It is not simply the finality occasioned by a 
particular act. In contrast to positivist science’s notion of finality (an 
occasional finality), Thomas holds that human beings can order even 
personal acts. We aim our desires and loves (through virtues of 
charity-friendship and prudence) at one single and ultimate end (a 
continuous finality). This movement grants an access to the end. 
Aquinas thus does not consider the end a disposable means or 
                                                 
118 Aquinas acknowledges the limits of his own notion of finality: e.g., the 
analogous nature of knowledge concerning the last end (God); cf. ST I 1. He 
treats the issue of finality in human flourishing in ST I-II q. 1. 
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instrument. Rather, we participate in the end (God as source of 
ultimate flourishing) through knowing and loving.119 
Aquinas’ approach distinguishes, yet actively interrelates, two 
dimensions of flourishing: that in which human flourishing consists 
(from the human side), and what makes us flourish (the external 
source).120 This realist, metaphysical approach once again flies in the 
face of contemporary emphases on “subjective” flourishing, which 
often recognizes God’s influence on humans only according to a 
person’s subjective appreciation of it. With the advances of genetic 
sciences, some thinkers tend to identify happiness-states with related 
genetic predispositions and hormone levels.121 This approach opens the 
way to attempts to chemically induce states of “happiness and well-
being.”122 
                                                 
119 Aquinas’ approach does more than distinguish between “secondary end 
and means.” He does not use “means” without a specific relationship to the end. 
His expression “ea quae sunt ad finem” affirms a participation in the ultimate 
end, while distinguishing between: (1) the acquisition (adeptio) of the end (what 
he sometimes refers to as “secondary ends”); these real ends pertain to the order 
of the love of friendship, for example; and (2) the use (usus) of the end (what he 
sometimes calls “means”); these instruments pertain to the realm of utility, 
although they involve a sort of acquisition (ad consecutionem finis). Cf. ST I-II 
1.8; Pinckaers 1998b, 38. 
120 Using Aristotle’s principle, Aquinas introduces (I-II 1.8 corpus) a 
twofold distinction about the ends concerning flourishing: the end “for which” 
(finis cuius) humans seek flourishing; and the end “by which” (finis quo) humans 
seek flourishing: “Sicut Philosophus dicit in II Physic. [C. 2, 194a95-6; S. Th. 
Lect. 4.8] et in V Metaphys. [De anima ii.4, 415b2-3; S. Th. lect. 7.316; cf. Met. 
xii.7, 1072b2-3; S. Th. lect. 7.2528], finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo: 
idest ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius rei.” On the 
one hand, human flourishing finis cuius is the end as the very source of 
flourishing (loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quae est 
finis). On the other hand, human flourishing finis quo is the way in which we 
participate in flourishing. Through knowing and loving, human beings partake in 
the source of flourishing, who is God (cf. ST I-II 2.7 corpus and ad 3). He treats 
that in which flourishing consists in ST I-II q. 2, and what flourishing is in ST I-II 
q. 3. 
121 The Courier de Genève (July 1996) reports a study, which claims that 
the person’s genetic (standard) level of dopamine determines about 50% of how 
we appreciate human flourishing. 
122 The list is too long to cite extensively. We simply note that certain 
experts explain that heroin charges the body with a massive dose of 
endomorphine, which so suppresses the organism’s pains that it induces a radical 
sense of well-being. Cf. François Nussbaum, Courrier de Genève 3 November 
2000, 16. 
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How can Aquinas’ approach face such challenges? He defines 
beatitudo in a twofold way: “Flourishing, itself, since it is a perfection 
of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes 
flourishing, viz. which makes humans happy, is something outside 
one’s soul.”123 The second, or ontological dimension (beatitudo ut res), 
involves goods, which merit and demand that we love them for 
themselves. When seeking these goods, we attempt to fulfill the basic 
human desire for flourishing. 
After reviewing all the major candidates for human 
flourishing, Aquinas rejects all created things as inadequate for 
ultimate fulfillment—here we can add all parallel human processes, 
such as temperamental and emotional, genetic and hormonal, and 
chemically induced ones. He concludes: “God alone constitutes man’s 
fulfillment.”124 From the standpoint of beatitudo ut adeptio rei, he asks 
what human actions make a person happy; he recognizes that 
flourishing corresponds with the good (bonum). Following Augustine, 
Thomas holds that the term bonum itself inseparably contains the ideas 
of good and flourishing. What is good will make one flourish; and 
what is evil makes one wretched.125 Aquinas places a primacy on the 
role of the intellect, the speculative intellect (a. 5), and the vision of the 
Divine essence (a. 8) in ultimate flourishing. His emphasis on the 
beatific vision does not however distance the whole person from the 
search for and participation in that flourishing that already finds partial 
                                                 
123 “beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam animae bonum 
inhaerens; sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod scilicet beatum facit, est aliquid 
extra animam.” ST I-II 2.7 ad 3; cf. ST I-II 2.7; ST I-II 1.8. 
124 “In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit” ST I-II 2.8. In 
establishing this principle, Aquinas call upon Psalms 143:15 and 102:5, and 
Augustine De Civ. Dei XIX.2: 252, b, 26-27; cf. ST I 12.1; SCG IV.54. 
Augustine and Aquinas give a new accent on the object in beatitude and love; the 
pagan emphasis is on the human subject and his activity (e.g. Aristotle). Without 
separating the two points of view, the thing (object) is of primary importance to 
specify the desire of flourishing and love of friendship, which has as an end its 
object loved for itself (in the case of other humans and God). As Pinckaers 
(1998b, 40) observes: “here, then, is a new aspect of Christian asceticism: that 
intellectual and spiritual detachment produced by the desire of truth, which urges 
us firstly to transcend sensible perceptions, then to transcend the ideas formed by 
our reason, then finally to transcend the intuitions of our mind, in order to allow 
the development within us of that contemplation, at once obscure and luminous, 
intelligent and unknowing, which is proper to faith in this life.” 
125 Pinckaers 1998b, 37. 
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fulfillment in the present through prayerful meditation, contemplation 
of beauty and study of truth. 
This defense of the role and content of flourishing in moral 
theory and theology has implications for resilience. Later this study 
will ask further how our present participation in divine beatitudo and 
the attraction of flourishing can serve resilience in facing difficulty, 
either in the extreme situations that threaten life and limb, or the more 
mundane situations requiring efforts at creating initiatives or enduring 
hardships. But before these more detailed studies, we shall address 
other questions that concern how complete and incomplete flourishing 
correlate. 
2.3.2. Fulfilled Human Flourishing and Graced 
Flourishing 
Aquinas’ notion of complete flourishing calls for an 
explanation of its relationship with the incomplete or partial 
components of human happiness.126 What is the good (happiness-
effect) found in the beauty and orderliness of created things, and the 
fulfillment of human faculties that do not directly compose ultimate 
human happiness? Aquinas’ moral theory, which concerns developing 
the full range of human powers,127 employs analogous senses of 
flourishing. First, human flourishing takes shape in the excellence of 
the natural virtues. They specify fulfilled aspects of life at natural 
level. Second, these natural (excellent though imperfect) types of 
flourishing have a certain order toward graced flourishing. We employ 
our body and the active life of moral virtue as a means of 
contemplation.128 However, we need to ask, what roles do natural 
desire, will and intellect play in the ordering between incomplete and 
complete flourishing? And how do they contribute to the development 
of virtue and resilience? 
                                                 
126 Cf. ST I-II q. 4. 
127 A. MacIntyre (1999,64) reminds us that we need to understand 
“flourishing” in its analogous sense, in terms of developing “the distinctive 
powers that it possesses qua member of that species.” 
128 It is the fullest notion of flourishing that orders and serves as the major 
criterion in the development of virtue. Cf. ST I-II 1-5; S.-Th. Pinckaers 2001a. 
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Aquinas conceives of the ordering of love (natural desire and 
will) as an integral part of rational moral activity.129 The foundational 
natural desire to see or know God as the Source of Truth130 directs not 
only the intellect toward complete flourishing, but it also inseparably 
motivates the will toward God as the Universal Good.131 Throughout 
his moral theory, Aquinas intertwines the desire for flourishing with 
(1) the knowledge of truth that moves the intellect, and (2) the love of 
goodness that moves the will towards the action that is an integral part 
of coming to flourishing.132 Aquinas puts these issues at the top of his 
treatment of morality (I-II 1-5) and of charity (II-II 23.1).133 Flourishing 
and friendship supply the backbone for his whole virtue theory. 
                                                 
129 Cf. S. J. Pope, 1994. 
130 An affirmation of this teaching on the natural desire to see God is found 
in the opening lines of the encyclical Fides et Ratio: “Faith and reason are like 
two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God 
has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth—in a word, to know 
himself—so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come 
to the fullness of truth about themselves (cf. Ex 33:18; Ps 27:8-9; 63:2-3; John 
14:8; 1 John 3:2).” 
131 Cf. ST I 2.8; ST I 2.7; ST I 5.1. 
132 Aquinas’ thought progresses on the question of a natural desire to see 
God. In the Sentences and the De Veritate, Thomas conceives of this natural 
desire as a movement of the will towards beatitudo. Later in the Summa 
theologiae and the SCG, he clarifies its metaphysical foundation, and considers it 
above all as the intellect moving toward truth. He asks whether such a natural 
desire can be vain, and answers in the negative, by affirming that there is a 
special capacity for beatific vision rooted in the human spiritual nature (however 
not as a simple obediential potency). The beatific vision is both supra naturam 
animae rationalis and secundum naturam ipsius (ST III 9.2 ad 3). The 
supernatural is firmly rooted in the human as created in the image of God. 
Humans are capax Dei (fit for God), but not idoneus (sufficient) concerning the 
beatific vision (cf. Pinckaers 1976, 255-273; Bujo 1984). Theologians at present 
continue to debate whether such a natural desire to see God is a natural desire for 
flourishing (beatitudo). 
133 These manuals divide the study of moral theology into two parts: (1) 
fundamental moral theology which treats of: human acts (and liberty), laws, 
conscience and sins; and (2) special morality which studies the laws and their 
application to concrete cases, what is permitted and forbidden. Even some 
authors who expressly desire to follow Aquinas’ moral teaching lack a treatment 
of beatitudo, for example, the work of Juan Azor S.J. (1536-1603). In his 
Institutions morales, which became the model of such manuals, he expresses the 
intention to follow Aquinas, yet starts with the study of moral acts instead of 
flourishing and finality. In his fundamental theology, Alphonsus Liguori (1696-
1787) likewise studies human acts in terms of conscience and law, but does not 
accord a foundational place to finality and flourishing. Cf. Pinckaers 1991, 39-49; 
1995a, 298-300. 
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A discussion of flourishing inevitably must respond to the 
Kantian critique of intuition, desire and happiness. Kant claims that 
only a good will is a fitting foundational moral criterion. How can a 
Thomistic teleological approach, dominated by flourishing as its 
ultimate end, avoid the critique that it is hedonistic, egocentric and 
leads to utilitarianism? Aquinas’ response would recall that the root of 
the desire for flourishing and the heart of charity is friendship-love 
(love of friendship), which permits this type of morality to avoid 
getting bogged down in calculations of utility and pleasure, or duty and 
obligation.134 A key question here is: what is the place of friendship-
love in flourishing? For Aquinas, the love of friendship (with God 
essentially, and with neighbors concomitantly) is the most primal and 
final element in flourishing.135 It serves as the true basis for the desire 
for flourishing, which beyond temptations and deviations is the desire 
to come to love God and neighbor in truth.136 The desire for flourishing 
is an inchoate perception of the perfection of this love. This desire is 
                                                 
134 The Kantian critique receives a threefold response. First, Aquinas 
construes the desire of flourishing as spiritual in its central core. As part of our 
higher sensibility, it makes us react to and appreciate moral realities: good and 
evil, truth and deception (untruth), virtues and vices, joy and pain. Beyond the 
purely sensible appearances (phenomena), through this spiritual capacity we are 
attracted by goods and can perceive their deep nature. Secondly, this desire is 
open to others; it is not egocentric. The desire of flourishing, rooted in love of 
friendship, makes us search the good of the other, as our own good, as well as the 
common good. Thirdly, this desire goes beyond utilitarianism’s focus on limited 
human capacities of pleasure, and the maximization of pleasure. The desire of 
flourishing, as grounded on the love of friendship, seeks the Good, which is 
desirable in itself as well as useful, but not useful in the same way as that which 
can be purchased with money; we can only attain it through sacrifice, as S.-Th. 
Pinckaers (1989, 185-9) reminds us. 
135 In the complete flourishing of the Fatherland (patria), the perfect love of 
God is essential, while the love of friendship (of neighbors) is concomitant. Cf. I-
II 4.8 ad 3. 
136 For Aquinas, friends are real ends (albeit secondary ones) in the order of 
the love of friendship. They are not “means” to final beatitude, as a disposable 
instrument pertaining to the realm of utility. Thinkers are sometimes confused 
when speaking of Aquinas’ use of the expression “ea quae sunt ad finem.” The 
“ea” share already in the nature of the end. They already begin to attain the end, 
of which they already express an imperfect fruition. Aquinas does not 
conceptually separate the “ea” and the “finis” in the ways that most 
contemporary ethical discussions separate “means” and “end.” The good of the 
end is present in the “ea,” which we need to understand in a certain unity, since 
the “ea” participates in the “finis.” For these reasons, Thomas’ term “ea” covers 
two separate English terms “secondary ends” and “means.”  
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not egocentric, but rather polycentric (including neighbors and other 
creatures). It is certainly theocentric. 
Given the primal place accorded to complete flourishing, what 
function does it play in the rest of Aquinas’ moral theory of virtue? As 
the last end and final cause, flourishing provides the higher criteria 
governing the principal treatises. In the treatise on human acts, 
imperfect flourishing serves to direct human actions and passions 
through practical intellect.137 Imperfect flourishing is inadequate or 
conflictive unless ordered to perfect and complete flourishing. For 
Aquinas, the virtuous dispositions (as efficient causes of good acts) 
direct humans to flourishing. Virtuous acts (and dispositions to act) in 
effect are the formal causes of flourishing. Through the moral, 
intellectual and theological virtues, we flourish according to specific 
capacities and sources of strength and wisdom.138 The type of 
flourishing (natural and graced) specifies a hierarchy among of virtues 
according to their final cause.139 Furthermore, Aquinas contrasts true 
flourishing with sin and its effects, chiefly mortal sin.140 Flourishing is 
only complete and sure with the support of the grace of the Holy Spirit 
in the New Law. This Law of love also perfects the acquired virtues. 
Through charity and prudence, we collaborate in truly human and 
Christ-like acts.141 
                                                 
137 Aquinas says that “the last and perfect flourishing, which we await in 
the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect flourishing, 
such as can be attained here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the 
practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.” 
ST I-II 3.5; cf. ST I-II 6, prologue; ST I-II 69.3. 
138 Concerning moral virtues see: ST I-II 60.1 obj.3 and ad 3. Concerning 
intellectual virtues see: ST I-II 57.1, where Aquinas cites Aristotle: “flourishing is 
the reward of virtue” NE i.9: 1099, b, 16-18; cf. ST I-II 3.7. Concerning 
theological virtues see: ST I-II 62.1; where Aquinas cites 2 Peter 1:4, indicating 
that through Christ we are made “partakers of the Divine nature;” and ST I-II 
62.2: “the theological virtues direct man to supernatural flourishing in the same 
way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end.” 
139 Cf. ST I-II 5.5 and 5.7. 
140 Cf. ST I-II 72.5; ST I-II 85.6. 
141 Cf. ST I-II 107.1; 108.3; Pinckaers 1998b, 35. 
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2.3.3. Health, Normality and Flourishing: Resilience 
Research Contributions 
Psychosocial sciences have developed evaluative notions in 
order to promote “optimal development” and adjudicate between 
health and disease, and between normality and deviancy.142 In this 
context, resilience theory and findings raise questions for Aquinas’ 
virtue-approach to flourishing: How might psychosocial resilience 
research’s underlying notions of flourishing, normality and health 
enhance Aquinas’ approach to complete and incomplete flourishing? 
First, few people would equate physical health with human 
flourishing (even though we might on rare occasions, as when we are 
in severe pain or close to death). Nonetheless, physical well-being 
contributes to human flourishing. Notions of physical health are 
important because of the perspective that they assume and promote. On 
the one hand, the tendency to define health as an absence of physical 
disease involves a pathogenic perspective that concentrates on disease, 
illness or abnormality.143 On the other, the tendency to define health in 
terms of personal and social capacities to cope with and overcome 
physical challenges involves a resilience perspective that focuses first 
on healing and well-being. This second approach concentrates 
                                                 
142 The World Health Organization defines health as “a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity” (14 May 2002; www.who.int/aboutwho /en/definition.html). The 
Webster Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary (1989, 653) defines “health” first 
of all as “the general condition of the body or mind with reference to soundness 
and vigor;” and secondly as “soundness of body or mind; freedom from disease 
or ailment: to have one’s health; to lose one’s health.” The primary reference in 
both cases is soundness or wholeness, which is often taken as a static notion. The 
OED (1989, VII: 53) defines health as follows: “soundness of body; that 
condition in which functions are duly and efficiently discharged.” 
Furthermore, the meaning of disease simply indicts the opposite of being 
whole. In regard mental health, “sane” according to Webster (1989, 1266) is 
defined as: “1. free from mental derangement; having a sound, healthy mind: a 
sane person. 2. having or showing reason, sound judgment or good sense: sane 
advice. 3. sound, healthy.”  
143 The nineteenth century doctrine of specific etiology held that a single 
microbial agent causes each infectious disease. Dubos (1959) has questioned this 
approach, since he observed that microbial disease is the exception rather than the 
rule, and that pathogens often fail to cause disease after becoming established in 
the tissues. Cf. Moberg 1991, 32; Schumaker 1992, 9. 
Virtue Theory and Resilience Research 163 
primarily on the resources for and dynamics of physical healing, and in 
a secondary sense on causes of disease. 
Second, psychological health perspectives offer 
complementary considerations for human flourishing. In particular, 
they consider subjective flourishing. Descriptions of psychological 
health include: “positive mental health” (Jahoda 1958); “self-
actualization” (Rogers 1961; Maslow 1971); “optimal living” 
(Rosenhan and Seligman 1984); psychological well-being;144 successful 
(physiological, psychological and social) adaptation and survival;145 
overall functioning;146 or coping well with stress.147 Of particular 
interest is a continuum model of health that identifies neither with any 
one definition, nor with the popular notion of health as a static state. 
Instead it views health as a continuum or composite of sensation and 
perception, cognition and emotion, which forms an overall healthy 
pattern of experience and behavior.148 This model might offer a way to 
                                                 
144 According to Perrez and Reicherts, (1992, p. 137), “one way of 
understanding mental health is as a complex, stable characteristic for describing 
psychological well-being and the realistic and adequate functioning of the 
individual.” According to Chamberlain and Zika (1992, 141), “well-being” has 
been seen to have three major dimensions: life satisfaction, positive affect and 
lack of negative affect. 
145 Cf. Brooks 1998, 229; Cicchetti, 1990. 
146 Dubos’ definition of health is not so much a state of vigor, well-being, 
long life, or even being disease-free. Rather health “means that you can function, 
do what you want to do and become what you want to become.” Dubos, 1959; 
cited in Moberg 1991, 37. 
147 Perrez and Reicherts (1992, 137) note some of the researchers who 
make an explicit connection between mental health and coping behavior include: 
Platt and Spivack (1974), Ilfeld (1980), Becker (1984a), Fisher (1986). 
Moreover, Schumaker (1992, 10) associates health with degrees of personal 
attributes such as: “personal growth and development, autonomous functioning, 
self-love, environmental competence, degree of insight and wisdom, the exercise 
of rationality, the realization of one’s potential, the joy derived from life, and so 
forth.” 
148 Health as a continuous dimension of experience and behavior moves 
between more and less successful adaptations to stress (Radke-Yarrow 1990, 98) 
and contains “healthy” and “unhealthy” elements (Schumaker 1992,10). In this 
perspective, Allport (1967,83) observed that being “mentally healthy” does not 
deny inevitable and ongoing psychological struggles and adjustment problems in 
the midst of human life’s complexity. Antonovsky (1998a, 6; 1987) furthermore 
conceives of health as a manifest level of systemic order of the human organism, 
in terms of an ease/dis-ease continuum, focusing on what underlies the movement 
toward health and order and what are the “negentropic” forces at work. 
According to Antonovsky, stressors are ubiquitous and open-ended in their 
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appreciate competing aspects of human flourishing, such as 
intermediate human goals (some attained, some thwarted) and 
fluctuating experiences (joy and disappointment; pleasure and pain). 
Thirdly, notions of social health address another dimension of 
human well-being and being human. On the one hand, some social 
science approaches employ reductionistic, empirical and statistical 
methods to identify human, moral and social normality or health as 
resilience phenomena. What can these approaches tell us about 
flourishing? We need to resist facile attempts to equate statistical 
calculations of empirical normality with moral normativity, for 
example: (1) the range of efforts to bestow a moral status on the 
statistical analysis of the “homme moyen” (Quetelet),149 (2) the 
“average type” (Durkheim),150 and (3) the is/ought problematic in the 
more properly ethical realm. Furthermore, there are limitations 
imposed by realist and normative claims of the social facts identified 
by nomic methods (Comte, Mill),151 evolutionary theories (Buss, 
                                                                                                          
consequences. The primary question in his “salutogenic” perspective is no longer 
“what causes this or that disease, or even what leads to dis-ease, but rather what 
underlies the movement toward health.” (Antonovsky 1998a, 6) The continuum 
notion of health can also be understood in terms of how adaptive and maladaptive 
behaviors are not so much dichotomous, but rather overlapping (cf. Achenbach 
1990, 4; Rolf et alia 1990; Garmezy 1994). 
149 Quetelet’s aim was to apply “figurative reasoning” (numerical 
reasoning) to the moral realm, arriving at means or averages, including a notion 
of the average human, the “homme moyen.” Quetelet presumes “that human 
nature, in its aberrations, has not a tendency to deviate from the mean in one 
sense in preference to another, as those who aim at a mark might have a tendency 
to shoot always too high or too low.” (Quetelet (1842, x; Cited in Turner 1986, 
70-71; cf. 64-69). 
150 Building on Quetelet’s notion, Durkheim defines the “average type” as 
“the hypothetical being which might be constituted by assembling in one entity, 
as a kind of individual abstraction, the most frequently occurring characteristics 
of the species in their most frequent forms” (Durkheim 1982, 91-92; cited in 
Turner, 1986, 111). He holds that the normality of a social fact is no more than its 
presence in the average society at the corresponding stage of its development; 
“normal” means consistent with the law of development for a particular type of 
society (cf. Durkheim1982, 91-97; Turner, 1986, 112-3). Accordingly, Durkheim 
discusses these social facts, which have a certain generality and obligatory 
character, as a paradigmatic area for morality (cf. 1982, 56, 142-44; Turner, 1986, 
124 ff). 
151 Both Comte and Mill were reticent to give an important place to 
statistical methods in identifying empirical laws in social science. Comte’s 
historical method was inimical to empirico-statistical social science approaches, 
which he described as “sheer empiricism, disguised under a vain mathematical 
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Wilson) and more skeptical reductionistic approaches (Pearson, 
Gould).152 
In what way can Aquinas’ approach to flourishing (virtue 
theory and moral theology) appropriate these insights on human well-
being? First, studies on physical health and resilience in the face of 
disease concern every human inasmuch as we are mortal and 
vulnerable. Likewise, they concern Aquinas’ treatment of the virtues, 
which need to revisit such experiences in regards to each particular 
virtue. Furthermore, research on the neurochemical support for human 
habitus can help develop our understanding of moral virtues and 
vices.153 They can offer insights not only into corporal, but also 
emotional and cognitive development that can enrich Aquinas’ 
approach to flourishing and virtue theory. In turn, Thomas’ 
anthropology offers a theological framework in which we can evaluate 
these insights. Through this larger perspective, we can better 
understand the role of physical health and resilience in spiritual 
development and flourishing. Likewise, research on human disease 
contributes to understanding obstacles to human flourishing. We can 
incorporate these insights into Aquinas’ virtue anthropology in order to 
differentiate physical, psychosocial and spiritual obstacles. We should 
not, for example, confuse bio-chemical malfunction with the effects of 
ignorance, social injustice or sin, which in their own ways hinder 
flourishing. 
Second, can psychological descriptions of health and resilience 
enrich Aquinas’ moral anthropology? A moral anthropology needs to 
adjudicate the adequacy of pertinent insights from psychological 
descriptions of health. As mentioned earlier, we must evaluate such 
psychological insights in the context of their underlying 
anthropological theories. We can pose the following diagnostic 
questions: In what way does a particular psychological notion of health 
                                                                                                          
appearance” (trans. in Virtanen, 1960, p. 60; cited in Turner, 1986, 59). Comte 
for example thought that social science, through theories and reflection on the 
facts instead of statistics, would be able to rationally foretell human action. 
152 Pearsons’ skepticism limits statistical claims to “probability” (cf. 
Pearson 1911, 113; cf. 152). Likewise, Gould (1996) criticizes statistical 
approaches that overstate their findings. 
153 We treat the development of habitus and neurochemistry more in the 
next major section (cf. Pope 1998b, 552; Damasio 1994, 182-3). 
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and flourishing appropriate sources beyond the human psyche? For 
example, does it restrict itself to simple peak experiences (e.g. 
Maslow)? L. S. Cahill, for her part, finds that “the underlying 
definition of human ‘health’” employed by empirical science is 
inadequate for use as such in Christian moral theory, inasmuch as it 
does not include basic Christian norms (‘suffering, self-sacrifice and 
self-denial for others’). Such norms depend neither on statistical 
frequency nor on psychological and physical standards alone.154 
Because of these sciences’ self-imposed, methodological limits, we 
cannot expect results concerning phenomena outside of their 
competency, or a larger vision of meaning. 
Third, how can social theories of health, normality and 
resilience enhance Aquinas’ view of flourishing? Social science 
approaches (e.g. cultural anthropology or ethnology) can apprehend or 
translate an extra dimension of the diversity in cultural and human 
experience. Nonetheless, we must interpret this data in terms of an 
anthropological and moral framework, in order to discern its value for 
“thicker” notions of human flourishing. In the empirical approach, 
classical ethnology uses digital-descriptive analyses to report human, 
social, moral and religious practices in an “objective” and abstracted 
way. Moreover, analogical-evocative methods try to provide “thick” 
reports of “mentalities” and cultures.155 Through art, literature and 
writing, this latter approach uses analogy and metaphor to recreate and 
communicate its object.156 As an art form, narrative expressions can 
evoke social experiences and “mental behavior.” They can thus 
provide Aquinas’ moral anthropology with insights into the importance 
of cultural heritage for human behavior, moral agency and religious 
practice. Nonetheless, we must evaluate the limits of statistical 
approaches to social analysis and public opinion, lest such accounts of 
                                                 
154 Here Cahill (1980/1989, 557) identifies the empirical sciences’ 
definition of health as “analogous to that pertaining to plant and animal life: the 
successful self-preservation and self-maintenance of an organism in its 
environment.” As Veritatis Splendor (no. 112) says, “the behavioral sciences, like 
all experimental sciences, develop an empirical and statistical concept of 
“normality,” faith teaches that this normality itself bears the traces of a fall from 
man’s original situation–in other words it is affected by sin.” 
155 Cf. Geertz 1968, and 1973; Rüegg (in press). 
156 Cf. G. E. Marcus and M. Fischer 1986. 
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normality take hostage morality and notions of flourishing. Otherwise, 
we risk taking the “normality” of social happenings (such as murder, 
rape, pederasty or child abuse) as morally acceptable, or public opinion 
about them as normative. This risk is especially great when 
adjudicating statistical analyses of human satisfaction and flourishing. 
Social science research moreover cannot directly access 
spiritual resilience and vulnerability, which we can only more directly 
see through personal reflection in a community that supports, affirms 
and challenges the work of the individual. Inasmuch as we can 
narratively report and statistically analyze personal experiences of 
meaning and purpose, these sciences can approach something more of 
the reality of spiritual resilience. However, we should only expect that 
each of these disciplines offers a partial view of human individuals, 
societies and cultures.157 Christian moral theology, while drawing on 
the insights of these disciplines, will need to employ them in the 
context of a philosophical anthropology,158 and moral theology 
framework that also draws its principles, content and experiences from 
a Scriptural and patristic, magisterial and theological tradition. In this 
richer approach, Aquinas’ moral theology purports to understand and 
promote better flourishing, as well as support growth in prudence and 
elaborate moral principles and norms. 
In conclusion, Aquinas specifies human finality and 
flourishing as central elements of his moral theory and virtue approach. 
However in the present intellectual arena, writers do not always 
                                                 
157 Pope Paul VI expresses this idea: “chaque discipline scientifique ne 
pourra saisir, dans sa particularité, qu’un aspect partiel mais vrai de l’homme; 
la totalité et le sens lui échappent” (Lettre au Cardinal Roy, no. 40, cf. no. 30; 
cited in Jullien 1982, 481-497). On the nature of truth, see: ST I-II 109.1 ad 1; FR 
44; GE, 10. 
158 The major problem with accumulated scientific data is the meaning to 
give or find there present. This data is already in some way wrapped in ideology. 
Philosophical anthropology’s task is to unwrap this meaning. Human sciences 
implicitly or explicitly are based upon a philosophical anthropology, which give 
them their full meaning (philosophical anthropology serves a hermeneutical role 
for the human sciences). Theology likewise calls upon philosophical 
anthropology to find the full import and meaning of the human sciences. Indeed, 
faith seeking understanding can employ the critical control of philosophy in order 
to differentiate ideology from meaning in the human sciences. According to G. 
Cottier (1980, 167): “c’est donc avant tout de la médiation de [l’anthropologie 
philosophique] que la foi a besoin pour rencontrer les sciences humaines.” 
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appreciate this perspective. The problems are numerous. Happiness 
and flourishing are not univocal terms. Thomas supposes a different 
basis and finality when speaking of flourishing than do some 
contemporary psychosocial theorists and practitioners. We need to 
attend to the presuppositions imported in language, theories and 
practices concerning flourishing in order to understand how research 
and theory might converge. The revival of Aquinas’ virtue ethics 
demands exploring the place of incomplete and complete flourishing 
both in moral anthropology and theology. His approach inhabits a 
larger moral domain than that delimited by psychosocial approaches. It 
implies going beyond a duty-based framework (of what is right and 
wrong), simply identifying norms (and their exceptions), or promoting 
human physical, mental or social health and well-being. Nonetheless, 
his approach inherently seeks empirical and theoretical input. It can 
take into account insights from resilience findings, which serve to 
enrich Aquinas’ understanding of human flourishing and his 
contribution to spiritual resilience. However, in this section, I have 
simply outlined human flourishing in Aquinas’ moral anthropology in 
order to advance our study on the virtues related to difficulty and 
initiative in the upcoming chapters. Now we shall examine the role of 
emotions in Aquinas’ virtue theory and resilience studies. 
2.4. Aquinas on Emotions and Moral Development 
We have set the stage with psychosocial resilience research 
and Aquinas’ virtue theory on health and flourishing. We can now 
constructively revisit Aquinas’ teaching on emotion and morality in 
order to understand related aspects of human agency and resiliency. 
The present section queries how Aquinas’ moral anthropology can 
appropriate resilience insights on emotions. A preliminary study on 
Aquinas’ general view of emotions and on the primary philosophical 
approaches to emotions in ethics will situate Thomas in his context. 
Then we shall ask: How do his and psychosocial approaches consider 
emotions as intelligent? Do they maintain that we need emotions for 
responsible agency? We shall then examine Aquinas’ understanding of 
the role of natural inclinations and emotions in the development of 
moral character. For example, neurochemistry offers us insights about 
the role of the emotions in moral decision-making. This dialogue 
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prepares for the following chapters, which treat the emotions 
associated with resilience and fortitude: fear and daring, hope and 
despair, as well as suffering and pain. 
2.4.1. The Appreciation of Emotions in Moral Agency 
Before we compare Aquinas’ and other ethical approaches to 
human emotions, we shall situate his teaching on emotions in general. 
Aquinas follows the Aristotelian tradition in acknowledging that the 
human composite has five faculties or powers:159 the intellective, the 
motive (volitional), the appetitive (emotional), the sensitive and the 
vegetative.160 He uses the word passio or passiones161 to refer to what 
contemporary psychology calls human emotions, feelings, affections or 
sentiment.162 While contemporary usage distinguishes emotions and 
                                                 
159 These powers of the soul interrelate as a teleological hierarchy of 
powers. Aquinas discusses them earlier in the Prima Pars (ST I qq. 77-81). The 
first four of these powers are subdivided in two intersecting ways: (a) as 
pertaining to the intellective or sensitive part of the soul, and (b) as being either 
cognitive or appetitive. Thus the intellective principle has two powers: (1) the 
intellect itself, the cognitive part of the intellect, performs thinking and reasoning; 
and (2) will, the appetitive part of the intellect, is responsible for volition and 
choice. The sensitive part also has two powers: (3) sensing, the cognitive 
principle in sensation, involves sensation and perception; (4) passion, the 
appetitive principle for the sensitive part, is sub-divided as eleven passions that 
we discuss later on. Cf. Aristotle, de Anima II.3 (414a29-32); Pinckaers 1990, 
382, 384; Jordan 1986a, 87-96; King 1999, 101. While Aquinas could have given 
a helpful reminder of this hierarchy of the human powers in order to better 
understand the discussion of passions in the Prima Secundae, he did not. As 
noted elsewhere, the pedagogical focus of the Summa theologiae leads he to 
avoid repetition. 
160 The vegetative part of the soul for a medieval thinker like Aquinas 
involves psychological experiences founded solely on physical reactivity: hunger, 
thirst, sexual urge, and so on. As more primitive motivational forces, both 
medieval thinkers and modern psychologists distinguish them from the passions 
of the soul, or emotions; the latter call vegetative movements “urges” or “drives.” 
Cf. P. King 1999, 101. 
161 Aristotle uses the terms p£qh and p£qoj. Other terms used by Aquinas’ 
sources to translate the Greek include motus animi (St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei ix, 
4), perturbationes, and affectiones (Cicero, Tusc. iv, 5). Cf. ST I-II 22.2 sc; 
Brachtendorf 1997, 290. 
162 See chapter one for our more extensive discussion on the modern 
conception of emotions, their impact on perception, and the influence of 
attachment, solidarity and emotional competency. 
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passions,163 often reserving the later for negative, vehement or 
overpowering feelings (e.g. anger or love), I use the term “passions” in 
a larger sense, as synonymous with emotions and feelings.164 
In his philosophical psychology, an emotion in general is: (1) a 
movement of a passive power, as acted on by an agent; and more 
precisely (2) a movement of an appetitive power; and more properly 
still (3) a transmutation of an appetitive power having a bodily organ. 
The passions related to evil, such as fear and sorrow, specifically also 
involve (4) “some deterioration” (aliquod nocumentum) of the organ, 
inasmuch as an evil overcomes a particular good.165 This last seemingly 
derogatory reference properly concerns how evil overcomes some 
emotions. It does not however eradicate the positive potential of the 
emotions, even of those related to evil, as we shall see later. 
Thomas distinguishes the concupiscible and irascible appetites 
as two general emotive powers, which involve sub-layers of 
interrelated human capacities, or passions of the soul (passiones 
animae).166 Both of these appetites appraise good and evil. The 
                                                 
163 The OED (2nd ed. 1989, IV.309-10) defines “passion” as “any kind of 
feeling by which the mind is powerfully affected or moved; a vehement 
commanding, or overpowering emotion; in psychology and art, any mode in 
which the mind is affected or acted upon (whether vehemently or not).” In a 
psychological sense, the OED (2nd ed. 1989, V:183) defines “emotion” as “a 
mental “feeling” or “affection” (e.g. of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, 
surprise, hope or fear), as distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of 
consciousness. Also “feeling” is distinguished from the other classes of mental 
phenomena.” 
164 For an extensive treatment of the relation between “passion” and 
“emotion,” see S. Leighton’s (1980, 203-237) article on Aristotle and the 
emotions. 
165 Cf. ST I-II 41.1; ST I-II 22. In the Prima Secundae, Aquinas treats fear 
as a human emotion, its objects, causes and effects (ST I-II 41-44). Although in 
this treatise on the passion of fear, Aristotle is the more often cited authority (NE, 
Rhetoric, Metaph., and De Problem.), Aquinas also draws from the following—
in order of appearance: Damascene (de Fide Orthod.), Augustine (De Civ. Dei, 
Tract.), Dionysius (Div. Nom.), Romans (4:18), Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De 
Nat. Hom.), Psalm (33:10), Isaiah 54:2, Cicero (Quest. Tusc.), Gal. 5:10. 
166 Aquinas takes this distinction from Aristotle’s de Anima III, which 
divides the soul’s powers as rational (logistikon) and non-rational (orexis); then 
within the non-rational he divides the sensory orexis (aisthetike) into 
(epithumetike) and (thumike), which Aquinas refers to as appetitus 
concupiscibilis and appetitus irascibilis following Moerbeke’s translation of the 
Greek (cf. E. d’Arcy 1967, xxv). Aquinas distinguishes these powers further 
according to the various subjects and objects. The specific passions (subjective 
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concupiscible appetite’s object is sensible good or evil considered 
absolutely; while the object of the irascible emotions are sensible good 
or evil in hardship. Both of them are integral for human efforts of 
fortitude and resilience, since the difficult is rooted in what precedes it, 
and drawn on by the good that finalizes it. 
Aquinas outlines and describes the concupiscible appetite in a 
six fold way, in two sets of three symmetrically opposing emotions: (1) 
amor (love); (2) desiderium or concupiscentia (desire); and (3) 
delectatio (pleasure) or gaudium (joy); and their contraries: (1) odium 
(hatred); (2) fuga (avoidance) or abominatio (dislike); and (3) dolor 
(pain) or tristitia (sorrow).167 Once human beings know a good object, 
their first concupiscible movement is love (amor) for it. Thomas says 
that: “a good produces in an appetitive faculty an inclination towards 
the good, a sense of affinity, a connaturality towards the good; this is 
the emotion called love.”168 His application of this conception of love 
surpasses pure sensuality; he raises it to include delight, charity and 
friendship. In order to understand the depth of love, Aquinas 
distinguishes love as an emotion from love as an act of the will.169 
Next, through desire (desiderium) the appetite further inclines toward 
the good loved. It continues what love starts, moving toward union 
with the beloved.170 Finally delight or joy (delectatio or gaudium) 
                                                                                                          
matter) relate to different objects with which they are primarily and secondarily 
concerned (cf. ST I-II 23.1 and 23.2). 
167 Cf. ST I-II 23.2; 35.2. He treats these emotions in ST I-II qq. 26-39. 
Concupiscentia or desiderium (pleasure) gives its name to this group of passions, 
since its is the one most strongly felt (cf. ST I-II 25.2 ad 1). 
168 “Bonum ergo primo in potentia appetitiva causat quamdam 
inclinationem seu aptitudinem seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad 
passionem amoris” ST I-II 23.4. The emotion of love has two sources of 
connaturality: one source being found in the lover, its connatural affinity to the 
beloved; the other source being found in the beloved, whose manifest goodness 
must be fitting or connatural to the lover (cf. ST I-II 26.1). 
169 Cf. ST I-II 25.3. As the most basic passion, amor not only encompasses 
particular expressions, but also prepares for Aquinas’ treatment of the virtue of 
charity, which finds its perfection in friendship with God (cf. ST II-II 23.1). In 
this regard, Aquinas distinguishes concupiscible love from the love of friendship 
(cf. ST I-II 25.4); and describes the effects of love employing the language and 
experience of Christian mysticism (cf. ST I-II 28; where he cites Dionysius’ De 
divinis nominibus; cf. Pinckaers 1990b, 382). 
170 “Appetitus enim unius cujus que rei naturaliter movetur et tendit in 
finem sibi connaturalem; et iste motus provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad 
suum finem.” ST I-II 62.3. In the case of those things connatural to us according 
 
172 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
involves that our appetite rest in the loved-good that we have reached, 
attained or joined. Connatural union with the loved object brings 
pleasure171 and joy.172 
In contrast, three concupiscible passions relate to evil: hatred 
(odium) disdains the evil; dislike (abominatio) or aversion (fuga) seeks 
to avoid and flee from it; while the presence of evil causes pain 
(dolor), sorrow and depression (tristitia). Temperance and its related 
virtues govern this group of emotions, which we need to direct through 
the good of reason. 
The object of the irascible appetite is sensible good or evil, but 
as difficult or arduous. Aquinas differentiates the irascible appetite in a 
fivefold way: spes (hope) and its contrary desparatio (despair); timor 
(fear) and its contrary audacia (daring); and ira (anger) which has no 
opposite.173 Aquinas says that “the irascible passions are not all of one 
order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are about 
some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; 
while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought 
harm.”174 He considers fortitude as the cardinal virtue for the irascible 
appetite. The root ira (anger) only lends its name to this particular 
human capacity. Anger is the greatest of the passions related to this 
                                                                                                          
to the life of the senses, e.g. food, drink and sexual urges, one is moved to 
procure and consume or employ them by a certain connatural desire. The 
establishment of a habitus is a consequent step. As in the case of the study of 
amor, which leads to the virtue of charity, Aquinas’ study of desiderium prepares 
for the virtue of hope. 
171 “amor et concupiscentia delectationem causant. Omne enim amatum fit 
delectabile amanti, eo quod amor est quaedam unio vel connaturalitas amantis 
ad amatum.” ST I-II 32.3 ad 3. Aquinas describes two types of connatural 
pleasure: one that has a stable basis in our nature, the other that entails a 
development by habitus or custom usually growing off this stable basis, as we 
shall see later. 
172 Aquinas distinguishes between the corporeal pleasures (delectatio), 
which proceed from sensation, and spiritual joys (gaudium), which proceed from 
reason. 
173 Cf. ST I-II 23.2; 23.3; 35.2. These emotions are treated extensively in ST 
I-II 40-48. Ira (anger) gives its name to this group of passions, since it is the one 
most readily perceived of the group (cf. ST I-II 25.3 ad 1). 
174 “Sed passiones irascibilis non sunt unius ordinis, sed ad diversa 
ordinantur: nam audacia et timor ordinantur ad aliquod magnum periculum; 
spes et desperatio ad aliquod bonum arduum; ira autem ad superandum aliquod 
contrarium quod nocumentum intulit” (ST I-II 60.4; cf. ST I-II 25.1; ST I-II 40-
48). 
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power, in the sense that it manifests itself more vividly than the other 
emotions do.175 Nonetheless, Aquinas does not construe it as the 
principal focus of the irascible appetite, since the fear of death is the 
strongest of its emotions.176 
In order to illustrate Thomas’ viewpoint on emotions, we shall 
ask: how does his ethical view of the passions177 correlate with other 
approaches to emotions and morality? Identifying diverse schools of 
thought on emotions and moral agency will help us to situate Aquinas 
and lead into a dialogue with contemporary psychology. I divide the 
major positions on human emotions into three groups.178 The first 
group views the emotions as irrational and evil (or at least always 
inclined to evil). For example, the Stoics teach that the passions are 
disturbances to reason that the sage suppresses through the practice of 
apatheia.179 Post-Tridentine moral manuals construe emotions as 
                                                 
175 Cf. ST I-II 25.3 ad 1 and 25.2 ad 1; ST I 59.1 ad 2; ST I-II 46.1 ad 1. 
176 As Aquinas says: “Similiter inter passiones irascibilis, praecipuum est 
quod pertinet ad timores et audacias circa pericula mortis, circa quae est 
fortitudo: unde fortitudo ponitur virtus cardinalis in irascibilis; non mansuetudo, 
quae est circa ira, licet ab ira denominetur, propter hoc quod est ultima inter 
passiones irascibilis; nec etiam magnanimitas et humilitas, quae quodammodo se 
habent ad spem vel fiduciam alicuius magni” (de virt. com. 12, 26). 
177 Aquinas’ extensive treatment of the passions includes: whether the 
passions are good or evil; how they are differentiated; the subject and object, 
cause and effect of the eleven major passions, and so on (I-II qq. 22-48). For 
recent discussions of Aquinas on the passions in the context of habituation and 
virtue, see: M. Jordan 1986a, 71-97; S.-Th. Pinckaers 1990, 379-391; G. S. Harak 
1993, 71-98, D. Fritz Cates 1997, 16-30; P. King 1999, 101-132 
178 If space permitted, I could add another group, the Epicureans, who 
search flourishing at the level of the passions, seeking to increase their pleasures 
and abstain from pain. If even more space were granted one could compare 
Aquinas to four major psychological perspectives on emotions: the Darwinian, 
Jamesian, cognitive, and social constructivist perspectives (cf. R. R. Cornelius 
1996). The neurological research discussed throughout this study, nonetheless, 
traverses this fourfold division of the evolutionary, physiological, cognitive, and 
social-construct dimensions. 
179 A. A. Long (1987) questions whether Stoic apatheia maintained a 
limited place for emotions, which might not have been called passions once under 
the guidance of virtue. According to J. Brachtendorf (1997, 290), the Stoic 
view—also held by Cicero—was not a simplistic stimulus-response theory. 
Rather an intermediary evaluative intellectual activity (a practical syllogism) 
gives forth a reasonable movement of the soul when the objects are real goods (or 
real evils), whereas passions precipitate when the object only seems to be good or 
evil. Cf. M. Nussbaum (1994) who speaks of the Stoic “extirpation of passion.” 
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enemies of voluntariness and obstacles to freedom.180 The casuist 
approach moreover often focuses exclusively on the dangers of 
emotions for moral action.181 A second position holds that passions are 
suspicious or ambiguous in themselves; at best, emotions are morally 
relevant inasmuch as reason and will succeed in controlling them. The 
Platonic,182 Kantian183 and socio-biology traditions in various ways fit 
here.184 A third position construes the passions as (neutral) energies that 
can become morally good or evil by participating in reason.185 The 
distinction between this and the previous two positions is a fine one, 
and has important consequences for the way in which passions interact 
with reason in a moral act. To recognize passions as trainable neutral 
                                                 
180 Post-Tridentine manuals of moral theology most often give negative 
attention to the passions. Obligation is the central element in this casuist morality 
focused on law, which directs moral action through moral imperatives. Passions 
are understood as obstacles, which diminish liberty, and nature (emotional 
inclinations) is seen as redundant, contrary or unreliable. It is for these reasons 
that such manuals (e.g. P. Vitrin, S. J.) do not have any chapter on passions. Even 
within the Thomist tradition (a virtue tradition), authors, like D. M. Prümmer 
(1953), interpret human emotions as obstacles to freedom. 
181 This approach is even based on a particular reading of Aquinas’ texts 
that need interpreting in their larger context. See ST I-II 24.3 and de Veritate 
26.7, which will be discussed below. 
182 Plato, for example, uses the image of two unruly horses representing the 
irascible and concupiscible passions.We can also mention here the cognitivist 
tradition of psychology, including L. Kohlberg. 
183 Kant distrusts emotions since neither are they always fitting and reliable, 
nor always a positive motivation for action. While emphasizing the authority of 
autonomous reason and good will in morality, nonetheless Kant insists that we 
must cultivate emotions in order to act from principle with right affective 
engagements (cf. The Doctrine of Virtue 386-7, 456; cited in N. Sherman 1997, 
142-3, cf. 6, 141-158). 
184 Socio-biology ascribes a “profound moral ambiguity” to “evolved 
natural emotional proclivities,” which might no longer be adaptive and fitting. 
Emotions may motivate bad character and lead to wrong behavior; in any case 
they have their origin in natural selection rather than ethical principles or a larger 
view of an ordered creation (cf. E. O. Wilson 1978; and critique by S. J. Pope 
1998a, 288 and 1998b, 551). 
185 “Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidem 
irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet 
a ratione” (ST I-II 24.1; cf. ST I-II 18.5). The passions are neither morally good 
nor bad considered absolutely (ST I-II 24.1 ad 3). They are moral according to 
their usage. An expression of a passion is adjudicated according to the rationality 
of its moral object as the way it participates in reason, which serves as Aquinas’ 
standard for moral agency. 
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energies affirms both their positive potential in responsible action, but 
also their capacity to render someone their prisoner.186 
This third view is more properly Aquinas’ position. Here 
emotions concern the whole range of emotive states that interrelate 
with the other human powers of sensation, volition and intellection. 
They are more than felt reactions. They are both object-directed, and 
pre-rational attractions or repulsions. On the one hand, as object-
directed, they first arise from the appetitive rather than the 
apprehensive (cognitive) part of the human being (soul), since they 
relate and are ordered to things in themselves and not merely to human 
apprehensions.187 On the other hand, as pre-rational movements of soul, 
evaluative-thought-contents (cognitive, intellective and even 
unconscious ones) constitute and interact with our emotions.188 For 
example, perceiving a quickly moving dark object, we can experience 
fear. And the recognition of a person in need can stir mercy towards 
him. 
The emotions however do not remain the initial affective-
appraisal. Through our practical intellect, we rationally adjudicate the 
adequacy of the initial perception made through the senses; thus we 
further identify good and/or evil aspects of the object. 
Aquinas’ account of the emotions becomes clear in terms of 
his doctrine of habituation, virtue and vice. Misconceptions of his 
                                                 
186 One needs to focus (educate, refine) them in order to remain the master 
of the object of one’s desires. The energy is so strong, if one is not careful, one 
can become prisoner of the object of one’s desire. The desire can take the place of 
master instead of the person; the emotion can overwhelm the will. We need to 
distinguish the focus on the object (at attentional level—cognitive, volitional and 
sensory levels) from the desire or the object of desire (emotional level). Cf. ST I-
II 24.3; ST I-II 10.3. 
187 Drawing upon Aristotle’s Metaphysics (vi.4, 1027b25-29), Aquinas 
says: “Nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in 
seipsis sunt” (ST I-II 22.2). 
188 The sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whose acts 
depend not only on the disposition of that organ but also on the soul. Thus, 
cognition influences the presentation of the object. When the apprehension of the 
senses or of the imagination (which are regulated by the command of reason and 
informed by intelligibles) presents objects to the sensitive appetite, the bodily 
passion can: react according to its dispositions (the law that has been inscribed 
through nature, fomes and habituation); or act according to the command of 
reason (when reason precedes and when the passion obeys). Cf. ST I-II 17.7; J. 
Barad 1991, 397-403. 
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position on how emotions increase or decrease the goodness or malice 
of an act often involve a simplified temporal reading of the 
“antecedent” and “consequent” distinction. Aquinas does not hold that 
every emotion that precedes intellectual adjudication of the situation 
decreases goodness and voluntariness. Particular emotions, which 
spring from virtuously shaped emotive capacities, first prepare and 
point us toward acting in a way which we have habitually done in the 
past. In a second intellectual step, we rationally evaluate the situation 
and the felt emotion. For example, our initial feeling of mercy does not 
deprive us from rationally and freely choosing an act of charity.189 It 
serves rather both as a sign of the intensity of the will, and as a chosen 
self-motivator to act; it renders us more attentive to the plight of our 
neighbor.190 It needs further intellectual involvement. We need to 
evaluate rationally and choose freely to act. Thomas follows Aristotle 
in holding that virtue involves both actions and passions. If our 
passions come to participate in our reason, then we habituate them to 
become in some way even more fine-tuned, object-directed and 
reasonable (without saying rational) movements of the soul. On the 
contrary, adverse and uncontrolled passions can attenuate an act’s 
voluntariness and an agent’s moral responsibility.191 In either case, 
emotions are part and partial of human agency. 
                                                 
189 A locus of misinterpretation is Aquinas’ article on “whether passion 
increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act” (ST I-II 24.3). The prior 
two articles of the Summa theologiae affirm that passions can be good insofar as 
they participate in reason and will; this principle must serve in interpreting article 
three. The heart of the problem concerns (1) whether passions are good prior to, 
or only posterior to a movement of the reason and will, and (2) whether the 
antecedent / consequent distinction is simply temporal, or also causal in nature. 
The first response reads: “Uno modo, antecedenter. Et sic, cum obnubilent 
iudicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas moralis actus, diminuunt actus 
bonitatem: laudabilius enim est quod ex iudicio rationis aliquis faciat opus 
caritatis, quam ex sola passione misericordiae” ST I-II 24.3 ad 1; cf. ST I-II 77.6. 
190 Cf. ST I-II 24.3 ad 1. On the contrary, Aquinas explains that it is less 
laudable to act simply from the passion of mercy without a judgment of reason. 
191 Cf. ST I-II 6.6 and 6.7. “Passion”—as a violent emotion that inhibits 
clear reasoning or willing—is classically identified as a circumstance attenuating 
moral responsibility. For example, civil law has become more lenient in regard 
“crimes of passion” inasmuch as they are not premeditated. 
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2.4.2. Can Emotions be Intelligent? Do We Need 
Emotions to Act Morally? 
Recent neurological research has renewed the debate on how 
emotions support moral judgments. Neurological specialists have 
posed two questions of vital interest for morality and the emotions. 
First, can emotions be intelligent? Second, do humans need emotions 
to act morally? These questions will lead us to ask how a reevaluation 
of emotions might enhance Aquinas’ moral anthropology, and the 
critical dialogue between resilience research and his virtue theory. 
While juxtaposing rational intelligence with “emotional 
intelligence,” neurological specialists hypothesize that emotions 
sometimes exhibit a cognitive content.192 This “emotional intelligence” 
involves expressing a certain control over emotions. Daniel Goleman 
(1995, 34) says that emotional intelligence involves “abilities such as 
being able to motivate oneself and persist in the face of frustrations; to 
control impulse and delay gratification; to regulate one’s moods and 
keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to empathize and to 
hope.” This approach sets rational intelligence in parallel with 
“emotional intelligence,” and even speaks in terms of two minds—one 
rational and the other emotional. It recognizes the cognitive element of 
the emotions and their social dimension. In what way do these 
researchers construe emotions as intelligent? They observe that human 
emotions involve intuitive signals, gut feelings and the emotional 
wisdom that we garner through experience.193 Humans express 
emotional intelligence when we intelligently manage emotions, when 
we recognize their cognitive content and then use them for larger 
personal and social purposes. For these researchers, emotional 
                                                 
192 The question of how we can consider emotions intelligent has been 
neglected by many, but also revived in the recent past. For example, two Yale 
psychologists Robert Sternberg (1985) and Peter Salovey have made significant 
contributions. Notably Salovey was the first to propose the model of emotional 
intelligence (Salovey and Mayer 1985), and did extensive mapping of the way in 
which humans can bring intelligence to their emotions. Their predecessor, E. L. 
Thorndike, in 1920s and 1930s promoted social intelligence, “the ability to 
understand others and ‘act wisely in human relations’” (cf. Goleman 1995, 42ff.). 
193 This statement builds upon our previous discussions on affect and 
emotion as “appraising processes,” which we find for example in Bowlby’s 
(1969) general control-systems theory of behavior (cf. Ainsworth 1978). 
178 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
intelligence means that we can employ our emotions in intelligent 
ways, but also that emotions affect the way in which we reason with 
our rational mind. A. Damasio’s research (1994) goes so far as to 
suggest that without emotions we cannot act rationally (that is, we 
cannot act according to our rational principles and goals), as we shall 
see shortly. 
To acknowledge the potential intelligence of emotions leads us 
to ask how emotion and rationality correlate. How can we rationally 
manage our emotions? According to Goleman, the “emotional mind” 
exercises a range of control over emotions: “the more intense the 
feeling, the more dominant the emotional mind becomes—and the 
more ineffectual the rational.”194 In particular, certain emotions (such as 
anger and fear) are more than just initial reactions; they do more than 
give a first impression of the situation.195 They also press the agent to 
act. A seemingly simple emotion-charged perception quickly puts the 
body into flight or fight postures. Nonetheless, except in extreme 
cases, emotions do not involve a fixed response.196 The internal 
emotional manager (the prefrontal neocortex) regularly acts to control 
emotions.197 We shall discuss this further in chapter three’s study on 
                                                 
194 Goleman (1995, 8-9) suggests that “this is an arrangement that seems to 
stem from eons of evolutionary advantage to having emotions and intuitions 
guide our instantaneous response in situations where our lives are in peril—and 
where pausing to think over what to do could cost us our lives.” 
195 Certain emotions (anger and fear for example) employ the limbic neural 
circuitry directly involving the amygdala. D. Goleman (1995, 17; cf. 18 and 21) 
explains, “Those feelings that take the direct route through the amygdala include 
our most primitive and potent: this circuit does much to explain the power of 
emotion to overwhelm rationality.” The amygdala leads us to act, while the 
slightly slower and more informed neocortex develops a more refined plan. The 
emotional arousal produced by the amygdala seems to imprint more strongly 
these moments in memory. Evolution’s way of ensuring vivid memories of what 
threatens or pleases, but they can be faulty guides to the present (i.e. without the 
analysis of the neocortex and informed judgment). 
196 For example, emotional hijacking can result from two dynamics: (1) the 
amygdala functions, while the neocortex processes fail to be activated (i.e. there 
is no balance); and (2) the neocortical zones collaborate with the amygdala in the 
direction of the “emotional emergency” (Goleman 1995). 
197 When the emotional and rational minds interact well, “emotional 
intelligence arises—as does intellectual ability. This turns the old understanding 
of the tension between reason and feeling on its head: it is not that we want to do 
away with emotion and put reason in its place, as Erasmus had it, but instead find 
the intelligent balance of the two. The old paradigm held an ideal of reason freed 
of the pull of emotion. The new paradigm urges us to harmonize head and heart” 
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neuro-biological interaction between the power of emotion and that of 
rationality in the case of fear. 
Lastly, emotional intelligence extends to the social domain in 
at least two regards, according to Goleman. On the one hand, to exhibit 
emotional intelligence, we must recognize emotions in others. 
Goleman conjectures a twofold social utility here: (1) empathizing 
with others enkindles altruism toward them. This empathy can start us 
on the way to an altruistic act. And (2) when we catch subtle social 
signals of the needs of others, we can more competently convey to 
them our own emotional signals and verbal communications.198 On the 
other hand, we display emotional intelligence when we are capable of 
handling other people’s emotions. This art of relationships involves not 
only recognizing their emotions, but also acquiring competence to help 
manage them.199 Social emotional competence concerns more than just 
taking the emotional temperature of the social group. It involves how 
group members manage their emotional lives together. How they 
employ emotions in larger projects of meaning. How emotions 
motivate us to act in tune with an intelligent life. On the contrary, it 
describes also how emotions can lead us to act against our goals. 
This notion of “emotional intelligence” offers us several 
insights on and challenges to understanding human resilience and 
Aquinas’ anthropology. An emotional intelligence approach marks a 
positive turn in the recent history of how specialists correlate 
intelligence with emotion. To manage emotions intelligently in 
difficult situations involves a type of emotional resilience (resilience-
producing use of emotional energy). In a group furthermore, it 
constitutes an element of social resilience. Indeed, social interactions 
aid us to manage our emotions, and an individual’s emotional 
                                                                                                          
(Goleman 1995, 28-9). The corrective side of the emotional brain can put a 
damper switch on the amygdala’s surges. It is the prefrontal lobes (of the 
neocortex) behind the forehead that seems to stifle or control feelings of rage and 
fear in order to deal more effectively with the situation at hand, for example when 
through reappraisal one finds a more analytic and appropriate response (cf. 
Goleman 1995, 24-5). Except in emotional emergencies, the prefrontal cortex 
governs emotional reactions. 
198 Cf. Goleman 1995, 96-110. 
199 We cannot address all the related questions here, such as: how can one 
aid in calming the anger of an other person, or in calling forth their courage? See 
Goleman (1995, 111-26) for suggestions. 
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intelligence (intelligent use of emotions) influences human rationality 
and social agency. 
Goleman describes the neural workings that underlie emotion, 
but his construal of an “emotional mind” causes us to think. Indeed, 
the functioning of the human brain and nervous system do not spell the 
whole of emotion for Aquinas nor do they constitute a separate mind 
(in classical terms). For Thomas, the intellect (reason and will) 
operates through the senses and through emotion. However, reason and 
will are distinct from senses and emotion, as we stated earlier. Aquinas 
addresses the interplay of emotion and intellect in his theory of moral 
habituation, as we shall see in the next section. Nevertheless, 
Goleman’s work on “emotional intelligence” offers insights for 
Aquinas’ approach to emotions and morality. He enhances Aquinas’ 
view with parallel and complementary observations about intelligent 
personal and social uses of emotion. He presents ample reflections and 
examples of pedagogical implications of the intelligent management of 
emotions. Aquinas’ position, however, outstrips Goleman’s treatment 
of “emotional intelligence,” especially concerning how the virtues 
instill intelligence in emotions so that we act with practical wisdom. 
Aquinas’ teaching on finality and motivation provides a larger 
framework and depth of insight as well. 
Thomas deems that emotions participate in reason by 
command and by habituation.200 Reason and will, in his developmental-
pedagogical sense, inform the emotions. In turn, emotions inform 
human reasoning about the situation on hand. First, as commanded by 
reason, human emotions participate in a political (non-despotic) type 
of rule.201 Second, as participating in reason by habituation (i.e. through 
acquired virtue), human emotions become principles of well-ordered 
human action. Through virtuous habituation of human emotions, we 
confirm the emotion’s “natural aptitude to obey reason,”202 and correct 
emotional disordering.203 Aquinas recognizes that we need well-formed 
                                                 
200 Aquinas’ approach to the pedagogy of virtue can be found in ST I-II 
56.4. 
201 Cf. ST I-II 24.1 corpus and ad 3; 24.3 ad 1; and 56.4 ad 3; in this 
Aquinas follows Aristotle’s Pol. i.3, 1254b4-5. 
202 Cf. ST I-II 56.4. 
203 In Aquinas’ terms, we thus correct the infection of the fomes. He says, 
“irascibilis et concupiscibilis ex se quidem non habent bonum virtutis sed magis 
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emotions in order to act morally. Such emotions render our acts more 
praiseworthy and help us to complete good acts.204 
Antonio Damasio poses a second, innovative question, on 
whether we need emotions to act morally. Often classic moralists treat 
only the culpability of emotions; at most, they exonerate emotions 
from negative influence. Conversely, Damasio’s neurological research 
construes emotions as vital for morality. His research claims that 
emotions are indispensable for moral evaluation and behavior.205 
Through observing neurologically impaired subjects, Damasio has 
found that a person’s higher level intellectual abilities (such as 
attention, perception, memory, language, intelligence) can remain 
intact while their moral judgment and decision-making is impaired by 
the disturbance to lower level emotion-related neurological activities.206 
Damasio construes this connection of absent emotions and immoral 
behavior as meaning that (1) higher-level intellectual activities do not 
suffice for moral action, and (2) we need emotions to reason and act 
morally.207 This approach goes further than Aristotle and other thinkers 
                                                                                                          
infectionem fomitis; inquantum vero conformantur rationi, sic in eis adgeneratur 
bonum virtutis moralis” ST I-II 56.4 ad 2. According to Aquinas, the “fomes” of 
sin inclines the sensual appetite against reason (cf. ST I-II 82.3; ST I-II 91.6; ST I-
II 93.3 ad 1; ST III 15.2; and ST III 27.3). 
204 Cf. ST I-II 17.7 ad 2; ST I-II 17.9 ad 3; ST I-II 22.2 ad 3; ST I-II 24.2 ad 
2. On praiseworthiness and emotions, see ST I-II 24.3; De Veritate 26.7. 
McDermott (1999, 37) argues: “that Aristotle and Aquinas bring out the moral 
significance of the emotions by making them part of moral actions as such, and 
not simply felt reactions to which an agent, if she is to flourish well, must dispose 
herself virtuously just as she disposes herself virtuously to right action.” 
205 For example, Damasio (1994) has identified that significant meaning is 
embedded in affects and behaviors, below the level of conscious awareness: “To 
summarize this line of research and clinical findings, it appears that only a small 
amount of the information and emotionally significant interpretations that we 
employ in arriving at moral decisions reach consciousness.” Wallwork 1999, 177; 
cf. p. 173. 
206 The site of damage that causes this impairment is the “prefrontal-
amygdala circuitry that links higher level cognition with emotional responses 
made possible by the cortex-to-amygdala neural pathway. […] Damasio 
concludes from this research ‘that observing social convention, behaving 
ethically, and making decisions [...] require knowledge of rules and strategies and 
the integrity of specific brain systems’ that have to do with the emotions,” 
according to Wallwork (1999, 173-174). 
207 According to Damasio (1994, 53 italics in original): “Reduction in 
emotion may constitute an equally important source of irrational behavior. The 
counterintuitive connection between absent emotion and warped behavior may 
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who hold that through dispositions, our emotions can serve moral 
judgments. Damasio furthermore accounts for the personal historical 
component of habitual agency by what neurophysiology calls “somatic 
markers.” He maintains that neurochemical profiles facilitate decisions, 
and extend past predispositions and choices.208 
Although Damasio cannot demonstrate the way in which 
emotions and somatic markers directly contribute to reasoned decision-
making, his research does convincingly show that disturbances to the 
emotional neurological circuitry precipitate problems in moral 
judgments. His research opens the way for further reflection on the 
importance, and even necessity, of emotions for moral life.209 
What do these observations, findings and theories offer in 
rapport with Aquinas’ anthropology and virtue theory? Damasio 
neurological research demonstrates that emotions do not simply 
accompany, but rather, are indispensable for moral evaluation and 
behavior. This work goes further than Aquinas,210 insofar as it involves 
a scientific discovery that damage to, or lack of emotional neural-
circuitry can impair moral agency. It provides a scientific neurological 
foundation for acknowledging that emotions constitute necessary, even 
positive, elements in moral agency. This insight, which correlates 
morality and emotion, nonetheless needs a larger theory of moral 
                                                                                                          
tell us something about the biological machinery of reason.” Damasio 
furthermore claims that the human rationality demands the regulation not only of 
neocortical, but also subcortical structures. 
208 S. J. Pope (1998b, 552.) says that “Neurophysiology also alerts us to the 
dangers of bias. “Somatic markers” facilitate decisions in complex social 
situations, but they can be disordered as well, as in uncritical “obedience, 
conformity, [and] the desire to preserve self-esteem” (Damasio 1994, 191). Bias 
can be felt “in the bones,” as when, for example, a person experiences unpleasant 
body states when encountering those he or she finds repulsive, be they mentally 
ill, homeless people asking for aid or an affluent interracial couple on a date. The 
body’s neurally based drive to reduce unpleasant body states can and sometimes 
does act as a counter-moral force that needs to be held in check.” 
209 There is certainly more to say on the relation of emotion and moral 
reasoning. For a more complete treatment, one could investigate the moral impact 
of Freud’s theory of pulsions (life pulsions and death pulsions—thanatos), or 
Cognitivist theories on the biopsychic schemas that relate to the interplay 
between the biological movements (emotions) and cognitive ones. 
210 Aquinas, nonetheless, already holds the principle that fully perfect 
human agency springs from well-formed will and passion (cf. ST I-II 24.3). 
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agency and finality, and in particular, of the development of moral 
habitus and virtue education. 
According to Stocker and Hegeman (1996), moreover, an act 
done without emotion is not only less than perfect, but can be a sign of 
illness, either psychological or spiritual.211 This position concurs with 
an aspect of Aquinas’ position. Neuro-biological and psychological 
studies on the necessity of emotions in moral reasoning and the 
development of emotional intelligence confirm the importance of 
emotions in morality, but also something of their function and 
trainability. Nonetheless, these sciences lack in themselves a larger 
view of human flourishing and normativity. The evolutionary 
researchers leave a vast field of meaning and purpose untouched, when 
they set it aside from their investigation. In the upcoming section, we 
shall return to the insights and challenges of these sciences in our 
constructive re-visiting of Aquinas’s work. In the meantime, we shall 
now turn to his understanding of moral habituation and natural 
inclinations, in order to put it into dialogue with resilience insights. 
2.4.3. Moral Habituation and Natural Inclinations 
We cannot adequately revisit Aquinas’ treatment of moral 
agency without also addressing moral habituation (habitus) and its 
relationship to natural inclinations. Habitus212 is the developmental 
                                                 
211 According to Stocker and Hegeman (1996, 1-2), “an absence or 
deficiency of affect is a characterizing feature of many neuroses, borderline 
conditions, and psychoses, as well as such maladies of the spirit as 
meaninglessness, emptiness, ennui, accidie, spiritual weakness, and spiritual 
tiredness.” 
212 Aquinas’ thought on habitus develops from a sketch in his Commentary 
on the Sentences of Peter Lombard to a full treatise in the Summa theologiae. 
After discussing the faculties as sources of action in the Prima pars of the Summa 
theologiae and the goal of flourishing and the passions early in the Prima 
Secundae, he presents his treatise on habitus in questions 49-54 of the Prima 
Secundae. He first discusses habitus in terms of acquired particular qualities 
relating to action (q. 49), then of how they differ when found in the body per se 
or also in the soul, intellect and will (q. 50). Afterwards he inquires whether 
habitus are innate, caused by one or several human actions or infused into human 
beings by God (q. 51). Finally he treats the nature of habitus’ growth and decay 
(qq. 52 and 53). Only after the building blocks of habitus are explored does 
Aquinas more fully address how moral habitus applies to virtue (I-II 55-67) and 
to vice in general, (I-II 71-80) as well as to particular virtues and vices in the 
Secunda Secundae. 
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backbone of Aquinas’ moral thought. It serves his virtue theory in 
three ways. First, a habitus integrates the moral building blocks: the 
goal of flourishing, basic inclinations and emotions. We develop a 
habitus through goal-directed, rational interaction with our natural 
inclinations and emotions. Second, it permits the continuity and 
creativity in moral acts. Third, a habitus serves as a psychological 
foundation for understanding virtue and vice, as well as sin, law and 
grace. In the next section, I shall ask how neuro-biology and resilience 
research can enrich Aquinas’ treatment of habituation. 
Aquinas defines habitus as an acquired quality that we alter 
only with difficulty. It is a disposition to act that has become second 
nature (connaturalis).213 Aquinas uses habitus to cover the full range of 
mental, sensory and organic states. He follows Aristotle in 
distinguishing a habitus of the body or entitative habitus,214 from a 
habitus of the mind or operative habitus.215 Operative habitus cover 
three closely related domains: (a) temperament or character traits, such 
as shyness and kindness; (b) acquired stable dispositions to act, that is, 
the virtues and vices; and (c) single acts.216 Operative habitus are hard 
to change qualities, connatural dispositions. They aid us to act with 
                                                 
213 “habitus autem est qualitas difficile mobilis (Aristotle, Cat. 6, 9, 3, 10-
13.), inde est quod incontinens statim poenitet, transeunte passione: quod non 
accidit de intemperato, quinimmo gaudet se peccati est sibi facta connaturalis 
secundum habitum” (ST II-II 156.3 ; also see 4 Sent. d. 49, q. 3, a. 2; ST I-II 78.2, 
and De verit. 20.2). Aquinas employs Aristotle’s definition: “Habitus dicitur 
dispositio secundum quam bene aut male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum 
se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est” Metaphysics 1022b10-12; quoted 
by Aquinas at ST I-II 49.1. He also cites Aristotle, and the Philosopher’s 
medieval commentators, as primary sources in explicating habitus. Aristotle 
(Categories 6.8b26-7) describes habitus, one of his ten categories, as a quality 
that is difficult to change. Of the four types of quality, only habitus modifies a 
subject’s nature. Such a modification either agrees or disagrees with the 
progressive development involved in one’s nature. 
214 Entitative habitus includes health, sickness, beauty and the like. They 
are like a disposition without fully being a disposition, since by their nature they 
are impermanent: ST I-II 50.1; also see ST I-II 49.2 ad 1; ST I-II 49.3 ad 3; and ST 
I-II 49.4. 
215 Cf. ST I-II 50.1. Although Aristotle uses health to exemplify the 
changeableness of habitus, Aquinas thinks that Aristotle does not include health 
(and other habitus of body) as this type of quality, which is the proper place of 
the operative habitus. 
216 Thomas thus identifies three types of operative habitus as temperament 
traits, dispositions and acts. 
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three key characteristics: ease, promptness and joy.217 Among operative 
habitus, Aquinas distinguishes cognitive or intellectual habitus, (ST I-
II 50, 3) from orectic or moral ones. 
The contemporary use of the word “habit” is inadequate to 
render the richness of Aquinas’ use of its cognate (especially in regard 
moral and intellectual habitus).218 The term habitus does not focus on 
external, non-voluntary acts, e.g. the habit of scratching one’s nose. 
Furthermore, unlike a habit, a habitus is not an uncontrolled or 
involuntary motor-reaction that impedes the freedom needed for moral 
action; e.g. in the habit of smoking, an involuntary compulsion 
slavishly drives one to light up a cigarette.219 Aquinas views habitus as 
a disposition towards a chosen goal. They aid us to act knowingly, 
freely and firmly.220 
The place of volition in moral habitus is critical. For Aquinas, 
we choose to exercise our habitus.221 A habitus not only pertains to the 
                                                 
217 Aquinas gives three characteristics of such acquired connatural 
habitus—pleasure, promptness and ease—while explaining how the idea of 
connaturality relates to that of habitus using Aristotle’s definition of habitus as “a 
quality which is hard to change;” Aquinas says: “Tunc vero recipitur per modum 
habitus, quando illud receptum efficitur quasi connaturale recipienti; et inde est 
quod habitus a Philosopho dicitur qualitas difficile mobilis; (Cat. 8,9b30) inde 
est etiam quod operationes ex habitu procendentes delectabiles sunt et in 
promptu habentur et faciliter exercentur, quia sunt quasi connaturales effectae” 
De verit. 20, 2. Also see SCG 3, 150, nr 7. 
218 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED 1993, vol. V.5) for example says 
that a “habit” is “1. some external deportment, constitution, appearance, [...] or 
behavior; […] or 2. a settled disposition or tendency to act in a certain way, 
especially one acquired by frequent repetition of the same act until it becomes 
almost or quite involuntary. […] 3. The way in which a person is mentally or 
morally constituted; the sum of the mental and moral qualities; mental 
constitution, disposition, character.” 
219 The involuntary automation entailed by habit conflicts with what is 
needed for moral acts, since automation evaporates (or diminishes) the moral 
dimension, which requires that acts proceed from a well-reasoned decision, from 
freely engaged consent. S.-Th. Pinckaers 19792, 144-147. 
220 For example, in the habitus of generosity, one freely gives good gifts to 
others. Thomas says: “Aliud principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem 
benefacere fit aliqui connaturale. Unde liberales delectabiliter dant aliis” ST I-II 
32.6. 
221 In this regard, Aquinas draws support from his main Patristic mentor 
Augustine, who says that habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est.” (De Bono 
Coniungali 21, 25. PL 40, 390; cited in ST I-II 49.3 sc.); and from Averroes who 
indicates “quod habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit” (Commentary on III de 
Anima, 18; cited in ST I-II 49.3 sc). 
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nature of the possessor, but also to the action that is either “the goal of 
the nature or something leading to the goal.”222 Therefore moral habitus 
do not become “almost or quite involuntary,” but rather they allow us 
to act more voluntarily. They constitute an element of creative liberty, 
through which we fulfill our well-formed will.223 One who has the 
virtue of piano playing can creatively interpret a musical score, or 
write a new one. Inasmuch as a faculty or power’s nature correlates 
with action, then the disposition will direct us to act in new ways. In 
this classical worldview, the habitus of the will thus affects our being 
and consequent operation, since our action follows our nature 
(being).224 
The need to acquire moral habitus seems more obvious when 
we comprehend the diversity of uses to which humans can put rational 
faculties. We can approach our goals through different means, and we 
can more or less develop our moral skills. Aquinas says that: “every 
faculty which can be exercised in more than one way needs a habitus 
to ensure that it is exercised in the right way.”225 Habitus help us know 
more clearly and act more surely. But how do they do this? How do we 
acquire moral skills that aid our moral discernment in the long haul? 
Aquinas for his part uses the notion of act and potency to 
analyze how we acquire habitus. We can habitually dispose a faculty 
only if it is not naturally determined, but rather open to further 
specification. Two critical open faculties are reason and will. In 
particular, to adapt a rational power according to its nature, operation 
or goal requires three conditions. First, the possessor of the power 
needs to have a potentiality. The related action must neither be 
                                                 
222 “Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam naturam rei, sed 
etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est finis naturae, vel perducens 
ad finem” ST I-II 49.3. 
223 At the physical level, one might stop the habit of smoking, since it is 
against the nature of the human person inasmuch as it causes health problems. At 
a social level, one might stop it since it is unpleasant for some other people. At a 
religious level, one might stop it for a spiritual or religious reason, e.g. as 
personal reordering (mortification) of the passions to focus on one’s own 
conversion to Christ during Lent. 
224 This view is formulated as “agere sequitur esse” (cf. R. Cessario 2001, 
23). 
225 “Omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad agendum indiget 
habitu quo bene disponatur ad suum actum” ST I-II 50.5. 
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impossible, nor in conflict with its nature, nor previously determined. 
Second, the rational agent must have alternatives to realize the 
potential. Third, the rational faculty seeks to analyze and synthesize 
complex elements.226 In sum, in order for us to acquire a rational 
habitus, we must have as yet undetermined potential, different 
possibilities and the ability for rational investigation. 
According to Aquinas’ anthropology,227 human nature itself 
inclines a person toward good habitus, toward virtue.228 We have what 
he calls the “seeds of virtue.”229 These natural or spiritual inclinations 
are preparatory principles or inclinations toward a proper object (e.g. 
the principles of natural right). Such inclinations belong to their 
respective powers, which serve as the basis for developing habitus. 
Casuist approaches have much misunderstood or neglected Thomas’ 
position on the natural inclinations. They have simply seen in them the 
effects of original, if not also social, sin. Furthermore, contemporary 
psychological theorists have sometimes neglected the input of such 
inclinations (at least at non-rational levels, e.g. in cognitive theories). 
They have treated instincts in a descriptive or therapeutic, but non-
moral framework.230 
                                                 
226 Cf. ST I-II 49.4. 
227 Aquinas’ optimism is of course tempered by the acknowledgement that 
this “connatural inclination” toward good is lessened through sin. Habitually 
disordered acts are not merely isolated incidences of sin, but stable patterns of 
vice. He affirms that: “Unde cum pecatum sit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipso quod 
homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturae, quod est inclinatio ad virtutem” ST I-II 
85.1. 
228 He says: “Inclinatur autem unumquodque naturaliter ad operationem 
sibi convenientem secundum suam formam, sicut ignis ad colefaciendum. Unde 
cum anima rationalis sit propria forma hominis, naturalis inclinatio inest cuilibet 
homini ad hoc quod agat secundum rationem; et hoc est agere secundum 
virtutem” ST I-II 94.3. Furthermore he says: “Ipsa autem inclinatio ad virtutem 
est quoddam bonum naturae” ST I-II 85.1. 
229 “In appetitivis autem potentiis non est aliquis habitus naturalis 
secundum inchoationem, ex parte ipsius animae, quantum ad ipsam substantiam 
habitus: sed solum quantum ad principia quaedam ipsius, sicut principia juris 
communis dicuntur esse seminalia virtutum” ST I-II 51.1; cf. ST I-II 63.1. In his 
Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas says: “seminaria virtutum quae sunt in 
nobis, sunt ordinatio voluntatis et rationis ad bonum nobis connaturale” 3 Sent. 
d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 3, co. Such seeds of habitus can also be seen when one 
admires virtue in other people’s actions, even though not being virtuous oneself 
(cf. ST I-II 27.3). 
230 For example, Freud’s notion of death instinct (thanatos) fixes a primal 
human interest in death, and his life instinct is excessively sexual-erotic. While 
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Aquinas’ treatment of habitus and natural inclinations 
distinguishes between cognitive and appetitive faculties, as well as 
between their rudimentary states. First, rudimentary cognitive or 
intellectual habitus belong by nature to the soul itself;231 e.g., the 
principle of non-contradiction.232 Second, the cognitive faculties 
possess natural inclinations that order humans to their connatural ends. 
Such an inclination, according to Aquinas, “starts from first universal 
principles known to us through the natural light of reason both in 
speculative and in practical matters.”233 These first principles tend 
reason toward conclusions, which aid us form intellectual habitus. 
Reason in turn moves the appetitive powers, which likewise can 
develop corresponding appetitive habitus, that is concerning human 
passions and volition.234 Third, the appetitive faculties have preparatory 
principles, certain inclinations, which direct the faculties toward their 
objects. As Aquinas says: “a thing’s appetite naturally is moved and 
                                                                                                          
there are many valid and interesting aspects of Freud’s observations of human life 
and death instincts, Thomas’ approach offers a more well rounded regard on 
human natural and spiritual life in a dynamic moral theory. 
231 “Secundum quidem naturam speciei ex parte ipsius animae: sicut 
intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis” ST I-II 51.1. 
232 Such principles are not habitus properly speaking but rather only in a 
derivative sense. As Aquinas says: “Sicut etiam principia indemonstrabilia in 
speculativis non sunt ipsi habitus principiorum, sed sunt principia, quorum est 
habitus” (ST I-II 94.1). The nature of the human soul makes evident such first 
principles of understanding through its contact with reality in sense experience. 
For example, once one understands p and the idea of negation, one grasps the 
principle of non-contradiction (not both p and non-p at the same time in the same 
way). “Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non est simul 
affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis; et super 
hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut dicit Philosophus in IV Meta. [3, 
1005b29. St. Thomas. lect. 4 and 6]” (ST I-II 94.2). Following Aristotle, Aquinas 
holds that we gain sense experience of reality by using mental species received 
through phantasms. 
233 “per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi 
connaturalem. Hoc autem contingit secundum duo. Primo quidem, secundum 
rationem vel intellectum inquantum continet prima principia universalia cognita 
nobis per naturale lumen intellectus, ex quibus procedit ratio tam in speculandis, 
quam inagendis” ST I-II 62.3. Humans naturally know the first principles in 
practical matters through a habitus called synderesis (ST I 79.12). 
234 “Nam actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi appetitiva secundum 
quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante objectum: et ulterius vis 
intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur de conclusionibus, habet sicut 
principium activum propositionem per se notam” ST I-II 51.2. 
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tends towards its connatural end.”235 The human rational appetitive 
faculty has a natural inclination, which orders us to our connatural 
ends, “from the rightness of will tending naturally to good according to 
reason.”236 
Aquinas says that such seeds of intellectual and moral virtues 
are naturally present in human reason, in that humans have a “natural 
desire for good in accordance with reason.”237 According to Thomas, 
the natural inclinations toward seeking the truth, pursuing the good, 
and living in community give direction to derivative moral action.238 
These inclinations are based on the first principle of practical reason: 
“that good is to be sought and done, evil to be avoided.”239 Aquinas 
analyzes human natural tendencies in three aspects of human nature: 
basic existence, animality and rationality. First, in common with all 
substances, humans tend to the good of our nature. In particular, each 
human being has “an appetite to preserve its own natural being.”240 We 
maintain and defend the basic needs of human life, for example, when 
                                                 
235 “Appetitus enim uniuscujusque rei naturaliter movetur et tendit in finem 
sibi connaturalem” ST I-II 62.4. Also, “Amor naturalis est inclinatio quaedam, 
indita rebus naturalibus ad fines connaturales” De Car. 1, 9; cf. ST II-II 141.1 ad 
1. 
236 “per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi 
connaturalem. Hoc autem contingit secundum duo. [...] Secundo, per 
rectitudinem voluntatis naturaliter tendentis in bonum rationis” ST I-II 62.3. 
237 “Utroque autem modo virtus est homini naturalis secundum quamdam 
inchoationem. Secundum quidem naturam speciei inquantum in ratione hominis 
insunt naturaliter quaedam principia naturalitater cognita tam scibilium quam 
agendorum: quae sunt quaedam seminalia intellectualium virtutum et moralium, 
inquantum in voluntate inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni, quod est secundum 
rationem” (ST I-II 63.1; cf. ST I-II 51.1). It is only in the Commentary on the 
Sentences that Aquinas calls these inclinations “natural virtues”: “Unde quaedam 
inclinationes virtutum sive aptitudines praeexistunt naturaliter in ipsa natura 
rationali, quae virtutes naturales dicuntur” 2 Sent. d. 39, q. 2, a, 1, co. 
238 Aquinas’ account of these natural inclinations (ST I-II 94.2) is strikingly 
like that of Cicero (cf. de Off. 1, 4), although his systematization and analysis is 
more complex than that of the Roman philosopher. However, it is uncertain that 
Aquinas directly saw Cicero’s text, for even though Aquinas frequently refers to 
this work, he never cites this passage. Cf. Pinckaers 1995. 
239 “Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod ‘bonum est faciendum et 
prosequendum, et malum vitandum’” ST I-II 94.2. 
240 “Inest enim primo inclinatio homini ad bonum secundum naturam in 
qua communicat cum omnibus substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet substantia 
appetit conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam; et secundum hanc 
inclinationem pertinent ad legem naturalam ea per quae vita hominis 
conservatur, et contrarium impeditur” ST I-II 94.2. 
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we eat healthily, and protect ourselves from social and environmental 
threats. Secondly, the social aspect of human nature, which we have in 
common with other animals, teaches us “the coupling of male and 
female, the bringing up of the young, and so forth.”241 Thirdly, humans 
have “an appetite for the good of our nature as rational,” which 
inclines us to seek to know truths about God, and to live well in 
society.242 Given human spiritual nature, Thomas maintains that these 
inclinations are both natural and spiritual. This third level pertains to 
human nature as rational. Nonetheless, all three levels of natural 
inclinations underlie the orientations of our innate emotional reactions, 
and volitional and rational principles. 
Even though they are under-specified and surrounded by the 
effects of original, personal and social sin, these inclinations involve 
inchoate goals. They are a first step: to conserve our health and being, 
to commit ourselves to the marriage union and the educating of 
children, to live in society, as well as to know truth, and to love the 
good known. We must however rationally investigate these 
inclinations and goals. In order to pursue the underlying goals more 
thoroughly, Aquinas establishes his moral framework of flourishing 
and excellence. The inclinations demand further habituation. It is not 
enough to recognize intellectually a moral order. We need to construct 
habitus (virtues) that positively make these inclinations more than 
mere promptings. 
Since native dispositions and social environments differ, 
however, humans do not all develop these inclinations in an identical 
way. For example, since natural individual intelligence differs 
according to the condition and use of sensory organs, we do not 
understand the first principles of understanding with the same clarity. 
Other dissimilarities spring from corporeal and appetitive 
                                                 
241 “Secundo inest homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia secundum 
naturam in qua communicat cum caeteris animalibus: et secundum hoc dicuntur 
ea esse lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia dociut, ut est commixtio maris 
et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia” ST I-II 94.2. 
242 “Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam 
rationis quae est sibi propria: sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc 
quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat; et secundum 
hoc ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae ad hujusmodi inclinationem spectant, 
utpote quod homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet 
conversari, et caetera hujusmodi quae ad hoc spectant” ST I-II 94.2. 
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differences.243 According to Aquinas, some people’s bodily constitution 
disposes them to chastity or mildness of temper, and so on.244 Aquinas 
even astutely observes that being naturally disposed to one virtue, such 
as fortitude, might well render a person less disposed to a contrary 
virtue, such as meekness. Indeed, we employ conflicting tendencies 
when pursuing arduous goods (courage) and restraining irascible 
emotions (meekness).245 However, he notes that reason inclines humans 
to all virtues, counterbalancing initial dissimilarities in natural 
dispositions. Although the inclinations as “seeds of virtue” direct us, 
we can develop them in multiple ways.246 
2.4.4. Nature and Nurture: the Development of Habitus 
Like Aristotle and other researchers involved in temperament, 
character and virtue studies, Aquinas asks whether interior mental and 
moral qualities of habitus are innate or acquired. He queries about how 
much we can know and do by nature, and how much by experience. 
We shall now inquire whether we can enrich Aquinas’ approach with 
studies on genetic influences, neurochemical circuitry and evolutionary 
reactions. How might these studies help us to understand fearful 
events, reactions to pain, and so on? Can they also aid us to distinguish 
better between nature and nurture?247 
With the exception of extreme sociobiology theories (e.g. E. O. 
Wilson), contemporary researchers on genetic heritage admit that 
nurture or human experience and environment in some way influence 
our genetic emotional make-up. Sociobiology and evolutionary 
                                                 
243 “Sed ex parte corporis, secundum naturam individui, sunt aliqui habitus 
appetitivi secundum inchoationes naturales” ST I-II 51.1. 
244 “Fines autem recti humanae vitae sunt determinati, et ideo potest esse 
naturalis inclinatio respectu horum finium. [...] quod quidam habent ex naturali 
dispositione quasdam virtues, quibus inclinantur ad rectos fines; et per 
consequens etiam habent naturaliter rectum judicium de hujusmodi finibus” ST 
II-II 47.15. “Et ideo illi qui carent aliis virtutibus, oppositis vitiis subditi, non 
habent temperantiam quae est virtus, sed operantur actus temperantiae ex 
quadam naturali dispositione, prout virtutes quaedam imperfectae sunt 
hominibus naturales, vel per consuetudinem acquisitiae” ST II-II 141.1 ad 2. 
Also see ST I-II 63.1. 
245 Cf. de virt. com. 8 ad 10. 
246 On how natural inclination is perfected in virtue: cf. ST I-II 51.1; ST II-
II 108.2 and ST II-II 117.1, ad 1. 
247 Cf. S. J. Pope 1994; F. de Waal 1997 and 1999.  
192 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
psychology suggest that the emotional “predispositions” selected by 
nature’s evolutionary pressures do not overpower our thoughts and 
choices. They stand, nonetheless, in need of cultural instantiation, 
training and habituation.248 As these sciences indicate, and Aquinas 
concurs, the human emotions, as well as the natural inclinations, need 
shaping and do not start in a pure, passive state (a tabula rasa). 
Neuro-biological studies promise to reveal at least some of the 
mechanisms that underlie habitual dispositions and emotions. 
According to Damasio, cognitive processes and neurochemical 
substances stimulate each other. On the one hand, our repeated or 
habitual acts shape emotions and their neurochemical profiles (somatic 
markers). On the other hand, emotions and their neurochemical 
profiles form our habitual action or dispositions to act.249 Habitual 
dispositions to act have a historical, personal neurochemical profile 
that interacts with cognitive, volitional and emotional processes. 
Although they cannot approach the spiritual center of 
intelligent and volitional activity, human neurochemistry and 
evolutionary psychology offer insights concerning certain aspects of 
moral progress and growth in virtue. As S. J. Pope suggests, “moral 
conversion, moreover, might lead to not only a modification of 
thoughts, words, and deeds but also, by the repeated physiological 
effect of appropriate action (to some extent perhaps) even a reordering 
of this neurochemistry, particularly in the prefrontal cortices.”250 The 
question becomes: how can neurochemical profile (personal historical 
component) for habitual action, which neurophysiology calls “somatic 
markers,” facilitate our moral discernment and choices in complex 
social situations, or on the contrary promote counter-moral 
decisions?251 
In order to respond to this question and to evaluate this 
research and reflection further, let us differentiate the types of habitus 
and recall the larger context of virtue theory. According to Aquinas, 
human agents develop habitus, either vices or virtues, in active and 
receptive ways. We both cause these changes, and are the subject of 
                                                 
248 Cf. Pope 1994, 154. 
249 Cf. Damasio 1994, 149-150. 
250 Pope 1998b, 552; cf. Damasio 1994, 182-83. 
251 Cf. S. J. Pope 1998b, 552; Damasio 1994, 191. 
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them.252 In particular, we produce moral habitus in our own appetitive 
faculties (with their neurochemical circuitry) through the repeated use 
of reason. We produce intellectual habitus (scientific and practical 
knowledge) in the mind when we reflect on human experience and 
investigate primary propositions.253 While entitative habitus and 
sensory faculties are primarily instinctual and only indirectly capable 
of rational influences,254 the interior cognitive sense faculties of 
memory and imagination on the other hand have an innate basis that 
we rationally control and develop (at least to some extent). The habitus 
that inform these latter faculties bring rational (non-despotic) control to 
the non-rational parts of the soul: to the concupiscible and irascible 
parts through the virtues associated with temperance and courage 
respectively.255 
For Aquinas, intellect itself, in our reasoning and willing 
capacities, is by nature both determined and malleable. Human reason 
is naturally adapted (determined) to truth in general as its object. 
Although we are receptive to the variety of things that we perceive 
(sense knowledge), we also actively think, critique and recall 
knowledge. We acquire intellectual habitus through such rational 
activities.256 Will, as an intellectual faculty, naturally inclines to the 
good in general. Nonetheless, its natural inclination for the good per se 
is under-specified for particular moral choices. We need additional 
volitional dispositions to ensure sure and prompt action toward 
particular goods.257 We must have further habitus to direct us mediately 
                                                 
252 “Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui habitus causari, 
non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, sed quantum ad principium 
actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur 
per actum agentis: unde ex multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in 
potentia passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus.” ST I-II 51.2; cf. de virt. com. 
1, 9. 
253 Cf. ST I-II 51.2. 
254 Nonetheless, entitative habitus can be morally significant to the extent 
that the physical state and sensory faculties influence human mental activity; cf. 
ST I-II 50.2 and 50.3; Zagar 1984, 187. 
255 Aristotle, NE iii.13, 1117 b 23-4; and Aquinas, ST I-II 50.3 sc. 
256 Cf. ST I-II 50.4. 
257 “Voluntas ex ipsa natura potentiae inclinatur in bonum rationis. Sed 
quia hoc bonum multipliciter diversificatur, necessarium est ut ad aliquod 
determinatum bonum rationis voluntas per aliquem habitum inclinetur, ad hoc 
quod sequatur proptior operatio” ST I-II 50.5 ad 3. 
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toward our final goal and particular human goals, concerning which 
conflicting concrete goods often present themselves. 
If any of these capacities are at first undetermined, or under-
determined, then we can actualize their potency through a habitus.258 
Aquinas explores the reasons for this habituation. In an acquired 
habitus, our faculty, such as the will, becomes connaturalized through 
a gradual transformation. An innate inclination to love the good, on the 
contrary, involves an immediate union of the appetite with the good 
object. When we repeat acts, the habitus’ potencies adapt to the object. 
Choices become easier through experience. This acquired connaturality 
functions differently than does an innate one. Through acquired 
connaturality, we can order ourselves to have right judgment.259 In the 
case of good moral habitus, or virtue, we qualitatively alter a power or 
nature through repeated acts.260 We do not, however, acquire habitus 
through simple repetition of external acts. Rather, we attend primarily 
to the interior quality of the acts, while not neglecting their external 
qualities. Instead of a life of unrelated singular acts, habitus supposes 
moral continuity as well as conversion in a moral history that becomes 
our character.261 
Such habitus are principles for further action. As a result of 
habitus, we can use the connaturalized power at will.262 Aquinas judges 
                                                 
258 “Sed ea quae sunt ad utrumlibet non habent aliquam formam ex qua 
declinent ad unum determinate; sed a proprio movente determinantur ad aliquid 
unum; et hoc ipso quod determinantur ad ipsum, quodammodo disponuntur in 
idem; et cum multoties inclinantur, determinantur ad idem a proprio movente, et 
firmatur in eis inclinatio determinata in illud; ita quod ista dispositio 
superinducta est quasi quaedam forma per modum naturae tendens in unum. Et 
propter hoc dicitur quod consuetudo est altera natura. [...] et ista dispositio sic 
firmata est habitus virtutis” de virt. com. 1, 9. 
259 Aquinas says, for example: “rectitudo autem judicii potest contingere 
dupliciter: [...] alio modo, propter connaturalitatem quamdam ad ea de quibus 
jam est judicandum. [...] per quadam connaturalitatem ad ipsa recte judicat de 
eis ille qui habet habitum castitatis” (ST II-II 45.2; cf. ST I 1.6 ad 3). Conversely 
people can disorder themselves toward vice, as in the case of continuous 
incontinent acts (cf. ST II-II 156.3). 
260 Aquinas says that: “Nihil autem est aliud habitus consuetudinalis quam 
habitudo acquisita per consuetudinem, quae est in modum naturae” ST I-II 56.5. 
261 Cf. Zagar 1984, 183. 
262 “Et ideo oportet quod similitudo superiorum potentiarum imprimatur et 
quasi sigilletur ut forma quaedam in inferioribus potentii, et tunc inferiores 
potentiae etiam ex se ipsis habent determinationem ad actus ad quos movent 
superiores. Et sic illae actiones efficiuntur eis connaturales et non accidit 
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it necessary to acquire such habitus concerning the particular 
principles of actions and their ends. In prudence, for example, a human 
being “needs to be perfected by a certain habitus, through which it 
becomes, as it were connatural to him to judge rightly about an end.”263 
Such a connaturalization or transformation demands an identity of end 
and person. Aquinas makes no qualms about following Aristotle’s 
principle: “such as one is, such does the end seem to one.”264 
We should not undervalue the spiritual nature of human 
beings, as an impetus to act (from a deeper level). The human soul’s 
power to influence human agency is more than a mere parallel to basic 
genetic and neural-biological wiring of natural inclinations. 
Nonetheless, human rational and volitional powers influence the whole 
person. We should not reduce these spiritual powers to evolutionary 
pressures on the species, nor the physical body with its myriad of 
interrelated sensate, biological and neurological systems. This 
discussion of the spiritual soul raises further questions. If we can 
acquire intellectual and moral habitus, then how can we shape them in 
ways that promote (spiritual) resilience and decrease vulnerability? In 
Aquinas language, how can we promote education in good habitus?265 
Aquinas offers a nuanced and extensive response that we can apply in 
due course to the resilience perspective. Habitus in general have a 
multitude of sources. They can originate either strictly from nature, or 
partly from nature and partly from agents (and their environments). 
                                                                                                          
impedimentum nec error in perficiendo dictos actus, sed subito et delectabiliter 
perficiuntur. Et hae formae sunt habitus.” 3 Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, from a 
previously unedited text of St. Thomas (cf. P.-M. Gils 1962, 618). 
263 “oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat 
quodammodo homini connaturale recte judicare de fine” ST I-II 58.5. 
264 “qualis unus quisque est, talis finis videtur ei” (Aristotle in the NE iii.5, 
1114a32, as quoted by Aquinas in ST I-II 58.5). 
265 Related questions concerning innate qualities include: What is the part 
of genetic heritage? Does the human soul and mind have its own predispositions? 
Does genetic and spiritual heritage determine us? Moreover, related questions 
concerning acquired qualities include: How can we change our agency that is 
influenced by our genetic condition? What it the influence of our will and grace 
in acquiring virtuous habitus?  
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Concerning this second kind, we acquire some habitus through human 
effort, while God infuses others.266 
In conclusion, to seek progress demands that we extend basic 
inclinations, the seeds of virtue, to more fully specified dispositions. 
As Aquinas says, “besides these natural principles, the habitus of 
virtue is required for the perfection of a human being according to the 
mode connatural to him.”267 It is in free and intelligent acts aimed 
towards temporal and eternal goals while employing instrumental 
goods, that we actualize virtue in ourselves. A problem arises however 
when one thinks that an automation of morality is possible and even 
desirable.268 Moral acts involve principled and loving adaptation, rather 
than blind repetition. Another problem arises when we neglect human 
animality, or forget the indications about the resilience and risk effects 
of our acts, dispositions and social relationships. It is important to 
recall the essential place of human animality (the body) in virtue, as 
has been remarkably done by A. MacIntyre (1999) and the 
psychosocial sciences. Nonetheless, we need to supplement these 
sources with a doctrine of the natural inclinations that involves 
ontological, animal and rational qualities (cf. ST I-II 94.2). Aquinas’ 
teaching on natural-spiritual inclinations offers several pertinent 
correctives. It recognizes: (1) that human action finds a vital principle 
in inclinations to preserve our existence, to develop life in family and 
society, to seek actively truth and goodness; (2) that these inclinations 
are of a spiritual order (we cannot reduce them to evolutionary 
pressures on the human species); and (3) that we should not too 
                                                 
266 A more detailed treatment of infused virtue is found in chapter five, in 
regards to the infused virtue of fortitude its associated virtues and their correlation 
with the gift the Holy Spirit. 
267 “Et sicut praeter ista principia naturalia requiruntur habitus virtutum 
ad perfectionem hominis secundum modum sibi connaturalem” (de virt. com. 1, 
10). 
268 This setback comes from conceiving that virtue’s goal is to gain by 
repetition all the needed automations (a series of actions materially identical) to 
always act in agreement with the obligation dictated by an external moral law. In 
this idea of virtue, one can permanently conform one’s actions to the moral law 
and avoid those actions prohibited by the same moral law by repeating exterior 
acts to measure up to this standard. But Aquinas teaches the contrary, saying that 
one needs to repeat the same interior acts of quality (not exterior acts per se) in 
order to build virtue. 
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sharply separate them from each other, when we seek to understand 
how virtues develop and correlate. 
2.5. Aquinas on Virtue, Education and Resilience 
To make moral progress, we train our emotional and 
intellectual capacities. We promote moral behavior as well as avoid 
conditions that tend to activate “undesirable aspects of our evolved 
‘incentive systems.’”269 We can develop both rational and emotional 
intelligence, as D. Goleman has put it. Aquinas, for his part, describes 
the way we instill intelligibility in virtuous habitus of emotions, will 
and reason. His brand of emotional intelligence does not confuse or 
collapse the habitus of the emotions with simple intelligence, reason or 
will. As intelligent, appropriate and virtuous as an initial emotional 
judgment might be, we must rationally adjudicate the situation in order 
to act morally. We shall now investigate Aquinas’ approach to virtue 
education in dialogue with the psychosocial approach to resilience. 
First, we explore Aquinas’ virtue pedagogy as a model for acquiring 
moral and spiritual resilience. Then we examine the import of internal 
and external sources for instruction and learning. Finally, we 
investigate what type of experience is at the basis of moral knowledge, 
virtue and resilient agency. 
2.5.1. Virtue Education 
The relationship between human agency, reason and resilience 
raises difficult questions, when we consider the moral complexity and 
immoral compromises often expressed in everyday action. What is the 
origin of the virtues? Even in the post-lapsus human condition—with 
all the disordered effects on human individuals and society—Aquinas 
claims that, “the seeds of virtue, which are in us, are an ordering of the 
will and reason to the good connatural to us.”270 This innate starting 
point not only directs our will and reason to the good (moral and 
                                                 
269 Pope 1998b, 552. This moral behavior is called “social ecology” by 
Bellah, et alia (1986, 284). 
270 “seminaria virtutum quae sunt in nobis, sunt ordinatio voluntatis et 
rationis ad bonum nobis connaturale” 3 Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 3, co; cf. ST I-
II 51.1; ST I-II 63.1. ST I-II 27.3. 
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spiritual goods), but it also directs them away from evil.271 Nonetheless 
these seeds are inadequate in themselves for responsible moral action 
or for understanding growth in resilience and virtue. 
‘Virtue’ has many meanings in contemporary language.272 
Different cultures and times have established diverse lists of virtues.273 
We can only understand Aquinas’ technical use of the term “virtue” in 
the context of his typology (study of the types) of habitus. Virtue and 
its contrary, vice, are operative habitus; they differ according to their 
rapport with reason. Thomas says: “virtuous deeds are connatural to 
reason, but vicious acts are contrary to it.”274 
Aquinas’ treatment of virtues is one of the masterpieces of 
medieval, scholastic moral theology. It was the fullest study of human 
agency to date, and established several novelties as it developed.275 The 
                                                 
271 In his Sentences, Aquinas states also that “‘nec aliquid male vult,’ 
ostenditur esse connaturalis, quia mala sunt contra naturam” 4 Sent. d. 49, q. 5, 
a. 5, sol. 3, ex. 
272 “Virtue” has numerous contemporary meanings that we should not 
confuse when approaching Aquinas’ treatment of virtus. First, the OED 
recognizes that the Latin word virtus has the following senses: “valour, worth, 
merit, moral perfection;” and that its root, vir, means “man.” Furthermore, the 
OED defines “virtue”: “I. As a quality of persons. 1. The power or operative 
influence inherent in a supernatural or divine being. [...] 2. Conformity of life and 
conduct with the principles of morality; [...] 3. With a and pl. A particular moral 
excellence; a special manifestation of the influence of moral principles in life or 
conduct ME.” Furthermore the Webster’s Unabridged Encyclopedia Dictionary 
(WUED) lists the following senses of “virtue”: “1. moral excellence; goodness; 
righteousness. 2. conformity of one’s life and conduct to moral and ethical 
principles; uprightness; rectitude. 3. chastity, esp. in a girl or a woman […] 4. a 
particular moral excellence. 5. a good or admirable quality.” The list goes on. 
273 The following recent studies illustrate the variety of virtue approaches: 
cf. A. MacIntyre 1981; 1988; S.-Th. Pinckaers 1985/1995a; J. W. Crossin 1985; 
J. Porter 1990; A. Comte-Sponville 1995. In these studies, the divergences in the 
lists of virtues are rooted in differing beliefs concerning human nature and its 
potential. The list we gave earlier can complete these ones. 
274 “virtutum opera sunt connaturalia rationi, opera vero vitiorum sunt 
contra rationem” ST I-II 70.4 ad 1. 
275 As in the case of habitus, Aquinas’ thought on virtue changes in its 
organization and deepens in its content between his Commentary on the 
Sentences and his Summa theologiae. In the earlier work he follows Peter 
Lombard’s approach of addressing virtues in terms of whether Christ had them, 
while developing major reflections on virtue that go beyond the Lombard’s 
structure and content. For example, to the Lombard’s framework of whether 
Christ had the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, Aquinas adds a 
treatise on virtue in general; (3 Sent. d. 23, q. 1) and after the Lombard’s short 
treatise on the four principle virtues, Aquinas adds an extensive treatment of the 
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richness of Aquinas’ virtue doctrine demands that he establish several 
definitions of virtue. In the Summa theologiae, the most basic 
philosophical definition asserts that: “virtue denotes a determinate 
perfection of a power.”276 This perfection involves the way in which the 
power correlates to its end or proper act. In this section, we focus on 
the type of virtue produced in rational powers, without neglecting 
emotional ones. Human rational powers are not determined to one act. 
Such specifically human virtue entails a good operative habitus, which, 
as a perfection of a natural human power, is good by definition.277 This 
good not only correlates to the basic ordering of nature, but it is also 
directed by the order of human reason.278 
Concerning the potency and internal causes of virtue that exist 
in the moral agent, Aquinas does not stop with the standard definition 
of virtue, but rather argues that all acquired virtues (intellectual and 
                                                                                                          
common moral virtues, the cardinal virtues and the parts of the moral virtues. (3 
Sent. d. 33, q. 1-3) In his Summa theologiae, Aquinas develops the topic further 
while employing a novel structural organization. He lays the foundation for 
understanding virtue by explicating the goal of flourishing, the nature of human 
acts, the principles of morality, the passions and habitus (ST I-II 1-54). This 
preparation then leads to his progressive elaboration of the virtues, which 
addresses the nature and seat of virtue, the intellectual virtues and their difference 
with the moral virtues, the cardinal and the theological virtues, the cause and 
mean of virtue, the reciprocity among virtues, as well as their comparison and 
duration (ST I-II 55-67). 
276 Aquinas says: “virtus nominat quamdam potentiae perfectionem” (ST I-
II 56.1). We shall discuss later the classic definition of infused virtue cited in ST 
I-II 55.4. 
277 Thomas says: “Ultimum autem in quod unaquaeuque potentia potest, 
oportet quod sit bonum, nam omne malum defectum quendam importat” ST I-II 
55.3. 
278 Aquinas draws from both Scriptural and Ciceronian authority in this 
regard. Concerning acquired virtue Aquinas cites Cicero: “Sed nihil aliud virtus 
est quam quaedam facilitas et inclinatio per modum naturae ad bonum rationis, 
ut dicit Tullius II De Inventione c. 53.” 3 Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, sed c. 2. Also see, 
ST II-II 58.3, and ST II-II 58.12 sc. This definition of virtue, as being according to 
the good of reason, not only belongs to wisdom, “a correct judgment made 
through rational investigation” (ST II-II 45.2) or to prudence, a stable disposition 
to judge by right reason to find the virtuous means to an end (ST II-II 47.7), but 
even to virtues like temperance which brings reasonable disposition to our 
concupiscible appetite, lest we stray from reason because of some powerful yet 
inappropriate sense of attraction (ST II-II 141.1-2) and to courage which makes 
the irascible power participate in reason (ST I-II 56.4). 
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moral) “arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us.”279 The 
early or preliminary stages of virtue are natural to human beings in two 
ways: according to our specific nature, and according to one’s 
individual nature. First, virtue is natural inchoatively, since through 
experience nature instills in human reason naturally known principles 
of knowledge and action. Along with the will’s natural appetite for 
good in accordance with reason, these principles serve as seeds for 
intellectual and moral virtue.280 Nonetheless, we must actively develop 
these principles. 
Secondly, our individual bodily dispositions affect the way in 
which we are disposed to virtue. The dispositions of bodily sensory 
powers and emotions consequently aid or hinder the rational powers 
that they serve,281 as we already saw in our study of emotions and 
temperaments. At this level, humans have unequal natural aptitudes: 
either for science, or for fortitude, or for temperance, and so on. As 
previously discussed, for Aquinas, the virtues build upon two natural 
bases. On the one hand, we extend the basic human inclinations to 
know truth, to love the good known, to conserve oneself in health and 
being, to commit oneself to the marriage union and the educating of 
children, and to live in society.282 On the other hand, we use and amend 
the natural dispositions (such as kindness, friendliness, 
courageousness, and so on). We develop these initial aptitudes for 
                                                 
279 “Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris 
actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis 
praeexistentibus” ST I-II 63.3; cf. ST I-II 51.1; ST I-II 63.1; and especially ST I-II 
63.2 on “whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation.” 
280 “virtus est homini naturalis secundum quamdam inchoationem. 
Secundum quidem naturam speciei inquantum in ratione hominis insunt 
naturaliter quaedam principia naturalitater cognita tam scibilium quam 
agendorum: quae sunt quaedam seminalia intellectualium virtutum et moralium, 
inquantum in voluntate inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni, quod est secundum 
rationem” ST I-II 63.1. 
281 “ex corporis dispositione aliqui sunt dispositi vel melius vel pejus ad 
quasdam virtutes. Prout scilicet vires quaedam sensitivae actus sunt quarumdam 
partium corporis, ex quarum dispositione adjuvantur vel impediuntur hujusmodi 
vires in suis actibus, et per consequens vires rationales, quibus hujusmodi 
sensitivae vires deserviunt” ST I-II 63.1. 
282 Cf. ST I-II 94.2. 
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virtue into virtue through virtuous acts. To acquire virtues, we need to 
actualize what we have as potencies.283 
Virtues have different natural and supernatural causes. The 
efficient causes of the virtues involve human intelligent and divine 
sources. At the natural level, reason and will produce virtuous acts and 
the formation of the underlying dispositions. For Aquinas, inasmuch as 
any natural good action correlates with the Source of goodness, God is 
also the efficacious cause through a help (auxilio Dei) that is typical of 
the goodness endemic to nature. At the supernatural level, God 
efficaciously produces the infused virtues, but not without human 
graced collaboration, as we shall discuss in chapter five. Aquinas 
moreover holds that God is the first cause of the virtues, since in Him 
exist the exemplar virtues.284 The final cause of the virtues, moreover, 
directs and motivates human beings. The perfect virtues of Christ and 
the saints in glory spell out the content of promised complete 
happiness, and thus serve to direct and motivate human efforts.285 
Lastly, the formal causes of the virtues constitute the reasons that make 
the act and disposition virtuous. In this regard, human social nature 
informs natural virtue according to our emotional, rational and 
volitional capacities, while the grace of the Holy Spirit and graced 
charity molds all Christian virtue.286 
The process of acquiring virtue is based in human potencies 
and demands time. According to Aquinas, it traverses steps as well. He 
distinguishes three stages, although he does not construct a strict 
developmental stage theory. He describes three degrees of charity, 
                                                 
283 Since in searching for flourishing we can use and habituate the powers 
proper to the human soul in various ways, the seeds of virtue grow according to 
the way one chooses: towards good, compromised good or an evil mistaken for 
good. In our experiential pursuits of flourishing and goods, we develop habitus 
that build upon our basic human inclinations, which through extension in habitus 
become an even more particularized and forceful directive within ourselves. 
284 Aquinas draws from Platonic sources through Macrobius in discussing 
how the cardinal virtues can be divided into social, perfecting, perfect and 
exemplar virtues (cf. ST I-II 61.5). Nonetheless Augustine is the key for 
explaining the Christian vision of God as being the exemplar, whom humans 
follow in order to “live aright” (bene vivimus). In God pre-exist the types of all 
good things, for Aquinas. 
285 Cf. ST I-II 1-5; ST I-II 61.5. 
286 Cf. ST II-II 23.8; ST I-II 61.5. See also Aquinas’ discussion of the 
“perfecting virtues” (cf. ST I-II 61.5). 
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which might serve as a model for the development of the other virtues 
(cf. II-II 24.9). The first stage involves beginners, the second 
progressives, and the third the mature. Aquinas does not order them 
according to chronological age, but to maturity in experienced, 
knowledgeable and discerning judgment. They advance toward firm 
and constant dispositions. First, these three steps of virtue parallel 
three stages in human development. They illustrate how we progress 
from childhood to adolescence, and finally to adulthood. Second, they 
resemble three qualities of moral development. To begin with, we need 
discipline in order to act morally. Then we make progress in virtues. 
And finally we become capable of mature action in freedom. Third, 
they correlate with three sources of morality in scripture: the precepts 
of the Decalogue, the encouragement of the Beatitudes, and the 
inspiration of the New Law. Fourth, these stages of growth in virtue 
involve three aspects of the mystics’spiritual progress. They advance 
from the purgative stage, to the illuminative, and finally to the unitive 
stage.287 
Although in this section I cannot address other pedagogical 
ramifications of this model of virtue development, we should highlight 
its perspective on charity, and on the roles of the teacher and of law 
therein. Although the theological nature of the experience of charity is 
not exactly parallel to moral virtues, it nonetheless manifests other 
similarities, especially in developmental trajectory. 
First, charity illustrates how virtue develops as a process of 
connaturalization with the end, the good that attracts us. Charity is 
more than the natural inclination or feeling of attraction for a good. For 
Aquinas, in charity, we acquire a sort of connatural knowledge through 
an experience of the Good (ultimately God, who is the source of all 
good). The experiential basis for acquired knowledge of the Good 
serves in turn as the basis for contemplation and for action. Since 
charity plays the primary role in this perspective, the connatural 
knowledge affected by experiential charity enlivens the whole range of 
                                                 
287 These stages can be put into diagram form (cf. ST II-II 24.9; Pinckaers 
1995a, 354-378): 
(stages) (human dev.) (moral qualities) (Scripture) (mystics) 
Beginners childhood discipline Decalogue purgative 
Progressives adolescence progress in virtues Beatitudes illuminative 
Mature adulthood maturity in freedom New Law unitive 
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our action. It serves as the foundational source for the other virtues. It 
is expansive, rather than restricted by norms. The highest form of 
mature charity spontaneity exceeds the normative and conventional 
demands.288 In the upcoming chapters, these three degrees of virtue 
serve as a point of convergence with the behavioral sciences and a 
contrast with Kohlberg’s developmental model.289 
Secondly, the roles of the teacher and of the law are to aid the 
student in such self-actualization and maturity. Aquinas emphasizes 
that a natural aptitude for virtue is inadequate. Humans must acquire 
virtue by means of some kind of training.290 We must apply ourselves. 
Yet a human being cannot train himself alone. We need training from 
another, in order to attain to the perfection of virtue in both disposition 
and act. In every case, we need paternal/maternal training. But when 
we are prone to vice and unamenable to instruction, it is useful that law 
restrain us from evil by force and fear. 
Human law disciplines us. Through fear of punishment, it 
causes us to do what virtue would freely dictate, at least minimally. 
Aquinas follows Aristotle in this understanding of our capacity for the 
heights of virtue and the depths of human depravity.291 Human law’s 
purpose is to establish peace and harmony. It aims to create a culture 
for advancing not only virtuous acts, but even virtuous dispositions. 
Aquinas’ Christian understanding of the Decalogue, the Beatitudes and 
the New Law of the Holy Spirit goes further than the natural level. Yet 
in order to understand it, we need to distinguish further the internal and 
external sources of growth in virtue and spiritual resilience. 
                                                 
288 Cf. S.-Th. Pinckaers 1995a, 365. 
289 Cf. P. J. Philibert 1975, 1980. 
290 He treats the need for training in the question: “whether it was useful for 
laws to be framed by men?” ST I-II 95.1. 
291 In ST I-II 95.1, Aquinas cites Aristotle (Polit. i.2) as saying: “‘as man is 
the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he 
be severed from law and righteousness’; because man can use his reason to 
devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are 
unable to do.” 
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2.5.2. Internal and External Sources of Learning and 
Instruction 
What internal and external sources underlie human moral 
agency, virtue and resiliency? How do the active correlation of 
learning and instruction underlie moral and spiritual agency? In order 
to exemplify virtue education, Aquinas correlates the way we acquire 
virtue and knowledge. He uses two principal images—the student and 
teacher, and the arts, especially the art of building—in order to 
demonstrate the act of teaching (docere) and learning.292 Aquinas 
borrows insights from the Greek philosophical tradition of paideia 
(paide…a). He renews them though his Christian treatment of the 
relationship between master and disciple.293 
Aquinas constructs his approach to teaching and learning 
neither on Averroes’ theory of the direct transfer of phantasms, nor on 
Plato’s theory of reminiscence.294 Rather led by Aristotle’s mediate 
position, Thomas argues that we learn through interior and external 
causes295 that advance us from potency to act. What are these internal 
and external sources? 
The internal sources occupy a primary place in both moral 
agency and theory. They involve the emotional, intellectual and 
spiritual sources that constitute natural and supernatural feelings, 
knowledge and love. They entail personal and communal experience. 
Aquinas does not confuse moral virtue and moral knowledge. 
Nonetheless, in order to study moral science, we need moral 
                                                 
292 Cf. Pinckaers 1995a, 359-374; 2000c; and Verbeke 1994. 
293 For Aquinas, the Master or Teacher par excellence is Christ (cf. ST III 
7.7), who is followed in this role by the Apostles, Bishops and the masters of 
theology who teach and comment on sacred Scripture. In this perspective, 
Aquinas regroups the gifts of the Holy Spirit (cf. 1 Co 12) around the teacher, 
since through instruction one human can act upon another on the spiritual level 
(cf. ST I-II 111.4; Pinckaers 2000c). 
294 Aquinas critiques these two theories in ST I 117.1 and De verit. 11.1.  
295 His scriptural commentaries add further reflections on the acquisition of 
virtue as well. For example in his Commentary on Philippians (Sct 4-1; on verse 
4:8), Aquinas discusses how one can be moved to good action (excellence)—in 
accordance with St. Paul’s admonition—in two ways. First, an internal virtue can 
provide the impulse from within oneself to do what is true, honorable and pure. 
Second, discipline or instruction learned from others can lead one to such action. 
However, receiving a doctrine must lead to thinking about it and then assenting to 
it, in order that the teaching bear fruit in a personal act. 
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experience. In his general discussion of science, Aquinas notes that, in 
order to elaborate a science (including sacra doctrina or theology and 
moral theology), we need related personal experience.296 On the one 
hand, mathematics and physics require that we abstract principles and 
knowledge from sensible things. Counting apples aids us to understand 
addition. Moral wisdom, on the other hand, requires moral practice and 
experience. Aquinas says that its “natural principles, which are not 
abstracted from sensible things, are known through experience, for 
which a long time is required.”297 We understand principles of practical 
prudence better because of experiences of others’ and our own prudent 
acts. 
Aquinas emphasizes however that an ethicist is not made by 
raw experience alone. Experience is insufficient, unless we acquire 
freedom from slavery to the emotions. Moral character aids us study 
morality.298 Aquinas insists that the virtues correlate with each other. 
Moral virtue (temperance, courage, justice and prudence) assists 
intellectual virtue (understanding, science and wisdom; and prudence 
and art); and vice versa. In ethics, we speculatively examine practical 
moral experience, our own and that of others. In moral theology, we 
examine the experiences communicated in Scripture, Tradition and the 
faith-community (liturgical and non-liturgical prayer), as well.299 
                                                 
296 This view was not uncommon. Aristotle states it in his NE (i.3, 1095a2-
11). In his Metaphysics (A 981a14-15) he acknowledges our need for experience 
as well as reason: “We see that the experienced are more effective than those who 
have reason, but lack experience” (cf. Aquinas, in Meta, A 981a14-15. In his 
commentary In Lib. Causis (lect. 1, ed. Saffrey, pp. 1-2; in Mauer 1963, 91), 
Aquinas lists the order of learning the sciences as follows: first, logic; second, 
mathematics; third, natural sciences; fourth, moral science; and fifth, metaphysics 
and divine science.  
297 “Sed principia naturalia quae non sunt abstracta a sensibilibus, per 
experientiam considerantur, ad quam requiritur temporis multitudo” (In VI Eth. 
lect. 7 n. 1209; cf. NE i.3, 1095a2-11 and In I Eth. lect. 3.38-40). 
298 “Quatro in moralibus quae requirunt experientiam et animum a 
passionibus liberum” (In VI Eth. lect. 7 n. 1211). Here Aquinas speaks in the 
negative; that the ethicist cannot be a slave of passion or continually seeking the 
pleasures of unvirtuous passion. “Ad actus autem virtuosos non perveniunt, qui 
passiones sectantur. Et sic nihil differt quantum ad hoc, an auditor hujus 
scientiae sit juvenis aetate, vel juvenis moribus, idest passionum sectator” (In I 
Eth. lect. 3 n. 40; cf. NE i.3, 1095a2-11). 
299 Cf. S.-Th. Pinckaers 1993, 439-441. 
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A study of moral and spiritual resilience includes how these 
sources address human suffering and failure, aspirations and efforts. 
Theological reflection involves a regular movement back and forth 
between experience and speculation in order that the one aids to 
interpret, guide and rectify the other. We construct a personal synthesis 
born of re-examining the text (e.g. Scripture) and significant events 
(such as personal experience of good and evil, as well as other events 
open through to history and faith, such as the exodus, Christ’s Passion, 
Auschwitz, Hiroshima). We revisit these texts and events neither qua 
historical text nor qua historical event. Rather we examine them to 
better understand their import for contemporary audiences and 
ourselves. They aid us to meet the challenges that we face concerning 
meaning and commitment, coping and constancy, and constructing 
something good out of human suffering and failure. 
Indispensably, external sources for moral agency, theory and 
theologizing involve those events and persons that help us to better 
understand the pleasures and pains of the human journey toward 
happiness. Aquinas’ analysis of teaching and learning emphasizes both 
internal and external sources.300 He explains how we learn from our 
joy-filled, painful and innocuous experiences through the master and 
disciple archetype. We use the light of the intellect (personal reason 
and will), and various sources of light (both outside teachers and 
God).301 The master (exterior principle) leads the disciple (interior 
principle) to acquire personal knowledge. Aquinas emphasizes that an 
external teacher does not directly cause us to learn. Yet we depend 
upon a teacher’s aid in order to appropriate human experience 
personally. External masters can involve non-formal interactions with 
unlikely teachers: the poor and weak, young and old alike. They lead 
us from things unknown by us to those known by them, in a twofold 
                                                 
300 Cf. ST I 117.1, ST II-II 181.3 corpus and ad 2, and parallel places: II 
Sent. dist. 9.2 ad 4; dist. 28.5 ad 3; SCG II.75; De verit. 11.1; Opusc. XVI, de 
Unit. Intell., 5. 
301 For Aquinas, the Holy Spirit accomplishes the goal of Scripture, which 
is human instruction and learning (eruditio), through the Saints’ scriptural 
commentaries. “Contra, ad eumdem pertinet facere aliquid propter finem et 
perducere ad illum finem. Sed finis Scripturae, quae est a Spiritu Sancto, est 
eruditio hominum. Haec autem eruditio hominum ex Scripturis non potest esse 
nisi per expositiones Sanctorum. Ergo expositiones Sanctorum sunt a Spiritu 
Sancto” QDL 12.17 sc. 
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way. First, the master provides instructive aids (auxilia vel 
instrumenta) in order that our intellects can acquire knowledge 
(scientia). Secondly, the master strengthens our intellects by proposing 
the order of proceeding from principles to conclusions. We need such 
demonstrations until we can continue on our own.302 
St. Thomas highlights a correlated and non-conflicting interior 
principle. We might call it an external-internal principle—an external 
principle that becomes internal. In addition to the interior light of the 
intellect, which is a principal cause of knowledge and virtue, God is 
also a principal cause of light, knowledge and virtue.303 Thomas 
identifies the second interior source not only as an interior source of 
light (the Word through faith) but also as an interior inclination to act 
(grace of the Holy Spirit through hope and charity).304 He recognizes it 
as the evangelical or New Law that the grace of the Holy Spirit 
inscribes in the believer’s heart. The Spirit, as a unique external-
interior source and Master, actively provides the understanding of 
Scriptures and knowledge of Providence. He is more fully associated 
                                                 
302 “Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem 
ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel 
instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam: […] Alio 
modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; […] inquantum proponit discipulo 
ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per seipsum non haberet tantam 
virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis posset conclusiones deducere” (ST I 117.1). 
“Virtus collativa,” according to R. Deferrari (1960, 1090), involves either reason 
or sense evaluation. 
303 In this regard, Aquinas quotes the Psalms while commenting: “E ideo 
sicut de Deo dicitur […] ‘Qui docet hominem scientiam’ [Ps. 93.10], inquantum 
‘lumen vultus eius super nos signatur’ [Ps. 4.7], per quod nobis omnia 
ostenduntur” (ST I 117.1 ad 1). In SCG (II.75 ad 3), Aquinas says: “Et quia 
exterior operatio docentis nihil operaretur nisi adesset principium intrinsecum 
scientiae, quod inest nobis divinitus, ideo apud theologos dicitur quod homo 
docet ministerium exhibendo, Deus autem interius operando.” God acts not only 
on human intellect, but also on the will, which God can move directly as the 
cause of creation and of universal good (cf. ST I-II 9.6, where Aquinas draws 
from Phil 2:13). 
304 In this way Aquinas’ sacra doctrina centers itself on the person of 
Christ as the Teacher par excellence. He thus reads Scripture according to three 
spiritual senses: allegorical (the Old Law signifies the New Law of Christ, cf. 
Secunda pars), moral (how things done in Christ signify what we are to do, cf. 
Tertia pars), and anagogical senses (how things relate to eternal glory, cf. the 
whole ST). Aquinas discusses these three spiritual senses and the literal sense in 
the following places: ST I 1.10; Ad Gal. ch. 5, lect. 7; and QDL 7.6 art. 15. Cf. H. 
de Lubac 1964, 2:272ff; Pinckaers 2002, 11. 
208 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
with the Gifts of the Holy Spirit that accompany the virtues, as we 
shall discuss later. The Spirit endows us with strength for action.305 
Christian moral theology thus takes as its basis the experience of the 
new resilient life in the Spirit.306 The twofold light of truth (human and 
divine reason) shines through the summit of the human mind to the 
depth of his heart. It permeates our judgments about the true goodness 
and good truth that we discern in the thoughts and action of other 
people and ourselves.307 The Teacher empowers us. He instructs us in 
this fuller path, and enables us to attain our goals through the presence 
and gift of the Holy Spirit. The pedagogical insight here involves the 
internalizing effect of law, especially the New Law. The goal is full 
maturity in the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which constitute 
freedom for a life of excellence. How might Aquinas’ teaching serve as 
a source of resilience, especially spiritual resilience? 
2.5.3. Moral Experience and Knowledge as Sources of 
Resilience 
Practical reflections on both ethical theory and resilience have 
a common starting point: resilient moral experience and virtue. How 
do another person’s and our own successes and failures serve moral 
reflection? How do personal and communal resources contribute to the 
moral journey in terms of happiness, in developing virtuous and 
vicious characters, and in good and evil acts? What difference for 
resilience does it make if we acknowledge faith experiences as 
authoritative, or if we secularize the basis of reflection? Aquinas’ 
approach to personal, social and divine sources would inseparably 
intertwine morality and resilience. He would not make resilience a 
standard for human agency, unless it was integrated with morality. 
                                                 
305 ST I-II 106.1 ad 2. In this domain, compared to his contemporaries, 
Aquinas marks a threefold originality, which Pinckaers (2002, 11) finds: “in his 
definition of the New Law as an interior law identified with the grace of the 
Spirit; in his definition of the gifts as dispositions to receive spiritual inspirations; 
and, finally, in his construction of morality around the virtues and the gifts that 
perfect them.” 
306 St. Paul describes this type of resilient life of the Spirit in his letter to the 
Romans (Rm 7:21-8:11). This new life entails living (and longing to live) by the 
Spirit, instead of the flesh. 
307 Cf. Pinckaers 2002, 10. 
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We need to avoid two extremes when correlating moral 
experience, knowledge and virtue to resilience.308 One side of the 
dichotomy favors a rational study of moral norms, while neglecting 
experiences of responsibility, virtue and excellence. Moral norms, as a 
priori principles, would simply need application, a rational step; 
knowing would produce doing, e.g. Socrates. Likewise, resilience 
would simply mean learning to apply resilience rules. The other 
extreme overshadows moral norms in favor of personal experience, 
which then would serve as the only criteria in the moral domain. 
Unfortunately, this extreme could involve abuses to liberty.309 
Resilience would then be experience per se, even normless experience. 
Aquinas forges a middle ground between these extremes. His 
approach accords a basic priority to the moral experience (virtuous 
character) that grows through virtue and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. 
Herein of course, he reserves an important, but subservient place for 
establishing norms and prudent decision-making. A parallel type of 
resilience would draw upon experience, norms and virtuous 
dispositions. It would demand a complete type of action. 
How can we understand experience in moral and theological 
frameworks? “Experience” etymologically finds its roots in the 
practical knowledge, skill or competence (peritia) that we draw from a 
trial or danger (periculum) once overcome.310 However, not all 
experience exhibits overcoming difficulty in the same way. What are 
the different sorts of experience? Even though a basic unity underlies 
being human, we have: emotional and psychological experiences; 
sensual and intellectual ones; and moral and spiritual ones. We need to 
reflect upon experience in order to gain moral science, virtue and 
resilience. However, not all experiences will serve as a basis for moral 
or resilient knowledge, judgment and action in the same way.311 
Interior experience is particular. We amass it developmentally 
in at least two ways.312 First, each of the two interior dimensions 
                                                 
308 Cf. Pinckaers 1995a, 91. 
309 St. Paul warns of such abuses of liberty in Romans ch. 8. 
310 Cf. Bruguès 1995, 33; WUED 1989, 501.  
311 For there are specifically shallow, immoral experiences; cf. Pinckaers 
1995a, 91-94. 
312 Cf. Philibert 1975. 
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(human and divine) of Christian experience is progressive. We acquire 
both only with time and in function of our own particular genetic 
heritage and personal history, gender and relationships, culture and 
society,313 and so on. Gratia praesupponit naturam.314 Second, when we 
develop moral theology and virtue, the utility of our personal and 
social context manifests itself in dialogue between our personal 
experiences and those of others: not only other theologians or ethicists 
from similar backgrounds, but also those who are young or 
inexperienced, weak or sick, dependent or crippled, who all have their 
lessons to offer.315 Beyond its particularity, each person’s experience 
has a certain universality, and for the better part, resilience. 
The dialogue between our own experience and that of others is 
made possible through: (1) being in relationship with others; (2) 
understanding the other person as another self; (3) having confidence 
that other human beings’ experiences are real and can be critically 
integrated to serve as a source for one’s own moral judgments; and (4) 
believing that we share a common humanity between people of all 
genders, cultures and times. Thus we can learn from another person’s 
and other people’s experience, and how theorized sciences (including 
both the theological and psychosocial sciences) can gain insights into 
human resilient experience through that of particular individuals and 
communities.316 
                                                 
313 The limitations and universality of human experience arise in the debate 
about the contextualization of theology. Although each theology is in a special 
relationship with the identity, origin and experience of its author(s), specific 
theologies have attempted to translate and to inculturate Scripture and Tradition 
for particular contexts; e.g. liberation theology (addressing the situation of the 
oppressed; cf. Juan Luis Segundo, or Jon Sobrino) and feminist theology 
(integrating the experience and perspective of women; cf. Ann E. Carr). 
314 Concerning the like parallel between faith and natural knowledge, with 
explicit reference to grace and nature, Aquinas says: “fides praesupponit 
cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et ut perfectio perfectible” ST I 2.2 
ad 1; and “gratia non tollat naturam, sed perfeciat” ST I 1.8 ad 2; cf. De verit. 
14.10 ad 9. 
315 Cf. A. MacIntyre 1999, 6-7; Pinckaers 2000a. 
316 The moral theorization of experience considers insights both from one’s 
personal experience as well as those gleaned through the observations of the 
social sciences (cf. VS, n. 111 and 112; Bruguès, 1995, 32-36), which analyze 
aspects of the diversity and richness of human experience and narrative in order 
to refine a moral anthropology in terms of spiritual-religious experience and 
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What type of moral knowledge can we attain through these 
different sources? In the light of Aquinas’ example, ethical theory and 
moral theology involve the rational elaboration of moral experience 
and sources: we reflect upon human experiences of successful and 
failed resilience; and we call upon different sciences—literary and 
human sciences, philosophical and theological ones. Moving from 
outside appearances to inner sources, to levels that we cannot 
measure,317 moral theology takes the point of view of the responsible-
faithfilled person318 and his origin of knowledge and volition, affect 
and action. According to Pinckaers, it involves four types of 
knowledge: basic, intuitive, reflective and systematic. These types of 
knowledge incorporate the resources available through our own person 
and gifts, friends and family, music and art, nature and environment, in 
differing ways.319 This involves a progressive appropriation of 
particular sources of resilience in virtuous dispositions. 
First, through our basic (fontal or causal) knowledge, although 
hazily, we grasp a whole action. The origin of knowledge—our basic 
self-awareness—grows out of the experience.320 We encounter a deep 
                                                                                                          
philosophical, sociological, psychological, neurophysiological and biological 
data, as we shall see more fully later. 
317 The immeasurable inner sources include: conscience and will, as well as 
the movements of grace and the Holy Spirit. We should note that moral 
conscience is an interior nexus where a human person meets and interprets the 
meaning of his relationships: forms of friendship and love with members of 
family and society; relationship with nature and the cosmos; friendship with God 
and activity of the Holy Spirit. The conscience is the fontal point, the voice of 
God (cf. VS 54-64; GS 16; S.-Th. Pinckaers 1995a). 
318 We can deem Christ as the prime analogue for the “responsible” person. 
Moreover, every person inasmuch as he is “responsive” to the grace of the Holy 
Spirit can serve as a model of “responsibility.” A human being is called to be 
responsible to himself, to his neighbor and to God; and responsible for himself, 
for his neighbor and for the world. Both aspects of responsibility need to be 
understood in terms of a graduated ordering that is determined in practice by love 
and prudence. 
319 We follow the fourfold division of knowledge as developed by S.-Th. 
Pinckaers (1995a, 49-55). Moral knowledge is gained through patient reflection 
upon human action, experiences and theories, both one’s own and those of others. 
Moral science pursues not only theoretical or speculative knowledge, but also 
practical and normative knowledge. 
320 This origin of knowledge (and experience) is described in different 
ways (which are not all equivalent): as the heart (Biblical conception, cf. 1 Cor 
2:11; Rm 8:16); as subconscious (Freud); as pre-moral good and evil (Curran, 
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unity of intellect and sensation, acts and goals, intentions and 
circumstances. This deepest level of knowledge is direct, dynamic and 
creative, an encounter of human inclinations and motives with grace 
and the Holy Spirit. It is inexhaustible. Wecannot adequately express it 
in words. It precedes both ideas and words. For example, it is the 
foundational, existential aspect of an encounter with a care-giving 
friend or a peaceful sonata that as a basic experience nourishes human 
resilience and serves as the origin for reflection. This origin of 
knowledge underlies later more developed types of knowledge. 
Second, when we develop moral reflection and seek self-
understanding, we acquire a reflex or intuitive knowledge. Here we 
observe experience and ourselves. Rather than an action itself, this type 
of knowledge involves speculative self-vision. Such intuitive 
knowledge entails a reflection of human action and basic knowledge in 
our conscience. Language can articulate some of this event. It cannot 
however entirely express the basic knowledge, just as words can only 
partially express the movements of the heart. This reflex knowledge 
involves for example, an intuitive glimpse of the cognitive and affective 
resilience-significance related to the contact with the friend, or 
listening to the sonata. 
Third, when we ask the questions “why” and “how,” we attain 
more specified, reflective knowledge. We produce a practically 
oriented knowledge, which starts to establish a process of 
generalization, but not yet systematization. Through this reflection, we 
seek the goals, motives, circumstances and consequences of the act.321 
We express reflective knowledge in narrative, instructive and wisdom 
literature, as well as in precepts and laws. For example, it describes 
and recounts the resilience wisdom and guidance, or support and love 
that we gain through the friend; it communicates the comfort and sense 
of order that we receive when listening to the music.322 
                                                                                                          
McCormick, Cahill); as superconscience, “fontal” or causal knowledge 
(Pinckaers); and so on. 
321 It attempts to “explain, justify, critique, or improve it” as well as to 
“draw lessons, resolutions, practical advice, and directives for living,” employing 
memories of past experiences. Pinckaers 1995a, 53. 
322 We find examples in the sapiential and moral teaching of Scripture and 
of spiritual works, inasmuch as they are written in concrete and ordinary 
language. 
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Fourth, in theoretic or systematic knowledge, we attempt 
scientific discourse. We employ reason and logic to transform, 
generalize and universalize reflective, reflex and basic knowledge. We 
even attempt to predict and verify the relevance of the way in which 
we theorize this knowledge. Parts of the New Testament exhibit this 
process of theoretical organization and systematization. More 
developed expressions include scholastic and contemporary theology. 
Thus we provide theories in order to explicate the resilience and 
existential significance of friendship and beauty. 
Language in some way always remains inadequate to explain 
moral experience, virtue and resilience. Nonetheless, actually resilient 
lives and virtuous individuals provide a rich source for reflection on 
resilience and morality. In order to appropriate deeper dimensions of 
spiritual experience and resilience, we shall resist the secularization of 
knowledge and reductionistic methods. In this spirit of renewal, 
Aquinas’ moral anthropology proves to be a resilient model. We have 
confirmed and adapted his virtue theory and moral theology. They 
constitute a framework and provide insights into how moral experience 
aids us acquire and understand resilience. 
This chapter’s dialogue has served as a methodological, 
theoretical and anthropological introduction to the following chapters 
on fortitude and its related virtues. In the upcoming chapters, I shall 
revisit Aquinas’ thought and psychosocial resilience research. 
Although Aquinas remains important both historically and as a 
contemporary master and dialogue partner, I do not wish simply to list 
his insights. Nor do I wish simply to report resilience findings. Rather, 
I seek to employ constructively both Aquinas and resilience research in 
order to enhance and renew virtue theory and moral theology. 

 PART TWO. APPLICATIONS 

 Chapter Three. 
Resilience and Aquinas’ Virtue of Fortitude 
3.1. Introduction: Philosophical dimension of Fortitude and 
Resilience 
Fortitude is necessary since each person is both vulnerable and 
has emotions. If any of our communities, families or selves were 
invulnerable, we would have neither emotions like fear, hope and 
daring, nor virtues like fortitude. Human vulnerabilities extend from 
physical to psychological, from economic to social, and from moral to 
spiritual levels. Even in the most protected environments, we rightly 
experience fear when faced with real and potential deformation, 
destruction or loss of life, limb and loved ones. The ultimate 
vulnerability of mortality produces manifold expressions of fear. Can 
we prevent such fear from causing deeper anxiety? Can we prepare 
ourselves in order to control better fearful situations? Can we resist 
fear without foregoing what is good, right and true? Courage and its 
related virtues offer responses to these questions. As the British 
analytic philosopher P. T. Geach says: “Courage is what we all need in 
the end; we all have to die, and for none of us can the possibility be 
excluded of dying nastily: in great pain, or after a long disabling 
illness.”1 Fortitude, like the other virtues, is only understandable in the 
context of the whole of our lives and in face of threats: our desire for 
flourishing, our relationships with others and our life projects. 
Human beings moreover need to act courageously to recover 
from and rebuild after less serious losses. Courage is also about the 
daring necessary to overcome danger and toil. For example, after a 
youth has lost a leg because of a land mine, he requires fortitude and 
patience. Whether the loss is due to heroic service or to an accident, he 
needs courage to rebuild courageously. In the midst of this arbitrary, 
violent and destructive event, he requires renewed perseverance, hope 
and confidence. 
                                                 
1 P. T. Geach 1977, 150. 
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Fortitude entails that we avoid going to extremes when faced 
with extreme situations. Its associated virtues—which Aquinas calls 
magnanimity, magnificence, patience and perseverance, but which I 
prefer to call the virtues of initiative-taking and resisting—bring 
balance and focus to our actions in the difficult situations of ordering 
everyday life. 
Having already examined Aquinas’ virtue approach and the 
resilience research as resources for the renewal of anthropology and 
moral theology in general, I now address two more particular 
questions. What is Aquinas’ understanding of fortitude? And how does 
resilience research help to renew our understanding of moral 
development and fortitude? Can it even specify a type of moral 
resilience? I present Thomas’ experiential and realist metaphysical 
foundation and teaching on fortitude in dialogue with resilience theory 
and research. In doing so, I attempt to extend Aquinas’ contributions in 
an active conversation with psychosocial sources. 
First, why place Aquinas’ virtue of fortitude in dialogue with 
resilience research? Other virtues are also pertinent—such as hope, 
prudence and justice—as mentioned in chapters one and two. 
Assuredly, fortitude is not a one-dimensional virtue, nor does it 
function alone. It engages different domains, which go beyond 
physical strength. As a moral virtue, fortitude involves moral strength, 
both in terms of rational, volitional and affective commitment.2 It 
parallels resilience as the center for overcoming difficulty. Second, 
why chose resilience to dialogue with the virtue of fortitude? Can we 
honestly study “resilience” in Aquinas and the virtue tradition? 
Thomas does not have a strictly synonymous term for “resilience.” Yet 
he does describe the reality also through other individual virtues such 
as patience, perseverance, magnanimity and magnificence, as well as 
through his description of virtue in general. 
In what follows, we shall revisit Aquinas’ treatment of 
fortitude and its related virtues. They offer us a means to understand 
                                                 
2 According to Y.-M. Congar (1974, 336-7), “Courage is a moral reality. A 
physically weak man can exercise more courage while demonstrating in the act 
less energy or resistance (cf. III Sent. 34, 1, 2 ‘secundum quantitatem suarum 
virium.’) Non-violence is a form of resistance that supposes eventually more true 
courage than violent attack or resistance.” 
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moral resilience, insofar as they help humans: (1) to cope with and 
master fear; (2) to resist the forces that threaten our goals and self-
integrity; and (3) to handle the daring needed to defend life, to recover 
from injury and to rebuild after suffering loss. Ultimately, fortitude 
involves an active resistance. It requires that we are patient and 
perseverant in the face of suffering and death. In the virtue tradition, 
fortitude is the most obvious primary dialogue partner for resilience. 
3.2. Aquinas on the Virtue of Fortitude 
Without giving a history of fortitude3 or Aquinas’ contribution 
thereof, in this section, we establish an anthropological context for our 
later in-depth treatment of fortitude. We concentrate on Aquinas’ 
philosophical anthropology and his insights on how fortitude helps us 
to manage fear and daring. Furthermore, we highlight the way that 
resilience input enriches our understanding of this virtue. 
                                                 
3 We can nevertheless recall a number of historical points in order to 
understand Aquinas’ synthetic account of fortitude. The ancients (taken 
cumulatively) hold to the following; characteristically courage: (1) is undeniably 
tied to the good, which distinguishes “true fortitude” from semblances thereof; 
(2) has a constitutive social dimension; (3) manages fear and affronts the greatest 
dangers of life; (4) demands patient suffering and firm resistance in the face of 
adversity, as well as (5) employs daring to confront danger in order either to 
overcome it, or to manifest truth and defend justice, even in the face of an 
inevitable defeat. Modern and post-modern discussions have introduced new 
questions, tendencies and distinctions, which have had a decisive and altering 
impact on contemporary conceptions of courage. Some thinkers challenge the 
basic characteristics that typify the ancient worldview and Aquinas’ Christian 
synthesis. Modern philosophical approaches more often than not severe or 
weaken the bond between fortitude and the good. They sometimes maintain that 
courage is not a virtue (because we can abuse or wrongly us it), or is outdated and 
misplaced (because we no longer need the courage of epic heroes). In its place, 
they claim that other more pertinent virtues need cultivating such as imaginative 
compromise, ironical detachment and political adeptness (to avoid situations that 
would otherwise need courage). Furthermore, they replace magnanimity and 
magnificence with generosity. Other transformations include (1) a shift away 
from courage as the mastery of fear to focus on daring or despair as the motor for 
courage; and (2) a denial or skepticism of the need for or possibility of heroic 
courage. This brief overview of diverse views on and critiques of courage sets the 
philosophical stage for a constructive treatment of courage in the light of 
Aquinas. Nonetheless, it does not pretend to be complete. Several recent work 
ably recount the history of fortitude: R. Gauthier 1951; M. Canto-Sperber 1996b. 
Attempts at addressing Aquinas’ treatment of fortitude in historical context 
include: O. Lottin 1942-60; R. Gauthier 1951; Y-M. Congar 1974.  
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3.2.1. Types of Fortitude 
Aquinas makes an extensive study of the types (typology) of 
fortitude and its related virtues.4 He establishes that fortitude can be a 
general or a specific virtue. He identifies integral and potential parts of 
fortitude, virtues related to it and its analogues. Moreover, he 
distinguishes acquired and infused virtue,5 and the fortitude that is a 
gift of the Holy Spirit (we shall return to the theological dimensions in 
chapter seven). Thomas’ typology of fortitude aids us to discuss 
fortitude6 philosophically and to avoid confusing its various senses. It 
also allows us to identify how resilience resembles this virtue in certain 
ways. 
Fortitude is not a question of simple physical strength or brash 
daring. As a moral virtue, truly courageous and good acts and 
dispositions are in accord with reason.7 For Aquinas, the rational 
faculty serves as a primary reference in managing efficaciously all 
aspects of life including our emotions, as discussed in chapter two. 
Emotions are a significant aspect of the virtue of fortitude. Difficult 
obstacles can disincline the will to follow reason. Hardship often 
excites an emotion like fear, daring, hope or sorrow. “In order to 
remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to 
resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fortitude of body, 
overcomes and removes bodily obstacles,”8 as Aquinas says. 
                                                 
4 St. Thomas uses fortitudo frequently, 2228 times in his collected works 
and in different ways; cf. R. Busa’s Index Thomisticus. 
5 Infused virtues have two specifications. As virtues, they strengthen our 
faculties in order to act in a way that is proportionate to our ultimate end and 
calling. As infused, God produces them in us, although their development 
depends on our deliberately exercising them. Cf. ST I-II 62.3; E. D. O’Connor 
1974, xv. Furthermore, Aquinas holds that graced fortitude is both an act 
(specific graced act) and an infused virtue (a strengthened power of operation). 
6 According to Deferrari (1986, 417), Aquinas employs fortitudo in four 
different ways: “(1) strength, firmness; (2) strength, firmness of soul, in the sense 
of a general virtue; (3) fortitude, courage of soul in the sense of a particular 
virtue; (4) feat of strength, trial of strength.” 
7 In reference to the goodness of acting in accord with reason, Aquinas cites 
both Aristotle (NE ii.6) and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22) as authorities. 
8 “Alio modo, per hoc quod voluntatem repellit ab eo quod est secundum 
rationem, propter aliquid difficile quod incumbit. Et ad hoc impedimentum 
tellendum requiritur fortitudo mentis, qua scilicet huiusmodi difficultatibus 
resistat: sicut et homo per foritudinem corporalem impedimenta corporalia 
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In order to study the treatise on fortitude (Summa theologiae 
II-II 123-140),9 we shall distinguish between St. Thomas’ analysis of: 
(1) fortitude as a specific virtue (and its integral related virtues) when it 
specifically faces the fear of death,10 and (2) fortitude as signifying 
secondary and connected virtues (potential parts of fortitude), as when 
the matter is some lesser difficulty,11 or as when it is a condition for all 
virtues (fortitude as a general virtue).12 Fortitude, as a specific virtue 
has no subjective parts (different types of fortitude),13 since according 
to Aquinas, we cannot differentiate it further according to another 
object, or break it down into distinct species. He construes fortitude to 
have such a unity that it has no higher universal concept that could 
collect distinct types of fortitude.14 
Aquinas divides fortitude into four (quasi-) integral parts: 
magnanimity, magnificence, patience and perseverance.15 He 
                                                                                                          
superat et repellit. Unde manifestum est quod fortitudo est virtus, inquantum facit 
hominem secundum rationem esse.” ST II-II, 123.1. 
9 The treatise on fortitude was most likely composed in 1272 in Paris; the 
commentary on the NE was done in 1271-72 (cf. Torrell 1996, 146-7, 227-8, 333; 
Congar 1974, 333). In distinguishing the parts of the virtue of fortitude in the 
Summa theologiae (II-II 128), Aquinas uses Cicero, Aristotle, Macrobius and 
Andronicus as his principal philosophical sources. He uses these same sources 
also in his treatment of the virtue of fortitude in his III Com. Sent. 33, 3, 3. 
10 This complete act of fortitude confronts the fear of death. In an objection 
(ST II-II 123.2 obj. 2) against fortitude as a special virtue, Aquinas quotes 
Ambrose as saying (De Offic. i.39, n. 192: PL 16, 80 BC): “Non mediocris animi 
est fortitudo, quae sola defendit ornamenta virtutum omnium, et iudicia custodit; 
et quae inexpiabili praelio adversus omnia vitia decertat. Invicta ad labores, 
fortis ad perricula, rigidior adversus voluptates, averitiam fugat tanquam labem 
quandam quae virtutem effeminiet.” 
11 “aliae virtutes adiunctae vel secundariae ponuntur partes cardinalium, 
[...] cum habeant materiam determinatam et actum proprium; sed quasi partes 
potentiales, in quantum particulariter participant, et deficienter medium quod 
principaliter et perfectius convenit virtuti cardinali.” de virt. com. 12, 27. 
12 Cf. ST II-II 128.1 ad 5. 
13 The other cardinal virtues on the contrary have subjective parts, cf. ST II-
II 143.1. 
14 We might ask why fortitude has no subjective parts. Has Aquinas so 
precisely conceived of fortitude’s objectthat he limits different types of fortitude: 
domestic, economic, political, military, and so on (cf. NE iii.11, 1116a16-
1117a28). Aquinas responds by saying that we might best construe these 
divisions as modes of fortitude rather than parts, since they lack the true notion of 
virtue (ST II-II 128.1 ad 5). Aquinas divided the virtues according to the faculties, 
as a perfection or habitus of a power (potentiae perfectionem).  
15 Cicero divides fortitude into four (quasi-) integral parts according to its 
four inclinations (appetitiones and contemptiones). Cicero considers these 
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recognizes two acts of fortitude: initiative-taking (aggredi) and 
endurance (sustinere).16 The act of initiative-taking (aggressiveness) 
underlies the virtues of magnanimity and magnificence that either 
combat or undertake some enterprise; these virtues employ and 
moderate aggressiveness.17 The act of endurance lies beneath the 
virtues of patience and perseverance that resist death and destruction; 
these virtues master endurance. Aquinas argues that patience and 
perseverance are more uniquely characteristic of fortitude. These four 
virtuous acts or dispositions are quasi-integral parts of fortitude when 
they apply to the proper matter of fortitude, namely the fear of death. 
They are potential parts, or secondary virtues related to, yet distinct 
from fortitude, when we apply them to another kind of hardship. 
Aquinas identifies longanimity and constancy as two other potential 
parts of fortitude. 
A diagram of the way Aquinas sub-divides the virtues and 
passions related to fortitude demonstrates the structure through which 
he articulates his philosophical psychology. This diagram displays how 
Aquinas relates fortitude and its associated virtues to their objects, 
emotions (proximate matter), remote matters and opposing vices.18 
 
                                                                                                          
inclinations to involve passions, feelings or emotions, rather than being abstracted 
or separated, as merely intellectual components. Aquinas, however, prefers 
magnanimity, rather than Cicero’s “confidence” (cf. ST II-II 128.1; Cicero Rhet. 
II, 54). Aquinas was not alone in following Cicero’s quadruple division of 
fortitude. Others who did the same include: Abelard in his Ysagoge (c. 1150); 
William (Guillaume) of Auxerre in his Summa Aurea (c. 1220); John de la 
Rochelle in his De virtutibus; Albert the Great in his Com. super sententiis (cf. 
Lottin 1960, III: 187-194). Nevertheless, we should note that Aquinas distinctly 
assigns Aristotle a central role in structuring this treatise. Aquinas is also original 
in his synthesis of Aristotelian and prevailing Abelardian conceptions of courage 
and associated virtues. 
16 Aquinas draws from the Stoic division of courage, but not from its 
content. He follows Philip the Chancellor in holding that the parts of courage are 
integral parts, but he uses a different conception than Philip, who thought that 
courage has one act with six parts. Aquinas holds that it has two acts: aggredi and 
sustenire. Cf. Gauthier 1951: 360-3. 
17 Cf. ST II-II 123.3 and 123.6; ST II-II 128.1. 
18 As mentioned earlier, this chapter focuses on the virtue of fortitude per 
se, while the following chapter focuses on the two groups of virtues associated 
with fortitude: virtues of resisting (patience and perseverance), and virtues of 
enterprise or initiative-taking (magnanimity and magnificence). 
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This sketch outlines Aquinas’ typology of fortitude. I shall 
now inquire: how might particular types of fortitude serve as 
functional equivalents to resilience? And how can resilience insights 
enrich our understanding of the virtues related to difficulty? 
3.2.2. The General Virtue of Fortitude and Resilience 
Aquinas depicts how truly courageous actions accord with 
reason and resist difficulty in two ways, with two virtue-types of 
fortitude. First, as strength of mind, affection and action, fortitude is a 
general virtue. It is a quality necessary for all the virtues. In this 
regard, I shall suggest latter this section that we can construe fortitude 
as a type of or, at least, a source for moral resilience. Second, fortitude 
is the special capacity to control fear and daring when resisting or 
overcoming some life threatening danger. I shall investigate the 
resemblances between resilience and the specific virtue of fortitude in 
the next section. 
In claiming that fortitude is a virtus generalis, Aquinas affirms 
that the virtues interrelate. As a general virtue, fortitude qualifies the 
other virtues, which, inasmuch as they are specific virtues have their 
own proper object. In other words, the general virtue of fortitude 
involves the strength or resilience that is one of the universal qualities 
of every virtue. The exercise of the other virtues involves consistency, 
truth and stability, which are necessary conditions for every virtue or 
act of virtue.19 Otherwise, a virtue would be transient or simply a 
singular act. Indeed, each excellence must stand firm in its own matter. 
According to Aquinas, this first sense of fortitude, which 
applies in general to all virtues, involves: “the power of resisting 
                                                 
19 In this general sense, Aquinas transfers the quality of fortitude to 
temperance and vice versa: that temperance is strong and fortitude temperate. 
“dicitur quod temperantia debet esse fortis, id est firmitatem habere; et fortitudo 
debet esse temperata, id est modum servare.” Qu. disp. de virtutibus 1, 12, 23. 
“fortitudo temperans est, et temperantia fortis.” Qu. disp. de virtutibus 5, 1, 1. In 
this later quote Aquinas is commenting on Gregory’s use of fortitude as a general 
virtue. 
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corruptions,”20 “all constancy of soul,”21 “the principle of action [as] a 
habitus whereby someone acts well,”22 the “firmness of mind in face of 
assaults of all kinds,”23 “a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened 
for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the 
emotions, or the toil involved by any operations,”24 the common formal 
principle, which “strengthens the mind,”25 or the firmness of mind 
“required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with 
regard to goods or evils that are difficult.”26 The general sense of 
fortitude makes fortitude a constitutive element of each virtue. It is the 
cement which, when added to other ingredients (a specific matter, 
                                                 
20 “uno modo potentia naturalis secundum quam aliquis potest resistere 
corrumpentibus.” ST II-II 123.2 ad 1. 
21 “omnem firmitatem animi ad fortitudinem,” as Aquinas says in his 
commentary on the NE: In Eth. 2, 8, 337. Aquinas names Cicero and Seneca as 
having such a general notion of fortitude as a virtue. Aquinas uses the authority 
of Aristotle in saying that “fortitude” can simply denote “Uno modo, secundum 
quod absolute importat quandam animi fortitudem. Et secundum hoc est 
generalis virtus, vel potius conditio cuiuslibet virtutis: quia sicut Philosophus 
dicit, in II Ethic., ad virtutem requiritur firmiter et immobiliter operari” ST II-II 
123.2; cf. NE ii.3, 1105 a 32 - b 5; and In Eth. 2, 4, 283. He makes this same 
argument in ST I-II 61, articles 3 and 4. In the cited passage, Aristotle (NE ii.4, 
1105b1) claims that in performing all virtues, a person, in addition to having 
knowledge and choice, “must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.” 
22 “est principium agendi [...] quam ‘habitus quo quis potest bene 
operari.’” ST II-II 123.2 ad 1, which he takes from Aristotle’s Rhet. i.9, 1366a36-
b1. Aquinas develops this argument using Aristotle’s Metaphysics V, 12: 
1019a15-20; In Meta. 14, 955. 
23 “animi firmitatem respectu quorumcumque impugnantium.” ST II-II 
123.2 ad 2 and “firmitas animi” ST I-II 65.1, In Eth. 2, 8, 336-7. Thomas also 
employs the insights of St. Ambrose, who speaks of fortitude in this general sense 
as a strength of mind which renders us strong in doing good when faced with all 
difficulties: vice, toil, danger, lust and covetousness. “Non mediocris animi est 
fortitudo, quae sola defendit ornamenta virtutum omnium, et iudicia custodit; et 
quae inexpiabili praelio adversus omnia vitia decertat. Invicta ad labores, fortis 
ad perricula, rigidior adversus voluptates, averitiam fugat tanquam labem 
quandam quae virtutem effeminiet.” (De Offic. i, 39, n. 192: PL 16, 80 BC) found 
in ST II-II 123.2 obj. 2. 
24 “fortitudo vero sit quaedam dispositio animae per quam firmetur in eo 
quod est secundum rationem, contra quoscumque impetus passionum vel 
operationum labores.” ST I-II 61.4; cf. ST I-II 61.4 ad 3. 
25 “secundum communes rationes formales. [...] et omnis virtus quae facit 
firmitatem animi contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo.” ST I-II 61.3. 
26 “haec quidem firmitas animi requiritur et in bonis faciendis et in malis 
perferendis, et praecipue in arduis bonis vel malis.” ST II-II 139.1. Other 
examples of fortitudo used as a general virtue include: ST II-II 123.3 obj. 1, 
where St. Gregory is quoted. 
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action or faculty), becomes a solid foundation for the life of 
excellence. 
Evoking the description of general resilience in chapter one, I 
would like to suggest that general fortitude (the general virtue of 
fortitude) is a functional equivalent to the resilience quality identified 
as general strength in difficulty. It manifests coping, resisting and 
constructive supports. Later, I shall develop the correlation between 
fortitude as a general virtue and resilience. For the time being, I also 
recall that studies on “emotional intelligence” provide parallel insights 
into what Aquinas would call moral virtue in general and the general 
virtue of fortitude.27 In conclusion, fortitude as a general virtue recalls 
the steeling aspect of resilience. Seen as a quality of all virtues, it also 
resembles an analogue for acquired and ingrained qualities that 
underlie more than singular instances of resilience. 
3.2.3. The Special Virtue of Fortitude and Moral 
Resilience 
When Aquinas further specifies the virtue according to its 
matter, his notion of courage offers added interest to the resilience 
dialogue. First, we shall investigate how Thomas delimits the special 
virtue of fortitude as an act and as a disposition of human character. 
What makes this virtue different from the others? Then, we shall 
examine how the specific virtue of fortitude correlates with resilience. 
How does it constitute an aspect of moral resilience? 
In addition to concerning the good of reason (like the other 
virtues), fortitude concerns danger and labor. As a specific or special 
virtue, “fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and 
withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, 
namely in certain grave dangers.”28 Aquinas does not stop at this 
                                                 
27 Cf. D. Goleman 1998 and 1995. 
28 “Alio modo potest accipi fortitudo secundum quod importat firmitatem 
animi in sustinendis et repellendis his in quibus maxime difficle est firmitatem 
habere, scilicet in aliquibus periculis gravibus.” ST II-II 123.2. To add support to 
this affirmation, he quotes Cicero, St. Gregory the Great and Aristotle. Cicero’s 
Rhetoric (II.54) affirms that “fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et 
laborum perpessio” (as cited in ST II-II 123.2). 
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general definition though. His philosophical project proceeds by 
progressive nuances, which examine specific phenomena of fortitude. 
Aquinas demonstrates that, even as a specific virtue, fortitude 
procures a general strength in resisting destruction to our dispositions 
and our person.29 Aquinas holds that a natural power involves both a 
capacity to resist corruptions and a principle to act. As the extreme 
activity of a power, he identifies the second (a principle to act) as the 
more common determination of virtue in general. But the first (being a 
power to resist corruptions) indicates an indispensable quality of 
virtue, and a particular quality of the specific virtue of fortitude. 
Aquinas says, “even as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it 
helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in 
things that are most difficult to bear is prepared, in consequence, to 
resist those which are less difficult.”30 
Fortitude helps us to resist in accordance with how we have 
become ordered to our ultimate goal, flourishing. Aquinas does not 
construe goods to be all of the same level or importance. Rather, he 
argues that human beings will more fully attain flourishing by seeking 
it through a definitely ordered hierarchy of goods. For example, 
holding firmly to the good of reason (bonum rationis) is more 
important than either avoiding bodily evils or seeking bodily goods, 
which by themselves are patent sources of attraction or repulsion. If the 
will’s courageous disposition to the good of reason holds in the most 
fearful situations, it should do so in less fearful ones. This rationale 
gives Aquinas the basis for identifying the specific nature of the virtue 
of fortitude. He claims that: “fortitude of soul must be that which binds 
the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the greatest evil.”31 
                                                 
29 Thomas’ argument (ST II-II 123.2 ad 1) builds upon, yet outstrips, two 
Aristotelian principles (cf. De Caelo i.116; and Metaphysics v.12). 
30 “est specialis virtus habens determinatam materiam, coadiuvat ad 
resistendum impugnationibus omium vitiorum. Qui enim potest firmiter stare in 
his quae sunt difficillima ad sustinendum, consequens est quod sit idoneus ad 
resistendum aliis quae sunt minus difficilia” (ST II-II 123.2 ad 2; cf. ad 1).  
31 “ad virtutem fortitudinis pertinet ut voluntatem hominis tueatur ne 
retrahatur a bono rationis propter timorem mali corporalis. Oportet autem 
bonum rationis firmiter tenere contra quodcumque malum: quia nullum bonum 
corporale aequivalet bono rationis. Et ideo oportet quod fortitudo animi dicatur 
quae firmiter retinet voluntatem hominis in bono rationis contra maxima mala: 
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Thomas’ hierarchy does not only specify the types of fear, but also the 
types of rational truths and volitional goods.32 
Aquinas’ argument deepens. He contends that fortitude is more 
precisely about fear and daring (ST II-II 123.3), the fear of death (ST 
II-II 123.4), and most specially death in battle (ST II-II 123.5). While 
building upon the basis of a natural virtue, he widens the cultural 
context and extent of its application. Thomas pushes beyond the 
notions of courage’s fulfillment as identified by Aristotle and Cicero. 
According to Aquinas, the highest form of fortitude is more than death 
in battle to defend the polis (Aristotle), or in a political effort for the 
common good (Cicero), as we shall see in a later section. 
Fortitude’s place in the hierarchy of virtues further illuminates 
Aquinas’ conception of this specific virtue. Even though fortitude 
concerns difficulty, Aquinas emphasizes the ordering due to excellence 
and the good, rather than difficulty per se. He says “simply speaking, 
that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object,”33 
and “virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult.”34 
Thus, intellectual virtues are more excellent than moral virtues (I-II 
63.3); and among moral virtues, prudence and justice are more so than 
the other cardinal virtues, because they concern the perfection of 
reason itself and establishing this good of reason in human affairs.35 
                                                                                                          
quia qui stat firmus contra maiora, consequens est quod stet firmus contra 
minora, sed non convertitur;” ST II-II 123.4. 
32 Later, I shall discuss the way in which Aquinas prioritizes the goods of 
reason that culminate in a faith-informed reason. In parallel, the hierarchy of the 
goods of the will culminate in the goods of charity that order other human desires 
and loves, and ultimately our relationship with fears. 
33 “Unde, simpliciter loquendo, illa virtus nobilitor est quae habet nobilius 
obiectum.” ST I-II 66.3. 
34 “ratio virtutis magis consistit in bono quam in difficili.” ST II-II 123.12 
ad 1. 
35 Cf. ST II-II 123.12. Aquinas also explains the division of these four 
virtues as “hinges” (cardines), since they are a foundation on which rests the 
other virtues. (cf. de virt. card. I, ad 12, ad 13; Gauthier 1951, 363 fn. 1; Lottin 
1960, III:174-180.) For Aquinas, the cardinal virtues are virtue-types because 
they completely fulfill the four general modes (formal principles) of virtue: 
rational determination of the good; rectitude in managing its operations; solidity 
preventing the emotions from dissuading us from the good; and moderation 
preventing the emotions from turning us to evil (cf. ST I-II 61.2; In Eth. Book 2, 
lect. 8; Gauthier 1951, 361). We reach these 4 modes in three degrees: (1) in all 
virtues, since each act of virtue needs discernment, rectitude, solidity, moderation 
and so forth; (2) more particular actuality in certain classes of virtues (concerning 
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This hierarchy of virtues by no means belittles the place and utility of 
the moral virtues though. 
Evidently, other factors differentiate the four cardinal virtues 
and their associated virtues, including their necessity for flourishing.36 
One of the virtues without the others leads to situations that can no 
longer be considered virtuous. Fortitude in particular needs the virtue 
of justice lest we put it to bad use. Aquinas integrates the notion of 
justice in true courage. Aquinas thus cites Ambrose, who says: 
“fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since the stronger 
a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker.”37 In the fuller 
sense, specific fortitude has a general utility in safeguarding justice, 
temperance and the other virtues.38 As a specific virtue, fortitude 
involves the capacity to cope with difficulties and resist the destruction 
of our dispositions. This moral resilience especially aids us to act 
according to our reasoned commitments and long-term projects when 
facing the danger of death. 
We can find analogues of fortitude in related domains such as 
altruism, generosity and self-sacrifice, which contrast self-preservation 
and egotism. Individuals and groups confront and overcome threats to 
life, truth and goodness with natural and acquired reactions, 
                                                                                                          
intellect, will, emotions); and (3) in determined matters. It is only in this last 
regard that one speaks strictly and not improperly of the four cardinal virtues. 
Thus, Aquinas can say that fortitude is a strength of soul that manifests itself 
above all when facing mortal dangers (cf. ST I-II 61.3 and 61.4). 
36 Aristotle (Politics 1323a23) says, “no one would maintain that he is 
happy who has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice or 
practical wisdom, who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and will 
commit any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust for meat or drink, 
who will sacrifice his dearest friend for the sake of half a farthing, and is as feeble 
and false in mind as a child or a madman.” He applies this same reasoning to the 
state, so that the happy state is the one the exercises excellence: wise, courageous, 
temperate, prudent, just activities; see Politics 1323b20-1323b35. 
37 Aquinas (ST II-II 123.12 ad 3) thus cites Ambrose’s de Offic. (I.35.176: 
PL 16.75A): “fortitudo sine justitia iniquitatis est materia: quo enim validior est, 
eo promptior ut inferiorem opprimat.” Aquinas and Ambrose follow Cicero in 
this regard, who holds a reserve concerning those who exhibit fortitude without 
yet having proved their general moral equilibrium. The Roman statesman and 
philosopher warns that “a courageous spirit in a human who has not attained 
perfection and ideal wisdom is generally too impetuous” (Off. I.46; cf. I.7, 62-3, 
66; II.33-34, 38). 
38 ST II-II 123.12 corpus and ad 5; ST II-II 142.3 ad 1; De verit. 1, 12, 23; 
and 5, 1, 1. 
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dispositions and strategies. For example, seeking to protect other 
individuals and social groups or ourselves involves an intellectual, 
volitional and emotional tenor in order not to be distracted from these 
goals, and to overcome the challenge actively. On the contrary, the 
inclinations to self-preservation coupled with selfish tendencies can 
undercut generous and altruistic acts. We shall address these topics 
further in the section on managing emotions of fear and daring. 
Second, how can the resilience findings and perspective enrich 
a study of fortitude? Even though the language of “courage” or 
“fortitude” per se is not particularly central to the social sciences, 
researchers employ related terms when treating the management of 
emotions, especially fear and daring.39 Synonyms of fortitude or related 
concepts that lend themselves to this investigation include: hardiness, 
dauntlessness, intrepidity, pluck, spirit, heroism, daring, gallantry, 
bravery, valor, bravado, security, self-confidence and self-efficacy. 
Contrasts to fortitude aid the illustration of its content and dynamics as 
well. Psychosocial researchers demonstrate the disruptive nature of 
extreme emotions, which would oppose this virtue: (1) fear, anxiety, 
fright, terror, cowardice, timidity, and the pathologies of hypochondria, 
panic and phobia; and (2) fearlessness, aggression, audacity, rashness, 
recklessness and indifference.40 
Fortitude and its related virtues are most evident when we need 
to cope with stress-filled, difficult or dangerous situations. This virtue 
group parallels major aspects of resilience. For example, the situation-
behavior (psychology) approach has investigated the dynamic of 
coping, as an aspect of resilience.41 It theorizes that courageous, 
resisting and initiative-taking acts are types of coping responses to 
different kinds of stress. Building upon a detailed taxonomy of 
                                                 
39 Cf. Lazarus and Lazarus 1994. 
40 Cf. D. Goleman 1995, 289-90. 
41 According to R. S. Lazarus (1992), the situation-behavior approach to 
coping, which is “transactional, contextual and process-centered, began to appear 
in the late 1970’s stimulated by cognitive-relational theories of stress and 
emotion, which were a part of the broad cognitive movement in psychology.” 
This work is contrasted with an earlier “psychoanalytical ego-psychology outlook 
in which the emphasis was placed on coping as a personality style” e.g. defensive 
strategies (repression-sensitization). (Perrez and Reicherts 1992a, 5). 
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coping,42 Perrez and Reicherts43 hypothesize that one type of stress 
producing situation (type I) promotes more passive (hesitate and wait) 
and evasive (escape and avoid) reactions.44 Another (type II) tends to 
promote more active and instrumental reactions and interventions.45 
They conjecture that these situations promote different emotions. Type 
I situations engender more depressive emotions and ones that aid in 
disengaging the agent from the danger or difficulty.46 Type II situations 
involve more positive emotions which favor active engagement in the 
environment and direct confrontation with the stressor. Perrez and 
Reicherts suggest that this second type of stressful events, which 
humans interpret as controllable and not likely to reoccur, activates the 
agent positively to influence the stressor. I suggest that the first type of 
situation-oriented coping response can enrich our understanding of the 
virtues of resistance (patience and perseverance), while the second can 
do so with the virtues of courage (as a whole) and initiative-taking 
(magnanimity and magnificence). We shall demonstrate these 
relationships in the sections that follow. 
Resilience phenomena, in general, and coping with stress, in 
particular, involve an important range of the cognitive, volitional and 
emotional dynamics related to situations of hardship. At the 
anthropological and psychological levels, resilience research can 
                                                 
42 M. Perez (1992, 5-8) develops an extended coping taxonomy, which 
involves the following classifications: (1) coping with a situation can demand 
instrumental, passive or evasive action; (2) the agent can cognitively relate to 
(represent) the situation either in seeking or suppressing information; and (3) the 
agent can opt to either chose to re-evaluate the situation or change his goals. 
Insights into these “coping responses” involve the way in which they distinguish 
between objective parameters and subjective perceptions. 
43 We should associate Perrez and Reicherts’ (1992a, 29) “situation-
oriented” approach with two other types of coping operation: (1) the 
representation-oriented type of coping that searches for or suppresses 
information; as well as (2) evaluation-oriented coping, which changes intentions 
and goals, or re-evaluates the situation. 
44 The Type I coping situation is characterized as follows: “If a stressful 
event is perceived as of low controllability and with high expected probability for 
reappearance, subjects react with rather negative emotions and with stronger 
evasion, passivity and disengagement” (Perrez 1992, 13). This type of stress 
situation can have a tendency to promote a depressive emotional pattern. 
45 Cf. Perrez 1992, 6 and 13; Folkman and Lazarus 1986. 
46 Cf. Perrez 1992, 6; Klinger 1977; Lazarus, Kanner and Kolkman 1980; 
Fridja 1987, 295, 298. 
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deepen our understanding of fortitude and the virtues of initiative-
taking and resisting. Psychological approaches, neuro-physiological 
sciences and social-evolutionary theory offer insights that enhance a 
philosophical conception of fortitude. They add observations and 
reflections on the relationship of emotion to human strengths, and on 
the analogues of fortitude. They aid to “thicken” our anthropological 
synthesis. Conversely, Aquinas’ virtue approach to fortitude and its 
management of fear and daring provides a philosophical basis to 
approach moral resilience. His typology of fortitude aids us to 
comprehend moral responsibility and agency. In the next section, I 
shall examine the way in which the disposition of fortitude involves 
managing the emotions of fear and daring and, in turn, how resilience 
insights can enhance this perspective. 
3.3. Managing Human Fear 
How do humans experience fear? How can we manage it in 
ways that are creative and consistent with our life-goals? How do we 
morally adjudicate the place of fear in human agency? In order to 
enhance our Thomist anthropology and understanding of the emotions 
related to fortitude, we shall first examine some neuro-physiological 
and psychosocial input on fear and anxiety. These sciences portray fear 
phenomena in terms of natural fear reactions’ utility, timid 
temperament and psychosocial anxiety. We then put these findings and 
theories into dialogue with Aquinas’ teaching on the emotions related 
to fortitude. After an examination of his teaching on emotion, we shall 
explore his typology of fear. His understanding of fear and timidity aid 
us to comprehend the way in which he morally adjudicates human 
agency in fear. These domains illustrate both the matter of fortitude 
and serve to understand the correlation of human, moral and social 
vulnerabilities and resilience more fully. 
3.3.1. Neuro-physiological Science on Fear and Timidity 
In order to understand fear-related moral phenomena and 
dispositions, we need to observe how humans experience fear. The 
contemporary neurological and physiological sciences offer detailed 
analyses of fear and timidity, as well as daring and boldness (the latter 
of which we treat in the next chapter). In this section, we ask: what can 
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we observe about fearful emotions? What do these sciences tell us 
about timid temperaments? 
To chart the phenomena of human fear at neurological and 
physiological levels offers us a further tool to know and manage fear. 
For example, we can log the trajectory of a fear-evoking sound. What 
spontaneous neurological and physiological reactions does a fear-
inspiring noise precipitate in us? Through our ear, brainstem and 
thalamus, we first sort out the physical sound wave. With the amygdala 
and hippocampus, we compare it with other sounds. Finally with the 
auditory cortex, we analyze it in order to determine its origin. This 
process startles us into alertness. 
If we cannot pinpoint the source and meaning of the sound, 
then we start a more in-depth analysis; we use the amygdala, 
hippocampus and prefrontal cortex, which at the same time heighten 
our uncertainty and fix our attention on the sound’s potential sources. 
If this process fails to resolve the query about the noise’s origin, the 
amygdala sounds an alarm that activates the hypothalamus, brainstem 
and autonomic nervous system. We then experience apprehension, 
subliminal anxiety and edginess. The body prepares itself for 
movement as the autonomic nervous system (through the emergency-
response hormone—corticotrophin-releasing hormone) charges the 
cardiovascular system, muscles and gut to act. The muscles of the 
vocal cords tighten, giving a higher-pitched voice. Norepinephrine 
(noradrenaline) heightens the sensory circuit’s receptivity. At this 
point, unconscious anxiety pierces consciousness and we start to feel 
fear. 
We experience other related fear-reactions, such as: a blanched 
face and fearful facial expression; tensed muscles; an increased heart-
rate and heightened blood pressure; slower breathing; focused attention 
on the source of fear; and a racing of the mind that seeks to resolve the 
fear-dilemma or to respond to the related danger.47 This neuro-
physiological description is not the whole story of human management 
of fear. In the next section, I shall ask: how do humans rationally and 
volitionally manage fear? And how might Aquinas’ virtue-based moral 
                                                 
47 Cf. Goleman 1995, 6; 297-300 and Kagan 1994. 
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theory integrate the neuro-physiological sciences while proving further 
input for moral action. 
At a second level, temperament traits involve fearfulness and 
timidity. Kagan (1994) identifies timidity and its contrary, boldness, as 
two of the four major temperament types.48 As mentioned in chapter 
one, according to Allport and a wide consensus of psychologists, 
temperament is a dynamic of behavioral, emotional and cognitive 
patterns.49 Temperament is a collection of types of personality 
differences, which we can detect at an early age. It influences how we 
develop our characters, involve ourselves socially and manage fearful 
situations. Its impact is due to underlying physiology and 
neurochemical levels of reactivity, which we can educate to a certain 
extent. 
Having an easily aroused neurochemistry (and neural 
circuitry), timid personalities tend to avoid the unfamiliar, shy away 
from the uncertain, talk less to strangers and more easily suffer 
anxiety. Timid children have higher levels of reactivity across the 
range of sympathetic nervous system indices (resting blood pressure; 
pupil dilatation; norepinephrine markers). From birth, their hearts beat 
faster than other infants when faced with novel or strange situations. 
This easy arousal seems to underlie their timid temperament, which 
means they are more likely to react to new people or situations as if 
they were threats.50 
These indicators suggest why we should consider an 
individual’s acquired vulnerability and resilience in the context of 
temperament and character developments. Not that our temperament is 
our destiny, but temperament types can heighten risk or protection for 
an individual in a particular situation. An individual’s neurological 
reactivity, with which he is born, serves as the basis for learning to 
                                                 
48 J. Kagan (a University of Harvard researcher) posits at least four 
temperamental types: timid, bold, upbeat, and melancholy. Each type involves a 
particular pattern of brain activity. These types nonetheless are involved in further 
innumerable differences in temperamental endowment. On the dimension of 
temperament that ranges from boldness to timidity, cf. Kagan 1994, esp. 155-57. 
49 Cf. G. W. Allport 1937/1961; K. Durkin 1995, 71. 
50 Furthermore, Goleman (1995, 216-8; 221-3) notes that they have been 
found to be at higher risk for developing: anxiety disorders, such as panic attacks. 
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cope in social interactions or to build on it as a strength.51 This second 
factor aids us to understand further fear and timidity. As for the 
neurological effects of fear, considerations of an individual’s 
temperament are necessary but insufficient to explain the moral quality 
of human agency and character. 
3.3.2. Psychosocial Sciences on Fear and Attachment 
The emotion of fear is more than its neuro-chemistry, 
physiology or its relation to temperament traits. Other important 
domains involve its relationship to attachment, its utility, its purpose 
and its evolutionary origin. In this section, we investigate input from 
socio-biological and attachment theories. These considerations widen 
the basis for our dialogue with Aquinas, in the next section, on moral 
development and courageous acts. 
As mentioned in chapter two, socio-biologists and 
psychologists deem fear a survival-promoting tendency;52 it responds 
in the face of certain “natural clues to an increased risk of danger.”53 
Without having to learn how to formally assess the particular risks 
involved, an individual has survival advantages based in his ingrained 
capacities to respond appropriately with avoidance, flight, resistance or 
the like.54 J. Bowlby identifies some natural clues of danger for 
                                                 
51 As in chapter two, timid temperaments has been shown to be a protective 
dynamic in situations demanding violence avoidance and intellectual/academic 
achievement; cf. Consortium 1994, 275. 
52 By natural tendency, they mean a disposition that: (1) promotes the 
survival advantage for the individual, his/her genes, or related gene pool 
(species); (2) that has been acquired through natural selection and is passed on 
through genes and / or conditioning. Cf. E. O. Wilson 1975/1978; S. J. Pope 
1994. 
53 Bowlby’s attachment theory (1969) is embedded in a general theory of 
behavior employing several trends from biology and social sciences: 
psychoanalytic orientation; biological discipline of ethology, which views 
behavior in a evolutionary context; psychobiology; control-systems theory; 
Piaget’s structural approach. Cf. Ainsworth et al. 1978, 3-4, 20. 
54 D. Goleman (1995, 297) efficaciously summarizes contemporary 
psychosocial theory (in an evolutionary perspective) on the utility of fear: “The 
emotional mind is our radar for danger: if we (or our forefathers in evolution) 
waited for the rational mind to make some of these judgments, we might not only 
be wrong—we might be dead. The drawback is that these impressions and 
intuitive judgments, because they are made in the snap of a finger, may be 
mistaken or misguided. […] Fear, in evolution, has a special prominence: perhaps 
more than any other emotion it is crucial for survival. Of course in modern times 
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humans: strangeness (unfamiliarity), sudden change of stimulation, 
rapid approach, height and being alone.55 He correlates fear and 
attachment, which are not simply opposites. When we feel secure 
(well-attached), we are not fearful. Inversely, when we feel afraid, we 
are not secure. The same circumstances often activate fear and 
attachment behavior together. When feeling afraid, people not only 
exhibit fear behavior, but also attachment behavior. For example, 
infants cling to their mother or father; children run for peer or adult 
protection; adults find shelter in the tried and true sources of support, 
such as spouses and friends. Likewise, when people feel secure they 
are more apt to explore potentially fearful, new situations. Infants 
momentarily distance themselves from a parental source of attachment 
and security, while probing a new surrounding.56 
What implications for resilience and courage arise from this 
correlation between fear and attachment? And how might courage be 
rooted not only in attachment to an affective source, but also to rational 
meaning? First, the “survival advantage” (evolutionary resilience) and 
disadvantage (vulnerability) of fear reactions depend upon the situation 
and individual. For example, the short-term advantages of being 
reactive to real danger can become a lasting problem when the brain 
resets its reactivity according to an experience of trauma. In this case, 
the brain’s predispositions react “like a car stuck in perpetual high 
gear;”57 we then need to re-establish emotional calm.58 
                                                                                                          
misplaced fears are the bane of daily life, leaving us suffering from frets, angst, 
and garden variety worries—or at pathological extreme, from panic attacks, 
phobias, or obsessive-compulsive disorder.” 
55 Bowlby also notes the tendency to respond more strongly when two or 
more natural clues are simultaneously present (cf. M. Ainsworth 1978, 20). 
56 Cf. Ainsworth 1978, 22. 
57 D. Goleman (1995, 206) notes that there can be excessive fear or 
hypersensitivity to it, when the amygdala and its connected regions fix a new 
setpoint during the moment of trauma. 
58 In emotional relearning, as when overcoming the learned fear of a post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the neocortex is critical in redressing the 
amygdala in having an appropriate, milder reaction to objects related to the 
trauma. Natural relearning occurs when we encounter the feared object without 
truly scary consequences. However in a PTSD, this spontaneous relearning fails 
to occur. According to Goleman (1995, 207-8), “but given the right experiences, 
even PTSD can lift; strong emotional memories, and the patterns of thought and 
reaction that they trigger, can change with time. This relearning, Charney 
proposes, is cortical.” 
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When inadequately attached, moreover, we can exhibit an 
increased flight-tendency. Bowlby’s research suggests that when 
humans have no personal attachment, we more readily exhibit a flight, 
rather than a fight movement. To flee a dangerous situation is 
necessarily neither inappropriate nor uncourageous. However, we need 
to counter such a tendency when the situation involves a cause worth 
defending. Likewise, the lack of attachment security in the face of fear 
can disrupt our attention,59 self-confidence and self-efficacy.60 This 
situation can incapacitate the rational analysis we need to adequately 
assess what is appropriate, what is courageous. In the next section, we 
shall consider the importance of fear, attachment and attention for 
moral adjudication. 
Second, in terms of resilience, security-producing attachments 
can contribute to the strength we need to assess the situation calmly 
and rationally, in order either to flee or to fight in a free and fitting 
way. We might also extend these reflections on attachment-based 
security to the emotional and affective (and not simply intellectual) 
attachment to sources of meaning and truth. If feeling attached 
includes a secure sense of meaning and finality, then attachment 
involves a source of strength to control fear and to more readily 
confront its source.61 In summary, fear and attachment correlate in both 
uncourageous vulnerability and courageous resilience. Ill-adapted fear 
reactions and inadequate attachment can accentuate vulnerability.62 On 
                                                 
59 As was illustrated earlier (Wilson and Gottman1996, 201), the high 
levels of arousal, such as when we are deeply under the influence of fear, can 
have detrimental effects on attentional process and in turn on our resiliency. 
60 Cf. Bandura 1986; M. Rutter 1990. 
61 Cf. Ainsworth, 1978: 20-22; Bowlby 1969. 
62 Certain existential and psychoanalytical insights further illustrate the 
dynamics of fear and anxiety. In particular these approaches widen the domain of 
fear beyond considerations of death and physical danger. According to Paul 
Tillich’s existentialist approach (1952/2000), fear and anxiety have three objects: 
first, physical dangers and death; second, doubt and meaninglessness; and third, 
guilt and condemnation. Tillich illustrates the need for courage to assume the 
existential (irresolvable) anxiety that constitutes the way that human beings must 
face not only death and physical dangers, but also threats to meaning and social 
participation (including salvation). This insight has value and application beyond 
the limitations of his existential project. It suggests distinguishing two basic types 
of fear: (1) an everyday fear whose concrete object threatens physical life and 
meaning, and (2) an ultimate fear whose object concerns at least a moral order. 
This ultimate fear also refers to a revealed moral order and our relationship with 
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the contrary, emotional, willed and intellectual attachment to sources 
of meaning and truth and to stable and solid relationships can serve 
resilience. 
3.3.3. Enhancing Aquinas’ Analysis of Fear and Timidity 
Now we turn to Aquinas’ anthropology and analysis of the 
emotions of fear and daring and the temperament of timidity. We shall 
revisit his anthropology in dialogue with the aforementioned neuro-
physiological and psychosocial insights. How might they enrich his 
conception of the way in which we manage fear and adjudicate moral 
resilience? 
In spite of his archaic theory of the movement of body heat 
and vital spirits, Aquinas makes pertinent phenomenological 
observations about the physiological and psychological effects of 
fear.63 For example, we experience a chilling and a loss of spirit, 
speechlessness and trembling, blushing (from shame as a type of fear) 
or turning pale (when facing the fear of death), as well as attack-
wariness and heightened flight-readiness, to name but a few.64 While 
retaining some relevance, these insights are incomplete and his 
physiology is outdated. We can renew Aquinas’ anthropology through 
integrating neurobiological and physiological observations on the 
effects of fear and daring, and contemporary temperament theory on 
                                                                                                          
God. This discussion will continue later in the context of Aquinas treatment of 
acquired and infused virtues of fortitude, in chapter five. 
E. H. Erikson, furthermore, in his psychoanalytical approach, construes 
anxiety to influence the three human processes: the somatic processes inherent to 
the organism, the ego processes that organize experience and the social processes 
that involve interpersonal roles and activities. At the somatic or biological level, 
we experience pain and tension. At the psychological level, ego undergoes a type 
of anxiety that puts pressures on self-individuation. Finally, at the social science 
level, we face the panic emanating from a group. Cf. E. H. Erikson 1985, 34-37. 
According to Erikson (1985, 24-5), the psychotherapist “deals above all with 
human anxiety,” which is based in conflicts that are present already in young 
children. This emphasis on conflict finds its origin in Freud’s first focusing on 
mental disturbance. 
63 We should further specify Aquinas’ physiology of emotions: e.g. fear 
involves the sensitive appetite, accompanied by a transmutation; Aquinas in this 
regard takes his leads from Aristotle and from Damascene, the latter of which 
uses the image of contraction (sustolen) to speak of fear (De Fide Orthod. III.23; 
cf. ST I-II 41.1 sc and obj.1).  
64 Cf. ST I-II 44.2 obj/ad 1; 44.2 obj/ad 2; 44.3; 44.2 obj/ad. 3; ST II-II 125. 
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timidity. In their well-defined domains, these contemporary sciences 
help us to understand fear and timidity more fully. Yet, we need a 
moral context, which Aquinas can provide, in order to understand 
better how fear and timidity influence our moral acts and dispositions. 
Aquinas’ interest in how human animality interrelates with 
moral and spiritual life leads him to pay searching attention to how 
human emotional capacities relate to moral acts and dispositions. In 
chapter two, we treated Aquinas’ theory of emotions and virtue. Here 
we need to specify the roles that fear and daring play in his approach to 
the virtue of fortitude. 
While aiming to integrate pertinent neuro-physiological 
observations on fear phenomena, we need to look beyond these 
phenomena for a rational and moral domain. For Aquinas, fear is an 
emotion of the soul (passio animae).65 Through it, we relate to an evil 
that seeks to overcome a particular good.66 Through the virtue of 
fortitude, we master such fear, as a special emotion whose object is “a 
future evil, difficult and [almost] unavoidable.”67 Fear and daring, 
although of key importance for us to understand resilience, are only a 
part of the emotional picture. In general, the irascible or contending 
emotions help us to manage sensible good and evil that are arduous to 
attain or avoid.68 Fear and daring face some great danger. However, 
these emotions are supported by the other irascible emotions: hope and 
anger.69 
We cannot understand human fear however without reference 
to love of particular goods. Love underlies all human agency. 
Likewise, resilience studies cannot simply focus on the emotions 
                                                 
65 Aquinas treats fear as a passion (cf. ST I-II 23.4; ST I-II 41-44) and as a 
gift of the Holy Spirit (cf. ST II-II 19.1-12). 
66 “Et importat etiam habitudinem ad malum, secundum quod malum habet 
quodammodo victoriam super aliquod bonum.” ST I-II 41.1co. 
67 “Ita obiectum timoris est malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest.” 
ST I-II 41.2; cf. ST I-II 42.1. Aquinas sometimes speaks of the evil as being 
irresistible or unavoidable (cf. ST I-II 41.2; 41.4; and so on) and at other moments 
as being almost unavoidable (cf. ST I-II 41.2 ad 3; 42.3; 42.4; 43.1). The second 
seems to be the general meaning since he explains that when the evil is absolutely 
unavoidable that even fear is lost in despair; for fear requires hope of escaping the 
future evil. Cf. ST I-II 42.2; and Rhet. ii.5 where Aristotle claims that those who 
are on the scaffold, facing immanent death are not afraid. 
68 Cf. ST I-II 60.4; cf. ST I-II 25.1; ST I-II 40-48. 
69 Cf. ST I-II 23.2; 23.3; 35.2; ST I-II 40-48. 
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directly rooted in difficulty. Our emotions and efforts in hardship find 
their sources in the love that motivates and sustains us.70 Aquinas 
recognizes that our two major emotional capacities—the concupiscible 
and irascible appetites—collaborate in morality. The concupiscible 
appetite aims at sensible good or evil per se. The irascible, on the 
contrary, perceives the good or evil in hardship. Aquinas says that the 
passions of the irascible faculty relate primarily, if not exclusively to 
the two movements of aggredi (initiative and attack) and sustinere 
(resistance and endurance).71 
He does maintain that neither anger nor hope72 (nor their 
related virtues—meekness and magnanimity or humility) are the 
cardinal points of the irascible power, since, as he observes, “anger and 
hope do not move men as does fear of death.”73 The irascible appetite 
concerns an ordered configuration of the passions of fear and daring, 
hope and despair, and anger, which respectively relate to the virtues of 
fortitude, magnanimity and meekness, in addition to the other virtues 
related to fortitude. 
The clarity of Aquinas’ philosophical psychology is admirable, 
but how useful is it for moral theory confronted with contemporary 
psychology and neuro-physiology? We find its pertinence in his theory 
of moral habituation and virtue, where (as suggested in chapter two) 
Aquinas’ views cast needed light on the way in which we can employ 
human emotions to confront and overcome human difficulties. We 
                                                 
70 We need to recall also that Aquinas distinguishes love as emotion from 
love as an act of the will. His understanding of love outstrips sensuality, since we 
find fulfillment in the joy of charity and friendship. Cf. ST II-II 23.1; ST I-II 25.3 
and 25.4; ST I-II 28. 
71 ST I-II 25.1; 25.3. We should not confuse the division between 
movement and rest, when Aquinas divides the virtues of the irascible power 
according to those that attack (fidencia / magnanimitas and magnificentia) and 
those that resist (patientia and perseverantia) in the Secunda Secundae of his ST. 
We need to construe such virtues of resistance in the context of movement 
toward a good to be obtained and not simply holding one’s ground. 
72 In one sense, we can hold that hope (the human passion) is the greatest of 
human passions since through it we attain all of our human projects. Hope is an 
effect of the arduous desired good on the human person. Human action is a result 
of working toward the hoped for future good. Unless one is plagued by constant 
fear or anger, hope is the motor for the majority of human action (cf. ST I-II 
25.3). 
73 “non enim ita movent hominem ira et spes, sicut timor mortis.” de virt. 
com. 12, 26. 
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shall now put Aquinas into dialogue with neuro-biology’s particular 
insights on the subject of fear and timidity. 
Aquinas considers the natural temperaments or psychosomatic 
forces toward being courageous,74 without the neurological and bio-
chemical nuance possible through contemporary research and theories. 
However, his moral teaching provides relevant lessons and a larger 
moral framework. In particular, his moral theory resists confusing 
natural character traits (or neurological reactions) with the virtue 
(acquired disposition) of fortitude. It also offers a basis to counter 
reductionistic tendencies, which assert that natural temperaments 
render this virtue redundant or disprove its existence. For Aquinas, 
character traits (temperaments) are in some way natural, although 
given in unequal measures—one person has more or less than another. 
Even though these traits correlate with the virtue of fortitude (forming 
its material basis), we acquire this virtue through courageous acts, and 
we diminish it through contrary ones. Although a natural temperament 
toward courageousness may make the further acquisition of that virtue 
easier, fortitude is not assured. 
The natural inclinations, which are on a different level than 
temperament, serve as a basis for Aquinas’ virtue theory. They 
establish a dynamic foundation for the virtue of fortitude and for 
understanding emotional phenomena of fear and temperamental 
timidity.75 We can find reasons to be courageous and to master fear, at 
different levels, in the inclinations toward self-preservation, family and 
social life, goodness and truth, and flourishing.76 These inclinations 
provide a formal cause for fortitude. They indicate a larger framework 
for managing emotions. 
The natural desire to know truth, for example, leads us to seek 
not only to extend our knowledge, but also to communicate and even 
                                                 
74 See ST II-II 123.1 ad 3. “ex naturali complexione aliquis habeat 
naturalem inclinationem ad virtutem,” as he also says in ST I-II 63.1. In this 
regard, Aristotle distinguishes natural virtue from virtue in the strict sense, cf. NE 
vi.13 1144b3, 1144b34-1145a1. Aquinas discusses natural or innate: dispositio 
(ST II-II 141.1 ad 2; ST I-II 63.1), inclinatio (I-II 6.5 ad 2), habitus (I-II 51.1), 
potentia (ST II-II 4.1; ST I-II 18.2). 
75 Aquinas does not neatly distinguish natural from rational inclinations. An 
excessively definite split results from later philosophical and theological 
developments. Cf. B. Kent 2000. 
76 Cf. ST I-II 94.2. 
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courageously defend it when fear weakens us. Truth’s effusive effect 
drives us to overcome timidity and fear through particular acts of 
fortitude. When a friend is slandered, our inclination to truth 
predisposes us to defend the truth that we have come to know (and 
love). Our fear of others and our natural timidity might hinder our 
efforts. Yet the thirst and quest for truth serves as an efficient cause of 
the courageous defense of particular truths. An inclination is already a 
movement towards action. However, we each need to expound a 
reasoned response and even strategies in order to overcome fear and to 
prevent similar situations in the future. Admittedly, in the case of 
calumny against a friend, we rely on more than an inclination to truth. 
In this example, our will is engaged because of our friendship (and our 
inclination to the good of social life), which provide further efficacious 
causes for action. 
Although aspects of Aquinas’ discussion of the physiological 
transmutations related to fear are outdated, his understanding of the 
formal element, the movement of the appetitive power of the soul 
remains pertinent,77 though misunderstood. While needing further 
defense, Aquinas’ hylomorphic principle provides a deeper 
philosophical basis on which to graft contemporary insights of neuro-
biology and temperament theory. The human soul, as principle for 
human agency, interacts with our emotions. As we have argued in 
chapter two, Thomas’ explanation of emotion and bodily changes, at 
least at one level, sounds contemporary.78 However, we cannot 
understand Aquinas’ insights unless we take them in the context of the 
existence of a human soul and its rational capacities for moral 
judgment; that is, we must employ a realist metaphysical framework. 
He uses the notion of the human soul to explain the rational movement 
involved in moral agency and emotions. This conception of the soul, 
which needs further explication, can assure a unity and depth to 
morality that is not evident in neurological and physiological theories 
per se. Aquinas’ framework for and understanding of the deeper 
                                                 
77 Cf. ST I-II 44.1; and ST I-II 28.5.  
78 He says, for example, “in passionibus animae est sicut formale ipse 
motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem materiale transmutatio corporalis: 
quorum unum alteri proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem 
appetitivi motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio” ST I-II 44.1; cf. ST I-II 28.5. 
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rational (cognitive and volitional) roots of fear-provoking phenomena 
thus provide additional explanatory power concerning human 
responsibility for actions done in or from fear. In effect, his 
anthropology and moral theory allow us to analyze another level 
involved in managing hardship, a moral resilience. 
3.3.4. Aquinas’ Typology and Moral Evaluation of Fear 
Neuro-physiological, psychological and social insights on fear, 
timidity and anxiety contribute a better understanding of different 
types of fear and resilience. We shall now analytically and 
constructively address Aquinas’ typology (study of the types) and 
moral evaluation of fear. We need to consider fear in terms of how it 
not only promotes or hinders human survival (resilience and 
vulnerability), but also moral agency and flourishing (moral 
resilience). We can, in Aquinas’ perspective, weigh survival-promoting 
tendencies in the context of other natural tendencies that give us a 
fuller context—in particular, the tendencies to family and social life, 
goodness and truth, flourishing and ultimate goals. 
Thomas distinguishes fear according to its object, causes and 
effects, which are in turn relevant for adjudicating the morality of acts 
done in or from fear. Aquinas bases his moral evaluation upon the act’s 
rationality, voluntariness and goodness.79 He notes that fear can 
influence voluntariness for the better and for the worst. 
Aquinas distinguishes natural from non-natural emotions and 
fears by the diversity of their objects.80 He calls a movement in general 
and a passion in particular “natural when nature inclines us thereto, 
either with or without the apprehensive faculty. In the case of the 
natural emotions of love, desire and hope, natural inclinations lead us 
to pursue what is good and to avoid what is evil. Thus, we naturally 
fear death, as a malum naturae.81 We naturally shun and fear a life-
                                                 
79 Aquinas requires that the intention and the object be good and the 
circumstances be favorable (cf. ST I-II 6-21). 
80 Cf. ST I-II 41.3. 
81 Cf. ST I-II 42.2. In other passions however, the natural inclination is not 
sufficient, for we need perception or knowledge for pleasure and sorrow; cf. ST I-
II 31.1, 31.3; 35.1. 
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threatening evil, because we naturally desire to exist.82 On the other 
hand, we exhibit a material and non-natural fear of painful evil when 
we shrink from fighting evil, simply because of the pain involved.83 
These intuitive and non-intuitive insights underlie his more developed 
theory and typology of the emotions. 
Thomas defends a typology of fear, which has enduring 
features and resembles cognitive theory. He argues that humans exhibit 
six types of fear: “laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor 
and anxiety.”84 Aquinas explains that we experience them according to 
the diversity of the objects of fear and certain special reasons. Fear can 
have either an internal or external object: the evil in our own action or 
in some external thing. On the internal level, humans fear the toils that 
burden our capacities. Thus laziness (segnities) arises when we back 
away from an effort for fear of the labor involved. We also fear 
disgrace in the sight of others, which involves disgrace from future 
(shamefacedness—erubescentia) or past deeds (shame—verecundia). 
On the external level, evil overcomes the human rational capacity of 
resistance. Dumfounded amazement (admiratio) arises when the 
magnitude of the evil surpasses our ability to rationally master it. 
Unusual and rare evil stupefies us (stupor). Lastly, anxiety (agonia) 
concerns an unforeseen or unforeseeable evil, which surpasses our 
capacity to resist it; for example, when unpredictable misfortunes 
cause us anxiety. 
Significantly, love is the primary cause of fear, as already 
mentioned. How can love engender fear? Aquinas confirms that love 
serves as the basis of human emotions and moral agency. It causes fear 
                                                 
82 Aquinas (I-II 41.3) follows Aristotle (Rhet. ii.5 1382a22) in 
distinguishing painful and corruptive evil, the latter of which involves death. 
83 Since this fear of pain opposes the natural inclination for self-
preservation, Aquinas deems it non-natural. The fact that we experience pain in 
attempting to prevent our own death is not a natural deterant, when we 
understand the severity of the threat. Shunning pain demands an inclination 
toward, knowledge of and commitment to a higher goal; cf. ST I-II 41.3. 
84 He follows St. John Damascene, who “assignet sex species timoris: 
scilicet segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, admirationem, stuporem, 
agoniam.” ST I-II 41.4 (cf. obj./ad 1 and sc); De Fide Orthod. ii.15: PG 94.932C. 
Here Aquinas delicately declines from following Aristotle, who divides the 
species of fear according to four species of sorrow (cf. Rhet. II.5 1382a22). 
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either as an efficient cause or as a material disposition.85 Cognitive, 
volitional or affective objects inform fear, which as a passion of the 
soul takes its species from both natural and artificial objects. The 
efficient cause of the object of fear inflicts the feared evil (on the part 
of the person feared). While our material disposition to be fearfully 
affected by such an object causes fear inasmuch as it disposes the thing 
to be an evil for us. Therefore, love causes fear, both since the evil of 
losing or not attaining the loved-good is fear’s object, and since loving 
that good is the basis for our fear of being deprived of it. 
According to Aquinas, human beings do not fear what we can 
control (what is within our power and will). He applies this principle to 
whether a human can fear sin or even fear fear itself. Since a human 
being can normally control his own will,86 we do not, properly 
speaking, fear the evil of sin. Sin involves a voluntary act and at a 
natural level, we abhor evil; the basic inclination of the will moves 
toward good rather than evil. In a secondary sense, however, we fear 
sin insofar as an external cause can attract our volition toward sin.87 
Furthermore, we fear fear itself through a natural reaction, which we 
can nonetheless overcome by intelligent choice.88 
These ontological and psychological types of fear prepare for 
further moral ones. Aquinas distinguishes praiseworthy and 
blameworthy fear. As a general avoidance tendency (universaliter 
fugam) however, it contains neither the notion (ratio) of moral good 
                                                 
85 In order to illustrate the role of love in fear, Aquinas (ST I-II 43.1 sc) 
cites St Augustine: “nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id 
quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum” OQ. 83, 
qu. 33; PL 40.23. BA 10.97. 
86 Weakness of will and the acquired internal dispositions to vice are not 
the free voluntary acts that Aquinas refers to here. See his reflections on vice: ST 
I-II 71-89. 
87 Aquinas holds that external causes (such as association with wicked 
people) can incline the will to sin; cf. ST I-II 42.3 Furthermore, we should fear 
the evil of sin as regarding the effect of sin (such as separation from God, cf. ST 
I-II 42.3 ad 1). 
88 An emotion first arises from an external cause (an imminent evil) that 
incites our imagination. In this sense, we fear the necessity of fearing the threat of 
such a great evil. However, as subject to the will, the lower appetite obeys reason 
in driving away inordinate fear. Indeed, we do not normally will to fear “fear 
itself.” Cf. ST I-II 42.4. This insight recalls the modern expression of F. D. 
Roosevelt “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself” (First Inaugural 
Address, 4 March 1933). 
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nor of moral evil.89 It is natural.90 For Aquinas, we adjudicate fear as 
praiseworthy (good) or blameworthy (evil) only when it concerns 
ordinate or inordinate reason and behavior. The good of human agency 
consists in its being duly ordered; evil acts consist in the opposite. 
Accordingly, we need to duly dispose the emotions (and will) through 
the rule both of human reason and of eternal law or God’s reason.91 
Human reason acts as the proximate and homogeneous cause of the 
action, while divine reason acts as the primary cause of rectitude. This 
due ordering demands that we subject the emotion to reason’s rule (a 
loving rule), indicating that we should shun (fugienda) some things 
and pursue (prosequenda) others. Thus, inordinate fear involves 
shunning what reason adjudicates that we need to endure. Ordinate 
fear, on the contrary, involves shunning what reason requires us to 
shun.92 We morally evaluate detrimental or constructive effects of fear 
in terms of how fear correlates with reason, volition and action; we 
must furthermore rationally weigh even fear that surfaces from pre-
conscious or unconscious levels. 
Aquinas reports a number of ways in which fear can hinder 
action. It can disturb reason, upset the imagination (promote failure in 
concentration-demanding tasks) and deflate motivation (inhibit action 
through fear of toil).93 Since bodily members instrumentally cause 
                                                 
89 Aquinas says: “timor communiter dictus secundum suam rationem 
importat universaliter fugam: unde quantum ad hoc non importat rationem boni 
vel mali. […] sed qui circa hoc aut ordinate aut inordinate se habent” (ST II-II 
125.1 ad 1; ST I-II 24.1 and 24.3). Aquinas follows Aristotle in this regard (cf. 
NE ii.4, 1105b31-1106a2). 
90 This aspect of the emotion of fear is natural according to Thomas and 
Aristotle (cf. NE iii.10 1115b26-8; cited in ST II-II 125.1 obj. 3). As natural, fear 
cannot be the matter of sin according to St. John Damascene (cf. De fide orth. II.4 
and II.30: PG 94.876A and 976A; cited in ST II-II 125.1 obj. 3). 
91 Cf. ST I-II 71.6. Examples of this rule (ordo) of reason include: (1) the 
good constituted by the order (bonum consistat in ordine) of truthfulness (cf. ST 
II-II 109.2); and (2) the “becomingness of order” (convenientiam ordinis) 
towards others as observed in the virtue friendliness (amititia sive affabilitas); cf. 
ST II-II 114.1. Aquinas draws from Augustine’s understanding of good as 
consisting of order (cf. De Nat. Boni III: PL 42.553; cited in ST II-II 109.2). 
92 It is interesting to note that while Aquinas calls inordinate fear “sinful,” 
he simply says that ordinate fear is not “sinful”: “quando vero appetitus timendo 
refugit id quod est secundum rationem fugiendum, tunc appetitus non est 
inordinatus, nec peccatum” (ST II-II 125.1). 
93 Cf. ST I-II 44.4. 
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external actions, fear can perturb an act by hindering the bodily 
members through disturbances to human reason, imagination or 
motivation.94 The correlation of fear and counsel illustrates this point. 
Aquinas says: “when a human is affected […] by a passion, things 
seem to him greater or smaller than they really are: thus […] to him 
that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing to 
the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders 
the faculty of giving good counsel.”95 He affirms that a certain type of 
fear unravels reason, insofar as it “drives away all thought and 
dislocates the mind.” In particular, the stronger the passion the more 
detrimentally it sways us. In extreme cases of fear, even though we 
seek counsel, we are even unable to use it appropriately. 
Aquinas resists, however, the opinion that every type of 
passion or fear “disturbs repose” and hinders reason.96 Fear does not 
hinder human agency always or in every way. Thomas affirms that we 
need fear “so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned.”97 Such 
positive types of fear move us to take council and to pay greater 
attention (work with solicitude). According to Aquinas, fear can be 
conducive to action “insofar as it inclines the will to do that whereby a 
man escapes from what he fears.”98 Especially in the face of a great, 
proximate or difficult to overcome evil, moderate fear that does not 
disrupt reason can incite us not only to work well and to employ our 
own rational guidance, but also to seek counsel.99 Aquinas highlights 
                                                 
94 Aquinas’ principle is sound, although he explains its function in an 
outmoded physiology; for example, he says that the bodily members are unable to 
act appropriately since fear deprives them of their “heat” (cf. ST I-II 44.4). 
95 “Quia homini affecto secundum aliquam passionem, videtur aliquid vel 
maius vel minus quam sit secundum rei veritatem. Sicut amanti videntur ea quae 
amat, meliora; et timenti, ea quae timent, terribiliora. Et sic ex defectu 
rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, impedit facultatem bene 
consiliandi.” ST I-II 44.2 corpus (and ad 2). Aquinas draws support from Cicero 
(cf. De Quaest. Tuscul. IV.8.). 
96 Cf. ST I-II 44.2 obj. 1 and corpus. 
97 Cf. ST I-II 125.1. 
98 “Sed timor qui est de aliis rebus, intantum adiuvat operationem, 
inquantum inclinat voluntatem ad operandum ea per quae homo effugit id quod 
timet” ST I-II 44.4 ad 3. 
99 “Sed ex parte animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem 
perturbans, confert ad bene operandum, inquantum causat quandam 
sollicitudinem, et facit hominem attentius consiliari et operari” ST I-II 44.4. 
Furthermore, Aquinas recognizes that hope makes a human a good counselor 
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how this moderate fear can help us to apply ourselves with greater 
attention and carefulness.100 For example, an ordinate fear can aid 
servants to not neglect their service and to work more carefully.101 This 
insight parallels those on positive types of anxiety that promote 
focused attention, as found in resilience research (chapter two), which 
aids task accomplishment and overcoming fear.102 
In conclusion, Aquinas recognizes four characteristics of 
positive fear: (1) we realistically fear what is fearful; (2) it motivates us 
to seek counsel and social support, (3) it does not gravely disturb our 
reasoning, but rather (4) it even heightens our attention, reflection and 
carefulness. Intense fear, on the other hand, blocks adequate reflection 
and leads to compromised choices. For example, when fear limits our 
considerations to what can go wrong, it robs our confidence to do what 
is good and right;103 furthermore, when it focuses our attention on a real 
but lower level evil, it hinders us from freely pursuing larger 
considerations and more important projects. 
Reflections on resilience and human attention furnish 
phenomenological and neurological descriptions of the anatomy of 
fear. Aquinas furnishes a moral theory that enlarges these observations 
and reflections to include considerations of normative agency and 
human flourishing. The above-mentioned distinction between 
praiseworthy and blameworthy fear in action ultimately evolves 
around the degree to which we do an action voluntarily or not, which 
we shall discuss in the following section on the virtue of fortitude. 
We have argued that we can enrich Aquinas’ analysis of fear 
through a dialogue with neuro-physical, evolutionary and psychosocial 
sciences. These latter sources provide insights on the utility and 
purpose of fear, the relationship of fear, attachment and attention. Our 
analysis of fear and moral agency here is only a propaedeutic. Next we 
                                                                                                          
inasmuch as he does not despair about the difficulty on hand (cf. ST I-II 44.2 ad 
3). Aquinas quotes Aristotle as saying “fear makes men of counsel” (Rhet II.5, 
cited ST I-II 44.2 sc). 
100 Cf. ST I-II 44.2 ad 2; J. Bowlin 1996. 
101 We need not restrict St. Paul’s insight about service to mundane matters; 
see Eph 6:5, which Aquinas cites (ST II-II 125.1 obj./ad 2). Cf. ST I-II 44.2 ad 2 
and ad 3. 
102 See Chapter one’s study on “Volitional Processes and Attention.” Cf. 
Wilson and Gottman 1996. 
103 Cf. D. DeMarco 1996, 45. 
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shall examine other aspects of the emotion of fear, including the 
characteristics and context of the virtue of fortitude, as a type of moral 
resilience. Afterwards, we shall examine growth perspectives on 
managing fear and developing fortitude. 
3.4. Fortitude: Characteristics and Context of Moral 
Resilience 
The previous discussion on the emotion of fear serves as a 
prelude to the present dialogue on the virtue of fortitude: its definition, 
characteristics and context. Indeed, in this chapter we have not yet 
fully addressed Aquinas’ definition of fortitude. In order to do so, we 
need to examine the inclination and emotion of daring, as well as 
further moral and social issues concerning fear. We shall consider the 
common good and justice, which are intimate parts of courageous acts 
and dispositions for Thomas. However first, we shall put his approach 
into dialogue with physiological and neurological sciences and 
philosophy on resilience as courageous coping with fear and daring. 
3.4.1. Resilience as Courageous Coping with Fear and 
Daring 
The various types, means and social dimensions of fear raise 
questions about how humans can best manage fear phenomena. How 
can we creatively and consistently handle fear, whose object tends to 
take on larger than life proportions? Triggered by impending pain, 
danger, evil, illness and separation, a simple fear reaction can lead to 
bouts of worrying or inactivity. In extreme situations, such fear can 
become chronic or pathological.104 Without blurring the spectrum of 
fear phenomena, I shall examine resilient coping with fear and daring. 
What strategies for coping with fear do the psychosocial sciences 
offer? 
Before addressing strategies and optics on managing fear and 
daring, I shall reiterate neuro-biology’s findings on positive and 
                                                 
104 Pathologies related to fear include: phobias, obsessions and 
compulsions, panic attacks, obsessive-compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety 
disorder, fright neurosis, and so on. Cf. Freud 1922/1955, 27; Anthony 1987, 13; 
Goleman 1995, 65-9. 
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negative types of fear. Neuro-biology situates fear’s survival advantage 
in a tendency to be alert to dangers. As a vigilance response, it can 
serve as a type of buffer against difficulty. Fear triggers the emotional 
brain to focus its attention on the source of worry, ignoring any other 
concerns for a time, until a viable solution surfaces.105 When having 
trouble finding straightforward solutions to the source of fear, we find 
a further survival advantage in a constructive reflex to mull over a 
problem at hand; this mulling is called worry. Furthermore, fear or 
anxiety can serve in protecting us against an experience. According to 
Freud, a non-neurotic type of anxiety can signal in advance a 
disturbing encounter, and thus protect a person, as would a shield.106 
Researchers have shown that worry can protect the subject from certain 
effects of anxiety.107 To keep in mind fear’s positive basis and effects is 
important in order to understand the negative side to fear and its 
management as well. 
The danger of fear, from the resilience perspective, is that it 
can lead into a vicious circle, where worry, anxiety and fretting distract 
and debilitate us. Vulnerabilities increase when failure leads to fears of 
failure, which in turn lead to beliefs that we shall continue to fail.108 M. 
Rutter’s research (1990) suggests that resilience-processes reduce fear-
failure chain reactions. But how can we stop vicious circles of anxiety 
producing interchanges? Indeed, researchers have suggested that self-
soothing, game playing and self-confidence can help us manage fear 
and control anxiety. 
Emotion researchers demonstrate that self-soothing is one of 
the basic life skills in question. According to psychoanalytic thinkers, 
                                                 
105 Cf. Goleman 1995. 
106 It can protect one from the stimuli, which could otherwise be damaging. 
This insight follows Freud’s theory that protection from stimuli is almost more 
important that the reception of stimuli. Cf. Freud 1922/1955, 27; and Anthony 
1987, 13; who cites Redl 1969 in this regard. 
107 Cf. Roemer and Borkovec 1993; Goleman 1995, 68. 
108 There are other risks involved with disordered fear and anxiety. 
According to Murphy and Moriarty (1976: 202-203), “Increases in vulnerability 
are seen when the interaction between the child and the environment results in 
new limitations or difficulties, new threats to homeostasis and to integration, new 
obstacles to learning, increased difficulties in mastering anxiety, or negative 
expectancies.” According to Garmezy (1990: 530), the compounding of anxieties 
might constitute a component of low social class status that relates to the 
actualization of risk and inhibits escape from it. 
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such as J. Bowlby and D. W. Winnicott, the art of soothing oneself in 
the face of fear is a fundamental skill. They even hold that it is one of 
the most important psychic tools, whose strength comes from our 
primary attachments; these attachments serve as the basis for handling 
fear, as well as daring.109 L. Roemer and T. Borkovec (1993), 
psychologists from Pennsylvania State University, have studied fears 
and phobias in order to identify strategies for calming vehement 
emotions. They have found that insomnia patients’ anxiety surfaces in 
cognitive and somatic forms. The cognitive form (worrisome thoughts) 
disrupts sleep more than somatic arousal (sweating, a racing heart, and 
muscle tension). One solution involves shifting attention away from 
the worries in order to break the cycle of fear, or to uproot its 
persuasive power. Roemer and Borkovec offer a twofold analysis of 
this solution. On the one hand, we must become mindful of the fear 
and evaluate its causes. Through self-awareness, we attempt to 
recognize as early as possible the start of a worry episode. Then we can 
actively challenge the worrisome thoughts through self-talk and 
investigation: Are they well founded? Are there other possible 
outcomes than the one we fear? What constructive steps can we take? 
And so on. This activity can decrease the neural activation (limbic 
drive) underlying low-grade anxiety. On the other hand, inducing a 
relaxed state can counter our anxiety signals. Once aware of anxiety, 
we can exercise relaxation efforts to calm the body so that we can 
better handle sources of stress.110Researchers have found that children’s 
play serves as a coping tool. Eisen (1988) has studied play as a strategy 
for managing fear. His interdisciplinary study has demonstrated how 
children’s play aids them to understand and manage otherwise 
unbearable situations. Indeed, children’s play can promote information 
processing (even in the face of the absurd), problem solving 
(proximate and long-term solutions) and coping (facing fear and 
finding balance “in both spiritual and physical realms” in the midst of 
                                                 
109 Cf. J. Bowlby 1969, 1973, 1992; D. W. Winnicott 1971, 1987. D. 
Goleman (1995, 57) explains: “The theory holds that emotionally sound infants 
learn to soothe themselves by treating themselves as their caretakers have treated 
them, leaving them less vulnerable to the upheavals of the emotional brain.” 
110 In more extreme cases, phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder or panic 
disorder, Goleman (1995, 69) suggests that medication might be used to interrupt 
the anxiety cycle, while a therapy is still needed to lessen its recurrence. 
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threats and hardships). It can even function as a survival technique in 
extreme cases. Play can make such contributions at both conscious and 
unconscious levels. At a conscious level, the skills that we acquire 
through complex problem solving games, in playing chess or other 
strategic games for example, can aid us to resolve or at least not be 
overwhelmed when we have to face complex situations, unexpected 
events or even chaos. At the unconscious level, through play, the mind 
can find a balance. For example, when faced with trauma, play 
facilitated distraction can allow the mind time to decipher the situation 
and to settle itself.111 These insights on children’s play give hints for 
similar benefits that certain types of games (and recreation) might have 
for people of all ages. 
Psychosocial researchers have shown that hope, self-
confidence, self-assertiveness and initiative-taking aid us to confront, 
to counter and to correct difficulties. They can help us manage the 
obstructive and debilitating nature of fear. Belief in our own self-
efficacy, according to Stanford psychologist A. Bandura, underlies our 
sense of optimism or hope, and how we use our capacities. Those who 
do not believe in their own self-efficacy have a greater fear of failure, 
and fear of seeming inept.112 R. S. Lazarus maintains that hope is an 
expression of intellectual intelligence, which resists anxiety and 
depression.113 Timid and pessimistic temperament traits however need 
not impede positive emotions and dispositions. According to J. Kagan, 
natural timidity, for example, does not obstruct humans from becoming 
self-confident, hopeful and even bold in practice.114 Assertiveness 
                                                 
111 G. Eisen (1988: 98) says: “Looking beyond the external, we must also 
consider a subconscious drive, a constant striving on the part of the human 
organism to reestablish an equilibrium in an utterly irrational and unpredictable 
universe. Techniques of opposition, coping, and survival were reflected in 
children’s play—not unexpectedly—for play practices and behavior became 
compensatory agents in relieving stress and providing a process for 
accommodating the painful and traumatic existence of that time.” 
112 Cf. A. Bandura 1986. According to Rutter (1990, 206-7, 197), evidence 
suggests that the establishment or maintenance of self-esteem, self-confidence 
and self-efficacy through supportive personal relationships or successful task 
accomplishment serves as a protective process when facing difficulty (cf. Bowlby 
1969 and 1973; Wilson and Gottman, 1996: 190-220; Yule 1992: 191; Maughan 
1988, 214; Consortium 1994, 276). 
113 Cf. Goleman 1995, 87; Lazarus 1994, 74.
114 Cf. Kagan 1994; Goleman 1998, 68-72. 
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training for passive or impulsive individuals can promote balanced 
responses, rather than passive or aggressive ones.115 These preliminary 
remarks will suffice to set the stage for treating the virtue of fortitude; 
later we shall focus more on the development of hope and optimism, 
self-confidence and self-efficacy, and the like. 
In conclusion, the management of fear is critical for short and 
long-term coping in the midst of adversity. We can manage fears in 
conscious, unconscious and pharmaceutical ways. Some basic skills 
and communal practices that support human well-being through 
managing fear, including: self-soothing techniques, play, hopefulness 
and self-confidence. This account of observations about courageous 
coping with fear and, inversely, about fear-vulnerability does not 
address the larger context of the management of both fear and daring 
through acquired human dispositions and virtues. It nonetheless 
provides a basis for opening this dialogue with Aquinas. 
3.4.2. Seeking a Mean Between Fear and Daring 
In order to understand moral resilience and to enrich Aquinas’ 
approach to the development of fortitude, we shall now outline further 
his analysis of this virtue’s object and dynamics. Aquinas utilizes the 
philosophical tradition of Aristotle to establish that fortitude is a mean 
between fear and daring.116 Fortitude is a mean, a middle ground where 
reason manages the proper use of fear and of daring—each with its 
own benefits, drawbacks, opportunities and threats.117 We search for a 
mean between fear and daring for various reasons: situations differ; not 
everyone acts (perceives, feels, thinks, and chooses) the same way 
                                                 
115 Cf. Bloom 1996, 99-100. 
116 The Philosopher discusses fortitude as a type of mean or just measure in 
regards to both fear and daring or confidence (as Barnes translates it). It is a just 
means between the extremes (mesotes) of fearlessness or rashness and 
cowardliness. Thanks to well-established dispositions and well-engaged rational, 
volitional and affective management, the courageous person experiences fear and 
confidence when he should, how he should and where he should (cf. NE iii.6, 
1115a12-13). Aquinas refers to chapters two and three of Aristotle’s NE, in 
which the Philosopher gives a rich explanation of fortitude. Aquinas’ own 
commentary on the NE on these chapters is also very illuminating (In Eth. 2, 8, 
341; 3, 14, 529 and 3, 18, 583). 
117 In particular, Aquinas says: “fortitudo est circa timores et audacias, 
quasi cohibitiva timorum, et moderativa audaciarum” ST II-II 123.3. 
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when faced with the same dangers and labor; we neither realize the 
gravity of the situation nor feel fear or daring in equal measure.118 
Aquinas argues that this just mean has a particular tenor. 
Fortitude primarily concerns fear and flight from the impending evil, 
and only secondarily concerns daring and fighting the difficulty, “for it 
is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger 
which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check 
daring, but to increase fear,”119 as Thomas says. In between fear and 
fearlessness, we experience security, in which we hold firm in the face 
of fear. Fortitude calls immediately upon security in order to overcome 
fear or at least hold it at bay.120 Through this virtue, we establish 
security, based on confidence, hope, and the other pertinent virtues. 
Although fortitude directly regards fear and security, it 
indirectly regards hope and confidence inasmuch as fortitude makes 
use of daring. This collaboration of fear (or security) and daring (or 
confidence) highlights two aspects of fortitude. In addition to 
managing emotions (an internal dimension), the virtue of fortitude 
draws upon skills and dispositions needed in posing related external 
acts. Thus, we employ a social dimension that goes beyond the acts 
themselves. 
Personal skills and our sense of self-efficacy are not 
insignificant, when we face danger.121 Indeed, the internal dimension of 
fortitude is necessary, but not always sufficient, to resolve the 
situation. Fortitude (as managing emotions of fear and daring, of flight 
and fight tendencies, of security and confidence) will not of itself 
                                                 
118 Cf. Aquinas’ Commentary on the NE, and Aristotle’s NE iii.8, 1116 a 
16. 
119 “Difficilius enim est timorem reprimere quam audaciam moderari: eo 
quod ipsum periculum, quod est objectum audaciae et timoris, de se confert 
aliquid ad repressionem audaciae, sed operatur ad augmentum timoris” (ST II-II 
123.6). Also see Aquinas’ Commentary on the NE: In Eth. 3, 18, 583. He follows 
Aristotle (NE iii.9) in holding that fortitude concerns more fear than daring. 
120 Cf. ST II-II 129.7; and ST I-II 45.2.  
121 According to Stanford University Psychologist Albert Bandura, who 
pioneered studies in self-efficacy (1986), self-confidence positively correlates 
with self-efficacy—the belief we have about our own capacity to perform. Skill 
alone is not enough, we have to believe in our skills and the way that they can 
develop. Especially in resolution of a difficult task, those who doubt themselves 
perform less efficaciously than do those who believe in their abilities (their self-
efficacy). 
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overcome the difficulty and danger. Nor does it necessarily accompany 
prudence, or skilled navigating, or temperance, which are all needed in 
situations such as storms at sea. Bravery is only part of the picture; 
other skills in the end will save the day (and the ship). Likewise, other 
virtues will complete fortitude. To overcome fear, courage employs 
audacity or confidence, which has its source in hope inasmuch as it is 
the mother of daring.122 Hope and confidence always have important 
roles to play in courage and its related virtues.123 Later we shall 
examine how fortitude moderates fear of failure and how initiative-
taking virtues bolster hope and confidence.Why does fortitude need to 
correct fear more than daring? Fear inclines us to withdraw from a 
menacing evil. If we calm fear, then our volition will not be disinclined 
from following reason; we can apply reason to resolve the situation on 
hand; in turn, we can more clearly adjudicate the type of initiative to 
employ in order to overcome the difficulty. 
Aquinas argues that fear in a certain way is more primary to 
the virtue than daring or confidence because of the centrality and 
universality of the fear of death.124 Like the other virtues, fortitude is 
built upon natural human inclinations. It is natural to love one’s own 
life, and to fear and resist the loss of it.125 In the hierarchy of goods, 
nonetheless, the goods of family and society are even more important 
than one’s own life. The undeniable social dimension of these natural 
inclinations inhibits an egotistical reading of fortitude. Fortitude of 
soul assures that no fear of the loss of a bodily good or the facing of a 
bodily evil—the loss of one’s own life being the greatest—will deter 
                                                 
122 M. Labourdette (1961, 23-40) says spes mater audaciae. 
123 In chapter five, we treat the correlation of courage, hope and confidence 
in a theological context. 
124 Since fortitude for Aquinas preeminently concerns the danger of death, 
it principally concerns fear. He says, “Sicut ergo virtus fortitudinis, de cujus 
ratione est firmitatem praestare, praecipue consistit circa passionem pertinentem 
ad fugam corporalium malorum, scilicet circa timorem, ex consequenti autem 
circa audaciam, quae aggreditur terribilia sub spe alicujus boni” (ST II-II 
141.3). For these reasons, he holds that fortitude is chiefly about managing fear of 
danger and difficulty (cf. ST II-II 123.3; ST I-II 45.1 corpus and ad 2). 
125 Cf. ST II-II 123.4 ad 2. 
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us from following the greater goods of reason.126 This vision of 
fortitude has several practical ramifications. 
First of all, Aquinas argues that if we stand firm in the most 
fearful of situations (the danger of death) then we should be able to 
stand firm in the lesser ones.127 However the opposite is not necessarily 
the case. Aquinas is not simply identifying the logical divisions of a 
virtue and its determinate matter here. Rather, there are pedagogical 
implications concerning how we develop our own self-image and 
attachments; how we judge what holds the greatest value in life; and 
how we foresee our own death. 
Secondly, although the virtue pertains to an extreme (ultimum), 
we should not confuse fortitude with the lesser instances where 
humans also need to manage fear bravely.128 Other virtues also deal 
with the fear of failure or losing different lovable things: such as 
money (generosity, magnificence), pleasure (temperance) and the like. 
The specific virtue of fortitude more properly concerns the danger of 
death, which is the most fearful and most inevitable extreme. Fear, 
rather than daring, has a certain priority in fortitude,129 because human 
beings are mortal, and must pass through the experience of death. 
Ultimately neither daring nor skills, neither medical treatment nor 
wisdom and the like can liberate us from the inevitability of death. 
Because it is more difficult to allay fear when faced with danger than 
to move to attack, endurance is the chief act of fortitude,130 as we shall 
discuss more in the context of the endurance found in patience and 
perseverance, and the capacity for attacking or enterprise found in 
magnanimity and magnificence (in the next chapter). 
Aquinas argues that properly speaking, fortitude concerns the 
fear of the fatal danger, rather than every kind of constancy, when 
                                                 
126 In this context, Aquinas once again quotes Augustine to insure that the 
discussion remains on a spiritual level: “in libro de Moribus Eccle. (i, 15: PL 32, 
1322) quod fortitudo est amor facile tolerans omnia propter id quod amatur” (ST 
II-II 123.4 ob. 1).  
127 “quia qui stat firmus contra maiora, consequens est quod stet firmus 
contra minora, sed non convertitur” ST II-II 123.4. 
128 Aquinas (ST II-II 123.4 ad 1) continually affirms other, restricted senses 
of bravery as well: “Ex aliis autem dicitur aliquis fortis secundum quid.” 
129 Cf. ST II-II 123.3. 
130 Cf. ST II-II 123.6. Here Aquinas seems to use the principle that what is 
more difficult is more worthwhile. 
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facing difficulty.131 Fortitude as a special or specific virtue, 
“strengthens against dangers of death,”132 moderates “fear and daring in 
connection with dangers of death,”133 and endures “not any kind of 
hardship, but only those connected with the danger of death.”134 This 
further specification of the special virtue of fortitude does not diminish 
Aquinas’ or our interest in a whole range of levels and types of fear 
and daring. It rather focuses on intense passions that concern 
unavoidable situations. 
We shall finish this section with the question about false 
fortitude, which raises important issues for resilience in general, and 
moral resilience in particular. The tradition of distinguishing true 
fortitude from its semblances predates Aquinas. Although his full 
definition of fortitude admits a larger range of acts, it denies the status 
of “true fortitude” to acts that merely resemble it.135 Semblances of 
courage are inadequate in several ways. Two people might perform the 
same external act, without having an adequate goal, motive, 
understanding or intention. The moral quality of their acts can also 
differ because of significant circumstances. Aquinas enumerates five 
semblances of fortitude; they are acts that we do: (1) since we have 
miscalculated the danger involved because of our ignorance, (2) since 
we have already escaped from similar situations, (3) since we count on 
own capacities or skills; (4) since emotions have moved us, such as 
                                                 
131 See Aquinas’ Commentary on the NE: In Eth. 2, 8, 339. Thomas says 
that it is with “better reason” that fortitude refers to the act concerning its special 
determinate matter and its diverse object. “Alii vero, et melius, accipiunt has 
quatuor virtutes secundum quod determinantur ad materias speciales [...] 
manifestum est quod praedictae virtutes sunt diversi habitus, secundum 
diversitatem obiectorum distincti” ST I-II 61.4. Aquinas uses this argument to 
support the distinctness of the four cardinal virtues. 
132 “fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis” ST I-II 61.3. 
133 “altera autem moderatur timores et audacias circa pericula mortis, 
quod etiam secundum se difficile est” ST II-II 137.1. 
134 “ad fortitudem, secundum quod est specialis virtus, non pertinet 
perferre quascumque molestias, sed solum illas quae sunt circa pericula mortis” 
ST II-II 147.2 ad 3. 
135 Aquinas associates true virtue (vera vertus) and true fortitude (vera 
fortitudo, integra fortitudo), which he distinguishes from counterfeit fortitude (cf. 
ST II-II 123. 10 ad 3; ST II-II 123.1 ad 2; ST II-II 128 ad 7; ST II-II 64.5 ad 5; ST 
II-II 23.7 sc and corpus; ST II-II 61.4 obj; ST I-II 65.1 corpus). In addition to 
Aristole, he draws upon St. Gregory (Moral. xxii.1), St. Augustine (De Civ. Dei 
22.23; PL 41.36-37). 
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sadness or anger; and (5) since we seek egotistical self-interest, 
personal honor, pleasure or profit.136 For Aquinas’ perspective, 
fortitude is more than standing steadfast in the face of danger. This 
insight offers correctives for reductionist approaches to resilience 
theory and ethics. It gives us the basis for understanding Aquinas’ 
contribution to moral resilience. Yet to understand it further, we need 
to investigate how Thomas specifies true fortitude in terms of social 
context and finality. 
3.4.3. Social Dimension: Human Struggles and the 
Common Good 
Aquinas addresses the social dimension of fortitude more 
clearly in the context and finality of courageous acts and dispositions. 
Fortitude per se is neither instinctive optimism nor firm confidence in 
our natural or acquired abilities. It is more than fighting fitness, or 
brute resilience.137 It demands an ordered social resolve. In this section, 
we shall undertake a more philosophical inquiry about fortitude and 
resilience. How does the social dimension of fortitude aid us to 
comprehend moral resilience? In particular, how does Aquinas’ 
treatment of human struggles and the common good offer insights for 
resilience efforts? 
Not every fear-producing object is of equal value. Since some 
are more worthwhile, useful and socially fitting, Aquinas seeks the 
most worthy object for true fortitude. Thus, he explores the social 
dimension of fear and this virtue. St. Thomas affirms (to a certain 
extent) Aristotle’s position that courage in battle is more honorable 
than courage at sea. To allay the fear born of human vulnerability in 
battle-ready fortitude is more honorable because of its social import. 
How do morality and the social value of our acts correlate? Aquinas 
employs Aristotle’s definition that “fortitude is chiefly about death in 
battle”138 in order to explore the social hierarchy of fortitude. The 
                                                 
136 Aquinas comments directly upon Aristotle’s analysis (NE iii.2: 
1116a16-1117a27); cf. ST II-II 123.1 ad 2; In Eth. 3, 16, 557-560; and 3, 17, 571-
582; de virt. com. 6 ad 4; de virt. card. a. 2; ST I-II 58.4 ad 3. 
137 Cf. Pieper 1966, 117-121 and 126-7. 
138 “Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in Ethic. (iii.9, 1115a,34-35), 
quod maxime est foritudo circa mortem quae est in bello” (ST II-II 123.5). Both 
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notion of battle, for both these thinkers, is not primarily synonymous 
with alleviating fear, but rather with protecting and promoting the 
common good. 
While employing Aristotelian social thought on fortitude, 
Aquinas goes beyond it in the ways in which he construes both battle 
and the common good. Thomas, on the one hand, enlarges Aristotle’s 
notion of battle. Aristotle argues that not just any risky business 
deserves the highest and most proper name of fortitude, but only that 
concerning military warfare.139 Although Aquinas follows Aristotle in 
his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics,140 he nuances and 
expands his own position later in the Summa theologiae to include the 
danger of death in different types of struggle and effort. 
Aquinas widens the notion of what type of action we fittingly 
call fortitude, from the narrow category of military battles, to a broader 
category including private (non-military) struggles that aim at a higher 
good. Aquinas affirms not only that fortitude involves voluntarily 
putting ourselves in danger of death, but also that it results from having 
directly chosen some higher good. Thomas also specifies that true 
fortitude involves only the dangers that ensue “directly on account of 
some good,” as when defending “the common good by a just fight.”141 
We can draw at least two conclusions: true fortitude for Aquinas is 
found (1) neither in unjust battles, (2) nor in just battles, in which we 
                                                                                                          
thinkers agree that fortitude most properly concerns the danger of death in battle, 
inasmuch as “quia in tali negotio ut frequentius homines sustinent mortem 
propter bonum” In Eth. 3, 14, 537; cf. 540. 
139 The dangers of death due to sickness, storms, journeys and the like do 
not concern fortitude strictly speaking for the Greek philosopher. For Aristotle 
the truly brave person is the citizen-solder, not the professional soldier. The 
former is brave not because of compulsion, nor profit, nor thinking his side is 
stronger, but rather because it is noble, virtuous to be so. Such a citizen-soldier 
does not flee from the post in the face of danger, but prefers death to disgrace. Cf. 
NE 1116a15-1116b2 and 15-22. 
140 “Bonum est enim quod homo vitam suam exponat pro bono communi. 
Sed in praedictis corruptionibus, scilicet morte quae est in mari vel in 
aegritudine, nec est fortitudo laudabilis, neque ex morte aliquod bonum sequitur. 
Unde audacter aggredi talia pericula, non pertinet ad virtutem fortitudinis” (In 
Eth. 3, 14, 542). In his commentary, Aquinas affirms Aristotle’s teaching and 
does not go beyond or refute Aristotle as he does later in ST II-II 123.5. 
141 “Sed pericula mortis quae est in bellicis directe imminent homini 
propter aliquod bonum: inquantum scilicet defendit bonum commune per justum 
bellum” ST II-II 123.5.  
260 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
have engaged for reasons other than the common good. Contemporary 
writers have taken up these issues, while often denying that they need 
to tie fortitude to the common good, or good per se.142 
For Aquinas, defending the common good through a just battle 
or struggle can take military or non-military forms. The judge or 
private person who does not waver from a just judgment because of 
death threats illustrates this latter case. Aquinas construes such 
situations to include personal assaults, struggles or battles.143 He can 
thus, unlike Aristotle, affirm that humans express true fortitude when 
(1) we attend to a sick friend, while fearing a deadly infection, or (2) 
we labor to support a family or accomplish a pious action, which 
involve facing the danger of death during a journey, e.g. on business 
trips or on pilgrimages, which were particularly tiring and perilous in 
Aquinas’ time.144 
On the other hand, Aquinas widens Aristotle’s notion of the 
common good as well. He holds that fortitude is concerned not only 
with the greatest dangers (i.e. threats to life) but also with the noblest 
of dangers, defending the common good with one’s own life.145 
Although, they agree here, and Aristotle’s notions of fortitude 
                                                 
142 Cf. J. Porter 1998b; S. B. Cunningham 1985; R. Davies 1998; G. 
Schedler 1997; M. Canto-Sperber 1996b; N. Dent 1981; and G.H. von Wright 
1963. 
143 Aquinas refers to: particulares impugnationes (ST II-II 123.5); 
personales impugnationes (idem ad 1); or particularia bella (idem ad 2). 
144 “Sed et circa pericula cuiuscumque alterius mortis fortis bene se habet: 
praesertim quia et cuiuslibet mortis homo potest periculum subire propter 
virtutem; puta cum aliquis non refugit amico infirmanti obsequi propter timorem 
mortiferae infectionis; vel cum non refugit itinerari ad aliquod pium negotium 
prosequendum propter timorem naufragii vel latronum” ST II-II 123.5; Cf. 
Congar 1974, 338. 
145 Aquinas, in his Commentary on the Nic. Ethics, explicates the relevance 
of the end (goal) involved in facing death. He makes the following comments on 
Aristotle, who “Dicit ergo primo, quod neque etiam fortitudo est circa mortem 
quam aliquis sustinet in quocumque casu vel negotio, sicut in mari vel in 
aegritudine; sed circa mortem quam quis sustinet pro optimis rebus, sicut 
contingit cum aliquis moritur in bello propter patriae defensionem. Et eadem 
ratio est de quacumque alia morte, quam quis sustinet propter bonum virtutis.” In 
Eth. 3, 14, 537. In commenting on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas says 
that “mors quae est in bello, est in maximo periculo, quia de facili ibi moritur 
homo; etiam est in periculo optimo, quia homo pericula sustinet hic propter 
bonum commune, quod est optimum, ut in principio dictum est (n. 30)” In Eth. 3, 
14, 538. 
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(¢ndre…a), honor (kalÒj), virtue (¢ret»), flourishing (eÙdaimon…a) and 
common good146 are parallel in key ways to Aquinas’, Thomas 
outstrips Aristotle’s notions, especially that of the common good. In 
particular, Aristotle’s notion of the common good does not extend to 
all mankind, and it seems to be culturally and historically bound.147 
Aquinas uses both Cicero and the Christian tradition to expand 
this notion of common good. First, Cicero extends the notions of 
common good and fortitude beyond that of a State at war.148 This 
movement is developed in the Ciceronian and Stoic consideration that 
fortitude deals with all descent matters (honestas) when we face fear 
and daring.149 They also maintain that we must use this virtue in service 
of the common good (salute communi) and not only for one’s self.150 
Stoics were the first in the Greco-Roman world to hold systematically 
that justice concerned humanity as such, irrespective of the polis.151 
                                                 
146 Aristotle says: “Those, then, who busy themselves in an exceptional 
degree with noble actions all men approve and praise; and if all were to strive 
towards what is noble and strain every nerve to do the noblest deeds, everything 
would be as it should be for the common good, and every one would secure for 
himself the goods that are greatest, since excellence (¢ret») is the greatest of 
goods” NE ix.1169a10-11. 
147 Aristotle’s use of the notion of the common good has been critiqued 
because of its limitations to the particular realm of family, friends and the polis in 
which one lives. Some critiques admonish Aristotle for his limiting the 
application of virtue, in particular justice. Although he had rather extensive 
knowledge of other States—he studied some 159 different constitutions in his 
Politics—he remained provincial in his view of justice and the common good, 
according to MacIntyre 1988 and 1966, and Randall 1960. 
148 Aquinas quotes Cicero’s Off. (I.22) in his ST II-II 123.5 obj. 2 
149 Cicero says: “Virtutem nullo tempore reliquendam; vel dolorem, si is 
timeatur, vel mortem, si ea formidetur, dedecore et infamia leviorem esse; [...] 
virtuti vel ultra mortem proficisci esse praeclarum.” Rhet. ad Her. III, iv, 9. 
150 Cicero affirms, “the Stoics correctly define courage (fortitudo) as ‘that 
virtue which champions the cause of right.’” Off. I.62. It is not enough to avoid 
doing injury to others, but the courageous person must prevent injury (Off. I.65). 
One strives to be virtuous in deed and not simply to be thought virtuous. 
151 However the Stoic account of justice and law did not prevail against the 
dominant practices of Greek and Roman polities. According to MacIntyre (1988, 
149, also see 150-152): “Any conception of justice which not only had a scope 
which extended beyond the citizens of those polities to all mankind but also 
provided a standard for evaluating them independently had to come from 
elsewhere.” But far from disowning the patris, Stoic thought recognizes both the 
homeland and the universe. As said by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: “My polis 
and my patris is Rome qua Antonine, but qua human being is the cosmos.” Quod 
sibi ipsi scripsit VI, 44 (cited in MacIntyre 1988, 147). 
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The basis for this widening of justice and the common good was the 
Stoic vision of the universality of the supreme law that binds all 
rational creatures to obey it, and human nature through which we 
recognize the humanity of others.152 
Aquinas takes inspiration from these philosophers to establish 
an ordering of types of fear and responsibility in fortitude. However, 
he nuances such movements (acts and dispositions) with a notion of 
the ordering of love that finds its inspiration and definition in the 
Christian tradition. Indeed, the philosophical fortitude that Aquinas 
promotes involves moral standards that offer the foundation for moral 
resilience. In the next chapter, we shall ask how Aquinas transposes 
and widens further this social dimension through his treatment of the 
virtues of initiative and resisting; in chapter five, we shall explore how 
he extends human sociality through theological considerations. In the 
meantime, we shall address the way in which we progress or fail in 
fortitude and moral resilience. 
3.5. Progress and Failure in Fortitude 
In this section, I shall focus on developmental perspectives, 
without which fortitude might seem a static definition or an intellectual 
exercise. A series of diagnostic questions on the resilience of fortitude-
building and fear-management strategies will guide our dialogue with 
Aquinas. What can failed fortitude teach us about moral vulnerability? 
How can the resilience perspective aid us to understand developmental 
matters and educative strategies related to fear and difficulty? 
At the moral level, Aquinas’ input on fear and fortitude 
enriches psychosocial resilience approaches with insights on finality, 
normativity, cognition and motivation. First, I shall investigate the 
parallel between failed fortitude and vulnerability. This analysis 
permits us to examine the moral efforts concerning fear in practice of 
                                                 
152 Nonetheless, their hierarchy of responsibilities involves: family, city and 
then universe, notably foreigners fall in this latter category. Cicero explains that 
we owe foreigners a very limited fare: water, fire, and honest counsel—whatever 
is common property. Private property is not owed to others, since “the resources 
of individuals are limited and the number of needy is infinite, this spirit of 
universal liberality must be regulated [...] in order that we may continue to have 
the means for being generous to our friends.” Off. I.52. 
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fortitude; it also prepares us to explore fortitude as a key factor in 
moral resilience. Then I shall complete this chapter with Aquinas’ 
developmental and educative insights concerning fortitude. 
3.5.1. Failed Fortitude, Failed Resilience 
According to Aquinas, we learn fortitude not only through 
positive experiences of managing fear and daring, but also through 
experiences of failed fortitude. How is failed fortitude a type of failed 
resilience, at moral levels? In order to treat failed fortitude and 
resilience, I shall address Aquinas’ moral evaluation of fear in fortitude 
and his understanding of the vices opposing fortitude: timidity and 
cowardliness, rashness and recklessness. Then I shall ask: what does 
failed fortitude teach us about failed resilience and moral 
vulnerability? 
Through cowardliness or rashness (in act or habitus), we at 
least temporarily override or dismiss a higher good for the sake of a 
disordered attachment to a lower one. We do not always face two 
viable and equal options. When we do not abide in the good prescribed 
by reason (a reasonable good) because of excesses of fear or 
aggression, we miss the mark of courage. We do not persevere in the 
goals and mediate ends (means) that we have conceived as good and 
fitting. We might cede to the threat of loosing external goods: prestige, 
reputation, honor, power, wealth, bodily integrity and even physical 
life. We can fail to courageously manage our emotions when faced 
with dreadful bodily ills, especially death.153 We can even fail because 
of more mundane dangers, toil or assaults. 
We can unsuccessfully express fortitude either in a single act 
or an ingrained vice (vitium). Aquinas distinguishes vicious 
dispositions from virtuous ones according to their rapport with 
reason.154 Both are operative habitus; yet both do not have the same 
relation to cognition and volition. In failed fortitude, we redirect a 
primary inclination in a way contrary to the common good, our 
flourishing and ultimate goals. We acquire a bad habitus when we 
                                                 
153 Cf. ST II-II 123.4. 
154 As Thomas says, “virtutum opera sunt connaturalia rationi, opera vero 
vitiorum sunt contra rationem” ST I-II 70.4 ad 1. 
264 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
have connaturalized ourselves to an activity that contradicts reason, 
human nature and the virtue.155 For Aquinas, fortitude entails that we 
manage, in a just mean, the two emotions of fear and daring.156 We 
seek a just measure involved in situations that inspire confidence and 
fright.157 
Properly speaking timidity or fearfulness (timiditas) is the 
opposite of fortitude. The danger of death158 and, in a secondary way, 
other difficulties cause us to act without due confidence or without 
proper estimation of the stakes at hand. Aquinas chiefly adjudicates 
human acts according to their end,159 which allows him to hold that 
bravery is not found in dying (or killing oneself) in order to avoid 
disagreeable situations such as poverty, lust or slavery.160 Inasmuch as 
fortitude involves daring or audacity that draws upon hope, inordinate 
fear of death (or other objects) tends toward despair and undercuts the 
movement of this disposition.161 His conception of fortitude is not 
physical resilience at any cost. The moral dimension leads human 
                                                 
155 Therefore, a bad habitus is not a habitus in the same way as good 
habitus, since a good habitus is a connaturalization according to nature, 
according to human reason—while a bad one is a deformation, or a 
connaturalization against the ends proper to human nature. A bad habit can be 
further differentiated from an evil habitus, the former of which lacks freedom and 
could be caused by bad environment, culture, family upbringing, and so on, while 
the later of which involves voluntary choice for evil. Vices have three 
characteristics. They involve acting: wrongly, badly or evilly, (2) connaturally, 
with the pleasure of habitualization, and (3) without resistance of reason (I-II 78.3 
ad 1). 
156 Aquinas follows Aristotle, for whom courage is an intermediary 
disposition between the vices of cowardliness and rashness. Aristotle says: “With 
regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who 
exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no 
name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in 
fear and falls short in confidence is a coward.” (Ross-Urmson trans. NE ii.7, 
1107a33-1107b3. Cf. NE iii.6, 1115a6; EE 1228a38; EE 1228b4. 
157 Cf. NE iii.7, 1116a10; iii.6, 1115a27-28; iii.8, 1117a30. The moral 
virtue of courage for Aristotle involves disposing the irrational part of the soul to 
participate in the principle of reason in order to develop further our virtuous 
dispositions and to act concretely in situations that inspire confidence and fear. 
158 Cf. ST II-II 125.2. 
159 Cf. ST I-II 1.3; ST I-II 18.6. 
160 Cf. ST II-II 125.2 ad 2. Here he once again follows Aristotle. 
161 Cf. ST II-II 125.2 ad 3; ST I-II 45.2. The sin of fear (the act of inordinate 
fear) is the beginning of despair: cf. ST I-II 40.4; ST I-II 45.2; and ST II-II 20.1-4. 
We shall discuss the relationship of hope and daring further in chapter five. 
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agency toward a particular type of resilience that involves normative 
standards. 
The distinction between praiseworthy and blameworthy fear in 
action hinges on how voluntarily we act.162 How responsible and how 
resilient can we be when under the influence of fear?163 A person can 
be responsible for an act done when experiencing fear, if the inordinate 
fear has not simply remained a passive emotive response to the fearful 
object (that is, if the fear remains on the level of sensate appetite and 
not rational appetite). In most cases, we can and must intentionally 
rectify our relationship with the person or thing that produces fear in 
us. Otherwise, we conform ourselves to the fear; we accept or even 
will the effect of fear (which opposes our rational good). That we will 
the effect of fear (e.g. being immobilized by a fearful situation) does 
not simply concern that we experience a real cause for fear. Rather, it 
specifically involves that we handle the cause of fear in an 
unreasonable way. According to Aquinas, fear’s inordinateness is due 
to the will inasmuch as we “deliberately shun something against the 
dictate of reason.”164 In order to override the inhibitive effect of fear we 
need to act with reasoned daring or patient perseverance. 
The question remains: when does fear excuse us from sin and 
willed moral vulnerability?165 For Aquinas, acting from fear (ex timore 
fiunt) involves an admixture of voluntariness and involuntariness 
(involuntarium).166 Fear-precipitated acts extenuate our responsibility 
(sin—peccatum) to the degree that we are under the necessity of an 
imminent fear. Nonetheless, Aquinas also distinguishes between levels 
of voluntariness and responsibility. He says that “the evils of the souls 
                                                 
162 Aquinas also uses a number of Scriptural quotes in bolstering his 
arguments on sin and fear in ST II-II 125 (in order of citation): Ps 18:8; Eph 6:5; 
Matt 10:28; Ez 2:6; Ps 127:1; Matt 27:44; Judges 7:3; Deut 20:8; Rev 21:8; Ps 
18:8. 
163 Aquinas (cf. ST II-II 125.3) even asks: when is fear a mortal sin? 
164 “Quandoque vero huiusmodi inordinatio timoris pertingit usque ad 
appetitum rationalem, qui dicitur voluntas, quae ex libero arbitrio refugit aliquid 
non secundum rationem” ST II-II 125.3. It is a mortal sin when the fear (of death 
or any other evil) disposes us to do something grave that is forbidden or to omit 
what Divine law commands. 
165 Cf. ST II-II 125.4.
166 Cf. ST II-II 125.4, where Aquinas cites Aristotle’s NE (iii.1, 1110a4-
19). 
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are more to be feared than the evils of the body; and evils of the body 
more than evils of external things.”167 These three levels prioritize 
fearful objects. We rightfully fear most the evils of the soul that 
underlie moral vulnerability (the contrary of good and virtuous acts 
that underlie moral resilience). We should not fear such evils any less 
than the others, since love presses us to cling to good. Even though the 
second and third types of object are truly fearful, they should not cause 
us to renounce the good of virtue.168 Whenever we adjudicate the 
dangers and evils of the body or external things as more fearful than 
the losing of the goods of the soul, we improperly order our loves and 
fears. Although fears may weaken our voluntary capacities, the virtue 
of fortitude constitutes the way to remain firm in the more fundamental 
goods and truths, even in the face of really dreadful evils. 
How do misdirected passions and acts create habitus (vices) of 
timidity and cowardliness, fearlessness and recklessness? Let us recall 
that through fortitude, we cope well with the emotions of fear, daring169 
and pain when facing threats, especially to our own life; we discern, 
choose and act in ordered, intelligent and loving ways. We fail in 
fortitude on the contrary when we voluntarily let disordered passions 
of fear and daring affect our thought, will and action. We can 
understand this later case more fully in dialogue with the psychosocial 
sciences on issues such as learned helplessness and aggressiveness, as 
mentioned in chapter two. Voluntary accord with disordered passions 
leads to acquired dispositions (at psychological and neuro-biological 
levels) that prolong their effect of vulnerability. We thus acquire a 
moral weakness. We accept distraction (even relishing in it) instead of 
concentrating our energies on more important goods, even those that 
we have identified as priorities for ourselves. We ingrain in ourselves 
patterns of fearful reserve and overbearing aggressivity. 
When asking whether blameworthy fear (peccatum timoris) 
opposes fortitude, Aquinas recalls that all fear arises out of love.170 
                                                 
167 “Sunt autem magis timenda mala animae quam mala corporis; et mala 
corporis quam mala exteriorum rerum” ST II-II 125.4. 
168 Augustine, the Peripatetics and Aquinas concur on this. Cf. ST II-II 
125.4 ad 3. 
169 Cf. ST II-II 129.1 ad 2; ST II-II 123, articles 4 and 5. 
170 Fear springs from love, in that we only fear the opposite of what we 
love. “omnis timor ex amore procedit: nullus enim timet nisi contrarium eius 
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While we find the general source of every virtue in ordinate love, 
every sin (disordered act) likewise finds its general source in inordinate 
fear—our inordinate fear of losing money (covetousness), pleasure 
(intemperance), and so forth.171 In this extreme and exaggerated sense 
we even fear fear itself. 
Fearlessness is another way in which we fail in fortitude. We 
can bring disaster, in seemingly heroic acts, through shortsighted 
audacity. We do not reasonably estimate the danger present to one’s 
self or the community. We manifest fearlessness in unreflected 
recklessness from three sources.172 According to Thomas, we can act 
fearlessly when we do not love one’s self, others or God in due 
measure.173 We can also, through pride, err by favoring ourselves, 
while despising others. Lastly, we can act without due fear through a 
defect in reason. Through fearlessness, we neither fear what we ought 
to fear nor as we ought to fear it.174 
Neurological, physiological and psychological descriptions of 
these vicious dispositions add further nuance to the underlying 
biological and psychic interactions. They enrich our understanding of 
human anthropology. Nonetheless, they are not enough to comprehend 
the entirety of the moral act, neither as a disordered moral habitus, nor 
as failure in moral resilience. From Aquinas’ moral analysis, fortitude 
fails when we act without a fitting and possible response, albeit at 
intellectual (reason and will) or emotional levels. Such failure can be a 
single happening. However, we form a moral habitus or vice in 
                                                                                                          
quod amat.” ST II-II 125.2. This “opposite” includes the loss of what we love. 
Aquinas finds a source for this principle in St. Augustine (Octoginta trium Quest. 
q. 33: PL 40, 22), whom he quotes in ST II-II 19.3: “Timor autem ex amore 
nascitur: illud enim homo timet amittere quod amat: ut patet per Augustinum.” 
ST I-II 43.1. 
171 Cf. ST II-II 125.2 corpus and ad 1. 
172 Cf. ST II-II 126.1. 
173 Thomas recalls this fearlessness in regards to the unjust judge that 
feared neither God nor other people. Cf. Luke 18:2; ST II-II 126.1 sc. In the 
corpus of the response, Aquinas also quotes St. Paul’s letter to the Ephesians 
(5:29). For Aquinas, although the vice of fearlessness mitigates our natural 
inclinations to love self, others and God, it can never erase these natural 
inclinations, even in the case of suicide, through which someone seeks liberation 
from present stress, pain and suffering, rather that being cutting off from these 
sources of love. 
174 Cf. ST II-II 126.2. 
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proportion as we repeat disordered acts. In turn, such an acquired vice 
disposes us to act more readily in similar ways. It makes us more 
vulnerable to the risks that fearful situations involve. 
3.5.2. Aquinas’ Developmental Perspective on Fortitude 
What does Aquinas’ developmental approach offer in the light 
of psychosocial reflections and research on managing fear and daring? 
In this section, I shall analyze Thomas’s developmental insights and 
perspective in terms of: the causes that ward off fear, and the place that 
the natural inclinations and emotions have in the development of 
fortitude. His perspective illustrates a type of connaturalization that 
occurs through experiences of fear and difficulties, in the context of 
our quests for flourishing. 
Before attempting a response to our opening question, I would 
like to note that some thinkers have criticized Thomas’ approach for its 
psychological shortcomings regarding human and social development. 
According to J. Porter, although his account of the virtues remains 
fundamentally sound and normative, it needs reformulation since, as 
she says, he “has no sense of the dynamic development of the psyche, 
and, perhaps more importantly, he also has very little sense of the 
significance of social forces in shaping individual identity.”175 This 
critique, while expressing a valid concern to advance Aquinas and the 
tradition’s reflections on virtue, seems overstated. There is no reason to 
defend Thomas for not having foreseen contemporary debates (and 
                                                 
175 J. Porter 1995a, 167. Porter (1995a, 168) “reformulates” an education 
perspective on virtue, based on “how the prudent and virtuous person [...] is 
capable of rational self-criticism and transformation of her individual and cultural 
ideals for virtue, precisely in and through her continued reflective practice of the 
virtues.” In particular, she (1995a, 169) identifies “that the formation of a sense of 
individual identity, and the awareness of oneself as one human being among 
others, are both dependent on a capacity for empathetic identification with others. 
This capacity for identification begins to emerge as the child is taught to observe 
the norms of her society, to participate in its rituals, and, not least, to talk, and it 
continues as she tries on the roles and the recurrent narratives of her community 
through role-playing.” A practical commitment to life and to being good (in 
whatever language it might take) is a basic condition for virtue education 
(including self-education). Porter expounds a framework (and ordering of the 
questions of morality) that emphasizes the interaction between individual persons 
and their wider communities. Concerning “the difficulties” in Aquinas’ account 
of human faculties she refers us to Anthony Kenny (1993, 145-160). 
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advances) concerning human individuation and socialization. 
However, we need to look deeper in order to examine the 
developmental insights that Aquinas expresses through his moral 
anthropology. 
Aquinas cites Aristotle in identifying a number of causes 
(some of which are social) that drive fear away. The Philosopher says: 
“wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away.”176 
From this quote, Thomas draws on two psychological insights for 
warding off fear. First concerning the material disposition to fear, he 
says: “some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear: for it is owing to 
some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening 
evil.” For example, we lack confidence of victory, when we fear not to 
have ample personal strength. Second, concerning the efficient cause 
of fear (of the person feared), he says, “it is owing to the fact that the 
cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be 
repulsed.” For example, when the opponent is strong, or when we face 
an evil beyond the measure of fear (when in the throws of being 
executed, for example).177 In this context, the place and utility of hope 
stand out; they become even more apparent when understood in the 
context of how we acquire virtue. In both extremely fearful things and 
to more mundane ones, fear diminishes inasmuch as hope increases. 
According to Aquinas, whatever increases a person’s power (potestas), 
such as experience (experientia), fosters a person’s agency; it thereby 
strengthens our hope and weakness our fear.178 These causes provide 
insights into personal development within a social context (friends, 
battles, society). 
The natural inclinations, which serve as the formal basis to 
establish virtue, serve fortitude in a particular fashion.179 For Aquinas, 
the expression and development of the virtue of fortitude involves the 
interaction of several natural inclinations: the natural inclination to 
preserve one’s own life; as well as the natural inclinations to pursue 
                                                 
176 “divitiae, et robur, et multitudo amicorum, et potestas, excludunt 
timorem.” Rhet. ii.5, 1383b1-3; cited in ST I-II 43.2 sc. 
177 Cf. ST I-II 43.2. 
178 Cf. ST I-II 42.5 corpus and ad 1; ST I-II 40.5 
179 As already mentioned, in the case of fortitude, Aquinas adapts 
Aristotle’s doctrine of virtue as a mean between extremes. Cf. ST II-II 123.3. 
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what is good and true, family life and social interaction. We need to 
prudently seek a just mean; in the case of danger and toil, especially 
concerning death in battle or for the common good, we need to develop 
proper relationships between these inclinations and more explicit 
personal and social goals. We must ask: how do these tendencies aid or 
hinder our more explicit personal and social aims? How can we further 
train and employ our natural inclinations and emotional, volitional and 
rational capacities in order to serve our goals and flourishing? 
In particular, the danger of death for a just cause demands that 
we adjudicate between the natural inclination to preserve one’s own 
life (and perhaps to support our family), as opposed to the natural 
inclinations toward the good, the true and the common good (and the 
ultimate good). Does such a situation involve a conflict between 
inclinations? In discussing fearlessness, Aquinas clearly speaks of this 
potential ambiguity of the natural inclination to self-love and 
protection: “And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his 
own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, 
that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as things 
to be used for the sake of his last end.”180 His placement of the doctrine 
of human inclination in a larger framework of finality demands further 
pedagogical efforts. It demands that we nurture and educate such loves 
and inclinations in order to arrive at a “due measure.” As we shall 
explore later, Aquinas modifies the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean 
with Ciceronian teaching on natural inclinations, but also with 
Christian teaching on the place of community and the ordered 
relationship of human ends and flourishing. 
While clinging to and pursuing good, and resisting or avoiding 
evil are difficult, we develop fortitude through understanding, feeling 
and acting well for difficult good ends, by employing good mediate 
ends. We make such efforts only within the larger perspective of the 
other virtues and the whole gambit of human social potential. Aquinas 
uses the concept of connaturality to explain how the acquired virtue of 
fortitude entails a certain mental and emotional firmness, which does 
                                                 
180 “Inditum autem est unicuique naturaliter ut propriam vitam amet, et ea 
quae ad ipsam ordinantur, tamen debito modo: ut scilicet amentur huiusmodi 
non quasi finis constituatur in eis, sed secundum quod eis utendum est propter 
ultimum finem” ST II-II 126.1. 
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not lack a sense of development and finality. A human being “can 
achieve this steadfastness in a way which is connatural and peculiar to 
him, so that he does not abandon the good because of the difficulty of 
either fulfilling some strenuous task or enduring some oppressive 
ill.”181 This mental and emotional steadfastness entails a 
connaturalization of the emotions so that we use reason to guide our 
actions even in the face of oppressive difficulties. Aquinas holds that 
the actions that virtue produces resemble the actions that produce 
virtue. He says, “We become brave by accustoming ourselves to 
despise and endure terrors, and having become brave we are very 
capable of enduring terrors.”182 As discussed earlier, Thomas promotes 
the role of parents, teachers and the law in the growth of virtue;183 his 
conception of good dynamically leads from self-love, to common 
good, to ultimate good. 
Pleasure and pain (delectatio et tristitia) play a special role in 
fortitude and in its associated virtues.184 Love and the natural 
inclination to preserve one’s own life serve human motivation and 
action. Fortitude concerns loving some present or future good that an 
impending danger and difficulty threatens. However, it is not about 
pleasure and pain as its proper matter, which is rather fear and daring. 
Nor is it about a false bravery, through which we do what appears to be 
brave, when really seeking some temporal good—pleasure, honor, 
                                                 
181 “Homo autem secundum proprium et connaturalem sibi modum hanc 
firmitatem in utroque potest habere, ut non deficiat a bono propter difficultatem 
vel alicujus ardui operis implendi, vel alicujus gravis mali perferendi.” ST II-II 
139.1. 
182 In Eth. 2, 2, 264 (cf. NE 1104b1-3). In his commentary on the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas says that Aristotle demonstrates the similarities 
between actions that virtue produces and actions that produce virtue. 
183 According to Aquinas, civil law’s purpose is to serve as a discipline so 
that humans become able to do freely, what the undisciplined do out of fear of 
punishment (cf. ST I-II 95.1; ST I-II 63.1; ST I-II 94.3). 
184 As was demonstrated earlier, Aquinas’ position on education in virtue in 
general and fortitude in particular is marked by Aristotle, who promotes a right 
education (paide…a) of moral excellence that trains human pleasures and pains in 
order to “to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought.” NE Book 
II.3 1104b7-8. Aristotle’s three definitions of courage as an acquired disposition 
help to illuminate education in courage. Cf. Smoes 1995, 210-12. On the place of 
pleasure in morality, see A. Plé 1980. 
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gain—or avoiding some disadvantage—pain, blame, loss.185 In moral 
virtues, pleasure and pain serve as mediate ends, through which we 
acquire a good end or avoid an evil one. Fortitude however is more 
complicated than some incidences of moral virtue, whereby pleasure 
accompanies but also characterizes the virtuous activity.186 It involves 
difficulty and therefore a mixture of pleasure and pain.187 
Thomas’ focus on the philosophical physiognomy of fortitude 
does not spell forgetfulness about finality and flourishing. Flourishing 
is the continual motive and dynamic end that animates human life, 
especially when we face fear.188 It involves a cognitive, motivational 
and emotional coping tool. A contemporary question is whether we 
necessarily need to tie fortitude with flourishing (and goodness). 
Aquinas affirms that brave persons do what is fitting to the virtue of 
fortitude, while they seek, at the same time, eternal and human 
flourishing and goodness.189 Fortitude itself is good. Yet it loses its 
fullest meaning and power to move us, when we abstract it from our 
love, desire and pursuit of complete flourishing (including its social 
dimension, the common good and ultimate good). 
In order to complete Aquinas’ position on fortitude and to 
identify its relevance for moral resilience, we need to treat the 
architectonic position that anger (and the other passions) plays in the 
operation of this virtue, especially regarding the daring, enterprise and 
aggression that comprise it. In the practice of virtue, moderate anger is 
instrumentally useful to reason. Particularly in regards fortitude, 
inasmuch as anger cooperates with reason, it renders action more 
                                                 
185 ST II-II 123.1 ad 2; In Eth. 3, 18, 583 and 587; see also Aristotle, NE 
1116a15-1117a28. 
186 For example, Aquinas (ST II-II 58.9 ad 1) citing Aristotle (NE i.8, 
1099a18-22) says that in the case of justice“non est iustus qui non gaudet iustis 
operationibus.” 
187 Cf. ST II-II 123.8; see also ST I-II 31.3-5. 
188 In his discussion on whether brave people act for the good of this 
habitus, Aquinas gives a striking example of how flourishing serves as a 
motivation (cf. ST II-II 123.7). 
189 On the goodness of fortitude, Aquinas cites Aristotle (NE iii.10, 
1115b21-24). On the relationship between fortitude and flourishing, Aquinas (ST 
II-II 123.7 obj. 3) quotes St. Augustine (De Trin. xiii.8: PL 42, 1022-1023, and 
De Morib. Eccl. xv, i, 15: PL 32, 1322). 
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prompt and more resistant.190 These considerations of the development 
or employment of fortitude lead to others on education in this virtue. 
3.5.3. Education in Fortitude 
What does Aquinas more specifically say about education in 
the virtue of fortitude? Thomas’ developmental perspective becomes 
clearer through an investigation of his counsel concerning how we 
prepare ourselves for fearful situations. It suggests a narrative method 
that employs imaginative foresight and self-calming efforts. In 
Aquinas’ virtue theory, the courageous disposition is informed by 
reason and rendered more obedient and docile to reason through our 
successive experiences of mastering fear. We can draw from 
previously ingrained dispositions, which we formed through formally 
similar experiences and actions.191 
To prepare oneself for the unforeseen is an integral, yet 
progressively acquired, characteristic of the virtue of fortitude.192 
Aquinas explains that courage involves both what is foreseen and 
unforeseen. How can we expect to foresee the unforeseen? Although 
fortitude concerns action in the face of sudden occurrences and 
unexpected dangers, it nonetheless involves that we prepare ourselves 
through imaginative and narrative efforts. For example, in choosing to 
ponder courageous people and stories, we progressively prepare 
ourselves for unpredicted events. Aquinas draws upon Saint Gregory 
the Great in this regard, when he says: 
                                                 
190 Aquinas affirms, “quia appetitus sensitivus movetur per imperium 
rationis ad hoc quod cooperetur ad promptius agendum, idcirco ponebant et 
iram et alias passiones animae assumendas esse a virtuosis, moderatas 
secundum imperium rationis.” ST II-II 123.10. 
191 Aquinas draws heavily from Aristotle’s insight on the acquisition of 
courage. In particular, Aristotle says that we become brave or cowardly “by 
doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel 
fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly” (NE ii.1, 1103b17-18). Just as 
humans are usually strengthened through eating and physical exertion, so 
likewise in the case of fortitude, Aristotle argues that by “being habituated to 
despise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we become 
brave, and it is when we have become so that we shall be most able to stand our 
ground against them” (NE ii.3, 1104a28-1104b3). 
192 Cf. ST II-II 123.9, where Aquinas once again cites Aristotle’s NE (iii.9, 
1115a32-35). 
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the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may 
arise, in order to be able to withstand them, or to bear them more 
easily: since according to Gregory, “the blow that is foreseen strikes 
with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, 
if we are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge.193 
We should choose to prepare ourselves for a good number of 
dangerous and toilsome things and in so doing become at least 
remotely prepared for them. Such mental planning and narrative 
imagination is important: we can forecast some dangers and toil in 
life’s great projects (involving family and education, business and 
politics, personal and ecclesial life); all people can expect to die and 
we cannot exclude beforehand a painful or violent death.194 The need 
for preparation has significant pedagogical implications, even 
concerning sudden events or surprizes.195 
Fortitude as a habitus is “made manifest chiefly in sudden 
dangers,”196 according to Aquinas. To confront bravely unpredicted 
dangers (including dangers of death) without weakening or 
disorientation demonstrates we have become disposed for courageous 
acts. Being prepared to be surprised is part and parcel of this virtue. 
Indeed, surprise exacerbates efforts to repulse evil in two ways. First, 
fear can overcome our capacities, when the magnitude of the evil 
startles us. Aquinas affirms that we can diminish such fear by 
premeditation. We train ourselves by thinking about possible situations 
                                                 
193 “iacula quae praevidentur minus feriunt: et nos mala mundi facilius 
ferimus, si contra ea clipeo praescientiae praemunimur” Hom. xxv in Evang. I: 
PL 76, 1259 c; cited in ST II-II 123.9, where Aquinas also cites Ambrose, who 
indicates how the brave person encounters future events through forethought (cf. 
de officiis I, 38, 189; PL 16, 79 C) 
194 “quamvis pericula mortis raro immineant, tamen occasiones horum 
periculorum frequenter occurrunt: dum scilicet homini adversarii mortales 
suscitantur propter iustitiam quam sequitur, et propter alia bona quae facit” ST 
II-II 123.11 ad 3. 
195 If someone is a fireman, policeman, politician, soldier or journalist by 
profession, then he might well be more often than the average confronted with 
sudden dangers, including that of a violent death. In these cases especially, it 
seems fitting they prepare themselves for surprises. But whether we have such a 
profession or not, we must keep our efforts at foresight (including foreseeing a 
sudden death) in the context of our ultimate goal (summum bonum) and the 
strength that God assures us. 
196 “secundum Philosophum, in Ethic. (iii.11, 1117a17-22), in repentinis 
periculis maxime manifestatur foritudinis habitus” ST II-II 123.9. 
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of evil, even sudden, great or long-lasting ones. Preparation helps us to 
correct emotion’s tendency to exaggerate threat.197 Secondly, a fearful 
surprise can further weaken us, when for lack of time it deprives us of 
the remedies and strategies that we might have mustered otherwise. In 
both these cases, suddenness can aggravate our vulnerability to 
fearfulness, while premeditative preparation for sudden fearful 
difficulty can aid us to master it rationally with emotional composure 
and a firm will. 
The fact that we cannot know exactly when or how we shall 
die raises an epistemological-moral question: how can we be sure to 
exercise real bravery, that is, fortitude, in the fullest sense? It is only 
when we are actually faced with the danger of death that we shall 
know whether we shall be truly courageous or not. A similar query 
concerns whether we are really and fully resilient, before the final test. 
Aquinas uses a principle that is reasonable, yet difficult to verify. It 
concerns facing real and not imagined near-death situations. He claims 
that if we are able to do what is more difficult, then we shall be capable 
of what is less so.198 A well-disposed capacity, though, does not 
guarantee we shall use it well; extreme situations have their ways of 
uprooting our best-laid plans. Not everyone furthermore has faced a 
real, sudden or immanent danger of death, nor should we purposely put 
someone into such a situation. Imaginative proximity is another story. 
Those who have bravely faced a sudden danger of death, on the 
contrary, cannot count on their laurels. Nonetheless, given the nature 
of habitus and remote preparation, we can face real and imagined 
situations of death with relative confidence, according to Aquinas. 
In conclusion, Aquinas recognizes that we master fear through 
practicing fortitude, which demands that we attempt to foresee threats 
and hardship, especially mortal ones. Education and development of 
this virtue, though, is not simply an exercise in human imagination. It 
demands that we actually learn to allay fears and worries, so that we 
can adjudicate accurately and efficiently the threat and our response. 
Our personal and communal engagement toward progress in 
excellence, including courageous justice, provides Aquinas a program 
                                                 
197 Cf. ST I-II 42.5 corpus and ad 3; ST I-II 42.6. 
198 “quia qui stat firmus contra maiora, consequens est quod stet firmus 
contra minora, sed non convertitur” ST II-II 123.4. 
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to acquire fortitude and master fears. This program outlines an 
important aspect of moral virtue and resilience. 
3.6. Concluding Remarks on Fortitude and Resilience 
St. Thomas develops a philosophical notion of moral fortitude 
that contains the following characteristics. Due to the virtue of 
fortitude, we firmly, rationally and deliberately face dangers and bear 
toil. We find a mean between the extremes of fear (principally) and 
daring (secondarily). We confront the difficulty of death and death in 
struggles, in the context of a just war or political engagement for the 
common good. His comprehension of fortitude and its contribution to 
moral resilience is richer than it might seem from this slim 
characterization. From Aquinas’ moral, developmental and relational 
approach to fortitude, we can extrapolate a moral resilience and a 
resilient fortitude. 
Some other characteristics of fortitude underscore the 
contributions (enrichment) offered by resilience research. Resilience 
research has well illustrated that resilient individuals should not rest on 
their laurels or social supports. They need to apply themselves 
diligently in each situation that tests their acquired strengths. The 
virtue of fortitude, as an acquired strength, involves a dynamic 
interaction between perception, emotion, reason and will. Neither do 
humans resiliently strengthen a virtuous disposition, like fortitude, by 
blindly copying a previous external act. Nor do we do so in isolation 
from other dispositions. Courage demands that we act creatively in a 
new situation that endangers us and causes fear. Courageous coping 
with conflict draws upon the expertise of virtues like prudence, justice 
and temperance. How can we courageously stand firm, if we 
misconstrue the adversity, or sacrifice the rights of others in our place, 
or cede instead to a desire for comfort? According to Aquinas, the 
principal virtues support each other. We can understand reasons for 
fortitude only in the context of our deeper goals, loves and moral 
norms. Our courageous character shapes our irascible capacity, which 
serves not only our loves, but also the whole range of inclinations and 
emotions, cognitions and volitions. Aquinas’ doctrine of the unity of 
the virtues does not involve static perfection. It suggests a type of 
pedagogy toward growth and completion, which draws on internal and 
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external collaboration and support. Psychosocial resilience research 
has highlighted the sociobiological and physiological working of fear 
and aggression, attention and concentration. 
This study has highlighted fortitude-related resilience 
promoting strategies: self-soothing techniques, self-efficacy and 
confidence, and so forth. A Thomistic anthropology can integrate these 
elements while offering a larger framework and guidance. Indeed 
Aquinas provides a basis to promote a moral type of resilience. Not 
that the other bases are immoral. Yet the sciences, according to their 
own methods, either admittedly depend on moral assumptions or make 
fallacious moral inductions or ignore the issue. Admittedly, this 
Thomistic moral appreciation of resilience is neither modern nor post-
modern in the limited sense of both terms. Rather, it represents a 
tradition that resists rationalistic and voluntaristic movements. In 
particular, it makes its own contribution to a moral type of resilience 
through its insights on ultimate finality, cognitive orientation and 
normativeness, affective motivation as well as emotional and 
intellectual dispositions. 
St. Thomas contributes his own insights regarding educational 
strategies as well. Courageous response demands self-knowledge and 
information about the origin of fear. It draws from our intended goals 
and commitments to norms, in addition to cognitive, motivational and 
emotional dispositions to act courageously. We increase courageous 
outcomes when we imaginatively foresee events, such as physical and 
social difficulties, as well as moral and spiritual challenges. This type 
of virtue encourages self-preparation, vigilance and practiced-
emotional control. It suggests the educational significance of literature 
and the arts that project difficult experiences that humans encounter. 
Our efforts, at a controlled practice of emotions concerning hardships 
and trials, demand that we do more than passively observe the 
situation. Rather, with active discernment, we select the objects of our 
attention and evaluate their effect on our society and selves. 
In addition to the foreseeable events for which we can and 
should prepare ourselves, Aquinas recalls that sudden occurrences can 
surprise us. In the latter, we must mobilize our moral and intellectual 
virtues and other resources in creative ways. In order to continue on a 
virtuous developmental trajectory, such as a resilient type of fortitude, 
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we prepare for the foreseeably unforeseeable future. The unexpected 
event calls us to apply our intellectual, moral and emotional skills to 
new terrain; we need our wits to do so. We can learn from our 
successes and failures, from our good decisions and mistakes. We need 
to be vigilant in order to continue to do the truth in love. 
As rich as this philosophical study of Aquinas and resilience 
research on the dispositional and emotional range of courage might be, 
it is incomplete. It needs to treat the philosophical dimension of the 
virtues of initiative and resisting, in the next chapter, and the 
theological dimension of these virtues and related emotions in the last 
one. 
 Chapter Four. 
Constructive Resilience and Aquinas’ Virtues of 
Initiative 
Hope and foresight are vital for constructive resilience. 
According to L. B. Murphy, “the resilient child is oriented toward the 
future, is living ahead, with hope.”1 Through individual and communal 
resilience resources, we muster hope, confidence and generosity 
toward initiatives that have a twofold effect. Not only do they promote 
personal flourishing, they also promote community. Constructive 
resilience entails rebuilding in the wake of disasters. It empowers us to 
face the challenges present in worthwhile but difficult projects. It 
enables us to build something positive out of destructive events. 
In this section, I shall employ the concept of constructive 
resilience to deepen our understanding of Aquinas’ treatment of 
initiative. For Aquinas, besides what is specific to the virtues of 
courage and patience, there are the initiative-taking virtues of 
magnanimity (magnanimitas) and magnificence (magnificentia). 
Magnanimity, as a natural virtue of hope, regulates our hope (emotion) 
of attaining possible goods, while it also strengthens us through the 
hardships involved in pursuing them. We can attain such goods only 
by investing ourselves in life’s project and by drawing upon the 
resources of others. The dynamics of human hope in initiative serves in 
the coping, resisting and transformative effects active in the other 
virtues as well. We shall investigate how the insights of resilience 
research strengthen Aquinas’ vision of hope-filled initiative. 
4.1. Introduction: The Virtues and Passions of Initiative-
Taking 
An analysis of Aquinas’ notion of magnanimitas and 
magnificentia can help us to understand the dynamics of facing 
difficulty, in rebuilding life in the aftermath of destruction and in 
generous acts that require confident risk-taking to accomplish an 
                                                 
1 Murphy 1987, 101. M. Manciaux (2001) also claims that having a life 
project facilitates overcoming hardships. 
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important good. For Aquinas, these virtues are the key movements in 
the act of initiative-taking or enterprise (aggredi).2 They pertain to self-
preparation for and execution of excellent deeds. 
Through magnanimitas, we mentally and emotionally prepare 
ourselves for an undertaking. For Thomas, the mind and will (animus) 
need to be assured and hopeful in great and honorable undertakings.3 
We prepare our mind and whole person (ad animi praeparationem) by 
measuring and imagining the efforts and risks involved. Magnanimity, 
unlike other virtues, does not simply search a virtuous mean among a 
single set of extremes (in medio stat virtus). Rather, it implies three 
matters: hope (being capable of excellent works), honors (being 
worthy of significant distinctions) and praise (regarding praise and 
glory properly).4 First, magnanimity’s proximate or internal matter 
concerns the passions of hope and despair. We shall ask whether this 
virtue is the natural virtue of hope. Furthermore, although the passion 
of daring is an internal matter of fortitude as well (along with the 
passion of fear), in this chapter, we investigate the daring and initiative 
necessary in human agency. Second, its external matter concerns 
honors, which serve as goals and sources of motivation. Third, the end 
or goal of doing great actions involves not only magnanimity, but also 
magnificentia. The interplay of honor and greatness causes many 
questions about the priority, interpretation and application of each; it 
leads us to ask whether in this regard magnanimity is rather a virtue of 
self-absorption or of excellent action in the world. 
Magnificentia involves not only the start, but also the 
development and the completion of the act. It engenders external, 
generous acts of making or doing. We imagine magnificence’s stages 
in the first moments of magnanimity (seen as a more general virtue), 
                                                 
2 We already discussed Aquinas’ notion of the irascible faculty in chapter 
three on fortitude. 
3 Aquinas borrows this key notion of magnanimity from Cicero’s (Rhet. ii: 
10-12) understanding of “confidence”: “fiducia est per quam magnis et honestis 
rebus multum ipse animus in se fiduciae cum spe collocavit,” cited in ST II-II 
128.1. 
4 Cf. ST II-II 129.1; ST II-II 129.8; ST II-II 131.2 ad 1; ST II-II 17.5 ad 4; 
Gauthier 1951, 316-7, Labourdette 1962, 28-29. 
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but need actually to execute the act without wavering from our initial 
confidence and purpose.5 
For Aquinas, magnanimity and magnificence ready our mind 
to start and accomplish enterprising action. They entail either facing 
the dangers of death (as quasi-integral parts of fortitude) or involve 
lesser hardships when seeking to accomplish some difficult good. They 
depend upon giving of oneself and one’s resources. We should not 
separate them from considerations of being worthy of great honor, as 
the completion of great projects (as potential parts of fortitude, and as 
its secondary virtues).6 As for the virtue of fortitude, Aquinas 
transforms philosophical definitions of the initiative-taking virtues, 
which he further specifies in terms of hope, honor and excellence. 
The emotional and intellectual energy that drives us to 
excellence can confront different obstacles. Aquinas analyses various 
pitfalls as excesses in striving for magnanimity’s end (hoping to do 
great deeds and to use one’s great abilities), its matters (hope and 
doing what is worthy of honors) or its effect (praise and glory).7 These 
pitfalls concern the vices of presumption, ambition and vainglory. A 
deficient exercise of magnanimity is called pusillanimitas, which we 
shall illustrate later in terms of insecurity, sloth and timidity. 
I have structured this chapter on Aquinas’ approach to the 
virtues of magnanimitas and magnificentia.8 We shall also argue 
however that resilience research—which addresses human resources in 
coping with difficulty, reconstructing one’s life in the aftermath of 
conflict, and in undertaking enterprising-action—has a specific 
relevance for the practice of these virtues of initiative. In particular, 
                                                 
5 Aquinas here borrows Cicero’s description of magnificence, which is 
“magnificentia est rerum magnarum et excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam et 
splendida propositione cogitatio atque administratio, idest executio, ut scilicet 
amplo proposito administratio non desit” ST II-II 128.1; cf. Cicero Rhet. ii: 7-10. 
6 Concerning magnanimity, see: ST II-II 128.1; 129.1-8; Aristotle NE iv.10, 
1125a34-35; S. Th. lect. 11, 791. Concerning magnificence, see: ST II-II 128.1; 
134.1-4; Aristotle NE iv.4, 1122a21-23-b2-6; S. Th. lect. 6, 708, 712-713; and 
NE ii.7, 1107b18-21; S. Th. lect. 8, 344. 
7 Cf. ST II-II 131.2 ad 1.  
8 The purpose however is not a simple commentary on his Summa 
theologiae, which contains his major treatises on these virtues and the emotions 
that they manage. Rather throughout, I shall integrate other of Thomas’ texts 
while putting his insights into dialogue with resilience research on these 
phenomena. 
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resilience studies offer insights on generosity and self-esteem, 
concentration and competency, motivation and optimism. The 
antitheses of these resilience components also enrich our work: 
pessimism and despair, helplessness and immobility, as well as a lack 
of generosity and related vulnerabilities. Such concepts need careful 
treatment, since the psychosocial sciences employ them from within 
difference schools and with some fluidity. Nonetheless, we shall 
demonstrate that they add further depth to Aquinas’ approach to 
initiative. 
4.2. Arduous Activity: Confronting Difficulty with the 
Energy of the Passions of Hope and Daring 
4.2.1. Aquinas on Arduum: the difficult good 
The difficulty involved in human initiative, especially 
magnanimous efforts, invites an initial study of what Aquinas calls 
bonum arduum (the difficult good).9 In fact, his complex notion of 
magnanimity seems to concern all the difficulties included in seeking 
flourishing, which he and classical thinkers purport to be life’s major 
project. Thomas associates magnanimitas or fidentia with the 
disposition that prepares our minds for action in the face of the dangers 
of death (as a quasi-integral part of fortitude) or in any lesser hardship 
(as a secondary virtue related to fortitude).10 Indeed the virtue of 
magnanimity includes the range of difficulties involved in the passion 
of hope (defined in terms of a difficult good)11 and in the notions of 
greatness and excellence, as well as in honor itself. 
Thomas construes virtue in general to concern the difficult and 
the good (difficile et bonum).12 Indeed, we face continual challenges 
and opportunities in establishing the rational mean of the intellectual 
                                                 
9 Aquinas says: “spes et desparatio ad aliquod bonum arduum” ST I-II 
60.4; “obiectum spei est arduum [...]: bonum autem cuius iam inevitabilem 
causam habemus, non comparatur ad nos in ratione ardui” ST I-II 67.4 ad 3; cf. 
ST I-II 40.1 ad 1; ST I-II 30.2 ad 3; ST II-II 161.1. 
10 Cf. ST II-II 128.1; 123.4-5; 129.1 ad 2. 
11 Cf. ST II-II 129.1 ad 1 and ad 2. 
12 Cf. ST I-II 60.5; In Eth. 2, 3, 278. In this regard, he follows Aristotle: cf. 
NE iii.2, 1105a9-13. 
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virtues and justice.13 Because of the specific adversity in managing the 
passions in a rational way, we need the other moral virtues.14 Even at 
the level of the sensitive appetite, which as a natural inclination is 
naturally subject to reason, both the passions themselves and their 
objects (when they are complex) resist reason.15 Rational failures are 
even more widespread when we aspire to an object that contains an 
aspect of greatness. Magnanimity involves a rational way of hoping for 
something great. Aquinas addresses the correlation of reason and great 
efforts time and again. Magnanimity saves the good of reason in: 
managing our hope of greatness (I-II 60.4) or our desire for greatness 
(De malo 8, 2); putting a just measure in our aspiration for greatness 
(In II Sent., 42, 2, 4); and imposing a rational mode in these aspirations 
(ST II-II 129.3-4). 
As mentioned earlier in regards to fortitude in general, the 
irascible faculty is in charge of managing difficulties,16 even though its 
passion of hope is entrenched in the concupiscible faculty. That is, 
hope concerns something we love that is difficult to attain.17 This 
insight opens the door for reappropriating Aquinas’ understanding of 
arduum, in which the object of hope involves not only difficulty, but 
above all an attractive good, a good capable of drawing us toward 
itself. Often writers take the Latin terms arduum and difficile as 
synonymous.18 According to R.-A. Gauthier, we should however 
translate arduum as “great” (grand in French),19 rather than “difficult.” 
                                                 
13 Cf. ST II-II 129.2. 
14 Aquinas (ST II-II 129.2), drawing from Dionysius (Div. Nom iv, 4), 
holds that the passions can resist reason. Sometimes passions even resist reason in 
a way that requires two moral virtues: one for the extreme object, the other for the 
common case. 
15 Without overshadowing the ease of the natural and spiritual inclinations, 
nor the connaturality of the virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, we must 
emphasize the effort involved in achieving life’s greater goals. 
16 We are drawn to the good in hope; or withdraw from it in despair. 
Moreover in regards to evil, through fear we recognize the presence of evil, in 
audacity we attack it, and in just anger we are moved to resolve injustices. Thus 
the irascible is not only involved with the good, i.e. the passions of hope and 
despair, but also connected with evil, i.e. the passions of fear, audacity and anger. 
17 Cf. ST I-II 40.1; ST I-II 23.1; ST I-II 25.1; Gauthier 1951, 331-2. 
18 Cf. Deferrari (1983) defines Arduus, a, um, (adj.) as arduous or difficult, 
and Arduitas as arduousness. 
19 Gauthier thinks that the term arduum is foreign to Greek philosophy, and 
that it was introduced by 12th century masters, the quidam or aliqui as Aquinas 
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This distinction helps us to understand Aquinas’ psychology of the 
irascible appetite. While linked to the notion of difficile, arduum is not 
always simply synonymous with it. Rather, as was the case for his 
contemporaries, arduum refers first of all to greatness and excellence.20 
Thomas uses the following terms to express the meaning of arduum: 
magnum, altum, elevatum, excellens, meloiora; it is the opposite of 
parvum.21 When thus associating the great and the difficult, arduum 
becomes what is great in two senses: objectively great, and great 
relative to our faculties. Arduum does not necessarily surpass our 
capacities, but it surpasses their easy exercise, their normal use. It 
demands a concerted effort. The greatness of hope is thereby not 
simply external to our greatness, for it entails personal involvement 
and personal difficulty. Inversely, what is difficult for our faculties 
implies that it is great, at least for us. 
In Thomas’ understanding of arduum, hope is based on an 
instinct, appetite or power (potentia) of initiative, enterprise and 
conquering aimed at the difficult good. It entails a twofold movement. 
On the one hand, the concupiscible appetite—as the instinct of 
possession, pleasure and joy—finds difficulty repulsive. On the other 
hand, the irascible appetite22 involves the instinct of assertiveness, 
combat, conquest and domination to overcome the difficultly involved 
in seeking the good (or avoiding evil). For the instinct of assertiveness, 
nothing is more moving than something great and difficult. But it does 
not focus on the difficultly in itself or as a source of suffering, but 
rather on the great in its aspect of being difficult to attain. This arduum 
is greatness not as source of difficulty, but as source of dominating the 
                                                                                                          
refers to them (cf. In de Anima, bk. III, Lec. 14; Gauthier 1951, 321, n. 1; and n. 
2). He notes that there were diverging conceptions of arduitas, e.g. the 
Salamancan Carmelites; Duns Scotus for his part struck arduitas from his 
theology of hope. 
20 Aquinas’ contemporaries use arduum in the following ways: Alexander 
of Hales: arduum is above one’s powers to undertake; St. Albert: arduum is that 
which is high and elevated; St. Bonaventure: arduum equals magnum, great, 
excellens, eminent, superior, and so on. Cf. Gauthier 1951, 322-3 and. 325-7. 
21 See: In III Sent., d. 26, qu. 1, obj. 1; ST II-II 136.5; Gauthier 1951, 323, 
n. 3; 324-5. In ST II-II 129.2 (on whether magnanimity concerns great honors), 
Aquinas says that difficile and magnum pertain to the same thing. 
22 Cf. ST I-II 23.1 ad 3. 
Virtues of Initiative 285 
difficulty.23 Thomas thus considers the irascible under both the aspects 
of struggling and fighting, as well as victory and domination,24 which 
seem to be elements in resilience efforts. His thought on hope and 
greatness in achieving the difficult good needs further exploration. 
4.2.2. Great Attention and Firmness of Mind 
Human efforts of struggle, accomplishment, enterprise and 
conquest demand concentration. Aquinas highlights the importance of 
great attention (magna attentio) and firmness of mind (firmitas animi) 
in magnanimously managing difficulty. Before exploring Thomas’ 
ideas in this regard, we shall turn to resilience (and neurobiology) 
research on attentional processes that serve in overcoming adversity 
and hardship. As extensively discussed in chapter two, the human 
capacity to manage attention is basic to a number of risk and resilience 
factors.25 Important, complex or urgent human initiatives can tax our 
basic skills; they demand maximal use of our personal and social 
resources. In order to organize these resources, we need to control our 
capacities, direct our mind to the goal and remain conscious of 
pertinent surrounding issues. 
Our attention shuttles between perceptions, emotions and 
cognitions in order to manage resiliently our responses to the situation, 
our moods and feelings, and our social relationships. An abundance of 
stimuli can distract us. We must focus our attention and calm ourselves 
in order not to be captured by the latest stimulus. In this regard, Wilson 
and Gottman distinguish two types of arousal and performance. On the 
one hand, high levels of “incentive arousal” as an active coping 
response aid in motivating and focusing attention on a primary task, 
while keeping contact with secondary ones, and even lowering levels 
of effort and energy dispensed. On the other hand, high levels of 
“anxiety arousal” tend to affect performance detrimentally because of 
anxiety’s negative cognitions such as self-doubt and fear of failure.26 
                                                 
23 As Gauthier (1951, 329; and 329-30, n. 1 and 2) says “c’est le grandeur 
même du bien qui nous domine et qui domine les difficultés qu’implique sa 
conquête.” 
24 Cf. ST I-II 32.6 ad 3 (vincere). 
25 Cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996; Wallwork 1999; W. Eysenck (1982). 
26 Cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996, 194-5. 
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Wilson and Gottman furthermore claim that attentional styles and 
processes are influenced by (1) personality type and past personal 
experiences, (2) past and present physiological arousals, our capacities 
and emotional states, surroundings and relationships, and (3) present 
goals for the future. In turn, effective attention management underlies 
resiliency strategies. 
The parallels between this research and virtue theory raise a 
question and invite a dialogue with Aquinas’ thought on the great 
attention and firmness of mind needed in magnanimity. How do these 
attentional styles enhance Thomas’ approach to great objects of hope, 
which involve difficulty and stress in attaining them? First, Aquinas 
for his part draws from insights retrieved in Aristotle, whose version of 
this quality of strong attention might well be found in the 
magnanimous person’s lack of interest in anything that is not great, 
and conversely his piercing interest in what is noteworthy. According 
to Aristotle, the magnanimous man’s “gait is slow, his voice deep, and 
his utterance calm.”27 This description might at first glance seem 
irrelevant or even an inside joke. Critiques of Aristotle’s thought have 
attacked his magnanimous man’s aloofness and self-absorption, and 
have found his characteristics no more than humorous.28 
Aquinas nonetheless finds meaning in the phenomenon of 
focused attention, which he cites twice in treating magnanimity, as 
well as elsewhere regarding learning.29 He says that “the magnanimous 
                                                 
27 NE iv.3. In the Physiognomics (809b15- 36 p. 1244), which Barnes 
(1983) judges as spurious, Pseudo-Aristotle’s conception of the lion, “moves 
slowly with a large stride, rolling his shoulders as he goes. Such in is bodily 
appearance, and in soul he is generous and liberal, proud and ambitious, yet 
gentle and just and affectionate to his comrades.” 
28 Critics claim that Aristotle’s megaloyucoj “does not command our 
modern sympathy” (J. A. Stewart 1892), is “unpleasing” and “offensive” (W. D. 
Ross 1964), or is a “product of his time” which modern readers find repulsive 
(Hardie 1978). B. Russell (1946) goes so far to say that Aristotle’s whole system 
is “unduly smug and comfortable,” and A. MacIntyre (1966, 79) says in insult 
that the megaloyucoj “is very nearly an English gentleman.” According to M. 
Nussbaum (1988), furthermore megaloyuc…a is the “relativists” favorite target. 
29 Aquinas draws upon the insights of St. Augustine (Soliloq. I.12.21; PL 
32.880) and Proverbs (2:4-5) when discussing the need for attention in learning. 
A focused attention is necessary and depends on the quality of our love. Pain can 
distract us even from what we have previously learned. Nonetheless, love makes 
the difference. Aquinas observes that the stronger our love, the more it retains the 
attention of our mind, and overcomes the distractions of pain: “[amor] quanto 
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person is intent only on great things; these are few and require great 
attention (magna attentione) or firmness of soul (firmitas animi), 
wherefore they call for slow movement.”30 Such great attention and 
firmness of mind is necessary in every virtue, but especially 
magnanimity and fortitude, both of which employ this mental attitude 
or psychological stance aimed at formidable deeds and overcoming 
hardship.31 Thus, magnanimous people stretch forth their minds to 
great things, exemplified basically in accomplishing great and difficult 
acts.32 
Aquinas’ complementary insights on solicitude, moral 
responsibility and human social nature help him to avoid the critiques 
leveled at Aristotle’s notion of magnanimity. First, Thomas highlights 
the importance of the magnanimous person’s solicitude, which is 
neither slowness nor disinterest per se. Rather through solicitude we 
focus on the things that truly need counsel and watchfulness, while 
trusting in regards to other secondary things, when it is fitting to do 
so.33 Second, according to Aquinas, free and moral agency demands 
control of our attentional focus, which is so important for proper 
knowledge, intelligent willing and loving. Although the type of desire 
that follows reason and will (passio consequens) increases moral 
responsibility, a second type of desire that inhibits knowledge and 
voluntariness by limiting attention can distract us and diminish our 
moral responsibility.34 Thus, for Aquinas, human agents must master 
their attentional focus on fitting objects, while resisting distraction in 
                                                                                                          
maior fuerit, magis retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem” (I-
II 37.1). 
30 “sed magnanimus intendit solum ad magna, quae pauca sunt, quae etiam 
indigent magna attentione; et ideo habet motum tardum” ST II-II 129.3 ad 3. 
Aquinas discusses the more culturally dependent properties in ST II-II 129.3 ad 5. 
31 The virtue of fortitude however demands more firmness of mind than 
magnanimity, since its object is more difficult. Cf. ST II-II 129.5; ST II-II 139; ST 
II-II 123.2; ST I-II 61.3. 
32 Cf. ST II-II 129-1-2; Horner 1998: 428. 
33 Cf. ST II-II 47.9 ad 3. 
34 The reason and will manage to resist excessive diminishing of attention 
when they resist the belittling effect of sensual desire. Thomas discusses these 
types of distraction in his article on moral responsibility and the sensitive appetite 
(I-II 77; see especially articles 1, 2, 6 and 7). For Aquinas, we are responsible for 
our desires and their objects, with two exceptions: (1) antecedent passion that 
diminishes attention, knowledge and voluntariness; and (2) the desire that renders 
someone crazy (in amentibus). 
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order to exercise their full moral responsibility. Third, Thomas’ notion 
of magnanimity involves giving one’s whole attention (tota ejus 
intentio) to the good of others.35 This type of attention is a long way 
from the purported self-absorption charged of Aristotle’s version, and 
demonstrates that in important regards, Aquinas’ notion of greatness 
has less to do with Aristotle’s than is commonly thought. 
With these three aspects of attention and strength of mind, 
Aquinas illustrates a type of effort that constructively elicits movement 
toward a goal. Rather than a demobilizing fear and anxiety, it involves 
an active attraction toward some good. Indeed at the very center of this 
virtue of great deeds and his virtue theory in general, Aquinas specifies 
an attentional style that is of the incentive rather than anxiety type, 
according to neurobiological typology. This aspect of virtue underlines 
another noteworthy characteristic of constructive resilience. 
4.2.3. Daring, Aggressiveness and Initiative: 
Temperament and Emotion 
The arduous good interacts with our emotions and 
temperaments, and captures the human intellect. The temperaments 
and emotions related to daring and aggressiveness can serve or hinder 
our initiatives to attain the difficult good. According to Thomas, we 
use raw aggressiveness or assertiveness (aggredi) for building up or 
tearing down. Hope gives rise to daring, which as an emotion or 
temperament trait we further use for good or evil. For Aquinas, the 
rational mastery of personal temperament and the passions of hope and 
fear are at the heart of turning simple assertiveness into well-reasoned 
initiative.36 While entering into a fuller treatment of Thomas’ thought, 
we shall demonstrate how we can advance his insights through a 
dialogue with contemporary sciences: physiology and neurochemistry 
on aggressiveness, daring and the bold temperament; evolutionary 
psychology (sociobiology) on the utility and purpose of “natural” 
daring and aggressive reactions; and psychosocial studies on boldness, 
                                                 
35 When commenting, “sed tota ejus intentio est circa bona communia et 
divina” (In Eth. 4, 10, 779), Aquinas widens the import of the Philosopher’s 
thought. 
36 Congar (1974) calls this side of fortitude’s aggredi its “aspect 
d’entreprise généreuse et d’attaque.” 
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daring and aggression. Enhancing chapter three’s study on fear, 
timidity and anxiety, we illustrate another aspect of fortitude’s genesis: 
the dimension where action is necessary and decisiveness 
advantageous. 
Before going further, I should clarify the terminology of daring 
and aggressiveness. For Thomas, audacia (daring) refers to three 
things: a basic passion, an underlying natural temperament and an 
acquired disposition.37 We employ audacia both when we make a 
quick response (operatio festina) that we moderate with reason 
(moderata ratione), and when we quickly act without adequate 
reflection and counsel.38 This second aspect can involve a culpable act. 
Contemporary English discussions likewise attribute positive and 
negative senses to human daring. As an emotion and an act, the terms 
daring, assertiveness, boldness and audacity have positive or neutral 
connotations, while aggression, rashness, recklessness, fearlessness 
and indifference connote a negative extreme. For example, the term 
“aggression” is commonly used only in reference to violent and 
unreasonable emotion or action. Although daring, assertiveness, 
boldness and audacity can also indicate a negative extreme, I have 
chosen to use them in the positive sense, akin to fortitude and 
courageousness, unless otherwise indicated by the context.39 
Contemporary sciences track the physiological and 
neurochemical bases of daring and aggressive phenomena involved in 
the cognitive and emotive appreciation of a threat as something to be 
overcome through confrontation and in the motivation to do so. This 
tendency is the fight aspect of the basic human flight or fight reaction. 
The apprehended threat precipitates a physiological arousal, hormonal 
secretion and neurological activity. The limbic system (the amygdala 
                                                 
37 I need also to note another sense, which is more the lack of this quality. 
Aquinas uses the term pusillanimitas to indicate the absence of due daring. Later 
we shall discuss this inorderinate act. Cf. ST II-II 133.1-2. 
38 Cf. ST II-II 127.1 corpus and ad 2. Aquinas affirms the value of daring, 
calling on the authority of St. Gregory the Great (Moral. XXXI.24 al. 11, in vet. 
19, n. 43; PL 76.597B) and Aristotle (NE vi.10, 1142b4-5). He calls upon 
Ecclesiasticus (8:18) to denote the sin of audacity. 
39 For example, the WEUD (1989) defines “daring” as: n. (1) adventurous 
courage; boldness, --adj. (2) bold; intrepid; adventurous. Its synonyms count: (1) 
audacity, bravery. (2) dauntless, undaunted, venturesome, audacious, brave, 
courageous. 
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and septum lobes) activates these emotions, while the neocortex can 
intervene in managing them according to higher goals. Primordial, 
evolutionary responses to the situation are not the last word; humans 
dialogue with them through acquired temperament, emotion, volition 
and cognition as well as memory and imagination. A person, 
moreover, consciously and unconsciously employs a web of family, 
socio-economic and religious dispositions and resources in eventually 
producing an act of daring.40 
Fearful and timid temperament types (as discussed in chapter 
three) react quite differently than bold and daring ones, which again 
differ from aggressive ones. A bold temperament can be characterized 
as involving a nervous system that is calibrated for a higher threshold 
of amygdala arousal. This type of personality results in the individual 
being not only less easily frightened, but also more naturally outgoing. 
It can mean that the individual will more easily explore new places and 
meet new people. It offers some obvious resilience advantages.41 
Aggressive personality types, on the contrary, entail an 
extreme form of reactivity, in which learned experience is an important 
determinant, according to D. Goleman. They involve a perceptual flaw, 
which assumes that the other human or animal, or the situation is 
hostile. Aggressiveness is more than a normal cautionary limbic 
reaction when faced with a potential threat. It goes to an extreme in 
nurturing and acquiring a mental appreciation that presumes others are 
malevolent rather than innocent. Furthermore, aggressiveness is clear 
in another reactional flaw, where the individual tends to “aggress” 
automatically the other, instead of exercising self-control and 
employing communication, negotiation or compromise to clarify and 
adjudicate the situation. The aggressive reaction can take the form of 
accusations and personal insults, as well as other learned behaviors 
involving the use of weapons and physical force.42 
                                                 
40 As C. Nessan (1998, 50) observes, the complexity of human daring and 
aggression is such that “a complete taxonomy of human aggression and violence 
would require examination of physiological, evolutionary, developmental (family 
and socialization), emotional, cognitive, cultural, socio-economic, and religious 
factors.” 
41 Cf. Goleman 1995, 196-7, 234-9.  
42 The related problems are numerous: impulse control and coercive style, 
learning disorders, hyperactivity and academic failures, as well as more gender-
 
Virtues of Initiative 291 
Recalling again the psychosocial discussion on resilience and 
temperament in chapter two, different styles of aggressiveness can 
expose an individual to risks or can promote resilience. In contrast to a 
bold temperament, it would seem that in most cases, an aggressive 
temperament lends itself to further risk and vulnerability, both for the 
individual and the social group. According to M. Rutter’s findings, 
anti-social aggressive behavior can in turn elicit aggressive and 
negative responses from other people. A chain of such behavior and 
responses can create a vicious cycle of negative experiences.43 
Nonetheless, in extreme situations like famine or emergencies, one’s 
aggressiveness turns into a resilience factor, when because of a more 
demanding attitude, someone prevails in acquiring limited resources, 
like food or medical aid.44 Furthermore, in everyday life, one can 
accomplish more typical situations and ordinary goals aided by a 
daring temperament or the reasonable management of our emotional 
drives. 
In order to put these insights into dialogue with Aquinas’ on 
daring, we must, first, include his understanding of natural inclinations 
and physiological reactions, second, consider the relationship of the 
emotion of daring with fear and hope, and finally study the related 
virtues, especially magnanimity. 
Thomas recognizes that the movement of daring involves our 
taking the offensive (in invadendo) against what opposes us. We are 
inclined by nature to attack the source of opposition, insofar as we are 
free from fear and mobilized by a hope of overcoming the threat.45 The 
lack of reasonable aggression or daring is timidity or cowardliness; the 
excess of reasonable aggression is audacity and fearlessness. 
                                                                                                          
specific violence in adolescent boys, and unplanned pregnancies in adolescent 
girls. In general, aggressiveness can be the result of emotionally inept parenting, 
and can be modeled through violent behavior among friends and in gangs. 
Nonetheless, it can in some cases be tamed through mentoring situations. 
Emotionally inept parenting is arbitrary and harshly punitive. The parents of 
aggressive children typically alternate neglect with extreme and capricious 
punishments resulting in making the children somewhat paranoid and combative. 
Cf. Goleman 1995, 196-7, 234-9; Jensen 1995; Wilson 1978. 
43 Cf. Rutter 1994, 371-2. 
44 Cf. The De Vries study on child survivors of the Zimbabwe famine (cited 
by M. Rutter 1998, 48). 
45 Cf. ST II-II 127.2 ad 3. 
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Aquinas draws his sources’ insights on aggressiveness or 
assertiveness (aggredi) into his architectonic structure of the irascible 
emotions, which are charged with energy for action when faced with 
the difficult good that appears possible to overcome.46 While Aquinas’ 
notion of hope strictly speaking involves the difficult good (bonum 
arduum), his notion of daring (audacia) concerns the overcoming of 
some great danger (periculum imminens) through the virtue of 
fortitude, which manages fear and daring.47 
Daring and hope creatively and positively interact. Firstly, 
daring can support hope. It is the emotional power horse in 
magnanimity to overcome the difficulty involved to attain the bonum 
arduum as well as to avoid the malum arduum.48 Both hope and daring 
involve movement toward (accessus) the object,49 hope to embrace the 
good aspect, and daring in order to overcome an evil aspect (through 
the virtue of fortitude) as well as to obtain the difficult good (through 
magnanimity).50 The irascible appetite is the gateway for the passions 
                                                 
46 St. Thomas’ synthesis of ideas concerning magnanimity does not shy 
away from Stoic and medieval contemporary (his references to quidam and 
aliqui) insights on hope, daring, aggressiveness and initiative. In particular, the 
thought of both Cicero and Peter Abelard are important for Aquinas’ 
understanding of hope in daring action, as well as of confidence and security in 
magnanimous initiatives. In interpreting Cicero’s fourfold division of the virtue 
of fortitude, Aquinas inserts “magnanimity” in the place of Cicero’s 
“confidence,” while appropriating confidence as an aspect of the virtue of 
magnanimity. Peter Abelard (1079-1142) and this current maintain that the first 
degree of courage is initiating difficult projects in a spontaneous and reasonable 
way. This virtue undertakes an initiative in a way capable of completing it. 
Abelard’s thought was passed on through the Moralia dogma and Philip the 
Chancellor, as mentioned earlier. It is important to note here that St. Albert did 
not integrate these insights in the same way as Aquinas, since he was even more 
set on finding inspiration in Aristotle (cf. M. Dixsaut 1996). 
47 Cf. ST I-II 45.1-4; ST I-II 40-44; ST I-II 23.2-3; ST I-II 35.2; ST I-II 59.4 
ad 3. 
48 At the end of summarily describing the movements of the emotions of 
the irascible faculty, Aquinas (ST I-II 23.2) says that “malum arduum […] habet 
etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet 
aliquid evadit subiectionem mali, et sic tendit in ipsum audacia. Invenitur ergo in 
passionibus irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali, sicut 
inter spem et timorem: et iterum secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem 
termino, sicut inter audaciam et timorem.” Cf. ST I-II 23.1 and ST I-II 23.4. 
49 Cf. ST I-II 45.1 ad 2; ST I-II 23.2; ST I-II 40.4. 
50 While maintaining that daring pertains, strictly speaking, to overcoming 
evil through the fortitude, Aquinas also construes magnanimity as employing 
daring to obtain good. Cf. 129.6 ad 2. 
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of motion and the foundation for human initiative.51 This enterprising 
side of magnanimity is a companion and corrective for the movements 
related to patience, which can tend toward passivity and play into 
helplessness.52 Magnanimity mobilizes our resources, calms the fear of 
failure and converts us in natural hope. 
The presence of hope and the lack of fear in the face of 
difficulty, secondly, produce daring action.53 Aquinas explains that 
daring ensues from the emotion of hope, “since it is in the hope of 
overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly.”54 
Hope puts aside fear and incites us to daring acts, but only when hope 
is strong enough.55 Thomas analyses the working of fear, daring and 
hope in terms of the corporeal effects of the passions (bodily 
transmutations and appetitive movements) that can participate in 
virtue.56 He does not balk at the physical aspect of the energy of daring 
that arises when an object grounds hope or banishes fear.57 Such an 
understanding of readiness to act encompasses all aspects of the human 
                                                 
51 Cf. ST I-II 25.1. The irascible passion concerns movement, motion (ad 
motum). 
52 Patience is also endangered by a certain dryness, which meekness or 
humility corrects. Later in this chapter, I extensively examine the virtue of 
patience. 
53 In chapter three, we discussed the way in which banishing fear gives rise 
to daring. Cf. ST I-II 45.3. 
54 “Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem: ex hoc enim quod 
aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hos audacter insequitur ipsum” ST 
I-II 45.2; cf. ST II-II 123.3 ad 3. 
55 Cf. ST I-II 45.2 ad 2; ST II-II 125.2 ad 3. 
56 Thomas quotes Aristotle as an authority on how hope causes daring, and 
how daring ensues from hope. The Philosopher notes that “those [who] are 
hopeful are full of daring” (NE iii.8); and that daring “is caused by the presence 
in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nearby, and that the 
things to be feared are either non-existent or far off.” (Rhet. ii.5, 1383a17-18; 
cited in ST I-II 45.3. “Daring” is also translated as “confidence” by McKeon 
1941, 1391.) Aquinas, however, goes further than him in recognizing the very 
corporeal effects of the passions in works of virtue. 
57 “Quia vero timor et spes, et etiam audacia, cum sint passiones quaedam, 
consistunt in motu appetitus et in quadam transmutatione corporali; dupliciter 
potest accipi causa audaciae, sive quantum ad provocationem spei, sive quantum 
ad exclusionem timoris: uno modo quidem, ex parte appetitivi motus; alio vero 
modo, ex parte transmutationis corporalis” ST I-II 45.3. [Does in motu appetitus 
refer to hope (as a sensitive appetite or voluntas--rational appetite)? Does 
transmutatione corporali refer to hope as the sensitive appetite alone?] 
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person.58 Daring is not concerned only with the emotions of hope and 
fear, but also the content of one’s virtue and character.59 
Thomas’ view of the larger teleological purpose of the emotion 
and acts of daring contrasts certain views from evolutionary 
psychology. In an extreme form of sociobiology, R. Dawkins measures 
animal behavior (including that of humans) according to what most 
efficiently propagates the individual’s genes. In particular the human 
“survival machine” employs the aggressive drives and instincts for 
self-preserving purposes.60 These insights, while explaining an aspect 
of animal instinct, do not however adequately integrate the whole of 
human moral agency and purpose. C. L. Nessan corroborates this 
critique. He argues that the human being is not only capable of 
“bottom-up” behavior based on drives and instincts. It also employs 
“top-down” behavior, based on conscious intention and decision. 
Observations of human agents demonstrate that they can override 
certain basic instincts for a consciously chosen end. 
What does a virtue-based moral approach contribute to this 
debate? According to Nessan, the human brain’s capacity for reflective 
self-consciousness integrates self-awareness, awareness of other 
human selves, symbolic language, culture, religion, art, music, and so 
                                                 
58 As J. Pieper (1966, 129-30) says in regards to the bravery and confident 
hope in aggressive human acts. “The brave man not only knows how to bear 
inevitable evil with equanimity; he will also not hesitate to “pounce upon” evil 
and to bar its way, if this can reasonably be done. This attitude requires readiness 
to attack, courage, self-confidence, and hope of success; “the trust that is a part of 
fortitude signifies the hope which a man puts in himself: naturally in 
subordination to God.” This aspect of virtue is sometimes quite foreign to 
contemporary Christian views of ethics, which is partly due, according to Pieper, 
to an evident mistrust of passions in ethics. There is an intellectual Stoicism that 
is actually more Kantian, in associating ethics with duty, rather with such brazen 
acts of courage and magnanimity. 
59 Aquinas says that “et fortitudo, quae non solum est circa timores, sed 
etiam circa audaciam et spem” (ST I 95.3 ad 2), in the context of discussing the 
primitive state of human beings. Fortitude already existed then, since it is useful, 
not only in moderating sorrow and fear (as is necessary now) but in moderating 
daring and hope. 
60 Self-preservation is so central for Dawkins (1976, 2 and 71ff.) that his 
reasoning verges on either reducing all other inclinations to self-preservation or 
making it the key inclination that orders all others. Dawkins’ mind-experiments 
attempt to demonstrate that cost-benefit calculations of fighting and 
aggressiveness; their statistical basis however does not permit a non-
reductionistic inclusion of deeper aspects of empathy, altruism and benevolence. 
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forth.61 We need to consider the proclivity for aggression, as an 
adaptive behavior, in liaison with human “reflective self-
consciousness,” which humans can put to rational use either for 
violence or for “empathy and altruism.” Human beings can employ 
their intellectual capacity to plan ever more sophisticated forms of 
violence, such as verbal and physical abuse, spouse and child abuse, 
rape and torture, slavery and capital punishment, murder and war. 
They even make weapons for non-ritualized violence and routinely 
regard watching violence as recreation.62 On the contrary, human 
beings can employ reflective self-consciousness in developing 
empathetic and altruistic alternatives to primordial violence. 
One of the greatest human struggles, according to Nessan, is to 
master violence, using models for resolving conflict and building 
human community without violence. Thus we employ our energy to 
promote positive interactions and constructions.63 Ambiguities will 
remain, however, since local cultures can also promote the survival 
function of certain undesirable behaviors.64 A Thomistic virtue 
perspective furthermore takes these insights to a deeper personal and 
communal level, to involve human dispositions and history in order to 
                                                 
61 Religions can use symbols, myths and rituals for either partisan support 
or elimination of violence. The human capacity of knowing how our actions 
affect others establishes the moral dimension to human activity that is not 
immediately incumbent on animal instincts (cf. Nessan 1998, 445-6, 451). 
Thomas and Carver’s (1990, 195) findings suggest that religion can significantly 
reduce negative social types of aggression. We need to contrast this position 
though with a fundamentalist promotion of aggression, for example, in the form 
of planned terrorism. 
62 Nessan (1998, 451) notes that as the inflicted psychological or physical 
harm that imposes an individual’s or group’s will on others through nonverbal, 
verbal or physical means, violence is a uniquely human potential.  
63 Human beings can use their intellectual functioning in relation to their 
sociobiological phenomena (sex, aggression, pain) to “either direct humans 
toward ever more destructive ways of perpetuating the self or redirect them 
toward the betterment of human community. […] Human beings demonstrate 
their fallen condition insofar as they fail to realize their capacity to redirect 
sociobiological inclinations for the sake of their neighbor” Nessan 1998, 453; cf. 
450-1; S. Rose 1998, 277; 290-291; and footnotes 20 and 21. 
64 According to research (Consortium 1994, 275), social competences adapt 
sometimes-negative ways. “This perspective incorporates the possibility that in 
certain cultures, neighborhoods and situations, so-called undesirable behaviors 
(e.g. aggressiveness, selfish, or passive behaviors) may be required if one is to be 
perceived as “well adjusted” or to avoid being subject to harm.” 
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focus human energies toward creative and peaceful activities. While 
we recognize aggression or assertiveness as a necessary survival 
instinct, human beings can couple aggressiveness with intellectual 
capacities to create or to avoid violence, to dissimilate or to promote 
peace. In addition to the extreme cases, humans muster assertiveness 
and daring in mundane initiatives. Aquinas’ position is consistent with 
Nessan’s corrective critique of a raw evolutionary perspective. Thomas 
though insists that we need to train temperaments through well-
disposed virtues in order to harness daring and aggressiveness for the 
common good. Aquinas takes this discussion further when addressing 
the place of daring in confident action. 
4.2.4. The Harnessing of Daring: Aquinas on Confident 
Action 
Aquinas distinguishes the person who has acquired the 
virtuous dispositions of fortitude and magnanimity from the one 
moved by the emotion of daring alone. Those moved by these virtues 
face danger according to the judgment of reason, with due deliberation 
and foresight, and “on account of the good of virtue which is the 
abiding object of their will. Whereas men of daring (audaces) face the 
danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing 
fear;”65 or according to an evolutionary perspective, on account of an 
aggressive instinct based on a genetic drive to reproduce or protect 
one’s gene pool (as R. Dawkins would say). Through a stable 
intention, disposition and rational adjudication, courageous and 
magnanimous people master both fear and daring. They are 
misdirected neither by one nor the other emotion. Aquinas sets 
demanding standards. A merely daring person aims at an object that 
calls forth hope and banishes fear, and may even accomplish a good 
effort. His act is nevertheless shortsighted insofar as it lacks some 
                                                 
65 “Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula aggrediuntur, cuius boni 
voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter 
solam aestimationem facientem spem et excludentem timorem” ST I-II 45.4. 
Aquinas draws upon Aristotle’s observations and reflections. The Philosopher 
views hope and optimism as negative elements. He notes that the mercenary, the 
optimist, and the rash person resemble each other in having too much confidence. 
Cf. NE iii.7, 1116a7-9; Smoes 1995, 227-234. 
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measure of correct rational judgment, due to deliberation and 
foresight.66 
A discussion of daring, raises questions about the Gospel 
dictum to turn the other cheek. Are Christians who follow such 
messages more vulnerable to aggression than others. Indeed, Aquinas 
and the Christian tradition’s attempts to temper aggressive behavior 
towards strangers and to instill benevolence toward hostile enemies 
have attracted extensive critiques.67 Aquinas’ position on just wrath, 
however, provides a partial rebuttal to claim that Christians are under-
protected from natural hostility. Indeed, just wrath serves to overcome 
the injustices that lay-way our personal and social projects by positive 
use of assertiveness. Anger is especially helpful in attack and in 
establishing justice, when it pounces upon evil and acts to right a 
wrong. Aquinas’ vision of the positive potential of anger is strikingly 
different from that of the Stoics and offers, an at least partial, response 
to contemporary critiques.68 
Further questions arise though. Can we harness aggressive 
instincts for positive endeavors? And can we turn “negative” 
aggression toward positive efforts? We find Aquinas’ response to these 
questions in the way in which he construes that basic human 
inclinations motivate self-confidence, self-efficacy, and so on. Thomas 
associates confidence (fiducia) with the virtue of fortitude and 
identifies it with magnanimity.69 Confidence qualifies the strength of 
hope that serves “magnanimity [which] is chiefly about the hope of 
something difficult,”70 according to Thomas. As an integral part of 
                                                 
66 On daring and attack arising from hope see: ST I-II 45.2; ST II-II 123.3 
ad 3; and NE 1116b 23. On the precepts relating to hope and fear see: ST II-II 22. 
67 We shall address the critiques of F. Nietzsche and S. Freud in the 
following theological section. 
68 On how fortitude and wrath work directly upon each other, see: ST I-II 
qq. 46-48; J. Pieper 1966, 130; W. Mattison 2002. 
69 Aquinas follows Cicero’s quadruple division of fortitude with this 
exception. Thomas replaces magnanimitas with Cicero’s fiducia, while guarding 
the content of the latter’s teaching. Cf. ST II-II 128; 129.6 ad 3; Horner 1998, 
428. 
70 Aquinas furthermore claims that we can be confident when this hope is 
strengthened ex aliqua firma opinione (by a strong opinion). “Magnanimitas 
proprie est circa spem alicuius ardui. Et ideo, quia fiducia importat quoddam 
robur spei proveniens ex aliqua consideratione quae facit vehementem 
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fortitude, confidence is not a separate virtue. But when identified with 
magnanimity, as fortified hope,71 it strengthens us to obtain a difficult 
good. 
When hope causes a daring confrontation of difficulty and evil, 
confidence contributes both to magnanimity’s overcoming despair, and 
to fortitude’s harnessing daring and banishing fear.72 Confidence 
relates not only to hope but also to faith (fides), from which it takes its 
name; and as such, it believes something or believes in someone. 
Insofar as human beings are not self-sufficient, we need the assistance 
of others, in whom we must put our trust. 
According to Thomas, internal and external sources can rouse 
us to confidence and hope for victory: to recognize our own strengths 
and resources, and to observe friends’ capacities and other sources of 
help.73 First, we find confidence in our own abilities and correct 
appreciation of them. We can also undermine it by our lack of a proper 
sense of self-efficacy, which we learn through observing our own 
accomplishments. We establish self-assurance by recognizing how we 
are successful agents with some degree of control over the positive 
outcomes we have experienced, as resilience research has affirmed. 
Observing our past achievements can give us a self-confidence that 
nonetheless depends upon self-correction. 
Second, we find confidence when we observe the availability 
of resources of friends and relatives. We need to recall past occasions 
of their aid and when we have aided them; such cases give us reason to 
believe that reciprocity will continue. Furthermore, it is advantageous 
(even a point of excellence for Aquinas) to have people willing and 
able to render us service (not only friends and relatives, but colleagues, 
employees and servants). Even with this experience though, we still 
must “believe” or “have faith” that they will help us again when we are 
in need. Likewise, we may reasonably assume that public resources 
will be attributed to us in strict distributive justice, although it does not 
                                                                                                          
opinionem de bono assequendo, inde est quod fiducia ad magnanimitatem 
pertinet” ST II-II 129.6; cf. ST II-II 129.6-7; ST II-II 129.1 ad 2. 
71 Aquinas specifically follows Cicero’s (Rhet. II, 54) usage here (cf. ST II-
II 129.6 ad 3; ST 128).  
72 Cf. ST II-II 129.6 ad 2; cf. ST II-II 129.7; ST I-II 45.2. 
73 Cf. ST I-II 45.3; ST II-II 129.6 ad 1. 
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always happen. History illustrates the “unexpected” in economic and 
civil crises, wars and disasters. Therefore, we need here also to have 
careful confidence, lest we be debilitated by mundane worries. For 
Aquinas, a person must trust not only in himself, but also in other 
human beings and in society. 
Security collaborates indirectly with magnanimity in calming 
fear, despair and anything that perturbs the mind.74 Fear not only can 
cause despair, but it destabilizes hope, as we mentioned earlier. 
Security, on the contrary, “denotes a perfect freedom of the mind from 
fear,”75 as well as the process of attaining it. Such security involves 
neither oblivion to fear nor its denial. Rather, it results from a person 
taking counsel and acting in order to find a way to avoid, remove or 
overcome the cause of fear. In the fears that arise from human 
resistance, intrigue and bad fortune (mala fortunae),76 magnanimity 
brings about security by overcoming fear and banishing despair, 
through its efforts that establish a confident hope of attaining the 
difficult to attain good. Each virtue in its excellence, as a difficult to 
obtain good, must overcome the resistance of human intrigue and bad 
fortune. The firmness and certitude of hope depends on the removal of 
such fear, which acts as an obstacle to hope and action.77 
In conclusion, when one is faced with trying circumstances, 
natural inclinations can produce an initial assertiveness which can form 
the first step toward: acting to protect the well being of one’s society, 
family or self; defending a child in need of protection; speaking out for 
justice in a community, and so forth. When the virtuous person can do 
something to overcome the danger or achieve the difficult good, he 
does not simply endure the difficulty and wait. Rather the person of 
virtue attempts to surmount the barriers and to combat the danger. 
Indeed, not every attack or effort is appropriate. The person of virtue 
reasons and deliberates. Consequently, beyond our natural inclinations, 
we seek to acquire dispositions to aid us to move quickly once we have 
                                                 
74 Cf. ST II-II 129.7. 
75 “securitas importat quandam perfectam quietem animi a timore” ST II-II 
129.7. 
76 Aquinas cites Cicero Off. I.20 as the authority in ST II-II 129.7 sc. 
77 Cf. ST II-II 128.1 ad 6; ST I-II 40.4 ad 1. Aquinas also adds pertinent 
insights concerning failure in managing daring and initiative. 
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taken counsel. Like fear and anxiety, daring and audacity can be well-
founded and appropriate emotions; yet they can also be 
disproportionate reactions to the situation at hand. We need to make a 
distinction. Through audacity, we deviate from the aim and measure of 
fortitude. The audacious person is presumptuous. He mistakenly 
adjudicates his own capacities and the difficulties entailed in the effort. 
He errs about himself and the nature of the enterprise. On the contrary, 
through assertiveness, the positive sense of aggredi, we employ careful 
strength and disdain for obstacles in a good initiative related to 
fortitude and magnanimity. 
This analysis of the energy we draw from the emotion of 
daring will be completed by the following studies of magnanimity and 
magnificence, in which we shall treat more extensively of the emotions 
of hope and optimism, and of the qualities of self-efficacy and self-
control. Taken together, these sections serve to illustrate the dynamics 
of human and social vulnerabilities and resilience in initiative-taking. 
Before treating hope and magnanimitas more extensively, we shall 
investigate magnificentia as a virtue of generosity in constructive 
action. 
4.3. Magnificentia as the virtue of making and generosity? 
As we have seen in the previous section, magnanimity and 
magnificence are intertwined. They both depend on related notions not 
only of greatness, but also of nobility and morality. Magnificentia has 
undergone many mutations, which we could chart from the 
conceptions of Greek and Roman nobility to medieval codes of 
chivalry, Aquinas’ philosophical-theological synthesis, the Cartesian 
reaction against the concept of nobility of his time and Kant’s 
exclusive turn to the universality of the good will. In modern 
conceptions, magnificence has been narrowed to the concept of 
“generosity.” Nietzsche furthermore reduces this generosity, as well as 
greatness, to an illusion (or at least reverses the values of generosity 
and greatness, giving them an extra-moral sense), and thus plays a 
decisive role in undermining modern notions of heroic morality and 
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virtue ethics.78 Nonetheless, after recent critiques of modernity and the 
resurgence of philosophical virtue theory, contemporary scholars have 
initiated a wider treatment of magnificence that re-appropriates the 
richer tradition has started. What is the interest of Aquinas and 
resilience research in this regard? What does a treatment of 
constructive resilience offer for understanding the virtues related to 
making and doing, spending and giving? 
4.3.1. Aquinas on Projects of Quantity, Value and 
Dignity 
For Aquinas, magnificentia concerns making or doing 
something great, realizing projects of “quantity, value or dignity.”79 It 
involves a sort of self-efficacy and excellence in agency. It includes 
but is distinct from the excellence and greatness in acts that belong to 
the very notion of virtue.80 More specifically, magnificentia concerns 
excellence in bringing about great external acts,81 which secondarily 
involve great expense. While it is not an art itself, it is nonetheless a 
virtue of art.82 Given Thomas’ social context and personal experience, 
as well as the diversity of his sources, we must ask to whom does his 
notion of magnificence refer. Is it for monastic procurators, medieval 
cathedral builders and aristocratic philanthropists? Does it apply to the 
business community and venture capitalists? Does it have anything to 
                                                 
78 On the history of the concept of magnanimitas, see: M. Dixsaut 1996, 
596 and 598-9; R-A. Gauthier 1951. It is telling to observe how Dixsaut 
amalgamates magnificence and magnanimity in her conception of generosity. 
79 “in quantitate, pretiositate vel dignitate;” ST II-II 134.2. 
80 “operari aliquid magnum, ex quo sumitur nomen magnificentiae, proprie 
pertinet ad rationem virtutis” ST II-II 134.1. 
81 Both Cicero and Albert consider magnanimity as a part of the virtue of 
magnificence. Albert defended Cicero’s classification of the four parts of 
fortitude found in his De inventione rhetorica: magnificence, confidence, 
patience and perseverance. Furthermore, for Albert (as for Cicero) magnanimity 
is a potential part of magnificence, which has two parts: (1) to confront difficulty 
with greatness of soul (magnanimitas), and (2) to bring these sentiments into act, 
i.e. to do great things. Thus, magnificence concerns both achieving great works, 
but also initiative-taking (enterprise). (Cf. Gauthier 1951, 306-7) 
82 “sicut Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic. [5, 1140b22; S. Th. lect. 4, 1172], 
oportet artis esse quandam virtutem, scilicet moralem: per quam scilicet appetitus 
inclinetur ad recte utendum ratione artis. Et hoc pertinent ad magnificentiam, 
Unde non est ars, sed virtus” ST II-II 134.1 ad 4.  
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say to those who altruistically give themselves and their possessions 
towards any worthwhile project? 
The etymology of magnificence (magna facere: to make great 
things) directs Aquinas in developing a comprehensive definition, 
involving both strict and broader senses. In a broader sense, 
magnificentia concerns the habitus or disposition behind the deed. We 
can be magnificent without actually accomplishing great projects, if we 
do not have the financial means or a fitting opportunity. Someone who 
has even the most meager of means can nurture the disposition of 
magnificentia; even the poor person can be magnificent, for Aquinas. 
In this sense, he says that the virtue of magnificentia is at the heart of 
the generous person (liberalitas) either through a proximate disposition 
or through the interconnection of the virtues.83 Thomas’ conception 
integrates a Stoic notion of the self-sufficiency of virtue.84 He even 
says that the poor person who is magnificent can accomplish an act 
which is proportionately great, “although little in itself.”85 Thus, we can 
count the widow’s mite as great, in terms of merit and efficacy.86 
Magnificent people have a virtuous inclination of the irascible appetite 
to make good use of the rule of art in regards to things to be made, 
especially in situations that press their resources to the limit.87 On the 
contrary, obstacles that inhibit us from engaging our resources in a 
“great work” (projects, gifts and expenditures) involve inordinate 
attachment to our money and other resources.88 
                                                 
83 Cf. ST II-II 134.1 ad 1; ST I-II 65.1 ad 1; ST II-II 129.3 ad 2. D. Fritz 
Cates’ (1997, 229) insights on compassion are pertinent here, since it serves as 
cognitive, volitional, affective and pedagogical bases for liberality. 
84 In ST II-II 134.3 obj. 4, Aquinas takes his cue from Seneca’s De ira (ch. 
9) and De vita beata (16.28-9): “virtutes non ex necessitate indigent exteriori 
fortuna, sed sibi ipsis sufficiunt.” 
85 Since the chief act of virtue is the inward choice (interior electio), even 
the poor person can be magnificent. Aquinas explains: “pauper [...]: sed forte in 
his quae sunt magna per comparationem ad aliquod opus quod, etsi in se sit 
parvum, tamen potest magnifice fieri secundum proportionem illius generis” ST 
II-II 134.3 ad 4. 
86 Aquinas esteems the widow’s act of giving her two copper coins (cf. Mk 
12:43; Lk 21:3) to be proportionately great; this greatness relates to the merit due 
(good deeds, cf. ST I 95.4) and the spiritual efficacy (almsgiving, cf. ST II-II 32.4 
corpus and ad 3). 
87 Cf. ST II-II 134.1 ad 4; and ST II-II 134.3 ad 4. 
88 Cf. ST II-II 134.3 ad 2. An ordinate affection is necessary lest one err 
through prodigality or covetousness. 
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In a strict sense, magnificentia concerns actually great deeds 
and the disposition that underlies them.89 This virtue, as a disposition or 
habitus, entails a mean in the order of reason concerning a certain 
extreme quantity of an external work (in aliquo opere factibili).90 As a 
virtue of making, we acquire it through art and external deeds. Thomas 
considers a work of art magnificent inasmuch as the work produced 
(factum) is something great in goodness (ratio bonitatis) in terms of 
“quantity, value, or dignity.”91 He claims that the strict sense of 
magnificence concerns both inward intending (ad interiorem 
intentionem) and outward accomplishment (ad exteriorem 
executionem) of “great and lofty undertakings.”92 
While magnanimity concerns greatness in every matter (in 
omni materia), magnificence concerns more specifically external 
works (in aliquo opere factibili). Magnanimitas’ primary focus is on 
the sole aspect of greatness,93 whereas magnificentia is a special virtue 
of doing and tending to do great things.94 Magnificence prolongs 
magnanimity in material realizations, in artistic and technical orders, in 
all that is done (faire).95 But this extension does not stop at the quantity 
of the material project; rather it reaches beyond to the project’s 
                                                 
89 Aquinas contrasts the strict with a broader sense of making or doing 
(facere) something great, which applies to any action, both external action as well 
as activities which remain in the agent, on the level of intellect and will (cf. 
134.2). Thus, there is a type of greatness (excellence) in each virtue, in which 
there is the excellence due to its genus. Each virtue’s primary focus is on its 
principal object. For example, an excellence in the virtue of temperance manages 
the concupiscible appetite according to right reason (cf. ST II-II 141). In this 
broader sense, he escapes a narrower reading of Aristotle’s virtue of 
magnificence. 
90 ST II-II 134.1 ad 2. 
91 “In cuius quidem usu potest attendi una specialis ratio bonitatis quod 
ipsum opus factum per artem sit magnum, scilicet in quantitate, pretiositate vel 
dignitate: quod facit magnificentia” ST II-II 134.2. 
92 Aquinas cites Cicero (Rhet. ii.54) concerning magnificentia, 
“‘magnificentia est rerum magnarum et excelsarum, cum animi quadam ampla et 
splendida propositione, cogitatio atque administratio’; ut cogitatio referatur ad 
interiorem intentionem, administratio ad exteriorem executionem” ST II-II 134.2 
ad 2; cf. ST II-II 128.1; where Aquinas adds “id est executio, ut scilicet amplo 
proposito administratio non desit.” 
93 As Thomas says, “respicit solam rationem magni” ST II-II 134.2 ad 2 
94 Aquinas says: “Ad magnificentiam vero pertinet non solum facere 
magnum secundum quod facere proprie sumitur, sed etiam ad magnum 
faciendum tendere animo” ST II-II 134.2 ad 2. 
95 Cf. Labourdette 1962, 26. 
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purpose and effect, in terms of self-flourishing and social benefit. We 
shall treat these further considerations first through examining the 
impact of great projects on the human flourishing and resilience 
involved in self-esteem and self-efficacy, before addressing the social 
and theological implications in the following sections and chapter. 
4.3.2. Self-esteem and Resilience in Taking Initiatives 
The present focus on great projects should not sidetrack us 
from considering the place of self-knowledge and self-worth in 
accomplishing initiatives. In particular, recent studies focusing on the 
place of self-esteem in resilient actions present both promises and 
problems that we face in creative projects. Resilience research 
highlights the importance of self-esteem as a motivating factor in 
human action. As the on-going debate demonstrates, however, we can 
make further nuances. As mentioned in chapter two, researchers have 
contrasting views of self-esteem: some conceptualize it as a means to 
an end, others as an end in itself. Some researchers correlate self-
esteem with how someone is doing in life. It is a simple indicator. 
Other researchers construe self-esteem as of primary importance for 
one’s self-realization and resilience.96 In the present section, we shall 
introduce the typology of self-esteem and distinguish the import of 
diverse self-valuation styles on social interaction and moral agency. 
Pro-social self-esteem as a temperament trait, according to 
numerous researchers, tends to elicit a positive response from family 
and community.97 As a feeling furthermore, self-esteem has resilience 
value, when it aids motivation and action that resist external and 
internal negative pressures.98 However other researchers have 
discovered that unwarranted self-esteem can lead to problems and 
vulnerability. Important questions arise: what are the bases of 
cognitions and feelings of self-worth? And in turn, what are the effects 
of different types of self-esteem? 
                                                 
96 Cf. Seligman 1998/1991, vi-vii; Baumeister et al. 1996. 
97 Cf. Rutter 1990, 182; Garmezy 1985. 
98 Emotional processes underlying self-esteem seem to spring from both 
emotional predispositions (temperament) and acquired dispositions (both 
conscious and unconscious ones). Cf. Rutter 1990, 197-207; Yule 1992, 191. 
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According to M. E. P. Seligman, the basis for our self-esteem 
influences the way that we react in strenuous efforts. He posits two 
types of foundation for self-worth: one is unfounded in a realist 
evaluation of one’s capacities and acts, and the other is based on an 
overly positive evaluation. He speculates that teaching unwarrantedly 
high self-esteem to children can lead to problems such as violence and 
depression, which tend to surface when a person’s unrealistic self-
esteem conflicts with strenuous challenges and personal failures.99 On 
the contrary, research suggests that realistic evaluations of personal 
accomplishments increase feelings and cognitions of self-efficacy100 
that serves as a basis for coping. M. Rutter conjectures that the 
cognitive dimension of self-esteem functions through the carry forward 
of cognitive sets concerning positive events and their relation to self-
esteem and self-efficacy.101 Personal attentional capacities, which aid 
us to manage emotional and social experiences, also seem to contribute 
in forming feelings and cognitions of self-esteem and self-efficacy. 
Negative or low self-images however increase vulnerability and 
inactivity. These sources are multiple and difficult to analyze: a history 
of personal failures, being crushed by external events, being 
abandoned in front of overwhelming tasks, and so on. The repetition of 
such events can lower our self-image leading us to depression, under-
achievement and a sense of incompetence. 
Since the notion of self-esteem is not independent from social 
interaction, another important question arises. What kind of resilience 
impact on agency results from social relationships? In addition to the 
social influence on self-evaluation, a person’s self-efficacy is shaped 
through feelings and relationships of social solidarity.102 A social 
network can supply affectional, intellectual and practical support that 
models not only external behavior but also internal emotional 
competency.103 Family influences the types of self-esteem that we 
practice. Some families model constructive self-esteem through fitting 
                                                 
99 Cf. Seligman 1998/1991, vii; Lösel, 1992, 9. 
100 Cf. Werner and Smith, 1992, 185-186, and 207; Maughan 1988, 214; 
Werner and Smith 1986; Seligman 1998/1991, vi-vii; Baumeister et al. 1996. 
101 Cf. Rutter 1994, 373-4. 
102 Cf. J. Bowlby 1969, and 1973; Ainsworth 1978. 
103 Cf. Clarke and Clarke 1992, 153; Rutter 1990, 203-10 and 1989; 
Maughan 1988, 214; Werner and Smith 1992, 5. 
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emotional support and effective communication.104 Family disruption 
and marital conflict can conversely produce cognitive sets of 
helplessness and low self-esteem leading to psychiatric vulnerability.105 
In certain cases nonetheless, we can compensate for inadequate family 
support by relevant experiences in another domain (e.g. other 
relationships, schools, communities and society).106 
This typology suggests that interrelations between self-esteem 
and resilient self-efficacy are complex. We need to affectively apply 
ourselves in order to perform well. We draw upon cognitive, affective 
and social elements in planning and executing acts. As was argued 
earlier, Aquinas’ virtue theory favors considering the affective, 
cognitive and volitional aspects of human agency with reference to 
larger purposes. He would deem that proper self-evaluation needs 
realistic external references, without neglecting the internal ones. 
Aquinas’ notion of the virtues of magnificence and generosity, 
especially when understood in relation to other pertinent virtues like 
prudence, temperance, hope and love, enrich these considerations of 
agency, resilience and vulnerability. In the upcoming section on the 
virtuous management of hope and daring, we shall further treat the 
typology of self-esteem, and the way that a type of self-esteem tends 
toward more resilient human agency. 
4.3.3. Conspicuous Consumption or Generosity at the 
Service of Survival and Flourishing 
A dialogue with a cultural anthropology perspective that 
investigates how types of generous and status-building initiatives 
measure-up as survival-tendencies can enhance Aquinas’ 
understanding of magnanimity and generosity in great and small 
projects. In this section, we shall first raise two questions that are 
foreign to Aquinas’ treatment of generosity and magnificence. How 
can socioeconomic status serve human survival in crisis? Can altruistic 
generosity (involving resources, wealth, time, energy and talent) with 
non-family members be squared with the need to pass on wealth to 
                                                 
104 Cf. Wills 1996, 115; Wilson and Gottman 1996, 220. 
105 Cf. Watt 1990, 300; Rutter 1990, 200; Tousignant 1998, 64. 
106 Cf. Rutter 1990, 197. 
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one’s own children? The research of James L. Boone (1998) 
investigates the evolution of generosity and magnificence.107 He 
advances a Darwinian explanation of conspicuous consumption 
(wasting time and energy on risky or decorative ventures) as a form of 
adaptive energy expenditure that reinforces social status and in turn 
brings fitness benefits. Boone uses a form of “optimization theory” 
from human behavioral ecology to explain the interaction of variations 
in fitness affecting behaviors (such as foraging or conspicuous 
consumption) with environmental conditions. He relates human 
subsistence and reproductive strategies in function of the time or 
energy expended (cost) and the energy or fitness acquired (benefit). 
Then, he predicts the optimal behavior that maximizes the net fitness 
gain (energy, surviving offspring and so on). 
Boone’s evolutionary theory observes that conspicuous 
consumption is omnipresent in rich and poor alike (Veblen 1973), in 
the forms of nonessential or elaborate decorations, clothing, housing 
and recreation. What benefit does wasting time, energy and resources 
on such things bring? He hypothesizes that conspicuous consumption 
is advertising; it is a costly signaling of an unobservable phenotypic 
quality in the sender.108 The quality that one advertises is social 
status.109 But what are the short and long-term reproductive benefits of 
reinforcing social status? He identifies fitness benefits; conspicuous 
consumption increases the “probability of survival through relatively 
infrequent, but recurrent, demographic bottlenecks by determining 
individual or familial priority of access to resources accumulated, 
produced, or defended by the social group during infrequent but 
                                                 
107 His article is entitled “The Evolution of Magnanimity” (in Human 
Nature 9, 1998:1-21). We should note that the article title takes “magnanimity” in 
a contemporary sense to mean magnificence or generosity, as a “costly helping 
behavior,” in contrast to “non-altruistic costly displays” (1998, 15). This use of 
“magnificence” means “conspicuous consumption” rather than a Classic notion 
of great-souledness. Boone is a cultural anthropologist (University of New 
Mexico) who does research on behavioral ecology and the archaeology of 
complex societies. 
108 Boone (1998, 9; cf. 2-5) says, “The key idea in strategic handicap 
theory is that a signal is effective and reliable because it lowers one component of 
a signaler’s fitness while raising another through the production of the display. I 
have argued above that social power is an underlying, usually unobservable 
quality that must be signaled or advertised in order to be effective.” 
109 Cf. Boone 1998, 5-9. 
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serious shortages.”110 But why and under what evolutionary ecological 
circumstances does status competition take altruistic rather than violent 
forms? He argues that competitive altruism prevails over violence and 
against rivals in social groups for two reasons. First, aggression and 
violence are more costly and less successful. Second, costly helping 
behavior is more likely to attract collaboration (supporters, mates and 
so forth), thus allowing dominants to stay so, and demonstrating a 
capacity to rally defense against outsiders.111 
One of the major problems in this type of analysis is 
uncertainty (not only for the scientist, but for the individual) in 
tracking the long and short-term effects on survival and fitness needs 
of altruistic conspicuous consumption.112 In the long-term, humans 
need to be ready for infrequent, unpredictable demographic bottlenecks 
(such as famine, economic crisis or war) that put personal and lineage 
survival in jeopardy. He argues that social status has the primary 
evolutionary raison d’être of promoting survival in such risky 
situations. Nonetheless, shorter-term needs related to fitness also 
expend time and energy: nutrient acquisition, avoidance of 
environmental hazards and pathogens, parental investment, mating 
efforts and so forth.113 He concludes that social status reinforcement is 
an adaptive, state-dependent strategy that involves short and long-term 
costs and benefits.114 These theories provide theoretical and 
                                                 
110 Boone (1998, 10) analyses strategies that favor fewer offspring and 
more offspring in the short-term. He compares survival during two nineteenth 
century famines (in India and Ireland) over the long-term. He (1998, 11-12) 
observes a higher population (higher survival rates, i.e. less deaths in famine-
crises) in the first instance. It seems to me that he uses two extreme cases, which 
seem to prove his point; but which in a larger analysis might not. 
111 Boone (1998, 15-16) argues furthermore that altruistic generous 
displays “as distinctive, emergent, group-level characteristics” are complex 
because: (1) they involve economic transactions—problems of interpreting 
history, or effect; and (2) a transfer of good or service reduces the fitness 
differential (at least in the short-term).  
112 Another problem would be if political propaganda or social studies 
would promote the contrary. For example, that aggression and violence are less 
costly and more successful for survival. Thus, we need moral norms. 
113 Boone (1998, 18) assumes, contrary to popular opinion, that 
socioeconomic status and fitness is not isomorphic, that it is not simply definable 
in terms of total annual income or some measure of total accumulated wealth. 
114 Boone (1998, 18) says that: “It seems at least possible that a group of 
individuals or families that have identical annual incomes or accumulated wealth 
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observation-based support promoting generous altruism rather than 
egotistical miserliness as a survival strategy. They offer constructive 
insights concerning the utility of altruistic generosity for oneself and 
one’s offspring as well as for the social whole.115 This evolutionary 
approach comes to some conclusions similar to Aquinas’, but for 
different reasons and with different import. 
Aquinas holds that the virtues of magnificence and generosity 
have personal and social import. Magnificence is primarily about 
accomplishing great ventures, but secondarily about the expenditures 
needed to complete these works.116 It concerns the emotions involved 
in such feats. First, the context of the virtues of magnificence and 
generosity is explicitly moral and social; we must explicitly intend and 
plan to bring benefit to others through our ventures and expenditures. 
They both involve a larger social impact. Neither generous, nor 
magnificent people are egocentric, but rather they recognize that 
“one’s person is little in comparison with […] the affairs of the 
community at large.”117 Aquinas affirms that excess of riches is meant 
to be generously distributed, without impoverishing the giver.118 This 
view gives us indications of the larger social context and the related 
virtues, such as justice and prudence. 
                                                                                                          
might expend widely variable proportions of income on (a) conspicuous 
consumption and other status reinforcement displays, (b) the production and 
rearing of offspring (Kaplan 1996), and (c) conservation of resources that can be 
passed on to offspring in the form of bequests (Rogers 1990).” He leaves for 
future research more detailed hypotheses about the relationship between 
socioeconomic conditions, wealth allocation and other components of long- and 
short-term fitness. 
115 However, he makes what I judge to be an inconclusive argument about 
the tradeoff between social status and fertility. Cf. Boone “More Status or More 
Children?” 2002. 
116 Cf. ST II-II 135.1. 
117 “Quod autem pertinet ad personam uniuscuiusque, est aliquid parvum 
in comparatione ad id quod convenit rebus divinis vel rebus communibus”ST II-
II 134.1 ad 3. 
118 Aquinas (ST II-II 117.1 ad 1) says: “suberabundantia divitiarum datur 
aliquibus a Deo ut meritum bonae dispensationis acquirant,” citing Ambrose 
(Serm. 81 de Temp.: PL 17.593-4) and Basil’s (Hom. 6 in Luc xxi.18: PG 
31.264C, 276 C) commentaries on the Gospel of Luke (12:18) in order to define 
the context and purpose for excess riches. In addition to the function of 
distributing wealth, Aquinas speaks in terms of the merit due the person that 
gives to those in need. He follows Aristotle and Ambrose in affirming that 
generosity is not meant to despoil the giver (ST II-II 117.1 ad 2). 
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Secondly, Aquinas attends to how our emotions and intellects 
interact in these virtues. He identifies great expenditure and the love of 
money as the critical points of magnificence. He compares and 
contrasts this virtue with generosity. Generosity or liberality 
(liberalitas) extends to all riches, money and possessions (pecunia, 
bona possessa). It immediately concerns the concupiscible passions of 
loving, desiring, pleasure and sorrow, which we experience when we 
liberate (liberat) things from our ownership. Generosity in effect 
demonstrates that our mind is free from attachment to these things.119 It 
moderates our love of money. Magnificence, in contrast, addresses 
these same two objects at different levels.120 First, it relates to the 
difficulty concerning monetary transactions and possessions that are 
properly proportioned to great works. A magnificent person directs his 
efforts, using reason to find a proportion of expenditure fitting for the 
great works at hand. Second, humans must efficaciously manage the 
related passions—the love and desire for these great means—amidst 
the project’s difficulty. The passions are more strongly influenced 
since these great goods and works confront risks; we may incur great 
loss.121 For these reasons, the irascible passions are more central than 
the concupiscible. We need to hope that we can complete the project 
and not be dispossessed of our property in the process.122 Although the 
proportions differ, both generous and magnificent people spend their 
money and give their possessions readily and with pleasure.123 
The outlay needed for a great project is a secondary aspect of 
the virtue of magnificence. It concerns both intellectual planning and 
emotional engagement. Only once we have adjudicated that a venture 
is a fitting end, can we set about to find appropriate means to 
accomplish it. We must calculate the details in terms of their suitability 
and cost. Through magnificence, we seek to maximize the quality of 
                                                 
119 Cf. ST II-II 117.2. 
120 Cf. ST II-II 134.3. 
121 Thomas says: “nisi diligens consideratio adhiberetur, immineret 
periculum magni damni” ST II-II 134.4 ad 3 
122 Cf. ST II-II 134.4 ad 1. 
123 “magnificus convenit cum liberali in hos quod prompte et delectabiliter 
pecunias emittit” ST II-II 135.1 ad 3. 
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the work for the expense.124 Through waste or meanness however, we 
can derail this effort. 
Meanness or stinginess (parvificentia) involves several 
problematics. First, on the level of the passions, it entails an inordinate 
attachment to our own goods. The possibility of failure related to great 
projects produces greater fear of being dispossessed and thus 
exasperates tightfistedness. Second, in the measure of the end, the 
miserly person intends something little (parvum), where it is fitting to 
aim higher, and where magnanimous people intend something great. 
The latter tend to great projects, because of the good involved; then 
they calculate and accept the expense in turn. While the stingy person 
first measures the expense, looking to minimize his outlay; then he 
intends to do a small work.125 He fails by aiming below the mark, by 
not even considering other goods (bonum), except in the optic of their 
material expense. Inhibited by love of possessions, he will not spend 
for a project of philanthropic or entrepreneurial value. Third, he “does 
not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, 
makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.”126 
Such greedy and ungenerous people only spend with sadness and 
delay.127 
Conversely, when one is wasteful (consumptio), one spends 
more than is reasonable for a project. One over-estimates the value of 
the venture. Thomas recognizes that a particular work (opus) calls for a 
proportioned expenditure (sumptus).128 Thomas uses the Latin term 
                                                 
124 At least twice (in ST II-II 134.3; and ST II-II 135.1), Aquinas quotes 
Aristotle saying, “magnificus ab aequali sumptu opus facit magis magnificum” 
NE iv.4, 1122b13-18; S. Th. lect. 6. 718. This idea concerns the proportion—a 
more adequate relationship between cost and the quality of the project. It involves 
reason applied in art—the virtue of art in relation to the cost of the work.  
125 Cf. ST II-II 135.1. 
126 “non dirigit affectum suum secundum rationem, sed potius rationis 
usum applicat ad inordinationem sui affectus” ST II-II 135.1 ad 2. 
127 “magnificus convenit cum liberali in hos quod prompte et delectabiliter 
pecunias emittit, ita etiam pervificus convenit cum illiberali sive avaro in hoc 
quod cum tristitia et tarditate expensas facit” ST II-II 135.1 ad 3. 
128 “excedat proportionem quae esse debet sumptus ad opus secundum 
regulam rationis” ST II-II 135.2. 
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consumptio, since this type of spending acts like a fire that consumes 
all for no good purpose.129 
How does the evolutionary approach on altruistic conspicuous 
consumption and survival compare with Aquinas’ virtue approach to 
magnificence and generosity? Both approaches promote an altruistic 
type of generosity. We find a major difference though in the moral and 
social dimension. Inasmuch as cultural anthropology involves an 
abstraction from moral adjudication and does not attend to important 
aspects of an act’s intentionality, it seems to neglect a deeper analysis 
of personal involvement in promoting not only the physical survival 
but also the moral flourishing of one’s self, family and society. We 
need to incorporate fuller notions of justice and common good, unless 
we accept leaving the quality of survival to the invisible hand of 
altruistic conspicuous consumption to distribute basic goods to those in 
need. Aquinas’ fundamental definitions of magnificence and 
generosity, on the contrary, cannot be separated from their larger 
context, which specifies a moral and just type of survival and 
resilience. In this case, we must correlate the difficulty of using money 
and possessions with the other virtues that direct them to the common 
good, the good of others and to one’s own excellence. In particular, the 
virtues of justice, prudence, fortitude and temperance necessarily 
underlie works of magnificence and generosity, and weigh them with a 
different measure than pure physical survival.130 In the end, they 
involve the physical and moral flourishing of individuals and society. 
Magnificence and generosity interrelate with the natural virtues of 
magnanimity and hope, which we shall now address more fully. 
4.4. Magnanimitas as the Natural Virtue of Hope 
We can now return to examine the way that humans confront 
adversity with the energy of the emotions through the disposition that 
Aquinas calls magnanimitas. By following Thomas, we can avoid a 
narrow concept of the emotion, disposition and act of hope. He 
                                                 
129 Cf. ST II-II 135.2. Such waste can be caused by another vice, like the 
pursuit of vainglory (cf. ST II-II 135.2 ad 3). Moreover, in regards to the virtue of 
generosity or liberality (ST II-II 117) Thomas treats the related vices of 
covetousness (ST II-II 118) and prodigality (ST II-II 119). 
130 Cf. ST II-II 117.6. 
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associates magnanimity with the management of honor, great deeds 
and excellence. Here resilience is of particular benefit again; it 
analyzes the roles that human hope and optimism play in temperament, 
attitudes and behavior. In this section, we shall thusly ask three 
intertwining questions: How can resilience studies enrich Aquinas’ 
virtue approach, in particular concerning hope? Can we construe 
magnanimitas as “the natural virtue of hope”? And how does Aquinas’ 
version of this virtue manage honors, great deeds and excellence? But 
before addressing these queries, I shall broach two etymological issues. 
The internal complexity of Thomas’ notion of magnanimitas 
and the emotions it manages are entrenched in an obscure historical 
evolution and etymology.131 How might one best translate his notion of 
magnanimitas today? Is ‘greatness of soul’ or ‘great-souledness’ more 
illustrative than ‘magnanimity’? The problems of magnanimitas is well 
exemplified through the history of its Greek forbearer megaoyuc…a, 
which is etymologically concerned with greatness of soul, and by 
definition it concerns great things (perˆ meg£la).132 Seeking to avoid 
coloring the interpretation of this virtue with anyone of its numerous 
facets (and thereby either infelicitously limiting it, or unjustly 
overcharging the definition), some English translators of Aquinas have 
literally translated magnanimitas as “magnanimity.”133 I shall follow 
                                                 
131 History has seen numerous debates, opinions and transformations of the 
meanings of magnanimitas. 
132 Cf. NE 1123a34. Before Aristotle, megaloyuc…a was a part of common 
language that signified successively clemency, magnificence, heroic courage, 
grandiose ambition, pride, and finally impassivity when faced with bad fortune. 
Aristotle’s specifically ethical treatment attempts to reconcile the vestigial 
Homeric values of greatness and grandeur with the newer values of moderation 
and the mean. For example, a heated debate among Aristotle’s commentators 
exists about the meaning and relevancy of his definition and description of 
megaloyuc…a. Its meaning has perhaps elicited more divergent interpretation in 
recent scholarship than any other of his virtues. Some people reject it as culturally 
irrelevant, and others hold it as Aristotle’s highest, synthetic virtue. Some of the 
difficulty is expressed in the way in which different thinkers translate 
megaloyuc…a (cf. Curzer 1990, 532, and 518; Gauthier 1951, 37-41, 52, 55-118, 
273; Smoes 1995; Somme 1999). 
133 Besides its literal renderings of magnanimity (Horner 1998; Rackham 
1983; Curzer 1990 and 1991; Gauthier 1951; Tricot 1959; Gauthier and Jolif, 
1970; Somme 1999), great-souledness or greatness of soul (Thomson 1953; 
MacIntyre 1966; Dalimier 1992; Smoes 1995, 267), other translations include: 
pride or proper pride (Ross 1923, McKeon 1941); high-mindedness (Ostwald; 
Greaves 1963.), superiority (Thomson 1953), and dignity (Joachim 1951). 
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this practice, while trying both to highlight the abundant richness of 
the concept and not to stray too far a field from its associations with 
resilience. 
Other etymological problems arise concerning hope. We need 
to distinguish the emotion of hope and optimistic temperament from 
the virtues that bear the same name. Etymologically, the English 
language is poor in this regard. We use “hope” both for the theologal 
virtue, as well as for everyday wishes, desires and expectations: such 
as an optimistic attitude or our hopes at work, in child-raising and so 
forth.134 Although lacking a clear terminological distinction in English, 
I shall contrast everyday hopes (in the plural), rooted in the natural 
passion of hope, from the fundamental theological hope (singular) that 
also involves grace and divine initiative. 
Aquinas identifies magnanimity as the virtue that manages the 
passions of hope and despair. Yet he also discusses it in terms of 
managing honor and excellence. Even though he deems that the 
passion of hope is the proximate matter of magnanimity,135 we need to 
ask whether his notion of the virtue of magnanimity entails the natural 
virtue of hope?136 I shall investigate the import of such a claim through 
his etymology of hope, his notion of the passion of hope, and the other 
emotions and virtues concerned with it. Fed by resilience research and 
Aquinas’ reflections, we shall develop a typology of hope starting with 
considerations of temperament traits, attitudes and emotions, before 
discussing related emotions and natural dispositions. In the following 
                                                 
134 English like Latin (spes), German (hoffnung), and Italian (speranza) 
have only one noun for hope. French on the contrary has the advantage of 
possessing two separate words (espoir and espérance) that are sometimes used in 
order to distinguish a natural virtue with its everyday hopes (espoirs), from a 
fundamental or theological virtue (espérance). For other reflections on this 
distinction between everyday or ordinary hopes and fundamental hope, see B. 
Schumacker (2000) who distinguishes “espoir” or “espoirs ordinaires” from 
“l’espérance fondamentale;” J. Pieper who differentiates die “Alltags-
hoffnungen” from die “fundamentale” Hoffnung (1967, 24-8); or J. B. Brantschen 
who distinguishes die vielen “vorletzten Hoffnungen” from die “letzte Hoffnung” 
(1992, 24-33). 
135 Cf. ST I-II 60.4; ST II-II 17.5 ad 4; ST II-II 21.1; ST II-II 128.1 ad 6; ST 
II-II 129. 
136 One counter indication of the claim seems to be that the passion of hope 
involves not only an aspect of magnanimity but also of magnificence (cf. ST I-II 
60.5). 
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section, we shall extend this research to include the accent that 
Aquinas puts on honor and excellence. 
4.4.1. Optimism and Resilience: Attitudes, Emotions and 
the Virtue of Hope 
Aquinas recognizes that individuals’ natural dispositions 
differ. As for timidity and boldness, some humans are more hopeful, 
others more pessimistic. But such innate differences are not static. 
Through our actions, we modify not only our way of experiencing such 
emotions, but also our temperaments and basic dispositions. That is, 
we can acquire the virtue of hope or its contrary. How might 
psychosocial insights on optimistic attitudes and hope enrich this 
Thomistic virtue anthropology? 
As mentioned in chapter two, the psychosocial sciences widely 
consider optimism or hopefulness as a temperament trait that tends 
toward acting with the expectation of attaining a good result.137 For 
example, L. B. Murphy conceives of optimism as “a bias evoking 
resilience;”138 C. R. Snyder defines it “as a generalized expectancy that 
good things will happen;”139 and Lazarus and Lazarus describe it as “a 
positive expectation about what will happen.”140 Such a temperament 
quality elicits positive social responses from the human environment. 
While involving human genes, these sciences recognize that humans 
can develop a temperament disposition like hopefulness in diverse 
fashions through interaction with one’s surroundings throughout life. 
In both individual and social domains, they construe optimism as one 
of the basic attitudinal dimensions of coping. 
                                                 
137 Cf. Wills 1996, 128; Murphy 1987; Rutter 1990, 182; Garmezy 1985; 
Seligman 1991; Goleman 1995. It is one of the “basic” attitudinal dimensions of 
coping described by Scheier and Carver 1987 (cited by Wills 1996). 
138 Lois Barclay Murphy 1987, 104. 
139 Snyder et al. (1991, 571) also cite Scheier and Carver (1985) who 
“argue that optimists maintain positive expectations that are not limited to a 
specific domain or class of settings.” 
140 Lazarus and Lazarus (1994, 73) say: “Optimism is having a positive 
expectation about what will happen. In optimism one is primed for a good 
outcome. This is sometimes imprudent because one may have risked too much, 
and, when things go sour, it is all the more dismaying, costly, and even 
disillusioning. Mostly, one hopes a bad situation will improve.” 
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Cognitive psychologists construe the hope as an emotional or 
sentimental reaction to a situation that one senses as beneficial, yet 
associated with something unfavorable. Lazarus and Lazarus (1994) 
deem hope an emotion with coping value, since it seldom involves a 
cool detachment, but rather brings emotion to action.141 They say that: 
People generate the feeling of hope as a way of coping with the 
trouble because it is better than giving into despair. The personal 
meaning is that there is some chance, either by virtue of what one 
does or merely as a result of good luck, that the outcome we dread—
and hope against—will not be as bad as was feared, or that despite 
what we dread, everything will ultimately turn out okay.142 
The feeling of hope forcefully sustains us in the midst of 
difficult conditions. They emphasize moreover that hope is not simply 
a positive state of mind. Rather, as rooted in some difficulty, it is 
“essentially an antidote to despair.” Since hope precedes a positive 
outcome, we need to anticipate it, without falling into “false hope.”143 
They emphasize though that even vain hope gives people a footing 
against despair. The danger of this kind of hope, however, according to 
Lazarus and Lazarus “is that the person will continue to seek what is 
denied and, therefore, fail to redirect his or her thoughts and energies 
toward a more realistic outcome.”144 
This discussion of the attitude of optimism and the emotion of 
hope leads to further queries about learned optimism and resilience, 
that is, about an acquired virtue of hope. Today’s difficult encounter 
might render a different emotional result than yesterday’s. Beyond 
emotive reactions, hope serves as a basis for further action. When it 
involves an operative disposition, a virtue for creative action, hope 
                                                 
141 Lazarus and Lazarus (1994, 73) describe the emotion of hope as: “a 
wish for better conditions of life in an ambiguous but difficult situation. Other 
words, such as faith, trust, security, conviction, confidence, all seem too positive 
and secure to carry the more tentative meaning of hope.” They maintain that 
promise, expectation and anticipation are synonyms for hope (Lazarus 1994, 72). 
142 Lazarus and Lazarus 1994, 74. 
143 Lazarus and Lazarus 1994, 72. Furthermore they (p. 71) say: “To the 
extent that hoping sustains our ability to cope actively with the way things are 
and to maintain a positive outlook on life, any claim about its falseness seems to 
lack wisdom.” 
144 Lazarus and Lazarus 1994, 74. 
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entails more than its associated acts, according to Aquinas. In order to 
understand hope-filled human agency, we need to examine emotional 
reactions and attitudes in the context of a person’s experiences, acts 
and dispositions (at social, intellectual, volitional, emotional, genetic 
levels), as well as the present situation.145 
As an acquired tendency for creative action, hope is more than 
a temperament trait or an emotional experience or even a judgment. 
According to both Thomas and resilience researchers, temperament 
and emotional styles form a natural basis for acquired qualities that we 
can only more fully understand in terms of cognitive and volitional 
input, in a more global perspective on the human person. Having or not 
having an optimistic temperament is not the last word. If we can learn 
hopefulness, then we can extend or correct to some extent genetic 
patrimony and personal history.146 A person can learn to knowingly and 
willingly act in the expectation of attaining a goal, and can thus: 
ingrain such an optimistic tendency in emotion, imagination, thought 
and will;147 or correct contrary tendencies as a sort of recovery, therapy, 
or conversion.148 Learned helplessness, in contrast, as a “failure to 
                                                 
145 In certain cases, researchers call hope an emotion, even though they 
conceive it in a very complete way, even including: intellectual perception and 
complex judgments about possible future solutions; volition involvement in goal 
acquisition. For example Post-White (1998, 281) say: “Hope is an emotion in 
human experience that entails finding meaning in a situation, perceiving a 
possible solution, envisioning a future goal, and participating to achieve that goal 
(Lynch 1965; Stotland, 1969). Hope is a situational, learned response that 
motivates the individual to achieve realistic, important goals (Mowrer, 1969).” 
146 For example, L. B. Murphy (1987, 104) describes the basic roots and 
early development of acquired optimism; she says: “I have shown here that the 
roots of early coping skills lie in the baby’s active protests and selectivity, and the 
young child’s capacity to accept substitutes and restructure experiences of 
gratification of needs, of being able to count on life feeling good. The optimism 
and hope that come from the earliest satisfying, restorative experiences are 
reinforced in the next few years when separations are followed by reunions, 
frustrations bring support in coping, pain is followed by comfort, initiatives are 
backed, and the child develops confidence that he and the environment will be 
able to manage any problem. There are ups and downs, downs and ups, and the 
growing child begins to feel that he can get out of the downs and help to make his 
life good. As Helen said at the age of 10, ‘Bad things can turn into good things’.” 
147 See T. Damasio (1999a and 1999b) on the relationship between human 
consciousness, emotions, and genes. 
148 For example, L. B. Murphy (1987: 101) construes “learned 
hopefulness” in the perspective of resilience, as recovery involving aspects of the 
whole person. 
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escape traumatic shock” can reinforce early pessimistic attitudes or 
reorient a hopeful temperament. 
Martin E. P. Seligman takes a cognitive and attribution 
approach to understanding optimism, pessimism and their related 
effects on human capacities to confront difficulty.149 He defines 
optimism as a habit of the mind that enables those who face misfortune 
to think of it as temporally limited, as having an external cause and as 
being restricted in its import.150 Confronted with setbacks and 
frustrations, optimism means expecting that, in general, things will 
turn out well. Attitudes and cognitive narrative styles are of utmost 
importance for optimism, which is not a static attitude. Rather 
Seligman conceives of it as a flexible quality that aims to increase our 
control over the way we think about adversity.151 He theorizes that 
optimistic explanatory styles not only decrease the down time after a 
defeat, but also promote renewed activity.152 
Besides his empirical approach to studying optimism, 
Seligman draws from several theoretical and experimental sources, 
namely control theory and attribution theory. The first theory identifies 
control as the psychological process of harnessing events and 
circumstances. We strive to appreciate the world’s causal texture in 
function of our own self-efficacy: which events we can master, and 
which ones we cannot. To be able to meaningfully harness ongoing 
events and direct our activity lends itself to optimism for the present 
and future. However, Seligman highlights risks from two extremes: an 
unresponsive world, and expecting too much control. If our situation is 
truly unresponsive, perceived control could be counterproductive. It 
cannot only lead to depression, but also to alternative strategies like an 
                                                 
149 In addition to his notable work on optimism, M. E. P. Seligman is 
perhaps best known for his research and theories on helplessness; cf. Seligman 
1975; Garber and Seligman 1980; Peterson, Maier and Seligman 1993. 
150 M. E. P. Seligman (1998/1991, 4-5) says that optimists and pessimists 
think about their hard knocks in opposite ways. The optimists “tend to believe 
defeat is just a temporary setback, that its causes are confined to this one case. 
The optimists believe defeat is not their fault: Circumstances, bad luck, or other 
people brought it about. Such people are unfazed by defeat. Confronted by a bad 
situation, they perceive it as a challenge and try harder.” 
151 Cf. Seligman 1998/1991, 208, and 281 ff.; Goleman 1995, 88. 
152 Cf. M. E. P. Seligman 1998 and 1995. 
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energy saving, coping strategy of limited “helplessness.”153 On the 
contrary, expecting exaggerated responsiveness and “personal control” 
in internal and external forums can make us more vulnerable to 
crushing defeats.154 Since our beliefs about our own capacities affect 
how those capacities are used, our performances can vary according to 
our sense of self-efficacy in bouncing back after failure and managing 
the situation positively instead of seeing defeat before starting.155 
The second and perhaps most important theoretical aspect of 
Seligman’s theory of learned optimism involves attribution theory. He 
describes it as the “explanatory style” which individuals use in 
attributing causality to their actions, successes and failures.156 
Seligman’s theory involves styles of explanation, instead of single 
narratives for single failures.157 He proposes three dimensions of 
explanation (permanence, pervasiveness and personalization), which 
vary according to optimistic or pessimistic narrative styles. First, 
optimists attribute good events as having permanent causes; negative 
events as having temporary ones. He warns that: “permanent 
                                                 
153 Peterson, Maier and Seligman (1993, 306; cf. 305) say that, in this case: 
“helplessness may be less a deficit than an alternative way of operating, a way of 
laying low and keeping one’s eyes open when the world becomes unresponsive.” 
Cf. Seligman 1975; Garber and Seligman 1980. 
154 According to Peterson, Maier and Seligman (1993, 307-9), the “era of 
personal control” can promote various problems: depression in young adults (a 
disorder of personal control); the seduction of technology (preferring the 
immediate but shallow responsiveness of technology, instead of person to person 
interaction); the rejection of the social world, and the promotion of egotism and 
special interest mentalities (a lack of interdependence and common-good 
orientations in society). 
155 Cf. Goleman 1995, 89; A. Bandura 1977. 
156 Seligman takes his inspiration from Bernard Weiner, a social 
psychologist, who at UCLA in late 1960s developed attribution theory. Weiner 
sought the factors to which people attribute their successes and failures—why 
some are high achievers and others not. Attribution theory runs against the 
Skinnerian theory about achievement, demonstrated (in 1930s) by the partial 
reinforcement extinction effect (PREE). Attribution theory postulates that human 
behavior is controlled not only by an external environment-based “schedule of 
reinforcement,” but also by an internal mental state, which is seen through the 
explanations that people make for why the environment has scheduled their 
reinforcements in this particular way (cf. Seligman 1998/1991, 40-1). 
157 In this regard, Seligman’s theory differs from Weiner’s. Other 
differences include: a third category of explanation (pervasiveness), not included 
by Weiner; and a focus on achievement, while Weiner studied mental illness and 
therapy (cf. Seligman 1998/1991, 43-4). 
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explanations for bad events produce long-lasting helplessness and 
temporary explanations produce resilience.”158 Second, pervasiveness 
contrasts universal versus specific explanations. He says: “The 
optimist believes that the bad events have specific causes, while good 
events will enhance everything he does; the pessimist believes that bad 
events have universal causes and that good events are caused by 
specific factors.”159 Thirdly, personalization identifies the target of 
blame for the difficulty. Optimists externalize the cause, blaming other 
people and circumstances; pessimists internalize the blame on 
themselves. 
While Seligman’s paradigm is in many ways convincing, it 
raises several questions. First, is his vision of optimism based in 
reality? Does it rest on an explanatory theory that promotes self-
delusion instead of truthfulness? We can establish one rebuttal to this 
charge in his approach to self-esteem. He opposes the promotion of 
groundless self-valuation, and provides striking counter-indications of 
educational practices that attempt to promote self-esteem without any 
basis in personal worth. Unmerited self-esteem correlates with 
violence, aggression and depression, when the individual confronts a 
harsh experience.160 Seligman does not promote empty self-esteem, but 
rather concentrates on skill acquisition in overcoming defeat and 
misfortune. Self-esteem follows then as a natural consequence.161 
The second question is: In promoting external blaming-
strategy (blaming other people and circumstances, rather than our own 
shortcomings), does Seligman at the same time encourage an 
egotistical orientation and an anti-social mentality? Elsewhere, he 
attempts to provide a social context to his theory of optimism 
                                                 
158 Seligman 1998/1991, 47. 
159 For Seligman (1998/1991, 47-8), hope depends on both the 
pervasiveness and permanence dimensions of explanatory style: “Finding 
temporary and specific causes for misfortune is the art of hope.” 
160 Baumeister et al. (1996) indicate that self-esteem can be a factor that 
causes violence in criminals. Seligman’s conclusion is that: “if you teach 
unwarrantedly high self-esteem to children, problems will ensue,” such as 
violence and depression (Seligman 1998/1991, vii). On the importance of self-
esteem for resilience, see Lösel, 1992, 9. 
161 Seligman recognizes that achievement is a function of talent, as well as 
the capacities of explanatory style that withstand defeat. Cf. Peterson, Maier, and 
Seligman 1993, 310; and Goleman 1995, 89. 
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promoting narrative style. For example, he claims that “becoming an 
optimist consists not of learning to be more selfish and self-assertive, 
and to present yourself to others in overbearing ways, but simply of 
learning a set of skills about how to talk to yourself when you suffer a 
personal defeat […] from a more encouraging viewpoint.”162 
Seligman’s approach to learned optimism offers merit, and illustrates 
facets of acquired resilience. Its close proximity to a virtue approach 
on hope invites a more in-depth investigation. Likewise, Aquinas’ 
virtue approach to hope in difficulty might well be enriched through 
the typology of hope and optimism, through insights on learned 
hopefulness and helplessness, and from pedagogical input from control 
and attribution theories, as we shall see. 
4.4.2. The Virtue of Hope: Goals, Agency and 
Developmental Pathways 
Psychosocial studies on goal-directed behavior aid us to 
further differentiate hope from optimism. They have distinguished goal 
perception from goal attainment and desiring an outcome from 
efficacious behavior.163 These studies have made advancements. 
Previously, a predominant view associated greater hope (as a goal 
orientation) with positive outcomes, and exceptionally low 
expectancies for goal attainment with somatic disturbance and 
psychopathology.164 More recent research however attempts to identify 
the means through which hope renders human acts adaptive; it draws 
on goal concepts to elucidate hope’s cognitive sets.165 Within this goal-
setting framework, C. R. Snyder proposes two intertwining elements of 
hope: agency (efficacy expectancies) and pathways (outcome 
expectancies). This perspective invites a dialogue with Aquinas’ virtue 
theory of hope. 
                                                 
162 Seligman 1998/1991, 207. 
163 Researchers often contrast hope with optimism. According to Snyder et 
al. (1991, 571), “Hope is similar to optimism in that it is conceptualized as a 
stable cognitive set reflecting general rather than specific outcome expectancies. 
Hope and optimism differ, however, in the hypothesized relationship between 
outcome and efficacy expectancies and the role that this relationship plays in the 
prediction of goal-directed behavior.” 
164 Cf. Post-White 1998; Erickson et al. 1975; Stotland 1969; Frankl 1963. 
165 Cf. Snyder et al. 1991a; Pervin 1989; Lee et al 1989. 
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Snyder defines hope “as a cognitive set that is based on a 
reciprocally derived sense of successful (a) agency (goal-directed 
determination) and (b) pathways (planning of ways to meet goals).”166 
First, our sense of “agency,” including our will to accomplish our 
goals, increases hope. We gain a sense of positive agency through 
individual participation in goal attainment. We successfully motivate 
ourselves and gain a feeling of resourcefulness in front of the 
challenge. Second, the perceived availability of successful “pathways” 
to a goal bolsters hope. We seek to generate successful projects, to 
break down formidable tasks into manageable pieces and to modify 
plans when the goals are unattainable. We employ cognitive capacities 
related to problem solving, but also to resisting anxiety, defeatist 
attitudes or depression when faced with setbacks. Both agency and 
pathways involve more than single acts. They constitute “an enduring 
disposition” of hope, which we subjectively construct as we set goals 
for ourselves and attempt to attain them.167 
Snyder’s theory expects that a person’s levels of facility and 
motivation in dealing with goals correlate with one’s behavior and 
achievements. His study confirms that people with a higher level of 
hope not only undertook a larger number of goals than people with a 
lower level, but also set more difficult goals.168 Nonetheless, while the 
                                                 
166 Snyder et al. (1991, 570-1). C. J. Snyder is a University of Kansas 
psychologist, who furthermore posits that “the two components of hope [agency 
and pathways] are reciprocal, additive, and positively related, although they are 
not synonymous” (Snyder et al. 1991a, 571). Snyder et al. integrate two dominant 
theories (that of Bandura and that of Scheier and Carver), while disagreeing with 
both Bandura’s emphasis on efficacy expectancies and Scheier and Carver’s 
reliance on outcome expectancies. Snyder et al. (1991a, 572) argue that “if self-
related cognitions pertaining to goal-directed behavior are the sum of the 
reciprocal action of efficacy expectancies and outcome expectancies, as we have 
posited in the present hope model, then focusing on either type of expectancy 
alone will not completely tap the cognitive set.” 
167 Snyder et alia (1991, 571) distinguish the emotion of hope from this 
disposition of hope. They say that “the cognitive emphasis of the present model 
does not imply that emotions are irrelevant, but rather that emotions are the 
sequelae of cognitive appraisals of goal-related activities. The quality of emotion 
for a particular goal-related setting depends on the person’s perceived hope in 
that setting.” Cf. Goleman 1995, 87. 
168 Snyder et al. (1991, 581-2) were surprised to find no gender differences 
in the level of reported hope. They speculate however “that gender differences in 
hope may emerge when different goals are explored in subsequent research.” 
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higher hope people were “more certain” to attain their goals, the lower 
hope people were found to be equally likely to attain their own goals, 
although these were objectively less challenging and fewer in 
number.169 Snyder’s health-as-an-adaptive-human-behavior perspective 
construes hope as relevant insofar as “health-related matters are easily 
conceptualized in terms of people’s goals.”170 His extrapolations on this 
study suggest a positive correlation between hope and health levels. 
What can Snyder’s research and theory on hope in agency and 
pathways offer to enhance Aquinas’ approach to the passion and 
virtues of hope? For Aquinas, the natural passion of hope is rooted in 
human love (amor) and desire (passio) and is manifest in the longing 
for flourishing (beatitudo) and the natural inclinations of the will 
toward the good and communion, of the intelligence toward the true 
and the beautiful, of the whole person toward love, family and life in 
society. Thomas’ perspective attends to both human origins and 
finality. Goals and their attachment are of ultimate and mediate 
importance. In his philosophical psychology and philosophical 
anthropology, a person loves and desires some good thing because of 
the nature of the good object to attract us. In this natural dimension, we 
move from loving a certain good, to desiring it (if we have not attained 
it), to hoping for it (if it is difficult but possible to achieve) and finally 
to experiencing joy (when we are united with it).171 Although the 
                                                 
169 Cf. Snyder et al. 1991a, 582. 
170 Snyder et al. 1991a, 583; Snyder et al., 1991b. Another suggestive study 
on the relationship of hope and health is that of Janice Post-White (1998), which 
indicates a probable correlation between hopefulness, quality of life and a strong 
SOC (sense of coherence). The SOC (discussed in chapter two) is seen as 
reducing tension and improving health by modulating the psychological, 
neurological, hormonal and immune systems. Positive effects in terms of immune 
function, cancer outcome and quality of life—cognitive, psychological and social 
levels—are expected, based on the three coping-related effects of stress on the 
immune function: 1. Poor coping skills decrease natural killer (NK) cell activity, 
while good coping skills and a positive attitude increase NK and neutrophil 
function. 2. Social support buffers stress and contribute to increased NK function. 
3. “Negative emotional states that result from the psychological response to 
stressors may explain how psychosocial events produce immuno-suppression 
(Kiecolt-Glaser and Glaser, 1991) and contribute to the increased incidence of 
infections, autoimmune disease, and cancer.” (Post-White 1998, 280) 
171 Aquinas puts it thus: “Primus affectus in aliquid est motus amoris [...]; 
qui quidem motus in desiderio includitur sicut causa in effectu; desideratur enim 
aliquid quasi amatur. Ipsa vero spes desiderium quoddam importat cum quadam 
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underlying passion of hope relates most directly to everyday hopes, it 
also relates to fundamental human hope and longings. What can 
Snyder’s approach to agency and pathways tell us about the natural 
level—the emotion and the virtue of everyday hopes? 
Hope, as the central passion for the virtue of magnanimitas, 
tends to expect great goods, according to Thomas.172 This hope in the 
midst of action, moving toward an end is intrinsically teleological. It is 
not simply an optimistic attitude or temperament. Thus initiative-
taking, in the larger sense of aggredi mobilizes human activity, 
including our own and other resources toward a difficult goal. In order 
to complete acts of maximal intensity, we muster a battery of personal 
energy and social resources. For Aquinas, magnanimous people have 
the power to focus their emotional and intellectual energies on life’s 
important tasks.173 This attentional and effective capacity involves 
natural and acquired emotional (modum affectionis) and bodily 
dispositions, and moral and intellectual character. 
Through magnanimity, we employ the stimulus of hope as well 
as daring, in addition to justified fear of failure and related passions. 
What is great and difficult can elicit hope, just as it can elicit despair. It 
can mobilize action, just as it can freeze human initiative.174 The 
difference between hope and despair is found in the possibility of 
attaining the object. More than a logical possibility, the agent must 
possess the needed physical power, psychological energy, intellectual 
plan, and necessary external assistance.175 Desire confronted with 
difficulty is transformed into hope only when we judge that we can 
attain the desired object.176 Snyder’s typology of high and low levels of 
                                                                                                          
animi erectione, quasi in quoddam arduum tendens” De verit., 28, 4; cf. ST I.5 ad 
1; ST I-II 40.8; NE i.1, 1094a3; Pinckaers 1976, 266-271; Pieper 1994, 20-24. 
172 Cf. ST II-II 129.5 obj.3 and ad 3. 
173 “magnanimitas facit quod ad perfecta opera virtutis tendat” ST II-II 
129.3 ad 4. 
174 According to Aquinas, the difficulty and greatness at which hope aims 
precipitate repulsion and frightened retreat. Cf. ST I-II 23.2; ST I-II 25.3. ad 2; ST 
II-II 161.1. 
175 Cf. ST I-II 40.3 ad 2; Gauthier 1951, 327-8. 
176 Cf. ST I-II 40.1. We recall also Breznitz’ interesting insight into a 
psychology of hope, despair and hopelessness. He describes despair as having 
anything left to loss (but something to gain through the involved risk). The risks 
involved in an act of desperation are extreme because of the extreme situation. 
According to Breznitz (1986, 303), the “opposite of hope is not despair, but the 
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hope usefully illustrates the power of great goals to attract us and the 
immobility that comes when we do not have the agency or pathways of 
attaining the goal. His speculation about the connection of hope and 
health is suggestive not only for everyday hopes but also our 
fundamental hope. Nonetheless, Thomas offers a deeper philosophical 
anthropology concerning the natural movement of hope in terms of 
finality and the development of magnanimity as an operative 
disposition. In order to demonstrate this point more fully, we shall now 
examine how personal and social resources motivate hope. 
4.4.3. Hoping in Oneself and in Assistance 
The emotion and the natural virtue of hope do not simply aim 
at goals that are within the reach of a person’s attainment. Hoping can 
pertain to oneself and to others. Its pathways are not only personal, but 
also social and theological. Thomas makes an important distinction 
between hoping in our own personal capacities (sperare tantum) and 
hoping in the assistance of another (exspectare). Medieval thinkers 
understood exspectare (to look at, to consider) and exspectatio 
(consideration) as the cognitive act preceding the movement of the 
passion of hope. This cognitive process considers both a hoped-for 
great good, and another person, through whom we obtain it. Through 
this kind of hope, we keep our eyes not only on the sought after good 
and our personal capacities, but also on the other (ex alio spectare). 
Thomas considers sperare tantum (hoping in one’s own capacities) as 
pure human hope, and exspectare or expectare as hope linked to the 
expectation of needing the help of others. 
On the one hand, the object of a human hope is a good we can 
attain by ourselves, through our own means and strength, our own 
planning and execution. This hope is the primal form (archetype) of 
the passion of hope as sperare tantum, which, according to Aquinas, 
the virtue of magnanimity manages.177 Resilience research has 
                                                                                                          
absence of hope. Whereas, in despair there is nothing to lose; in the absence of 
hope, there is nothing to gain. Despair may yet act as a motivating force for acts 
of despair, whereas, in the absence of hope, there is no energy left.” One can 
reasonably ask, whether such acts have only tragic results (e.g. suicide terrorism) 
or also surprisingly good ones (altruistic death-defying acts). 
177 Cf. ST I-II 40.2 ad 1; cf. Gauthier 1951, 341 fn. 3. 
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demonstrated that competency can breed hope inasmuch as our 
experiences of overcoming difficulty give rise to hope for future 
successes. When we cope with hardship, for example, we build up a 
type of immunity, which involves a situational mastery and learned 
hopefulness. This immunity counteracts learned helplessness and past 
experiences of failure.178 
Human expectation on the other hand is involved in a second 
kind of hope. We derive it from the first type, which always serves as 
the basis of pure impetus—the simple movement of the appetite, since 
it has but one object. When in certain cases we need the help of others 
in order to attain the sought after goal, we feel hope in our own 
capacities as well as a confident expectation in the help of another. The 
other (person or group) supplies a second object to hope.179 This type of 
exspectare does not mean delay, immobility or simple possibility 
however. It implies neither pure receptivity of hoped-for-goods nor a 
lack of an effort to reach for them. Rather here, we consider the good 
in terms of the means of attaining it, which establishes confidence in 
oneself and the other.180 Aquinas employs one underlying 
psychological structure for both types of hope (sperare and 
exspectare): a good object (which is future, great and difficult), and the 
accompanying confidence (in another and in oneself). 
Aquinas identifies three characteristics of the virtue of 
magnanimitas that illustrate how it is a type of constructive resilience. 
First, magnanimity concerns the passions of hope and despair 
concerning doing great things.181 It manages extremes in both 
directions concerning future goods that are difficult but possible for us 
to obtain. Second, it has two sources of efficacy. It tends to something 
that is within one’s own power properly, and secondary only with 
someone’s assistance.182 Third, the object desired is a good. This 
                                                 
178 Cf. Werner and Smith 1986, 157; Werner and Smith 1992, 209; Meyer 
and Lausell 1996, 125. 
179 Cf. ST I-II 40.2 ad 1; ST I-II 40.7; ST I-II 42.1; ST I-II 43.1 ad 1and ad 
2; ST I-II 62.4; cf. Gauthier 1951, 342, fn. 2.  
180 Concerning fiducia, see ST II-II 129.6; Gauthier 1951, 344. 
181 “spes et desperatio ad aliquod bonum arduum; […] magnanimitas 
circa spem et desperationem” ST I-II 60.3;cf. ST I-II 60.4. 
182 Aquinas says: “magnanimitas tendit in arduum sperans aliquid quod est 
suae potestatis. Unde proprie respicit operationem aliquorum magnorum” ST II-
II 17.5 ad 4; cf. ST II-II 17.1. 
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emotional aspect demonstrates why magnanimity is the virtue of hope 
(as a natural passion) for Aquinas.183 His notion of magnanimity 
however is not so simple; this virtue also manages honor and 
excellence in human agency. Before treating honor and excellence and 
the way in which resilience research enriches them, we shall first 
confront failed magnanimity in terms of false hopes, presumption and 
despair. 
4.4.4. Sidetracked by False Hopes, Presumption and 
Despair 
Because of false hopes, presumption, despair and 
faintheartedness, we fail to accomplish fitting ventures. These 
unresilient dispositions represent a vulnerability to fail in constructive 
initiatives. But before treating St. Thomas’ approach to these 
psychological and moral weaknesses, we shall examine psychosocial 
insights on the functional advantages or pseudo-resilience of non-hope 
phenomena, such as despair, denial and depression. 
Empirical research on hardship has observed not only the 
efficacy of hope, but also the utility of denial and despair in certain 
situations. Breznitz says: “even an ineffective coping mode is better 
than none at all” and denial and despair can be psychological “vital 
signs” in an individual’s struggle to cope..184 He argues that the 
opposite of hope is not despair, but rather the absence of hope. He 
continues: “whereas in despair there is nothing to lose; in the absence 
of hope, there is nothing to gain. Despair may yet act as a motivating 
force for acts of despair, whereas, in the absence of hope, there is no 
energy left.” The energy that drives acts of despair may well exist, but 
the moral and resilience question involves where we direct such deeds. 
Breznitz’ understanding of despair moreover guards an element of 
hope and thus differs from that of Aquinas. 
Researchers likewise argue that depression can have positive 
consequences. Pelham’s survey of psychosocial studies suggests “that 
depressed people react to their acute distress by engaging in self-
                                                 
183 The following scholars also hold that Aquinas’ notion of magnanimity 
is the natural virtue managing the passion of hope: Gauthier 1951; Horner 1998, 
430; Schumacher 2000. 
184 Breznitz 1986, 303. 
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serving biases and striving to develop positive self-views.”185 He argues 
that the use of compensatory self-enhancement can offset losses in one 
dimension of the self-concept by boosting self-perceptions in 
another.186 Once again moral and resilience questions arise. What is the 
reality behind our self-concepts, especially when we “enhance” them? 
And how long can we consciously deceive ourselves with false-hope? 
If artificially enhanced self-concepts serve as short-term tools to 
overcome depression, we can include them in a larger context of 
health, realism and finality. Aquinas’ notions of presumption and other 
failures in constructive resilience illustrate this broader vision, but 
should integrate (in a developmental perspective) the manner that self-
serving bias (enhaced self-concepts) may aid a long term goal. 
Presumption as an excess of hope implies an immoderate 
expectation of what we can accomplish through our own powers. 
According to Aquinas, we cannot attain all arduous goods through 
human power. Moreover, not all humans can equally do what others 
can. Exceptionally gifted people tend to make others marvel by their 
great deeds. But humans are unique in background, training, native 
gifts, social network and so forth. And while we need each other’s 
strengths to attain our goals, it is presumptuous to think that each 
human can do the same job as well as another. However, presumption 
is not simply the sin of the weak, of those who are incapable of great 
things.187 We can presume too much of our capacities for several 
reasons. We mislead ourselves by a false appreciation of our capacities 
(lack of self-knowledge or mistaking riches with ability or self-worth). 
A type of false bravery also comes through over-estimating the skills 
acquired through experience. Such false-hopes spring from the anger 
that blinds us to the larger context and to what we really need in order 
to resolve the situation. They also hope that we shall triumph merely 
because we have succeeded before, not because of any personal skill 
acquired through experience.188 A desire for inordinate honor, glory, 
                                                 
185 Pelham 1991, 670-1. 
186 Pelham (1991, 670) furthermore points out that most depressed people 
manage to escape by themselves (with their own personal and local resources) 
from their depression without psycho-medical interventions. 
187 Cf. Gauthier 1951, 354-5. 
188 As Aquinas says in his Commentary on the NE, “confidunt etiam nunc 
victoriam obtinere, non propter aliquam peritiam, quam per experientiam sint 
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money or success can mislead us.189 When we press such ventures 
beyond due measure, we doom them to failure.190 
In addition to false hopes and presumption, Thomas considers 
the ways that despair, insecurity and faintheartedness sidetrack hope 
and initiative. Fear produces despair and causes one to conclude that 
the future arduous good is impossible to attain.191 Such fear overrides 
hope, which is also weakened by laziness, impurity and depressive 
sadness, according to Aquinas.192 
In hoping to accomplish great deeds, we can also err through 
insecurity. When insecure we lack due confidence in our own 
excellence and abilities. We misapprehend our external resources and 
ourselves. Through lack of proper self-esteem, we overly criticize and 
thereby undercut our own efficacy. In addition to having a relationship 
with our genetic constitution, environmental support and interpersonal 
attachments, sustainable self-esteem is rooted in skill-acquisition rather 
than empty ego-inflation. The negative side of flattery-based self-
esteem mirrors the positive traits of authentic competency-based self-
esteem. The former favor violence and aggression, while the latter 
bolster pro-social motivation. Security, according to Aquinas, counts 
on an intertwined web of personal and social resources. Errors in self-
inspection and evaluation of past deeds can make us fearful, even to 
the point of despair. Insecurity can demobilize us or, less severely, 
simply present undue barriers to action: e.g. as when we do not even 
hope for the things that are within our reach. When insecure, we do not 
strive for the great deeds of which we are capable; we are overcome by 
fear of failure or immobilized in despair.193 This point recalls the 
insights of J. Bowlby and attachment theory concerning the importance 
of bonding relationships, as well as Aquinas’ account of security and 
                                                                                                          
adepti (hoc enim pertinet ad secundum modum fortitudinis), sed propter solam 
fiduciam, quam ex frequentibus victoriis accepterunt” in Ethics, 1, 3, 17, 577. 
189 Cf. ST II-II 130.2 ad 3. 
190 In the context of theological hope, Aquinas distinguishes two types of 
presumption, one of which concerns the virtue of magnanimity, when we 
immoderately hope in our own capacity to attain an arduous good (cf. ST II-II 
21.1). 
191 Cf. ST I-II 40.4; ST I-II 45.2; and ST II-II 20.1-4. 
192 Cf. ST II-II 20.4. 
193 Cf. ST II-II 129.7. 
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confident action that build upon an intertwined web of personal and 
social resources. 
In the face of impressive difficulty and opportunities for 
excellence, we can show ourselves to be great or timid, even in minor 
things. Aquinas calls the latter littleness of soul or faintheartedness 
(pusillanimitas), by which we deem ourselves unworthy of things 
within our grasp.194 In this vice of unused strength, we are discouraged 
by pride, fear or a lack of self-confidence. Through pride, we can cling 
too resolutely to a false opinion about our incompetency.195 We can 
desist from fittingly taking on a great project, either because of fear (ex 
parte appetitus) or ignorance (ex parte intellectus).196 Fear of failing in 
matters that we falsely judge beyond ourselves can cause us to shrink 
from the great things of which we are worthy and capable. Ignorance 
of our true capacities can be caused by laziness (pigritia) when we 
consider neither our own ability nor accomplish what is within our 
power.197 
Aquinas holds that we have a natural inclination to act 
commensurately with our capacities (potestatae). While presumption 
exceeds what is proportionate with our capacities, faintheartedness 
falls short of this measure. We are timid inasmuch as we have abilities, 
natural disposition, knowledge and external fortune, but fail to use 
them for excellence.198 He illustrates this extreme through the parable 
of the slothful servant who out of fear, faintheartedly buries instead of 
trades with the money left in his charge.199 In timid acts, one errs not 
                                                 
194 “pusillanimus ex animi parvitate se retrahit a magnis” ST II-II 133.2; cf. 
NE iv.7, 1123b9-13; S. Th. lect. 8, 740; cited in ST II-II 133.1 obj. 2 and obj. 4. 
Faintheartedness takes various forms, which oppose the exaggerated greatness 
found in presumption, ambition or vainglory. 
195 Cf. ST II-II 133.1. 
196 Cf. ST II-II 133.2. 
197 Cf. ST II-II 133.2 ad 1; cf. NE iv.9, 1125a23-24: S. Th. lect. 11, 786. 
This sloth is opposed to solicitude (cf. ST II-II 47.9). 
198 “Vel potest dici quod pusillanimus est dignus magnis secundum 
habilitatem ad virtutem quae inest ei, vel ex bona dispositione naturae, vel ex 
scientia, vel ex exteriori fortuna: quibus dum recusat uti ad virtutem, 
pusillanimus redditur” ST II-II 133.1 ad 2. 
199 Aquinas refers to Mt. 25:14-30 and Lk 19:11-27 in ST II-II 133.1.  
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only by leaving our potential undeveloped, but also by not doing what 
benefits (iuvare) others.200 
A natural moral virtue of hope (magnanimity), according to 
Aquinas, specifically assures a rational mean in hoping for a future 
good. It seeks avoiding the extremes of false-hope, presumption, 
despair and weakness.201 Its finality involves truth and realism, 
although we may make slow progress in approaching them through 
well-developed virtue. Indeed the mediate steps involved in attaining 
everyday hopes are necessarily complex. For example, an object of 
hope might motivate an action that has become possible to hope for 
only because competing objects have been wrongly abandoned through 
despairing their possibility or through indiscriminate choice. Natural 
hope-phenomena, as illustrated by Breznitz’ example, are not always 
normative; they can prove to be maladapted. We must rectify human 
hopes in terms of our mediate and ultimate goals. Aquinas offers a 
metaphysical, moral and psychological foundation for a further 
analysis of such phenomena of failed and resilient hopes. 
By way of a transition to the next section, we recall that 
initiative taps into the emotional, psychological and intellectual 
resources that we find around and within us. Aquinas demonstrates that 
the virtues of fortitude, magnanimity and hope put these resources to 
work. However, other content and motivational considerations fit 
within the larger normative, moral and social framework. In particular, 
we need to consider the type of rewards, honors or excellence that 
drive the human pursuit of natural hopes. 
4.5. Accenting Honors or Excellence? 
Hope, optimism and their contraries do not explain the whole 
of initiative. At least Aquinas’ notion of magnanimitas recognizes that 
honors and excellence play constitutive roles in human agency as well. 
The practical question though is: what accent does he accord honor and 
excellence in hope-filled action? And how do pursuing excellence and 
honors relate to constructive resilience? 
                                                 
200 In ST II-II 133.1 ad 1, Aquinas calls upon both Aristotle NE iv.9; 
1125a18-19; S. Th. lect. 11, 784; and St. Gregory Pastorali I, 5: PL 77, 19 C. 
201 On the need for a mean in moral virtue, cf. ST I-II 60.4. 
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In treating magnanimity, Aquinas borrows the structure from 
Aristotle, who has two readings of magnanimity. The first gives 
primacy to the idea of greatness; here magnanimous people consider 
themselves as worthy of great things; through excellence, they only do 
what is great. The second gives primacy to the idea of honor; here 
magnanimous people act properly concerning the object of honor. We 
need to ask whether Aquinas’ conception of magnanimity is a virtue of 
greatness (doing great deeds) or of honor (hoping to be worthy of 
honor) and whether this consideration makes any difference for 
resiliency. 
I shall start this section by addressing three questions about 
honors: (1) how does Thomas employ reward and honor in human 
agency? (2) How can honor serve as a motivator for resilient acts and 
dispositions? (3) How does honor relate to excellence in agency? 
These questions prepare us to examine the role of excellence in 
initiative and in magnanimity. Finally, issues related to misplaced 
honors and excellence will contrast Aquinas’ view of excellence with 
failures in the virtue of hope and constructive resilience. 
4.5.1. Aquinas on Virtue Guiding Honor 
St. Thomas emphasizes magnanimity’s rational management 
of natural hope. Why then should he concern himself with saving a 
place for honor in his treatment of this virtue? This question might not 
trouble one, since Modern and Postmodern disregards for honor 
minimalize this concept.202 Honor is nonetheless one of the gateways to 
exploring the magnanimous person’s sociability for Aquinas. Any but 
the most individualistic evaluations of human efforts raise questions 
about honor. What place of honor does Thomas accord to human 
efforts? Can an honor-seeking motivation be unambiguous? We miss 
the full depth of these questions and Aquinas’ perspective if we 
construe honor as self-centered reference to a non-social ideal of the 
human being. 
Studies in cultural anthropology remind us that conceptions of 
honor define the value that we have in our own eyes, but also in those 
                                                 
202 P. Berger (1983, 172-81) outlines the violent abuses that people have 
perpetrated in the name of honor. 
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of others. In regards to both the ancient, medieval and modern 
Mediterranean worlds, cultural anthropologists have found that honor 
is a “pivotal value” expressed in a general honor code as well as local 
ones.203 They suggest that social forms of honor have varied according 
to cultural influences, in particular, according to a given culture’s 
dominant values, such as veracity, self-renunciation, loyalty or military 
courage. 
Ancient and medieval worldviews are intent on archetypal and 
hierarchically ordered social roles, practices and institutions in which 
honor has a particular regulatory function. Both modern and Post-
modern conceptions of the self on the contrary define self-worth in 
terms of human dignity, instead of public recognition and honor. Thus, 
Martha Nussbaum can re-appropriate magnanimity by simply 
grounding its “attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth” 
without acknowledging the place that a hierarchical system of goods 
play in self-valuation.204 Nonetheless, the social aspects of honor, as 
being integral to related notions such as self-worth, are essential for 
understanding Aquinas’ magnanimous person. 
Thomas’ notion of magnanimitas synthesizes the rich doctrines 
of Aristotle, Cicero and Scripture on the finality and function of honor 
in human agency, especially in great and difficult deeds, but also in 
more ordinary experience. Does his synthesis have anything to offer us 
today? Following Aristotle, Aquinas identifies two virtues concerned 
with honors. The first involved with ordinary honors is nameless; 
while its extremes are called philotimia, love of honor, and 
aphilotimia, lacking love of honor. The second is magnanimitas, which 
like other moral virtues manages that which is great in a passion, in 
this case great honors.205 It is curious that a whole philosophical 
                                                 
203 According to J. Neyrey (1998, 5-8), honor and shame are the key 
concepts for understanding Sacred Scripture. In a historical-critical perspective, 
he contends that we correctly understand Scripture only by taking into 
consideration the local culture. In particular, we understand the culture of honor 
and shame through a study using the models and efforts of modern cultural 
anthropology in dialogue with ancient rhetorical theory (i.e. Aristotle, Cicero, 
Quintilian), which in practice influenced the elite and the non-elite, the rural and 
urban populations, males and females, although in different ways. 
204 D. McInerny (1997, 78-9) makes this charge concerning M. 
Nussbaum’s “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” (1988, 32-53). 
205 Cf. ST II-II 129.2.  
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tradition lacks a name for the virtue that manages the ordinary honors. 
Does this absence mean that every honor is conceptualized in 
relationship to great honors, that even the unsung glory of a normal life 
finds motivation in great ideals? 
This perspective on honor is that of the ancient world and 
Aquinas, who target nothing less than flourishing through human acts. 
In particular for Aquinas, the search for flourishing is not only great in 
itself, but also informs the relatively great difficulties in virtuously 
managing more mundane honors and shame. Thomas claims that the 
mode of reason observed in virtuously employing and seeking great 
honors is much more difficult than for normal honors.206 What is great 
serves as a training ground for lesser trials of honor and shame. People 
who make good use of great honors are more able to make good use of 
lesser honors, as well as being well-ordered in regards to dishonor or 
shame. We must resist the ways honor can mislead us, and avoid 
extreme relationships with honor. 
Aquinas holds that honor has several purposes. In general, it 
serves as a source of motivation (as a final cause), for in order to attain 
honor and avoid shame, people set aside all other things.207 It aids in 
focusing one’s attention, efforts and even affections. Furthermore, it 
has a social function (an efficacious causality), for he considers that 
excellent qualities should be praised in order to benefit others.208 We 
should use honor to benefit others. For example, one can translate the 
honors that come with a position of dignity into assistance for others. 
Although human honor is not the ultimate source of good, it is a useful 
good.209 
Even though an ordinate desire of honor can hearten people to 
do good and to avoid evil, humans can abuse honor.210 Aquinas follows 
Cicero in holding that the inordinate desire for honor tends to lead us 
                                                 
206 Cf. ST II-II 129.2 ad 1. 
207 Cf. ST II-II 129.1. 
208 Aquinas says, “secundo considerandum est quod id in quo homo 
excellit, datur homini a Deo ut ex eo aliis prosit. Unde intantum debet homini 
placere testimonium suae excellentiae quod ab aliis exhibetur, inquantum ex hoc 
paratur sibi via ad hoc quod aliis prosit” ST II-II 131.1. 
209 Cf. ST II-II 131.1 ad 3. 
210 Cf. ST II-II 131.1 ad 1. 
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to unjustly dominate others.211 Such tests of the social dimension of 
magnanimity contrast Aristotle’s self-absorbed magnanimous person. 
Aquinas’ sense of overall goodness does not focus exclusively on 
interior or personal goods or autonomy.212 Rather this conception of the 
virtue of magnanimity involves an other-regarding tension. As the 
crown of the virtues, it is the fulfillment of the other virtues. For 
Aquinas as for Aristotle, contrary to the position of Nietzsche, a person 
cannot be both wicked and magnanimous.213 Rather, magnanimous 
people focus their attention totally on the goods of community and 
God in actions that are “beneficent, generous, and grateful.”214 
According to Thomas, while we should not care 
disproportionately for honors, we should not care too little for them 
either. Reason should regulate such desires for good.215 A deficiency in 
appreciation for honor can lead a person to asocial habits: not avoiding 
what is contrary to honor, not seeking to be worthy of honor, not 
honoring the good that others do, that is, a slothful inertia. A deficient 
sense of honor can lead us to inappropriate levels of shame as well. In 
general, shame functions to dissuade us from doing what is base.216 Not 
only honor, but also shame depends upon social networks. According 
to Thomas, anonymity can weaken a sense of shame, while proper 
levels and types of shame on the contrary encourage us to act aright 
when peers support us.217 According to Aquinas, the perfectly virtuous 
person does not experience shame, since he does not even imagine 
                                                 
211 Cf. ST II-II 131.2 sc. 
212 Nonetheless, Aquinas does consider magnanimity as overall goodness, 
with a certain priority on the interior life, since the magnanimous person is fully 
concerned with the internal goods, which are truly great. As Thomas says in his 
Commentary on the NE, “quia tota sua vita versatur circa interiora bona, quae 
sunt vere magna” (In Eth. 4, 10, 777). 
213 Cf. Horner 1998, 431. 
214 In his Commentary on the NE, Thomas affirms the social import of the 
magnanimous person, “Sed tota ejus intentio est circa bona communia et divina” 
In Eth. 4, 10, 779. Cf. ST II-II 129, 4, ad 2. 
215 Aquinas demonstrates similarities to Stoic teaching in this regard; cf. ST 
II-II 131.1 ad 1. 
216 Cf. ST II-II 144 articles 1-4. Aquinas cites St. John Damascene (De Fide 
Orth. ii, 15) and Nemesius (De Nat. Hom. xx) in ST II-II 144.2 sc. He cites 
Aristotle throughout his discussion, see especially NE. iv, 9 (cited in ST II-II 
144.4 sc). Cf. ST II-II 72 on reviling; and ST II-II 74 on derision. 
217 Aquinas finds support for this insight from Aristotle; cf. Rhet. II.6, cited 
in ST II-II 144.3. 
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doing what is evil. In the meantime, for those developing in virtue, it 
serves a pedagogical function. 
How do these indications on the finality and function of honor 
and shame relate to those previously mentioned concerning hope, 
despair and resilience? When Aquinas says that magnanimity is 
primarily about the emotions of hope and despair (rather than the 
emotions of honor and shame),218 he does not discredit honor. While he 
defines magnanimity as immediately concerning the passion of hope 
(as its proximate matter), honor on the other hand is placed as the 
mediate object of magnanimity.219 Even though Aquinas provides us 
with a key to understand how hope and honor correlate, we need to ask 
how he saves a place for honor. 
First, although Aquinas places such importance on honor, it is 
a secondary object for the virtue of magnanimity. As the greatest 
external object of the passion of hope, honor “tends to the difficult 
good.”220 Even though it is not the greatest difficulty, which involves 
the danger of death and concerns directly the virtue of fortitude,221 
magnanimity strengthens the mind in hope against challenges of being 
worthy of honor. He says: “magnanimity by its very name denotes 
stretching forth of the mind to great things.”222 This stretching forth of 
the mind, soul or spirit can relate to many objects and acts, including 
the best use of the greatest goods; it concerns, all virtues and being 
honored for virtue. Honor is the greatest of external things, that is, 
honor as an attestation of virtue, in particular concerning great and 
                                                 
218 Cf. ST I-II 60.4. 
219 Aquinas says that “honor, etsi non sit passio vel operatio, est tamen 
alicuius passionis obiectum: scilicet spei, quae tendit in bonum arduum. Et ideo 
magnanimitas est quidem immediate circa passionem spei, mediate autem circa 
honorem, sicut circa obiectum spei” ST I-II 129.1 ad 2; cf. ST I-II 60.5. Aquinas’ 
original insight is an innovation in regards to Aristotle’s position, which despises 
hope inasmuch as it implies weakness. 
220 “quod honor, etsi non sit passio vel operatio, est tamen alicuius 
passionis obiectum: scilicet spei, quae tendit in bonum arduum. Et ideo 
magnanimitas est quidem immediate circa passionem spei, mediate autem circa 
honorem, sicut circa obiectum spei” ST II-II 129.1 ad 2. On the passion of hope, 
cf. ST I-II 40.1; ST I-II 45.1; ST I-II 60.5. 
221 Cf. ST II-II 129.5. 
222 “magnanimitas ex suo nomine importet quandam extensionem animi ad 
magna” ST II-II 129.1. 
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difficult matters.223 Honor is positive contact with a social realm, 
inasmuch as the latter can appreciate the level of honor due. Second, 
Thomas’ correlation of hope and honor becomes clearer when we look 
more deeply at how they interact in his treatment of excellence in great 
and difficult action. 
4.5.2. Magnanimitas as a Life of Excellence? 
To seek to be worthy of honor leads one to pursue excellence. 
The ordering of honor toward excellence, however, is not so evident. 
Different schools of thought have tried to work excellence into the 
notion of magnanimity. Although Aristotle defined magnanimity 
solely in terms of a person’s being worthy of honor (because of their 
excellence), one can legitimately ask whether honor provides sufficient 
matter for a virtue. Indeed, scholars have debated this issue for 
centuries. Abelard, for example, defined magnanimity in terms of 
initiative-taking and great action. Although St. Albert follows closely 
Aristotle’s emphasis on honors, St. Thomas seems more conscious of 
the limitations inherent in this view. He seems to attempt a synthesis 
between Aristotle and Abelard.224 I shall now explore Aquinas’ 
typology of initiative and greatness in action.225 This study sets the 
stages for understanding further the way that initiative-taking virtues 
involve a lifestyle marked by a particular type of excellence and moral 
resilience. 
Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s NE emphasizes initiative-
taking concerning great actions and enterprising aspirations,226 offering 
a triple correction of Aristotle. First, while Aristotle says that 
magnanimity implies the extension of our desire to great things, 
                                                 
223 ST II-II 129.1; ST II-II 103.1 ad 2; ST II-II 129.4 ad 1. We should not 
forget that for Aquinas honors are also important because they are given to God 
and to the best. This view of honor rectifies a disregard of virtue. 
224 This synthesis can be said to find its formula in Aristotle, and its “soul” 
in the Abelardian current (via Philip the Chancellor and the Moralium dogma); 
cf. Gauthier 1951, 282 and 310. 
225 According to Horner (1998, 433), “Aquinas, filling out Aristotle’s 
account, manages to preserve both the minimal requirements of ordinary virtue 
and the maximal requirements of extraordinary virtue. The maximal is rooted in 
the minimal; in going beyond it does not replace, subvert, or compete with it.” 
226 Gauthier (1951, 315) esteems that Aquinas takes this tack only after a 
few hesitations about the importance to give to honors in magnanimity. 
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Aquinas adds a gloss to the effect that the magnanimous soul (animus) 
focuses on accomplishing a great action.227 Secondly, while Aristotle’s 
magnanimous people judge themselves to be worthy of great things, 
Aquinas’ gloss describes a type of self-esteem that comes from being 
worthy of doing great things.228 Thirdly, Aristotelian magnanimous 
people seek what is great in each virtue, which Thomas explains as 
magnanimity inclining us to do what is great in each virtue.229 Aquinas 
emphasizes a type of agency, greatness in action. 
We need to ask whether Aquinas is treating only extraordinary 
excellence in the context of magnanimity. Some scholars affirm this 
interpretation both for Aquinas and Aristotle’s conception of 
magnanimity.230 Aquinas, however, explains that “an act may be called 
great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. 
An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consists in the 
use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one makes a very 
good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it 
consists in the best use of the greatest thing.”231 Concerning external 
things, honor is simply the greatest, since it is most akin to virtue. 
Although it is integrally related, it is nevertheless secondary to human 
flourishing. 
This response leaves the question of how becoming worthy of 
honor depends on having requisite means at our disposal and on human 
action. We need to have a certain security of means in order to attain 
great honor (ad materiam) or accomplish something great (ad finem). 
Aquinas describes such means not only as the good of fortune (bona 
                                                 
227 “Consideratur autem habitudo virtutis ad duo: uno quidem modo, ad 
materiam circa quam operatur; alio modo, ad actum proprium, qui consistit in 
debito usu talis materiae. Et quia habitus virtutis principaliter ex actu 
determinatur, ex hoc principaliter dicitur aliquis magnanimus quod animum 
habet ad aliquem magnum actum” ST II-II 129.1; cf. NE, 1123a 34-5. 
228 Cf. In Eth. 4, 8, 736.  
229 Cf. NE 1123b30; ST I-II 66.4 obj. 3; ST II-II 129.4 ad 1; ST II-II 134.2 
ad 2; de virt. card. 1, obj. 15; in Boet, De Trin. qu. 3, ad 2; cited in Gauthier 
1951, 315, n. 4 which includes references to the In Sententiarum.  
230 Cf. Horner 1998, 436-7. 
231 “Aliquis autem actus potest dici dupliciter magnus: uno modo, 
secundum proportionem; alio modo, absolute. Magnus quidem potest dici actus 
secundum proportionem etiam qui consistit in usu alicuius rei parvae vel 
mediocris: puta si aliquis illa re optime utatur. Sed simpliciter et absolute 
magnus actus est qui consistit in optimo usu rei maximae” ST II-II 129.1. 
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fortunae), riches or power, but also friends.232 As in the case of virtue 
in general, which involves a level of self-sufficiency,233 magnanimity 
employs external means and engages human relationships in order to 
act more expeditiously,234 remaining nonetheless detached from these 
external goods. The magnanimous person is unwavered by their 
presence or absence, neither rejoicing at obtaining them, nor grieving 
at losing them, except in the case of friendship. He esteems them as 
useful for accomplishing virtuous deeds and living a virtuous life.235 
The magnanimous person tends toward doing great deeds in 
regards to any virtue,236 in seeking all human goods;237 thereby he tends 
to what is worthy of great honors. For Aquinas, since honors are due to 
every virtue, magnanimity concerns all the virtues.238 He in effect holds 
that a magnanimous person tends toward what is excellent and shuns 
what is defective.239 One does acts of beneficence, generosity and 
gratefulness,240 because they are excellent things to do; one disdains the 
contrary because they are not fitting to true excellence and greatness. 
Aquinas also distinguishes magnanimity, as a general virtue,241 
which has a certain priority in a sphere of human agency. The cardinal 
                                                 
232 “quia per divitias et potentiam et amicos datur nobis facultas operandi” 
ST II-II 129.8; cf. Aristotle NE i.9, 1099a32 - b7; S. Th. lect. 13 n. 163; ST I-II 
4.7-8. 
233 Aquinas’ source here is Seneca, De Ira i: De vita beata xvi. 
234 “Indiget tamen his exterioribus bonis ad hoc quod expeditius operetur” 
ST II-II 129.8 ad 1. 
235 Cf. ST II-II 129.8, ad 2 and ad 3. 
236 “Et inde est quod magnanimus intendit magna operari in qualibet 
virtute: inquantum scilicet tendit ad ea quae sunt digna magno honore” ST II-II 
129.4 ad 1. As such, it is a special virtue as establishing the mode of reason in a 
determinate matter of honors.  
237 Cf. De malo 8, 2; ST I-II 84.2; ST II-II 162.2. ad 4.  
238 He says: “Sed quia honor est cuiuslibet virtutis praemium, ut ex supra 
dictis patet; ideo ex consequenti, ratione suae materiae, respicit omnes virtutes” 
ST II-II 129.4; cf. ST II-II 103.1 ad 2. 
239 “magnanimus tendit ad magna, consequens est quod ad illa praecipue 
tendat quae important aliquam excellentiam, et illa fugiat quae pertinent ad 
defectum. Pertinent autem ad quandam excellentiam quod aliquis bene faciat, et 
quod sit communicativus, et plurium retributivus” ST II-II 129.4 ad 2. 
240 “beneficent, generous, and grateful” ST II-II 129.4 ad 2; cf. Horner 
1998, 433.  
241 There are three general virtues of the moral life that serve the highest 
goals of the natural order: the greatness of man (magnanimity), the good of the 
community (justice) and the honor of God (religion). Each embraces 
harmoniously all the other virtues and directs them to its end, in the order of 
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virtues have neither an absolute priority nor primacy in all regards. 
Rather, repeatedly Thomas introduces the case of magnanimity in 
order to show that other virtues can be greater in different ways.242 
Being a general virtue is one such distinction of greatness that he gives 
to magnanimity.243 It might well entail an aspect of constructive 
resilience. When discussing general virtues, Aquinas differentiates 
between three types of generality: genre, cause and effect.244 He 
specifies that magnanimity is a general virtue as a universal cause of 
other virtues. It is like the sun, which is the general cause of all that 
grows. Such a general virtue extends its influence over the whole 
moral life. This extension is possible for the virtues whose ends are 
high enough to embrace the ends of other virtues. They thereby 
command the other virtues to serve this higher end.245 Beyond this 
ordinary sense of magnanimity, Aquinas remarks that magnanimity has 
a universal effect, inasmuch as it needs many other virtues to operate 
in fulfilling its condition. As a universal effect, it adds an extra allure 
to the beauty of all the virtues. The virtue of magnanimity confirms the 
mind in “hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods.”246 Such firmness 
of mind is a quality present in every virtue, but chiefly in virtues 
tending to a difficult good (arduum). This firmness concerns both 
magnanimity and fortitude, the latter of which serves as a virtue-type 
                                                                                                          
acquired virtue. At the level of grace, the infused virtue of magnanimity is 
completed by theological hope and charity. Charity is the general virtue par 
excellence for the Christian. It orders the whole life to its goal of God as Father 
and as Friend, and leads infused magnanimity to seek greatness by friendship 
with God. Cf. Gauthier 1951, 370-1. 
242 Cf. ST I-II 61.3; see list Gauthier 1951, 364, footnotes 1 and 2. 
243 According to Gauthier (1951, 364-67), before Aquinas, medieval 
theology used the following notions as more or less synonymous: “principal” 
(from Chrysippus), “general” (from the Stoic school) and “cardinal” (used after 
St. Ambrose). Aquinas distinguishes these terms in his Summa theologiae in 
order to indicate different sorts of primacy, which can apply to the same virtue: 
(1) Cardinal Virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. (2) General 
Virtues: prudence, justice, magnanimity, obedience, religion, and so on. 
244 Cf. ST I-II 46.1. 
245 This general virtue must then be a special (or proper) virtue with its 
specific end, to which it then orders a large number of other virtues (cf. ST II-II 
58.6; cf. in III S., d. 9, qu. 1, a. 1 qle 2). 
246 “in maximis bonis sperandis vel adipiscendis, ad quae confirmat 
animum magnanimitas” ST II-II 129.5. 
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for the former.247 These qualities entail general aspects that also 
constitute a person’s moral resilience. 
In brief, natural magnanimity tends toward obtaining a great 
good (attingere ad magnum bonum) and demands focused 
concentration. It is a virtue of intensity whereby we give our whole 
potential by mobilizing personal and social resources using the 
movement of hope for action. Magnanimity accepts not only the risk of 
death, but more generally the risk inherent in seeking greatness in all 
virtue, in every initiative of both major and minor scale. It has the hope 
of triumph or success.248 Through ordinary magnanimity we have the 
habitus, even while not having the opportunity for a great act (which 
would in turn make one worthy of great honor). Thomas’ interpretation 
of magnanimous hope is the hope of being honored for excellence in 
virtuous action. This view construes magnanimity as a disposition 
aimed toward more than singular acts, but rather toward a life of 
excellence and resilience.249 
4.5.3. Misplaced Excellence: Vainglory and Ambition 
Misplaced excellence is a danger endemic to worthy projects. 
The emotional and intellectual energy that drives us to excellence can 
lead us to impasses, excesses and vulnerability. Such failed-resilience 
is as much a social issue as it is an individual and moral one. Thomas 
identifies the classic pitfalls to initiative-taking as the vices of 
vainglory (inania gloria), ambition (ambitio) and false-humility 
(pusillanimitas). We can enrich his understanding of the possible 
failings in human initiative with resilience insights both on individual 
and social planes. 
Competency and excellence ordinarily call forth praise. We 
receive rightful praise as a result of individual or joint efforts: in 
completing a worthwhile project (achieving peace in the midst 
                                                 
247 Fortitude needs strength of spirit in the face of death, while 
magnanimity needs strength of spirit in the face of the difficulty of the task and 
the greatness of the good to be conquered. They both actualize the same type of 
virtue, but fortitude in a more complete way, making it the virtue-type and 
magnanimity the lesser image of this model (cf. ST II-II 129.5; and ST II-II 129.6 
ad 3). 
248 Cf. ST II-II 128, ad 3, Labourdette 1962, 25-6. 
249 Cf. Labourdette 1962, 29. 
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conflict), in overcoming major difficulty (rebuilding after disaster) or 
in attaining noteworthy qualities (breakthroughs in science and 
medicine). Morally and socially speaking should we long for such 
praise? What good purpose can it serve? And what are the risks 
associated with it? 
Glory itself is an effect of honor and praise, which make 
known the excellence of a person, according to St. Thomas.250 Being 
glorified means being brought into the light (clarificari),251 which 
makes known one’s qualities either to the multitude, to a few or to 
oneself. It involves social recognition as well as self-knowledge. 
Aquinas both illustrates the positive side to glory and investigates the 
means by which we should seek it. 
First for Aquinas, glory is basically good, true and useful. 
Glory’s utility does not degrade its true-value or goodness. It should be 
sought for the good of others. Indeed, glory can edify others, who see 
the effect of the excellent things done by the person who receives it. 
Second, glory serves to motive one’s own actions, to better oneself and 
to strive one’s utmost.252 Although both true glory and vainglory can 
motivate good works, Thomas nonetheless considers the works of 
vainglory not to be truly virtuous. The aim of the latter is vacuous self-
pleasure.253 All told, Aquinas affirms that we should not primarily seek 
human praise and glory in themselves nor strive for the pleasure that 
they bring; they nonetheless aid us to persevere in goodness, seek to 
better ourselves and edify our neighbor.254 
According to Aquinas, seeking praise and glory for our own 
excellence can go astray in two extremes that he calls vainglory or 
ambition and false-humility (pusillanimitas), the latter of which was 
                                                 
250 Cf. ST II-II 132.1-2; ST II-II 103.1 ad 3. In ST II-II 132.4 ad 2, he says 
that honor and praise cause glory (as their end) as a renown (notitia) in the 
knowledge of others. 
251 Aquinas (cf. ST II-II 132.1) quotes Augustine’s Commentary super 
Joan. tracts: 82, 1 (re: 15:8); 100, 1 (re: 16:13); 104, 3 (re: 17:1) PL 35, 1842-43, 
1891, 1903. 
252 In this regard, Aquinas (ST II-II 132.1 obj. 2) cites Cicero: “omnes ad 
studia impelluntur gloria” (de Tusc. Quest. I, 2). 
253 Thomas follows Augustine (cf. De Civ. Dei 5, 12, 4: PL 41, 156) whom 
he cited in ST II-II 132.1 ad 2 and ad 3; cf. ST II-II 103.1 ad 3 on the distinction 
between honor, praise and glory. 
254 Cf. ST II-II 132.1 ad 3. 
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discussed earlier. In vainglory, we err in manifesting excellence255 and 
precipitate instead related vices. Aquinas outlines three types of desire 
for vainglory: one concerns unworthy things (when we overestimate 
the value of something frail and perishable), another comes from 
uncertain sources (when we overrate judgments from fallible human 
sources) and the third lacks a due end (when it does not also reflect its 
ultimate source and contribute to the common good).256 
Secondary (but important) risks accompany a desire for glory. 
First, a disordered passion for vainglory might enslave our minds.257 
We can ask, what is the long-term resilience of the human glory 
acquired through non-truth and injustice? When politicians fall 
because of wrongdoing, through which they acquired popularity at the 
polls, we see that once revealed misdeeds bring dishonor and 
vulnerability at individual and social levels. Second, we run the risk of 
developing a disposition toward other vices, especially pride, self-
complacency, presumption and over self-confidence.258 In this tradition, 
pride (superbia) denotes an “inordinate desire of excellence,”259 and is 
considered an utmost danger. Aquinas enumerates vainglory as one of 
the seven capital vices (or as the queen of all the vices) and identifies 
seven other vices relating to it: boasting (iactantia), love for novelties 
(praesumptio novitatum), hypocrisy (hypocrisis), obstinacy 
(pertinacia), discord (discordia), contention (contentio) and 
disobedience (inobedientia).260 These dangers pertain to every effort, 
which we can do well and which can occasion public recognition. 
Aquinas distinguishes vainglory from ambition (ambitio). The 
ambitious person seeks honors for excellent qualities that he does not 
                                                 
255 “Finis autem inanis gloriae est manifestatio propriae excellentiae” ST 
II-II 132.5; cf. ST II-II 132.1; and ST II-II 132.4. 
256 Cf. ST II-II 132.1. 
257 Aquinas quotes Cicero who says that: “cavenda est gloriae cupiditas: 
eripit enim animi libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse 
contentio” Off. I.20; cited in ST II-II 132.2 sc. 
258 Cf. ST II-II 132.1 ad 1; ST II-II 132.4; ST II-II 132.3 ad 3. 
259 “Superbia enim […] importat inordinatum appetitum excellentiae” ST 
II-II 132.4; cf. ST II-II 162.1-2. 
260 ST II-II 132.5. Thomas finds support here from St. Gregory the Great, 
as he does in regards to the analysis of other failures in virtue. Aquinas cites 
Gregory’s Moralia in Job (chapter 31: PL 76, 621 A); cited in ST II-II 132.4 sc 
and corpus, and ST II-II 132.5 sc. 
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possess or deeds that he did not do. We might seek recognition for 
superior knowledge through plagiarizing an essay or cheating on an 
exam. We might seek honor from inappropriate sources or for 
compromising reasons. Aquinas is however quite aware that honor and 
glory motivate people both in doing good and in avoiding evil. In this 
regard, he quotes Cicero who says that: “honor fosters the arts.”261 We 
can nevertheless rightfully wonder about the disproportionate (blind or 
shallow) honor that society and the media sometimes give to 
entertainers, sports stars and politicians who indeed have certain 
excellent qualities, and can symbolize the hopes and dreams of youth 
and nations. Aquinas would consider that the honor attributed because 
of artistic, technical, popular or financial success is unworthy of being 
desired, unless it is rooted in virtue and used toward higher goals.262 
In order to avoid such pitfalls and acquired vulnerabilities, 
magnanimous people glory neither in little things (as true as they may 
be) nor in human opinion (truth is of the utmost importance) nor in an 
excess of glory in rapport with their desserts and certainly not in 
contending for vainglory.263 Rather the magnanimous are solidly rooted 
in honesty and flee self-complacency. For this reason, they shun not 
only false-humility (which concerns the intellect) and vainglory 
(concerning social recognition), but also isolationism and 
individualism. According to Aquinas, we should use glory in 
moderation and only for good ends. Indeed through being 
acknowledged by others, one “acquires clarity” (redditur clarus),264 
which one must in turn reflect on its sources. This social dimension of 
resilience and vulnerability is more profound and extensive than at first 
sight. It entails a social dimension of virtue, which consists of the 
person’s proper relationship to reality and social networks, as well as 
the way that the social entourage gives recognition to its members in 
order to motive their growth in excellence. 
                                                 
261 De Tusc. Quest. 1; cited in ST II-II 131.1 obj. 3. He also quotes Aristotle 
and Sallust in this regard. 
262 Cf. ST II-II 131.1 ad 3. 
263 Cf. ST II-II 132.2 ad 1, ad 2 and ad 3. 
264 “ex hoc enim quod aliquis laudatur, vel quaecumque reverentia ei 
exhibetur, redditur clarus in notitia aliorum” ST II-II 132.2. 
Virtues of Initiative 345 
4.6. Conclusion: Constructive Resilience and Virtues of 
Initiative 
Courage and resilience entail more than the management of 
fear in the face of danger. They empower us to overcome the obstacles 
involved in constructive human acts with concentration and hope, as 
well as a drive for flourishing. By doing something rather than 
nothing, we expose ourselves to the risks of failure. Likewise, when 
pursuing excellence in great and small projects, we multiply the need 
for resilience in the face of opposition. We demonstrate another facet 
of fortitude and another facet of resilience: constructive resilience and 
virtues of initiative. 
Considerations of constructive resilience have enriched our 
study of Aquinas’ approach to the initiative-taking virtues of 
magnificence and magnanimity. Placed in dialogue, resilience research 
and his virtue theory aid us to understand how humans build life in the 
face of difficulty and face the difficulty of building. In order to 
accomplish endeavors, we employ our emotional and intellectual 
dispositions. We engage our emotions of hope and assertiveness. We 
manage our desires for excellence, honor, confidence and security. At 
the same time, we overcome the counter-forces found in insecurity, 
presumption, timidity, meanness, vainglory and ambition. 
Resilience research enhances Aquinas’ conception of 
magnanimity through its insights on optimism and hope. Through 
initiative-taking virtues, we mobilize hope and daring in an active and 
constructive resilience. These virtues are more than simple coping 
responses to different kinds of stress, challenge or loss. We can 
differentiate them according to their sources of motivation: the quality 
and finality of goals, competencies and dispositions. Social support 
from family, friends and society can also make us optimistic and 
trusting in people’s assistance. Hope and motivation underlie human 
agency. Our motivation increases with hopefulness and more hopeful 
people are motivated to attain more challenging and more numerous 
goals. On the contrary, when friends and family fail us, we acquire a 
sense of pessimism and distrust. Social and personal insecurity can 
also hinder our endeavors. 
The efficacy, purpose and resilience of another type of 
initiative revolve around generosity and magnanimity in Aquinas’ 
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language. Evolutionary psychology offers insights on the impact that 
resource management styles—such as generosity, sharing and status-
promotion—can have on human development and survival. It offers 
benefits such as returned energy, acquired fitness and offspring 
survival. Aquinas, in contrast, situates generosity and magnanimity in 
the larger framework of truth, goodness, honor and excellence. He 
measures the use of resources in terms of their contribution to the 
common good, personal flourishing and a veritable search for honor 
that depends on the verity of the excellence sought. This perspective 
might or might not serve the survival advantage of individuals (and 
their gene-pools) in a particular historical-cultural crisis. It 
demonstrates that virtue theory and resilience theory do not always 
have the same norms. Indeed, the measure of success determines 
outcome appraisals. 
Aquinas offers insights into the misplaced searches for 
excellence, like vainglory, ambitiousness and false-humility that 
counteract constructive resilience. He promotes a type of initiative 
(magnanimity and magnificence) that finds its roots in a truth-seeking 
estimate of our own resources and need for assistance. This type of 
initiative promotes resilience in several ways. It avoids the 
vulnerability endemic in false self-esteem, timidity and other-blaming. 
It involves a social relationality that seeks human flourishing while 
building up the common good. It discerns our own capacities and 
limits, as well as the assistance offered through social circles. A 
magnanimous disposition courageously stretches us from strength to 
strength, while it resists overstepping rational limits. It maximizes the 
investment of time and energy in great and seemingly little things. It 
focuses collaborative human agency on necessary goals, while 
recognizing that lesser goals might not be achieved. 
Aquinas’ approach to the natural virtues of initiative finds 
challenges and enhancement from input on constructive resilience. The 
latter offers useful insights especially concerning the management of 
stress and daring, as well as the effects of coping, hope and optimism 
in human agency. Thomas for his part offers a stable yet flexible 
framework, which demonstrates a capacity to assimilate insights from 
the psychosocial sciences. For Aquinas, we act resiliently when we 
enact a moral good or avoid an evil. In this context, great initiatives are 
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synonymous with a lifestyle that seeks moral excellence and employs 
constructive resilience. This synthesis contributes a positive 
psychology that involves moral parameters for human initiative. 

 Chapter Five. 
Resistant Resilience and Aquinas’ Virtues of Endurance 
5.1. Introduction: The Virtues and Emotions of Resisting 
and Enduring 
In order to resist the destructive effects of adversity, we need 
to master the emotions and dispositions that underlie endurance. As 
mentioned previously, for Aquinas, the soul employs two distinct but 
interrelated types of action in confronting difficulty. The initiative-
taking virtues (aggredi) clearly involve action. The virtues of enduring 
and resisting (sustinere) nonetheless also require action and a 
disposition to act. In the latter case, humans are not passive. We endure 
the difficulty, hold firm in the good, resist self-destruction and persist 
until we accomplish our goal. Thomas clarifies these movements as 
belonging to two distinct virtues: patience and perseverance.1 These 
virtues are key elements in his virtue theory and in understanding 
moral and spiritual resiliency and vulnerability. 
We need to pose several questions in order to identify how 
resilience research enhances Aquinas’ thought on these virtues. When 
do patience and perseverance signify vulnerability and unresilience? 
On the one hand, when do they denote resilience? In this chapter, I first 
focus on the types of emotion and action related to resistance and 
endurance in Aquinas’ virtue theory and resilience research. I examine 
their analyses of the emotions of sorrow and suffering and the actions 
related to waiting and standing firm. Secondly, I explore the typology 
of the enduring virtues and resistant resilience. The virtues concern 
primarily patience and perseverance, and in a secondary way 
longanimity and constancy. The psychosocial research offers 
observations and insights on the anatomy and management of pain, 
sorrow, suffering and loss. In dialogue, these two perspectives enrich 
each other. Lastly, I investigate strategies for managing sorrow and 
pain, and Aquinas’ notion of virtuous sorrow. The bottom line is: how 
do moral virtues of patience and perseverance enable us to actively 
                                                 
1 Cf. ST II-II 128; III Sent. 33, 3, 3. 
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endure hardship and wait for the accomplishment of the good? And 
how does resilience research enrich this understanding? 
5.2. Emotions related to Sorrow, Suffering and Waiting 
How do the virtues of patience and perseverance manage the 
emotions related to suffering, waiting and loss? In order to answer this 
question, I shall identify the typologies of pain and suffering supported 
by Aquinas and the psychosocial sciences. We shall attempt to enhance 
Thomas’ view of patience, perseverance, long-suffering and constancy 
with psychosocial analyze of the emotional component of resilience 
and vulnerability phenomena. 
5.2.1. Resilience and Social Sciences on Pain and 
Suffering and Loss 
What do resilience research and the psychosocial sciences, in 
particular psychoanalytical theory, and neurochemical and 
developmental sciences, indicate about human reactions to pain, 
suffering, waiting and resistance? As discussed in chapter two, pain, 
suffering and loss can have destructive as well as steeling effects on 
humans. E. J. Anthony has documented this phenomenon in regards to 
children who seem to have become capable of mastering life and its 
obstacles in the midst of painful episodes.2 We need to differentiate the 
sources of human pain and suffering, as well as the risks and 
opportunities that spring from them. Without being limited to it, I shall 
structure resilience phenomena using E. Erikson’s typology of human 
suffering, which purports three levels: physical pain, psychological 
anxiety and social panic.3 How can suffering and pain prove to be 
sources of risk or opportunity for resilience at these three levels? 
On the organismic plane, experiences of physical suffering can 
lead to heightened thresholds of pain. This adaptation can have several 
effects. It can aid us to not be distracted from more important goals by 
physical pain and discomfort. It nonetheless can open us to 
                                                 
2 Cf. E. J. Anthony 1987, 180; Wills et al. 1996, 108; Lösel 1994, 9. 
3 Cf. E. Erikson 1985, 36. This psychoanalytical perspective is based on his 
conception of a human being in terms of three continuously interrelating 
processes of organization: as a physical organism, as a psychological ego and as a 
member of society. We discussed this more extensively in chapter three. 
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vulnerability when pushed too far. This capacity is detrimental when, 
for example, a premature baby’s ability to support pain leads him to 
unresilient behavior, including not avoiding excessive amounts of 
physical pain and the bodily damage and danger that accompanies it.4 
The types of psychological suffering are numerous: anxiety, 
phobias, loneliness, loss and so on. Resilience research has found that 
personality types and developed emotional styles present themselves as 
added risks or protection for certain kinds of suffering, as discussed 
earlier. First, timidity, for example, involves added risk of suffering 
anxiety due to having an easily aroused neurochemical circuitry, to 
avoiding unfamiliar situations and to shying away from uncertainty. 
However, timidity can be a source of resilience when shy behavior 
protects someone from marked dangers of a violent neighborhood or 
from contact with dangerous strangers. It can aid someone in focusing 
to accomplish tasks that are more amenable to their personality 
strengths. In a pacific ambiance on the contrary, it can however spell 
isolationism and missed opportunities.5 According to D. Goleman, 
timid children are at higher risk for developing anxiety disorders, like 
panic attacks.6 
Second, the emotion of fear can have positive and negative 
effects on human psychological well-being. Fear is crucial for survival, 
aiding our perception of dangers, as well as avoiding and even 
overcoming them. Misplaced fears on the contrary are counter-
resilient. According to Goleman, they involve the more ordinary 
suffering of daily frets, angst and worries, as well as pathological 
extremes of phobias, obsessive-compulsive disorders and the like.7 
Lastly, types of psychological suffering come from a heightened 
threshold of psychological discomfort. They can open us to 
vulnerabilities, as when co-dependent persons unnecessarily abide 
excessive psychological suffering.8 However, resistance to 
                                                 
4 Cf. C. Petit et alia, 1996, 3045-6. 
5 Cf. Cowan, Cowan and Schulz 1996,10; Consortium 1994, 275. 
6 Cf. D. Goleman 1995, 218. 
7 Cf. D. Goleman 1995, 297. 
8 This vulnerability is only one aspect of dependent and co-dependent 
people’s suffering. Cf. M. Beattie 1987; P.-Y. Albrecht and J. Zermatten 1994; 
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psychological suffering also gives us endurance in pursuing a difficult 
good. 
We also confront social sources of suffering, like parental 
favoritism, family violence, discrimination, social injustice and so 
forth. According to N. Watt, children of divorced parents suffer from 
immediate disruptions and parental hostility (violence), and further 
progressive costs from latent psychological insults, such as: loss, 
estrangement or tarnishing of primary identification figures, 
disintegration of family structure, sentiments of social stigma and 
isolation, and excessive challenges like prematurely imposed self-
reliance.9 Social injustices produce suffering and vulnerability at 
family and extra familial level, as when parents display favoritism 
among children, or when children suffer prejudices in school. M. 
Tousignant estimates that such phenomena are cumulative factors for 
already vulnerable children becoming even more so.10 An added risk 
arises from excessively supporting pain through social passivity. 
The capacity to persist in difficulty can be risky in extermis; it 
can also promote resilience when rationally measured for a good end. 
In the second regard, we can avail ourselves to numerous fitting 
pathways to a goal. Yet it might be more resilient to take another tack 
or even to stop for sometime, before taking up a difficult pursuit. 
Researchers demonstrate that strategies of rest, humor, and play 
facilitate long-term effects of coping with a difficult situation, task or 
goal. These strategies actually contribute to solving problems that 
cannot be resolved in more conventional ways.11 Furthermore, 
attachment researchers have positively correlated attachment and 
confidence in challenges. Lutkenhaus’ experiment on the tower 
building performance of three-year-old infants who were securely or 
insecurely attached found that securely attached children tended to 
speed up under pressure, whereas insecurely attached children tended 
to slow down. According to M. Rutter, this tendency implies that 
“secure attachments led to a sense of confidence in their ability to meet 
                                                 
9 According to N. Watt (1990, 300), divorce spells the opportunity for both 
acquired vulnerability and resilience. 
10 Cf. M. Tousignant 1998, 64. According to E. Erikson (1985, 36), as 
members of society, humans are susceptible to the group’s panic. 
11 Cf. G. Eisen 1988. 
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challenges, whereas insecurity was followed by a tendency to give up 
under pressure.”12 These findings suggest that the quality of our 
perseverance finds roots in our strategies, not only conventional 
cognitive goals and volitional approaches, but also those 
underestimated resources found in rest and humor, play and 
interpersonal attachments. Once again these strategies and resources 
show themselves to be important for the quality of life and efficacious 
goal achievement. 
I shall put this typology of suffering and persisting, and their 
correlation with resilience into dialogue with Aquinas’ approach to the 
management of suffering through the virtue of patience, and of active 
waiting through the virtue of perseverance. These strategies will also 
return in the upcoming section on strategies of treating pain and 
suffering in patience, and managing waiting and resisting in 
perseverance and other resilience techniques. 
5.2.2. Aquinas’ Typology of Sorrow and Suffering 
What are Aquinas’ framework, conception and typology of 
sorrow and suffering? How does the preceding psychosocial analysis 
complete his typology of related emotions? First, I shall outline 
Thomas’ analysis of sorrow and suffering. His approach to the genesis 
and development of sorrow (tristitia) aids us to explore this emotion’s 
causes and potential for risk and resilience outcomes further. Secondly, 
it prepares the way for a minor comparison with the preceding 
psychosocial research, as well as for the upcoming analysis of sorrow’s 
management through the virtue of patience. 
In order to understand Aquinas’ conception, we shall 
distinguish tristitia (sorrow) from dolor (pain). In a general sense, we 
might translate his term tristitia as both sorrow (or sadness) and pain 
(or suffering). Thomas identifies sorrow or tristitia as one of four 
principal passions, inasmuch as it arises from all the other passions 
when an evil is present or a good is absent.13 
                                                 
12 Rutter (1990, 200) cites the research of Lutkenhaus et al. 1985. 
13 The other principal passions are joy (gaudium), hope (spes) and fear 
(timor). In his question on whether there are four principal passions (I-II 25.4), 
Aquinas supports this division of the passions with the authority of Boethius’ De 
consolation (I, 7, PL 63, 657A-658A). Augustine’s list of the four principal 
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In his more frequent and technical use however, he defines 
tristitia as a species of dolor.14 Nonetheless, he then differentiates dolor 
as bodily pain, from tristitia as the internal suffering of the soul 
(anima).15 Pain and sorrow are the counterparts of pleasure (delectatio) 
and joy (gaudium and laetitia) respectively.16 Two things are requisite 
for the experience of pain in general: the encountering of some evil 
and the perception of this event. Sorrow, on the contrary, is the pain 
that is caused by an interior apprehension of the intellect or 
imagination. This inward pain—sorrow, sadness and grief—is both 
greater and more universal than the exterior or bodily pain.17 
We cannot understand sorrow and suffering in Aquinas’ 
conception unless we relate them to the good and seen in the context of 
the other concupiscible emotions. Indeed, while a type of sorrow is 
managed by patience in the irascible faculty, sorrow and suffering in 
general arise from the concupiscible emotions: from loving something 
that is good (amor), through desiring it (desiderium or concupiscentia), 
to the pleasure of being in union with the good (delectatio or 
gaudium).18 This series in turn has its contraries: hatred of an evil 
object or the rejection of a good (odium), the avoidance or dislike of it 
(fuga or abominatio), and finally pain or sorrow when a good is not 
attained or an evil is present (dolor or tristitia).19 
Sorrow on the occasion of contact with evil is both an evil, 
inasmuch as one experiences something that is evil (even if only 
imaginary, an ens rationis), and a good, since being pained or 
saddened at the presence of evil is a sign of the goodness rooted in the 
                                                                                                          
passions contains tristitia, but replaces spes with cupiditas (De Civ. Dei xiv.3.2 
and 3.7; PL 41.406 and 410; which Thomas cites in ST I-II 25.4 obj. 1). 
Comparable divisions can be found in Cicero Fin. III, x, 35; and St. Jerome In 
Ezechiel I, i, 7, PL 25, 23 BC. 
14 Aquinas says, “sic igitur tristitia est quaedam species doloris, sicut 
gaudium delectionis” ST I-II 35.2. 
15 Thomas (I-II 35.2) cites Augustine’s De Civ. Dei (xiv.7; PL 41.411) and 
Aristotle’s NE iii.13, 1118a16-23. Cf. In Eth. 3, 19, 610-11, and 3, 20, 613-4. 
16 Cf. ST I-II 35.3; Deferrari 1986, 1051-52. 
17 Aquinas (ST I-II 35.7) supports this insight from one sole authority, that 
of scripture, Ecclesiasticus 25:17. 
18 Cf. ST I-II 23.1-3; and ST I-II 35-39. 
19 Cf. ST I-II 23.2, and ST I-II 35.2. Thomas extensively treats the 
concupiscible virtues in ST I-II 26-39 drawing from Aristotle and other 
philosophers, St. Augustine and Patristic sources, as well as Scriptural texts. 
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ordering of the faculty.20 Aquinas affirms that sorrow can be good and 
righteous (bonum honestum), when it involves a proper disposition to 
evil. The right relationship with evil depends on the proper use of 
reason and will, and takes emotional form in righteous expressions of 
sorrow and anger, and virtuous form in patience and perseverance 
principally.Sorrow is caused most properly by the presence of an evil,21 
which does not just involve the simple absence of good. Indeed, the 
apprehension of evil focuses on the undue and undesired absence of 
the particular good.22 Aquinas claims that the proper cause of sorrow is 
the personal experience of evil, which triggers a certain repulsion of 
the appetite.23 Aquinas identifies four different types of sorrow: pity, 
envy, anxiety and apathy.24 Each of these types of sorrow involves 
applying the notion of sorrow to its cause (object) or effect. This 
simple causal typology should not be read outside of Aquinas’ realism, 
which includes not only physical, psychological and social realms but 
also the underlying moral, metaphysical and spiritual ones. 
Through pity or mercy (misericordia), we consider the evil 
experienced by another as our own. In the archetype of mercy, 
friendship-love impels us to act on behalf of the other as another self.25 
In a second type of pity, we feel sorrow for the other person, because 
we might fall into the same predicament.26 Such empathetic 
expressions are deeply social in nature. 
Through envy (invidia), we consider the good experienced by 
another as our own evil. Strictly speaking, envy contradicts charity, 
which should rejoice at our neighbor’s good. This vice engenders risks 
                                                 
20 Thomas says: “tristitia est bonum secundum cognitionem et 
recusationem mali” (ST I-II 39.2). 
21 Aquinas finds support for this insight in quoting John Damascene, saying 
(De Fide Orth. ii, 12): “expectum malum timorem constituit, praesens vero 
tristitiam” ST I-II 36.1 sc. 
22 Cf. ST I-II 36.1; ST II-II 136.3. 
23 Cf. ST II-II 34.6; ST II-II 136.3. 
24 Cf. ST I-II 35.8 corpus and obj 3, where Aquinas refers to the division of 
sorrow presented by Nemesius (mistakenly attributed to Gregory of Nyssa), 
Nemesius, 1; PG 40, 688A.  
25 Aquinas supports his arguments with insights drawn from St. Augustine 
(de Civ. Dei, ix.5; PL 41.261), St. Paul (Rom 12:15) and Aristotle (NE ix.4, 
1166a7-10). 
26 Cf. ST II-II 30.1 and ST II-II 30.2. 
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to the social order when we seek to denigrate the good of the other or 
to emulate evildoers who unjustly cumulate material wealth.27 
Through anxiety, distress or perplexity (angustia), we have a 
certain burden on the mind, making escape from the evil seem 
impossible,28 for example, when future unforeseen fears surpass our 
capacity to resist them.29 The larger the source of fear and its social 
consequence, the more troubling the anxiety will be. 
Through torpor, apathy or depression (acedia), we are so 
weighed down by the evil as to be rendered motionless, speechless and 
closed in on ourselves. Inasmuch as it hinders the will from enjoying 
some good, the presence of evil is repugnant to our movement and thus 
depresses or burdens the soul. The hindrance to the soul can even 
express itself through bodily paralysis. The strength of the sorrow 
depends on whether and to what degree we continue to hope to evade 
the evil, as will be clarified in the upcoming section on patience and 
hope. Aquinas adds that, in general, pain and sorrow hinder action that 
they produce; nonetheless, pain and sorrow serve as a type of cause 
when we attempt to overcome them.30 
How can psychosocial research and Aquinas’ typology of 
sorrow enhance each other? Resilience research observes the emotional 
phenomena and their developmental trajectory. How do they lead to a 
positive self-organization and self-construction? Erikson’s tripartite 
division of sources of pain, anxiety and panic from the physical, 
psychological and social spheres benefits from a further metaphysical 
and moral analysis of the structure of fear and evil. Although the 
immediate ramifications for Thomas’ analysis of these emotions are 
psychological, they extend to deeper moral issues. His virtue theory is 
more than a phenomenology of emotional states; nevertheless it 
benefits from a realist, metaphysically based phenomenology, 
especially one focused on the resources that we need to overcome and 
                                                 
27 On envy, see ST II-II 36.1-2. 
28 On anxiety or perplexity, see ST I-II 37.2. 
29 Aquinas refers to this aspect of anxiety as agonia (ST I-II 41.4) and 
anxietas de futuro (ST I-II 35.2 obj 2). It is also found in the way that he (ST I-II 
67.1) discusses fortitude’s work of overcoming anxiety of evil (molestia 
tolerandorum malorum), a phrase he borrows from Augustine’s De Trin (XIV.9; 
PL 42.1046). 
30 Cf. ST I-II 37.3, and ST I-II 37.2. 
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to resist adversity. Aquinas’ approach to virtues leads us to inquiry into 
the way that humans can develop dispositions to act more responsibly. 
Psychosocial insights about how humans can be resistant to acquiring 
vulnerability and to external destructive pressures must be read in a 
normative project: the goal of human growth in excellence its 
contribution to a more just society. These reflections serve as a 
propaedeutic for discussing the resilience of the virtues of patience and 
perseverance and the vulnerability of their contraries. 
5.3. The Virtues of Patience and Perseverance in a Resilience 
Perspective 
In order to suggest some ways that resilience findings enrich 
Aquinas’ understanding of the virtues and acts of patience and 
perseverance, I shall explicate his philosophical conception and 
typology of these virtues, and their contraries. In the next section I 
shall integrate some resilience insights, especially in terms of the 
developmental trajectory of these virtues. 
5.3.1. Aquinas on the Virtue and Act of Patience 
In establishing patience as one of the four parts of fortitude (ST 
II-II 128), Aquinas analyses how it principally involves enduring 
(sustinere) hardship or suffering in order that good be achieved or evil 
avoided. He employs the definition of patience that Cicero gives in his 
Rhetorica: “patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of 
arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or benefit.”31 To this 
moral definition of patience, Aquinas adds the notion of managing 
sorrow. As introduced in chapter three on fortitude, for Thomas, 
patience (and perseverance) relates to fortitude either as one of its 
potential parts, when we deal with any minor adversity, or as an 
                                                 
31 “Patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac 
difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio” Rhet. II.54. This text is used in the 
ST II-II 128.1, and III Sent. 33, 3, 3, co. In following the Ciceronian fourfold 
division of fortitude, Aquinas brings certain changes to the contemporary currents 
of thought on this virtue. Philippe the Chancellor (Summa de bono), for example, 
followed the Abelardian (Moralium dogma) division of fortitude in six integral 
parts or hierarchies dispositions (not virtues per se), which included patience; cf. 
Gauthier 1951, 272-277; and O. Lottin 1942-1960, III:160ff. and 180ff. 
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integral part of fortitude, when we deal virtuously with the greatest 
danger, specifically death for the common good.32 
Aquinas furthermore establishes that patience concerns the 
mind remaining strong when faced with the sorrow and suffering that 
comes from withstanding evil. Aquinas extensively treats suffering and 
pain in his moral theory.33 We can best understand this emphasis on 
suffering in the context of the importance his virtue theory places on 
flourishing. He says that the role of the virtue of patience is to assure 
that “the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its 
greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil.”34 The object and 
act of patience entail safeguarding the good of reason from the 
sorrowful impulse of the passions, that arises from bearing evil. 
Aquinas goes so far as to claim that we can develop sorrow as a 
virtuous good (bonum honestum).35 Indeed, we have to wait for the 
possession and enjoyment of longed-for goods (especially the ultimate 
good). One can only understand patience’s object and act in relation to 
the difficulty of the good and the passion of sorrow. 
The philosophical framework and foundation for Thomas’ 
explication of patience involves a natural virtue that raises many 
theological questions in the next chapter. However, for the time being, 
in order to dialogue with resilience insights better, I shall focus on its 
philosophical and psychological dimensions. Thomas’ analysis of how 
patience resists the disturbance of sorrow is unique and important 
enough that he modifies (see italics) the classic definition from 
Augustine’s De Patientia: “human patience is whereby we bear evil 
with an equal mind, i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, lest we 
abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby we may advance to 
better things.”36 Evil and difficulty firstly produce sorrow, then anger, 
                                                 
32 Cf. ST II-II 128, ad 4, and ST II-II 136.4. 
33 Thomas devotes 25 articles to sorrow and pain (cf. ST I-II 35-39), as well 
as the questions on courage, patience, perseverance and the gift of fortitude (cf. 
ST II-II 123-140). 
34 “quorum primus est ne difficultate imminentium malorum animus 
frangatur per tristitiam, et decidat a sua magnitudine” ST II-II 128. 
35 Cf. ST I-II 39.2 corpus and sc. 
36 Aquinas’ insert is not in italics: “patientia hominis est qua mala aequo 
animo toleramus, idest sine perturbatione tristitiae, ne animo iniquo bona 
deseramus per quae ad meliora perveniamus” (ST II-II 136.1). Cf. St. Augustine, 
De Patientia ii; PL 40.611. 
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hatred, and unjust injury; we employ other virtues to manage the later 
three directly.37 However, since sorrow itself has different sources, 
patience thus demands the aid of different virtues: temperance to 
manage the pain (as opposite of physical pleasure) that comes from the 
alimentary and sexual abstinence and fortitude to manage the sorrows 
(evil, suffering and pain) that are inflicted by other people through 
deeds or words.38 Even so, patience has a certain perfection or 
excellence; thus, Aquinas interprets the letter of James (1:4) “Patience 
hath a perfect work,”39 as illustrating how patience bears hardships and 
plucks up (extirpat) any related inordinate sorrow.40 
The act of patience involves not only bearing evil and not 
giving into sorrow, but also holding fast with a calm spirit. Patience 
serves all the virtues (as a general virtue) through its calming effect on 
the soul.41 It indirectly serves as a foundation and protection for the 
virtues inasmuch as it manages (evellit) the passions that are 
precipitated by adversity and disturb the soul.42 Patience allows us a 
certain undisturbed self-domination, control or ownership.43 Lastly, he 
                                                 
37 While the virtue of patience manages and moderates feelings of sorrow, 
meekness does so for anger, charity, for hatred and justice, for unjust injury (cf. 
ST II-II 136.2 ad 1). 
38 Cf. ST II-II 136.4 ad 2; ST II-II 72.3. 
39 “Patientia opus perfectum habet,” as quoted in ST I-II 66.4 ad 2, ST II-II 
136.2 obj. 1 and ad 1, et alia. Aquinas quotes often the letter of James (1:4) to 
illustrate the importance of patience. The RSV translation of the full verse is: 
“And let steadfastness (Øpomon») have its full effect, that you may be perfect and 
complete, lacking in nothing.” Unfortunately, Thomas did not write a 
commentary on the letter of James. 
40 Indeed, sorrow causes emotions like unjust injury, hatred and anger (cf. 
ST I-II 66.4 ad 2; ST II-II 136, 2 ad 1). Patience also has a certain perfection in 
being an effect of the abundance of charity, through which one bears hardships 
patiently (cf. ST II-II 184.1 ad 3). It is in this context that Aquinas quotes Rom 
8:35: “Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? or 
distress?” 
41 In this regard, Aquinas (ST II-II 136.2 obj 3) quotes St. Gregory the 
Great (Hom. xxxv in Ev. n. 4: PL 76, 1261 D), who says: “patientia est radix et 
custos omnium virtutum.” Gregory bases his homily on Luke 21:19, “By your 
endurance you will gain your lives.” 
42 Thomas says: “patientia, ut non perturbetur per tristitiam immoderatam; 
[..]. patientia non permittit propter tristitiam discedere ab aequanimitate mentis” 
ST II-II 136.2 ad 2; cf. ST II-II 136.2 ad 3; III Sent. 33, 3, 3 ad 1. 
43 Aquinas (ST II-II 136.2 obj 2) supports this idea by quoting the Gospel of 
Luke (21:19): “In patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras.” The RSV reads: 
“By your endurance (Øpomon») you will gain your lives.” 
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claims that patience produces pleasure as a fruit that helps in 
overcoming sorrow and calming the soul.44 
While patience concerns not being broken by the sorrow of the 
difficult effort at hand, longanimity45 or long-suffering (longanimitas) 
describes the dimension of waiting, how we must remain and endure.46 
Longanimity relates to waiting in a way different than does hope. The 
expectation implied in hope does not emphasize the delay (delatio) of 
what we hope for, as does long-suffering.47 Indeed, longanimity 
describes how we tend to something a long way off. In facing 
difficulty, it participates in the dynamic of hope as a passion (instead 
of the passions of sorrow, daring or fear per se). In this way it is like 
magnanimity, which participates in the passion of hope while daringly 
confronting adversity. 
Longanimity relates to patience insofar as waiting causes 
difficulty, suffering and sorrow. It describes how we need strength to 
endure over time some difficulty for the sake of good. As it is less 
difficult to endure the same trial for a shorter time, so we need more 
strength, longanimity or long-suffering, if the trial lasts a longer time. 
Delay itself causes sorrow. Indeed, a delay in overcoming evil or in 
waiting for the good entails a certain suffering.48 Longanimity bears the 
sorrow of not only facing and resisting evil but also the delay needed 
before enjoying the good. 
                                                 
44 Cf. ST II-II 136.1 ad 3. 
45 I have chosen to use longanimity as the translation of longanimitas. This 
translation parallels the use of magnanimity for magnanimitas, in the previous 
chapter. 
46 Aquinas in III Sent. 26, 2, 2, ad 3, when addressing whether hope is a 
theological virtue, notes the different ways that patience and longanimity 
participate in the expectation of hope: “expectatio patientiae est expectatio divini 
auxilii in periculis; expectatio autem longanimitatis est expectatio divini auxilii in 
laboribus actionis tendentis in aliquod bonum arduum obtinendum. Unde patet 
ex praedictis quod expectatio patientiae et longanimitatis est per participationem 
expectationis a spe, secundum quod virtutes posteriores participant aliquid a 
prioribus.” 
47 Aquinas says: “expectatio quae ponitur in definitione spei non importat 
dilationem, sicut expectatio quae pertinet ad longanimitatem: sed importat 
respectum ad auxilium divinum, sive illud quod speratur differatur, sive non 
differatur” ST II-II 17.5 ad 3.  
48 In this regard, Aquinas (ST II-II 136.5) quotes Proverbs (13: 12): “Hope 
deferred makes the heart sick.” 
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In the context of his analysis of patience, Aquinas 
distinguishes longanimity from constancy: longanimity concerns the 
waiting or delay in the patient effort, and constancy concerns the 
involved toil. Constancy precisely refers to the toil needed in 
persistently confronting some evil for the sake of good, or in 
accomplishing some good while resisting evil.49 
This framework sets the stage for a discussion of the 
development of patience and resilience (later in this chapter), as well as 
the theological dimension (in the next one). Before continuing with a 
more in depth analysis however, a short summary of the virtue of 
perseverance will round out this introduction to Aquinas’ treatment of 
the virtues of resisting. 
5.3.2. Perseverance, the Virtue of Active Waiting 
Aquinas’ treatment of perseverance is akin to patience, in 
philosophical and psychological framework. He explores perseverance 
as the virtue that aids us to not weary, for we need to stay attached to 
the future good and to resist evil when difficulty persists.50 Aquinas 
reasons that a virtue may concern difficulty or goodness, either by its 
object or by a special difficulty. He deems the length of time, that is, 
persisting for a long while, a special difficulty that demands a specific 
virtue: perseverance.51 He stresses the attainment of the goal, for we 
must “persist in good for a long time until the end.”52 He distinguishes 
this perseverance from the general quality of very virtue to persevere 
inasmuch as it is a quality difficult to change.53 
Following Cicero (Rhet. II, 54), Aquinas annexes perseverance 
to fortitude as a secondary virtue, as they both do for patience.54 
Thomas construes fortitude, as a specific virtue, to outstrip 
                                                 
49 He finds this notion in Cicero’s (Rhet. ii.54) definition of patience, which 
concerns arduous things (cf. ST II-II 136.5). 
50 Cf. ST II-II 128.1. 
51 Thomas says (ST II-II 137.1): “Et ideo diu persistere in aliquo bono 
usque ad consummationem pertinet ad specialem virtutem.” 
52 “diu persistere usque ad finem in bono” ST II-II 137.1 ad 3. 
53 Cf. ST II-II 137.1 ad 3; Aristotle, NE ii.4 1105a 32 b 5. 
54 Aquinas borrows from, yet enriches, classical definitions of perseverance 
found in Cicero, Andronicus (Chrysippus) and Augustine. He (ST II-II 137.1 obj 
3) employs Cicero’s definition: “perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata 
stabilis et perpetua permansio” Rhet. II.54. 
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perseverance in the order of difficulty and the way of handling it. He 
subordinates perseverance, as the “endurance of difficulty arising from 
delay in accomplishing a good work,”55 to the difficulty addressed in 
fortitude, concerning the fear of fatal danger. These virtues interrelate 
since both perseverance and fortitude are in the irascible appetite. In 
particular, perseverance moderates the passion of fear as related to 
weariness or failure because of the length of delay entailed.56 
Aquinas’ own definition adds, or puts an emphasis on the 
duration of time in a way different from classical philosophers.57 He 
says: “perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring 
delays in the above [temperance and fortitude] or other virtuous deeds, 
so far as necessity requires.”58 He notes that we shall have more 
occasions to persist for a certain time concerning matters of 
moderating pleasures (of touch) rather than the fear of death. Indeed, 
most often the fear of the danger of death is not endured for a long 
time. 
Aquinas remarks that a virtue sometimes also has the same 
name as its act, which is the case for perseverance.59 Thomas’ 
distinction between the habit and the act of perseverance is a useful 
heuristic tool. As a habitus, perseverance refers to the human tendency 
to complete a task, to achieve a goal or to persist in it. But we fulfill or 
not a habitus in a particular act. As an act, Aquinas specifies two types 
of perseverance, according to two different types of ends: a work and a 
life. Some acts cannot find completion until the end of life. This 
distinction allows Aquinas to explain Augustine’s dictum that “no one 
can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until 
                                                 
55 “Sustinere autem difficultatem quae provenit ex diuturnitate boni opere” 
ST II-II 137.2. 
56 “Sed perseverantia secundum quod ponitur virtus, moderatur aliquas 
passiones: scilicet timorem fatigationis aut defectus propter diuturnitatem. Unde 
haec virtus est in irascibili, sicut et fortitudo” ST II-II 137.2 ad 2. 
57 For example, Cicero and Andronicus do not emphasize duration. Cf. ST 
II-II 137.1 sc. 
58 “perseverantia est quaedam specialis virtus ad quam pertinet in his vel in 
aliis virtuosis operibus diuturnitatem sustinere prout necesse est” (ST II-II 
137.1). The reference, “in his,” is to temperance and to fortitude. 
59 Cf. ST II-II 137.1 ad 2. 
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death,”60 as we shall discuss in a theological context in the next 
chapter. Thomas does not construe perseverance as merely a human 
natural virtue related to completing acts important for this life, such as 
building, planting and familial and friendship relationships. 
Aquinas says that constancy relates in a special way to 
perseverance, since both refer to the same end, persisting firmly in 
some good (ST II-II 137.3). But they differ in regards to what makes it 
difficult to persist in this way. Perseverance specifically pertains to the 
delay itself, while constancy pertains to other difficulties that come 
from external hindrances. According to Aquinas, the delay itself is 
more intrinsic to virtue than the external matters considered in 
constancy. As mentioned before in relation to longanimity, constancy 
is also a matter of moderating sorrow, since it handles difficulties. In 
this regard, it is also associated with patience. In concerning delays and 
duration, both longanimity and constancy resemble perseverance, 
which adds the notion of completing the act, of arriving at the end. 
Not much commentary on resilience is perhaps necessary here. 
Perseverance serves as a synonym to resilience efforts that demand 
completion over time: coping, conserving and constructing. Can 
everything that is said about perseverance be said about persisting 
resilience? Once again, context and finality are important to fix 
comparative standards. Aquinas discusses perseverance in a moral 
context, which can serve to expand reductionistic notions of resilience. 
5.3.3. The Vices in Opposition to Perseverance 
In order to expand Aquinas’ treatment of perseverance and to 
enhance resilience research, we shall examine counter examples of 
failed perseverance. Aquinas recognizes two vices that oppose 
perseverance, as extremes to a rational mean: softness or moral 
weakness (mollities) and pertinacity (pertinancia). He uses a tactile 
image to illustrate moral weakness. Thomas deems people as mollities, 
if they are “ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties which he 
cannot endure. This is what we understand by softness, because a thing 
                                                 
60 “nullus potest dici perseverantiam habere quandiu vivit, nisi perseveret 
usque ad mortem,” De Persever. i; quoted in ST II-II 137.1 obj. 2. 
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is said to be “soft” if it readily yields to the touch.”61 This softness or 
weakness does not find its corrective virtue in indestructibility. The 
resilience research has demonstrated the dangers of such an 
exaggerated extreme. 
Indeed even a strong wall will fall to the battering ram, as 
Thomas says. Rather this type of weakness refers to the person who 
does not resist or struggle in order to stand firm.62 Thomas claims that 
in this soft condition a lack of pleasure causes sorrow, when one tends 
to withdraw from the difficult pursuit of some good, in order to pursue 
a bodily pleasure. Both the intended good and the specified pleasure 
vie for our limited time, memory, attention and so on. According to 
Aquinas, a higher good or more complete goal requires a well-ordered 
mind, heart and affections. Pleasure, although good in itself, is 
sometimes desired inordinately or from unfitting sources, which would 
mean desiring and pursuing a lower pleasure instead of accomplishing 
a more important good with its accompanying, but delayed joy. 
Aquinas says that softness or moral weakness can be caused by 
natural disposition or custom, by nature or by nurture. First, he 
remarks how temperamental frailties can make the mind less 
persevering.63 We have examined such genetic or natural weaknesses, 
for example, in terms of attention deficiency disorder. Aquinas, 
following Aristotle and the anthropology of their times, judges that 
women are more delicate and weaker than men and therefore 
demonstrate a natural frailty making them less fit for toil and less 
                                                 
61 I offer “softness” as a modified translation, since the English edition 
renders mollitiei as “effeminacy,” which is rightly to be avoided. I prefer “moral 
weakness” in general, and “softness” here because of the literal context. The 
original reads: “Cui directe opponi videtur quod aliquis de facili recedat a bono 
propter aliqua difficilia, quae sustinere non potest. Et hoc pertinet ad rationem 
mollitiei: nam molle dicitur quod facile cedit tangenti” ST II-II 137.1. Aquinas 
cites Aristotle’s analysis of pain in terms of softness and perseverance: NE vii.7, 
1150a24ff. 
62 He (ST II-II 138.1) quotes Aristotle (NE vii.7, 1150b6-16), as saying: “si 
quis a fortibus et superexcellentibus delectationibus vincitur vel tristitiis, non est 
admirabile, sed condonabile, si contra tandat.”  
63 Aquinas (ST II-II 138.1 ad 1) says, “ex naturali dispositione: quia 
videlicet habent animum minus constantem, propter fragilitatem complexionis.” 
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persevering.64 Aristotle and Aquinas must be corrected in this regard, 
for while males may in general have more brute physical force, women 
demonstrate physical stamina, as well as perseverance not only in their 
efforts of child-bearing and rearing, but also in efforts at justice, 
compassion and so forth. 
Second, we become accustomed to enjoy pleasures to the 
extent that it becomes difficult to stand lacking them.65 Our 
imagination and memory are permeated with the attraction to pleasure 
in such a way that a greater good is either disregarded or considered 
out of its full context. We may still recognize the greater good as more 
important than the particular pleasure, but the distraction unsettles our 
concentration. Aquinas notes that indulgence in such pleasure 
diminishes the actual participation in the good. Moreover, he illustrates 
several types and causes of moral weakness. Some people are delicate 
(deliciosi) and cannot support toil, since it diminishes pleasure. Others 
inordinately seek play, relaxation or rest and are thus unable to endure 
toil.66 
The opposite extreme of softness is called pertinacity, in which 
we inordinately hold on to the good in the face of sorrow.67 This 
inordinate perseverance entails a disordered consideration for the 
importance of oneself or one’s opinion. In holding on to some good in 
order to seek our own glory (vainglory), pertinacious people disorder 
their pursuit of good.68 In exaggerating the significance of their own 
views or opinions (sententiae), the pertinacious err. Lastly, in 
                                                 
64 Cf. ST II-II 138.1 ad 1; NE 1150b15. Aristotle curiously claims that these 
traits of weakness are hereditary with the kings of the Scythians. Aquinas 
additionally quotes Dt 28:56 in a similar regard (cf. ST II-II 138.1 ad 2). 
65 He says in regards such customs: “Uno modo, ex consuetudine: cum 
enim aliquis consuetus est voluptatibus frui, difficilius potest earum absentiam 
sustinere” ST II-II 136.1 ad 1. 
66 Thomas speaks of inordinate ludus, remissio vel quies; cf. ST II-II 138.1 
ad 2 and ad 3. 
67 Aquinas (ST II-II 138.2) quotes Isidore as saying, “pertinax dicitur 
aliquis qui est impudenter tenens, quasi omnia tenax” Etymol. x, ad litt. P, nn 213, 
211: PL 82, 390 A, 389 C. 
68 St. Gregory says that pertinacity arises from vainglory; Thomas (ST II-II 
138.2 obj. 1) quotes his Moral. xxxi.45 al. 17, in vet. 31.88: PL 76.621A. 
Gregory is especially important support for Aquinas in regards to the theological 
dimension of virtues in contrast to their vices. 
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persisting in something against difficulties, they inordinately desire the 
consequent pleasure and shun the opposing pain.69 
In this chapter, I have so far outlined Aquinas’ thought on 
patience and perseverance. We shall treat the numerous parallels with 
resilience and its contraries in the context of the development of 
patience and perseverance, focusing on the natural level in the next 
section and on related theological issues in the following chapter. 
5.4. The Development of Patience, Perseverance and 
Resistant Resilience 
In the previous section, I have presented Aquinas’ notion of 
patience and perseverance, comparing and enhancing them to some 
extent with resilience research. I shall now address his educative 
strategies underlying how patience and perseverance develop as types 
of resisting and persisting resilience. I shall investigate resilience 
findings on suffering and waiting. How might this approach enhance 
our understanding of virtue theory and moral development in the 
context of patience and perseverance? Recalling Aquinas’ 
anthropological perspective, we shall ask: What is the relationship 
between the desired goal, the sources of strength and the measure of 
our limits in these virtues? How can we develop related inclinations 
and emotions? Aquinas did not devote a systematic treatise to 
education. Nonetheless, he has pertinent insights on the development 
of patience.70 He is especially astute in his strategies for managing 
sorrow and waiting. However, before returning to Aquinas, I shall 
examine the resilience research concerning suffering and loss. 
5.4.1. Resilience Findings on Suffering and Resilient 
Patience 
What do resilience approaches suggest for overcoming pain, 
suffering and loss through patience-like attitudes, activities and 
character traits? The term “patience” is infrequently found in resilience 
                                                 
69 Cf. ST II-II 138.2 ad 2. 
70 Various questions in the ST relate more or less directly to patience 
(including the questions on sorrow that we address below) and others relate more 
or less directly to education (including most pertinently De verit. 11, 1, and ST I 
117.1; as we discussed earlier). 
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findings. Although it does appear occasionally, we do find patience-
like phenomena in discussions on managing pain, suffering, loss, 
distress and so forth. Indeed, a focus on patience-like phenomena 
needs to search transversally across the three resilience aspects of 
coping, resisting and constructing, through different schools of 
psychology. Here I shall focus primarily on cognitive and evolutionary 
psychology. 
Cognitive psychologists, like R. Lazarus, M. Perrez and M. 
Reicherts, identify a type of coping reaction that I construe as 
paralleling the notion of patience. They establish a phenomenological 
taxonomy that systematizes coping in regards to the function and 
temporality of the stressor (past, present and future). The coping 
response functions to alleviate our discomfort by reestablishing 
homeostasis. This process may involve choosing high levels of 
discomfort in order to obtain long-term goals.71 As discussed earlier, 
cognitivists identify a situation-oriented (type I) coping operation in 
which coping reactions involve either active influence on the situation 
or passive (understood as a standing firm or waiting reaction) and 
evasive strategies.72 I suggest that the coping activities of evasion or 
withdrawal and passivity parallel patience in noncomprehensive ways. 
In this schema, these activities are served by representation-oriented 
(type II) and evaluation-oriented (type III) coping operations, as 
prudence, knowledge and wisdom serve patience in virtue theory. 
These researchers confirm that coping sometimes needs to involve 
what they call passive or evasive activities. This first observation starts 
to assemble elements for patience strategies. 
In addition to evasive and passive coping operations, patience 
functions in cognitive appreciations to aid us to bear or to overcome 
suffering. In the midst of physical and psychological pain, we find that 
a sense of solidarity and justice (moral order) serves as anchoring 
experiences, which give us strength to weather the difficulty. 
According M. Tousignant’s findings,73 children who have faced the 
injustices of parental favoritism find it easier to cope when their 
siblings show compassion or suffer with them. Understanding that 
                                                 
71 Cf. Perrez and Reicherts 1992, 28. 
72 Cf. Perrez and Reicherts 1992, 28-9. 
73 Cf. Tousignant 1998, 64. 
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suffering is not limited to themselves, that it is pervasive in the world, 
permits an opening to understand that others suffer as well. This 
experience establishes a basis for understanding morality. Tousignant 
thus suggests that resilience is born out of perceptions of solidarity and 
a larger moral order in hardship. M. Rutter likewise finds that bad 
experiences as well as good ones can serve in promoting adaptive 
behavior and coherent self-concepts.74 
Efforts to establish appropriate types of patient relationships to 
pain and to our neighbor demand that we manage sociobiological 
inclinations. As mentioned earlier, we need to develop sociobiological 
inclinations involving sexuality, aggression and pain. From the 
evolutionary perspective, the biochemical alarms (the pain caused by 
particular objects) provide incentive to an organism with self-
awareness to correct the painful relationship with an object, as well as 
to plan to avoid it in the future. According to A. Damasio, self-
awareness of these alarms and avoidance of painful objects rewards us 
with survival advantage.75 C. Nessan however goes further. He argues 
that humans can employ their intellectual functioning in order to direct 
sociobiological phenomena either toward destructive expressions of 
self or toward the bettering of human society.76 He holds that humans 
demonstrate their fallen condition or moral weakness when they fail to 
redirect sociobiological inclinations for the sake of neighbor and 
instead have unreflective and simply self-serving reactions to pain. 
More needs to be said on this topic, especially on human efforts at 
putting a reasoned order between pain and altruistic projects.77 
Resilience researchers suggest that optimism and hope also 
help us to cope with pain and to build something positive out of 
hardship. They have identified some processes used by optimists to 
overcome suffering. First, optimism is conducive to flexibility, 
intentional adaptation and hope for restoration of normalcy. It involves 
the acquired capacities to accept substitutes, to restructure our 
                                                 
74 Cf. Rutter 1990, 206. 
75 Cf. Damasio 1999b, 79. 
76 Cf. C. Nessan 1998, 451-453. 
77 S. J. Pope (1992) examines the complexity of this task, which must 
consider community and neighbor, family and self in an ordered ethical way. He 
discusses the differentiated way that humans express an ordo amoris (an ordering 
in their loves) and an ordo caritatis. 
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expectations of need gratification and to count on comfort following 
pain. According to L. Murphy, these roots of optimism support not 
only coping skills, but also the capacity to transform bad situations into 
good ones, to build something positive out of what is negative.78 
Secondly, according to the research of M. E. P. Seligman, a key skill 
of optimists is the active and acquired capacity of talking to themselves 
when suffering personal challenges.79 They encourage themselves in 
the midst of pain and suffering; they project new goals and imagine 
other desirable outcomes when temporarily defeated. Optimistic 
strategies spell active ways to face suffering and hardship; they involve 
a sort of confidence that eventually we shall manage the problem at 
hand. This confidence in the midst of challenge, threat or loss can be 
rooted in different sources such as being securely attached,80 
compensatory self-enhancement81 or existential hope. 
Optimist or not, one of the major sources of suffering is related 
to loss or bereavement of a loved one. According to C. C. David, 
protective factors related to facing death include: anticipation of death, 
a clear concept of death and previous experience of a loved one’s 
death.82 These factors can help us to mourn and to recover from the 
feelings of grief. According to Eisen’s findings, play activities aid us to 
adapt after suffering the death of someone as well. They promote 
survival by including resistance, protest and defiance behaviors.83 
These insights might well enlighten experiences like disability, loss of 
friendship or employment, and so on. 
Research and experience differentiate, yet interrelate 
developmental tutors of patience and resilience tutors of patience84 
                                                 
78 Cf. L. Murphy 1987, 104. 
79 Cf. M. E. P. Seligman 1998/1991, 207. 
80 Cf. M. Rutter 1990, 200; Bjorck and Klewicki 1997. 
81 Cf. Pelham 1991, 671. He has found that we can compensate for losses in 
one dimension of our self-concept by enhancing another area. 
82 Cf. C. C. David 1994, 101 and 133. Early parental loss, however, has 
been found to create vulnerability to psychiatric disorders, especially when 
associated with risk variables like cognitive sets of helplessness and low self-
esteem (cf. Rutter 1990, 200). 
83 Cf. Eisen 1988, 11 and 88f. 
84 B. Cyrulnik during a lecture in Geneva (HUG, 9/2001) discussed tutors 
of resilience, which involved mostly extreme cases—he defined resilience in 
terms of extreme loss, difficulty or suffering. In turn, I extend the idea of tutors to 
include to a type of everyday growth as well. 
370 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
First, developmental tutors for patience or perseverance involve the 
telltale ways in which we acquire patterns of resisting and persisting 
attitudes, behaviors and characters through everyday situations. This 
process includes facing the suffering and pain, distress and waiting that 
come in birth, growth and death: for example, the unavoidable 
difficulty involved in individuation, separation, seeking justice and 
moving residences. From early on, temperament traits, like robustness 
in the face of suffering and pain, can elicit positive social responses. 
Such temperamental bases aid us to face adversity and to establish 
strong attachment relationships that in turn serve as a social safety 
net.85 However, even without optimal temperament traits, social 
interaction and support from social groups can promote self-worth and 
strengthen personal resistance to external and internal negative 
pressures and suffering.86 These are just examples of more ordinary 
developmental pathways toward patterns of resilience and resisting in 
the face of suffering and waiting. 
Second, resilience tutors of patience and perseverance involve 
the more extreme situations in which we have to prove ourselves 
resilient through suffering and pain, separation and threats of death. 
“Extreme” might be “everyday” for the street child, or the refugee 
family. In any case, it pushes human capacities to their limits. In most 
every case, one already has some basic strength that he has won 
through everyday life to date. However, by definition, the extreme 
situation puts human dispositions to the test. Will the person prove 
resilient or vulnerable in this situation? Unsurprisingly, normal 
adaptation often proves solid and resilient under trail, even though not 
always. On the contrary, surprisingly, certain qualities that are 
maladaptive for normal situations seem instrumental for overcoming 
extreme situations. For example, the DeVries Zimbabwe famine study 
found that a demanding temperament and low tolerance for pain, 
hunger and suffering, while sources of distancing a child from 
caregivers in normal situations, served the survival needs of children in 
                                                 
85 Cf. Werner and Smith, 1992, 192. 
86 The social development model suggests that motivation serves to protect 
an individual through social bonding with family and other social units. This 
attachment can regulate behavior according to the group’s standards (cf. 
Consortium, 1994, 300; Hawkins et al., 1992; Hawkins and Weis, 1985). 
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famine.87 While educational projects revolve around everyday 
situations, the extreme situation is the locus of undesirable testing that 
can nonetheless provide a resilience tutor for patience and 
perseverance. 
Although a good number of individuals resiliently overcome 
extreme situations having coped with pain, resisted self-destruction 
and even built something positive out of a negative situation, others 
need therapeutic intervention. In both cases, the complexity of 
development and trauma makes resilience theories an evolving 
commodity. In both everyday and extreme cases, resilience involves 
exploiting the numerous ways in which we find personal and social 
resources to affront and overcome the adversity or loss. It is difficult to 
distinguish these two categories too neatly, since we acquire the 
disposition for resilient patience and perseverance both through 
ordinary developmental pathways and through more extreme 
hardships. 
I suggest that patience-phenomena spring from the three 
aspects of resilience: we creatively cope with sorrow-producing 
situations; we actively resist suffering, deformation and loss; and we 
constantly build out of the painful situation. Without having depleted 
the resilience input, we shall now use it to enhance our understanding 
of patience in managing suffering and adversity, and perseverance in 
the face of waiting for and attaining a far off goal. 
5.4.2. Strategies for Managing Sorrow and Pain and 
Virtuous Sorrow 
Before asking how resilience insights enrich Aquinas’ 
approach, this section will examine his own strategies for managing 
sorrow and pain. Thomas, in his Summa theologiae, explains five such 
strategies that involve the employment of pleasure, emotional venting, 
receiving sympathy, contemplation of truth, as well as being refreshed 
through sleep and baths.88 He first describes how pleasure can drive 
away sorrow. Not only the pleasures directly contrary to the given 
                                                 
87 Cf. De Vries study (cited in M. Rutter 1998); Clarke and Clarke 1992 
hypothesize that temperamental irritability can become a resilience mechanism in 
extreme situations. 
88 Cf. ST I-II 38.1-5. 
372 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
pains or sorrows, but any pleasure in some way pacifies them. Indeed, 
according to Aquinas’ anthropology and psychology, as sorrow 
wearies the appetite, so pleasure refreshes it.89 He observes that when 
seeking pleasure to overcome sorrow, more people seek bodily 
pleasures (delectationes corporales) because sensible goods are more 
widely known than spiritual goods and pleasures (delectationes 
spirituales).90 
Aquinas holds secondly that “tears and groans naturally 
assuage sorrow.”91 Hurtful things pain us more when we are intent 
upon them and when they are kept inside. Inward sorrow is lessened 
when sorrow manifests itself in tears, groans and words. Such action 
befits the sorrowful condition, accords a certain pleasure and lightens 
sorrow further. As true as this may be, exceptions exist and we need to 
avoid extreme types of emotional venting. The excessive venting of 
emotions like sorrow has drawbacks; especially when we cannot break 
the grip of the disordered emotion (e.g. being inconsolable). An 
expressive, yet self-soothing and corrective manifestation of sorrow 
can put the cause of sorrowing into a larger perspective. 
The sympathy of friends thirdly brings consolation to the 
sorrowing in two ways. The heavy, depressing effect is lightened, 
through other people helping to bear the burden. Furthermore, the love 
expressed through a friend’s sympathetic sorrowing serves as a source 
of pleasure, which sedates the sorrow. In both these regards, Aquinas 
acknowledges the importance of social bonding, the highest and most 
pervasive form being friendship-love.92 
Fourth, Aquinas holds that the contemplation of truth, which is 
the greatest of all pleasures, calms pain and sorrow.93 Contemplation of 
                                                 
89 Cf. ST I-II 38.1. Here Aquinas draws upon Aristotle, NE VII.15, 
1154b13-15. 
90 Cf. ST I-II 31.5 ad 1. We shall discuss spiritual good and pleasures in 
chapter six. 
91 “Lacrimae et gemitus naturaliter mitigant tristitiam” ST I-II 38.2; cf. 
Augustine Conf. iv.7. 
92 Aquinas (ST I-II 38.3) here draws from the insights concerning love and 
friendship from St. Augustine’s Confessions (cf. Conf. iv.9; PL 32.699) and 
concerning sympathy and friends from Aristotle’s NE (ix.11, 1171a29-30). See 
also the ultimate context for friendship-love as the highest form of charity in ST 
II-II 23.1. 
93 ST I-II 38.4. 
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truth calms us; the higher powers of the soul influence the lower ones. 
Once again this action gives a form of pleasure (joy, in this case) 
overcoming pain, for a truth-inspired-joy lightens both physical pain 
and psychological sorrow. Although contemplation itself is a good 
(based on the natural and spiritual inclination to truth) and naturally 
pleasant, Thomas claims that the more a person is a lover of wisdom, 
the more the contemplation of truth can assuage suffering and even 
sensual pain. 
Lastly, he notes the remedial effects of sleep and baths, which 
“bring nature back to its normal state.”94 By restoring the bodily nature 
to its due condition of vitality and giving a certain pleasure, sleep and 
baths lighten both pain and sorrow. Aquinas demonstrates a well-
balanced understanding of human corporality, and the effect of the 
body on the soul. The body serves the soul. Bodily pleasures and even 
simple caring for the body can help to overcome pains that are on the 
same level, as well as sorrows that are on another.95 Here the reprieve 
that refreshment and sleep offer may be short-lived, if resolution of the 
problem is elsewhere. Nonetheless, it may grant us physical energy to 
address the more profound issue. 
If we were to stop the study here, Aquinas’ strategies for 
managing pain and suffering might seem lacking on both 
psychological and philosophical levels. His five strategies for 
managing sorrow and pain might seem unexpectedly venial. But his 
understanding of human nature and of metaphysics gives these 
strategies further relevance. Indeed, his strategies for managing pain 
and sorrow are varied elements for developing the virtues of patience 
and perseverance. Employing these strategies in a way that orders them 
toward the goals that give life meaning requires prudence. Aquinas 
astutely uses these strategies—to which we should join the other 
resilience strategies earlier discussed—in order to develop his idea of 
                                                 
94 “Per hoc etiam quod huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum 
statum, causitur ex his delectatio” ST I-II 38.5. 
95 The classic tradition supports Aquinas’ claim. As Augustine says: 
“Audieram balnei nomen inde dictum, quod anxietatem pellat ex animo” Conf. ix, 
12, 32: PL 32, 777; quoted in ST I-II 38.5 sc. And according to Ambrose: “Quies 
artus solutos reddit laboris usui, mentesque fessas allevat, luctusque solvit 
anxios.” Deus Creator omnium: PL 16, 1410; quoted in ST I-II 38.5 sc.  
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virtuous sorrow. Patience and perseverance strategies are ways to 
develop the ability to sorrow virtuously. 
Virtuous sorrow, for Aquinas, involves a disposition to resolve 
situations of sorrow in the larger moral (and resilience) framework.96 
Indeed, the framework sets the standard for the type of virtue and 
resilience that we exercise through patience and perseverance. If 
patience strategies are not in rational relationship with some good, then 
the implied endurance of pain and sorrow will be more a hardness of 
heart (duritia) than the virtue of patience.97 Aquinas argues that 
virtuous sorrow is expressed in relation to a virtuous good. It is an 
interior sorrow that follows a right measure and rectitude of reason and 
will.98 The virtue of patience thus is not simply a matter of managing 
pain, suffering and sorrow; it entails virtuous sorrow. Thomas 
identifies virtuous sorrow as one that entails the perception and 
rejection of evil, either through shunning bodily pain or through a right 
rational judgment of the evil situation, which should then lead us to act 
appropriately.99 
Virtuous sorrow is useful when it moves us to expel the 
saddening evil, the source of the suffering. It adds another motive for 
avoiding evil as well. It does so in two ways. It entails avoiding things 
that are evil in themselves or that are occasions of evil. It also rectifies 
disordered sorrows, as when we rejoice at evil or when we are 
saddened by good. For Aquinas, we need to refine all the soul’s 
passions by the rule of reason.100 In excessive sorrow, our passions are 
                                                 
96 We have taken this notion of “virtuous sorrow,” from Aquinas’ 
discussion “Utrum tristitia possit esse bonum honestum” (Whether sorrow can be 
a virtuous good?, ST I-II 39.2). Since Aquinas affirmatively responds it would 
seem that we can speak of a “virtuous sorrow” as we explain here following. He 
also describes how sorrow is useful or beneficial (bonum utile) in ST I-II 39.3. 
Furthermore, even though Aquinas does not mention “patience” in this discussion 
of virtuous sorrow, patience serves as the conceptual context, as the virtue 
implied in managing sorrowful situations well and not going to extremes for the 
sake of charity (in the fullest sense). 
97Cf. ST II-II 136.1 ad 2 from a quotation of St. Augustine, De patientia ii. 
98 Aquinas identifies the rational and volitional dimensions of virtuous 
sorrow: “In interiori vero tristitia, cognitio mali quandoque quidem est per 
rectum iudicium rationis; et recusatio mali est per voluntatem bene dispositam 
detestantem malum” ST I-II 39.2. 
99 Cf. ST I-II 39.2. He also describes how sorrow is compatible with moral 
virtue: cf. ST I-II 59.3. 
100 Cf. ST I-II 39. 2 ad 1; cf. ST I-II 24.1. 
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not properly under reason. It is patience’s role to manage sorrow in 
general and especially when it moves us toward excess. This virtue 
involves rejecting the temptation to revel in sorrow. Inordinate sorrow 
is an obstacle to flourishing. However, cultivating virtuous sorrow 
does not mean that one chooses to be sorrowful per se, as if sorrow 
were a good in itself and certainly not as an end in itself. Although we 
can nurture the character from which emanates particular emotions, we 
do not choose to be sorrowful inasmuch as we do not choose the evil 
that is the source of the sorrow. Rather, we patiently choose and 
perseveringly long for the good end and the mediate good in the face 
of suffering and sorrow. 
5.5. Some Conclusions on Patience, Perseverance and 
Resistant Resilience 
Aquinas bases his notion of how patience naturally develops 
upon the dynamic interaction of human inclinations, passions and 
virtues. His moral and metaphysical approach, while offering 
enrighing insights, can be enhanced by resilience research at the same 
time. When something impedes the enjoyment of a good for which we 
long, we have at least two options. We can labor, when possible, to 
overcome the obstacle. In other words, we seek to solve the problem in 
order to attain the desired good. The virtues of initiative primarily 
manage the acts of daring and hope required by this option. 
Secondarily, when the desired good is unattainable, we can respond by 
patiently keeping our wits in the midst of the inevitable sorrow. We 
perseveringly hold on to our goal by waiting and wisely working on 
practical remedies to alleviate or mitigate the sorrow. It is through the 
virtues of patience and perseverance that we withstand suffering, 
sorrowing and waiting in the midst of our mediate and ultimate goals. 
For Aquinas, the virtue of patience safeguards the good of 
reason. It strengthens the mind in the face of sorrow and suffering that 
inevitably arise from bearing evil. We need to recall two elements of 
Aquinas’ anthropology here. First, we only withstand difficulty for the 
sake of some good. Second, the nature of sorrow, suffering and delay 
enter into direct conflict with our fundamental search for flourishing. 
We can understand how patience bears with the evil, does not give into 
sorrow and holds fast with a calm spirit, only in the overall quest for 
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goodness, truth and happiness. It produces undisturbed self-domination 
and control, as well as a joy in the process. The virtue of long-suffering 
specifically relates to the dimension of waiting and enduring in the 
midst of the delay in attaining what is hoped for, especially when it is a 
long way off. Constancy specifically manages the toil required in 
persistently confronting some evil for the sake of good, or conversely 
in accomplishing good while resisting evil. Lastly, perseverance 
pertains to the specific difficulties involved in persisting for a long 
time until the good is accomplished and the goal attained. It moderates 
fear of failure or weariness due to the length of delay in our efforts. 
How can Aquinas’ virtue theory on patience and perseverance 
critically appropriate the resilience theory and findings on suffering? 
Thomas’ insights on virtues of enduring provide a developmental 
framework that has psychological, philosophical and metaphysical 
tenor, while not offering the last word on the study of resisting 
persisting phenomena or on the promotion of developmental strategies. 
Resilience findings aid in enhancing virtue theory concerning how 
humans endure difficulty or suffering, hold firm in a painful struggle, 
resist self-destructive pressures, wait for the attainment of good, persist 
until the accomplishment of some goal, and even express sorrow as a 
virtuous good. 
The social and developmental lines of insight are especially 
strong in cognitive, evolutionary and social developmental sciences. 
Their observations of resilience and vulnerability phenomena offer 
both confirmations and extensions to virtue theory. The three aspects 
of resilience that involve coping, resisting and constructing suggest a 
nuanced grid through which to cull insights for the virtues of enduring. 
In general, the resilience perspective affirms that pain, suffering and 
loss can have detrimental as well as steeling effects on humans at 
physical, psychological and social levels. First, developing a capacity 
to endure physical pain in extremis involves the failure of adequately 
protecting the goods of the body within the larger scheme of human 
goods. On the contrary, a capacity to manage the distractive and 
destructive nature of physical pain and even to support immense 
suffering can lead to personal and social benefits. Second, different 
expressions of timidity, fear and suffering can have either positive or 
negative effects on human psychological well-being and resilience, 
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depending on situations and personal adaptation. Third, at sociological 
level, we cumulate risk through relationships and through various 
emotional styles that promote violence, family disintegration or social 
passivity. However, we acquire resilience confidence in challenges 
through social attachment, socially supported life projects and 
strategies like play, humor and rest. 
Resilience theory offers parallels to the virtues of patience and 
perseverance. In particular, the concept of coping as formulated by 
cognitive psychology parallels the notions of patience and 
perseverance. We can use “coping” to understand how humans develop 
active, passive and evasive strategies to reestablish homeostasis in the 
face of suffering, or even choose high levels of discomfort in order to 
achieve a goal. Representation-oriented, and evaluation-oriented 
coping operations parallel the role of prudence, knowledge and 
wisdom in virtue theory. Some resilience research even speculates that 
cognitive appreciations of a moral order (e.g. sense of solidarity and 
justice) can aid us in bearing suffering and managing sociobiological 
inclinations concerning pain in altruistic perspectives. As in the case of 
the virtues of initiative, resilience research in the domain of enduring 
and resisting finds positive correlations between optimism or hope, and 
both coping with pain or suffering and building something positive out 
of the painful hardship. 
Aquinas’ vision takes neither patience nor perseverance as 
synonymous with passivity, vulnerability and defeatism. Rather these 
virtues require that we actively resist the difficultly, while employing 
an intelligible project in order to retain a good or to stand strong 
against assault. Researchers have sometimes confused enduring, 
resisting and passivity. Distinguishing between levels of action, 
intention and finality however help to resolve this confusion. 
Moreover, we need to differentiate the battle from the war. Overall 
success may demand that we endure a certain kind of defeat or firmly 
hold far-off goals in the midst of the proximate struggle. What appears 
to be a passive defeat, a waste of time or the result of weakness, may 
be a vital stepping-stone in a larger event. To understand this type of 
activity, we must admit a difference of perspective. Aquinas 
recognizes that in the midst of a difficult struggle for the good we 
cannot always engage in an initiative that will immediately right the 
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wrong or resolve the difficulty. Sometimes we need to stand firm in the 
midst of an onslaught that will spell a loss on one level, in order to 
achieve a gain on another: losing a contract because we will only make 
an honest bid, losing a job in order to retain moral principle, suffering 
for defying an unjust law, and so on. This is more than a trade off. 
Patience resists the vulnerability of passivity. It manages sorrow and 
resists evil, while remaining resolutely attached to a good. 
Perseverance resists significant compromise and the vulnerability of 
misplaced suffering. It persists for as long as it takes to procure the 
ultimate victory. 
 PART THREE. 
FORTITUDE AND RESILIENCE TRANSCENDED 
In the previous three chapters, we have employed resilience 
research to enhance St. Thomas Aquinas’ philosophical conception of 
fortitude and its related virtues. In turn, Thomas’ approach has offered 
insights to enrich resilience theory. However, our effort up to the 
present is the last word neither on these virtues nor on resilience. 
Aquinas’ theological considerations, which build up, yet transcend the 
natural virtues, take us further. 
I have delayed treating explicitly the theological aspect of 
fortitude until now. This delay has allowed us clear terrain for dialogue 
between resilience research and Aquinas’ virtue anthropology. The 
previous chapters serve as a foundation concerning his vision of 
human agency in adversity and the way in which resilience research 
completes it. By treating the theological aspects of virtue and resilience 
apart from the philosophical and psychosocial aspects I do not mean to 
imply that the philosophical and scientific domain exists apart from the 
spiritual and theological dimension of human life. Instead, I am 
following Aquinas’ model (Secunda Secundae), which is pervasively 
theology in dialogue with philosophical and scientific sources. 
Nonetheless, in the present chapter, the object becomes explicitly 
theological: God as source and goal for human agency. The present 
theological exploration of virtue theory seeks to renew moral theology. 
This unequivocally theological project draws upon the philosophical 
anthropology and virtue theory enriched by resilience insights in the 
discussions on natural fortitude and its related virtues. It also recalls 
chapter two’s theological discussion of resilience, virtue theory and 
moral theology. 
In this theological aspect of the dialogue between resilience 
and Aquinas, I shall continue to explain his thought, while enriching it 
with resilience insights. In doing so, however, I cannot draw upon 
specific resilience research, as before, since no resilience studies 
pursue these properly theological questions. Nevertheless, I do 
enhance Aquinas’ theological approach with the resilience perspective 
and a resilience-enriched anthropology; in this limited way, I 
appropriate the insights of resilience research in revisiting Aquinas’ 
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thought. In turn, St. Thomas’ theological insights offer a coherent 
spiritual worldview that invites reductionistic approaches to consider 
larger realities concerning spiritual coping, resisting and constructing 
in hardship. 
Chapter one proposed a tentative definition of spiritual 
resilience, which now serves as a means to deepen our theological 
understanding of the virtues in question. Spiritual resilience takes into 
account the ethical, religious and theological dimensions of human 
resilience. Earlier I tentatively defined it as the spiritual processes that 
render human persons and communities able: (1) to cope actively with 
difficulty, (2) to resist disintegration of actual competencies, and (3) to 
construct positively out of the present adverse situation. In this chapter, 
I employ the resilience research to understand the theological 
dimension of virtue theory, fortitude and its associated virtues. 
This chapter’s subdivisions follow the anthropological 
structure that Aquinas uses for the virtues that face difficulty, making 
manifest their theological dimension. First, theological fortitude 
specifically concerns an infused virtue, the act of martyrdom and the 
Beatitude of the just. It is strengthened through the Gift of the Holy 
Spirit. What is the theological tenor of Thomas’ conception of 
fortitude? Does it simply add a deeper motivation to a natural virtue, or 
does it specify a different act and measure of strength in the midst of 
fearful trials? How might we consider Christian fortitude as a type of 
spiritual, and more specifically Christian, resilience? 
Second, Aquinas identifies theological initiative-taking as a 
type of Christian excellence. He distinguishes the exacting parameters 
for this excellence, which expresses hope, magnificence and generosity 
in a way we can summarize as a meek and humble magnanimity. What 
are the theological sources and purposes of initiative for Aquinas? 
What are its dangers? Can we consider it a constructive spiritual 
resilience? 
Third, Thomas describes the theological aspect of enduring. 
The related virtues patiently manage pain and suffering, and 
perseveringly treat waiting and longing. How might theological 
patience and perseverance serve as a measure for Christian resilience? 
Can we consider Christ’s passion and death an archetype for spiritual 
resilience or vulnerability? 
 Chapter Six. 
Aquinas’ Theological Transformation of Fortitude and 
Resilience 
“The Lord is my strength and my song.” (Psalm 118: 14) 
In this chapter, I start by investigating the infused virtue of 
fortitude and its relationship with spiritual resilience. How do infused 
and acquired virtues, in general, differ and resemble each other? In 
particular, how does theological fortitude underlie spiritual resilience? 
Second, I examine Aquinas’ teaching on martyrdom. What type of 
resilience or vulnerability is promoted therein? Third, I demonstrate 
the centrality of the Gifts, Beatitudes and fruits of the Holy Spirit in 
understanding Christian fortitude. Once again, Aquinas serves as the 
prism through which we revisit the tradition. I ask: How might his 
theological transformation of fortitude appropriate insights in dialogue 
with the resilience perspective? And how might it modify 
reductionistic perspectives on resilience, which challenge the Christian 
tradition? 
6.1. The Infused Virtue of Fortitude 
6.1.1. Distinguishing Acquired and Infused Virtues 
Before entering into the content of the virtue of fortitude, I 
shall address how Aquinas distinguishes acquired and infused virtue. 
In general, Aquinas distinguishes virtue as either acquired or infused in 
order to account for the interplay of divine grace in human agency. 
Even with his large definition of virtue, he has proper notions of how 
complete virtue accomplishes actions that are purely good.1 Rather 
than employing Aristotle’s definition of virtue, Aquinas uses a 
customary definition of infused virtue (attributed to Augustine) in 
order to discuss the perfection of virtue: “virtue is a good quality of the 
                                                 
1 Cf. ST I-II 65.1. 
382 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad 
use, which God works in us, without us.”2 Thomas identifies three 
characteristics of infused virtues: its object is God; only God can 
infuse it; and its object depends on divine revelation.3 He also 
differentiates acquired and infused virtues according to their final, 
formal and efficient causes. 
A specific distinction between these types of virtue arises from 
what they subserve, their finality or goal: either the socio-political or 
the divine order. The goal or final cause of the acquired and infused 
virtues directs and motivates human beings. The acquired virtues aim 
at the good of the earthly city, whereas the infused virtues aim at 
acting well as members of the household of God. As Aquinas says 
citing St. Paul’s letter to the Ephesians, in acquired moral virtue 
“people behave well in relation to human affairs,” while in infused 
moral virtue “people behave well as fellow-citizens with the saints, and 
of the household of God.”4 The acquired and the infused virtues differ 
according to their relation to these ends. The perfect virtues of Christ 
and the saints in glory spell out the content of promised complete 
flourishing, and thus serve to direct and motivate human efforts that 
are transformed by infused virtue.5 
Aquinas specifies that the acquired and infused virtues also 
differ according to their formal cause, which constitutes the reasons 
                                                 
2 “Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, 
quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur” (de Libero Arbitrio, II.19: PL 32.1268), 
which Aquinas quotes and comments on in ST I-II 55.4; cf. ST I-II 65.1. 
According to O. Lottin (1929, 371), although this definition is customarily 
attributed to St. Augustine, it is probably due to Peter of Poiters in his 
commentary on the Sentences (III, I. PL 211, 1041). Thomas notes that this 
definition would be more precise if it read “habitus” instead of “qualitas.” He 
furthermore notes that instead of properly referring to infused virtues this 
definition could include acquired virtues if one deleted the phrase “which God 
works in us without us.” Cf. J. Porter 1998a, 1219. 
3 As Aquinas says: “tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas 
recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia a 
sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur” (ST I-II 
62.1; cf. ST I-II 63.3). 
4 “Et per hunc etiam modum differunt specie virtutes morales infusae, per 
quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et 
domestici Dei (Ephsians 2, 19): et aliae virtues acquisitae, secundum quas homo 
se bene habet in ordine ad res humanas” ST I-II 63.4. 
5 Cf. ST I-II 1-5; ST I-II 61.5. 
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that make acts and dispositions virtuous. Acquired virtues use the 
measure fixed by human reason, establishing the mean according to a 
virtue’s matter. Human social nature informs acquired virtue toward 
human flourishing in accord with the common good.6 Infused virtues 
use the measure of divine rule (ultimately) and reason informed by 
faith (mediately).7 They operate through faith and charity, which grant 
a higher principle (secundum regulam divinam) and surer will.8 For 
Thomas, human beings can rationally participate in divine reason, as 
created in the image of God and guided by God’s Spirit. The Holy 
Spirit and graced charity thus form all Christian (infused) virtue. 
Ultimately, our good is eternal flourishing, being face to face 
with God and experiencing the beatific vision. However, natural, 
spiritual inclinations towards acquiring virtue, and human rational and 
volitional powers, cannot efficiently cause the virtues needed to obtain 
this supernatural good.9 While the natural principles and seeds of virtue 
are ordered to eternal glory, they cannot cause the virtues proportioned 
to this end. Rather here we need God’s grace, the theological virtues of 
faith, hope and charity, as well as the infused moral virtues.10 The Holy 
Spirit, through the grace received in the infused virtues, perfects our 
natural powers so that we attain the theological object of divine 
flourishing and act more faithfully toward every good. 
Aquinas’ teaching on the efficacy of grace follows at least 
three basic principles: (1) that which is received into one, is received 
according to one’s nature: “even though the divine power is infinite in 
its cause, and so acts without limits, the effect of this power depends 
                                                 
6 Cf. ST II-II 23.8; ST I-II 61.5; ST I-II 63.4. Cf. Aquinas’ on the 
“perfecting virtues” (ST I-II 61.5). 
7 Cf. ST I-II 63.4. I have already correlated natural and infused prudence 
with moral and theological norms in chapter two. 
8 Cf. ST I-II 91.4 ad 1; ST II-II 23.1. 
9 The grace associated with infused virtues alone causes this flourishing. 
Aquinas says, “quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in 
nobis” (ST II-II 24.3 ad 2). That is, we are elevated to a status of salvation that 
otherwise would be un-hoped for and therefore unsought (cf. ST I-II 4.3). For 
Thomas, our first turning to God involves a divine act (prevenient grace) and is in 
no way merited by us (cf. ST I-II 111.3). 
10 Aquinas says: “Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad bonum, secundum 
quod modificatur per legem divinam et non per rationem humanam, non potest 
causari per actus humanos, quorum principium est ratio; sed causatur solum in 
nobis per operationem divinam.” ST I-II 63.2; Cf. 3 Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2. 
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upon the capacity of the recipient and upon God’s own plan”11; (2) that 
our operations are perfected not destroyed by grace; and (3) that we are 
capax Dei—able to enjoy communion with God—although unable to 
achieve this union on our own, that is without grace. 
The last qualification of Augustine’s definition of perfect 
virtue—“which God works in us, without us”—refers specifically to 
God as the efficient cause of infused virtues. Thomas thus identifies 
how human intelligent and divine sources cause virtues. At the natural 
level, reason and will produce virtuous acts and the formation of the 
underlying dispositions, as we discussed extensively in chapters two 
through five.12 At the supernatural level, God efficaciously produces 
the infused virtues, but not without human graced collaboration. 
Infused virtue enables an excellence of performance that we could not 
assure otherwise.13 This flourishing is not a purely human progressive 
self-elevation towards God. Rather, it entails a two-fold action: a Gift 
from God and a response of the believer. First, God’s gift involves 
calling us into union with Himself. This union is primarily His 
movement toward and presence in us, rather than our moving 
ourselves.14 His grace is the common root for two distinct but 
simultaneous effects: “the enlightenment of the mind and the 
                                                 
11 “etsi virtus divina sit infinita, et infinite operetur quantum est ex parte 
operantis, tamen effectus virtutis ejus recipitur in rebus secundum earum 
capacitatem et secundum Dei dispositionem” ST III 57.3 ad 3. Also see ST I 75.5; 
ST I 79.6; ST I 89.4; ST III 54.2 ad 1, and SCG 3, 150, ad 7. 
12 However, insofar as any natural good action correlates with the Source of 
goodness, God is also its first and efficacious cause through a help that is typical 
of the goodness endemic to nature, which Aquinas calls auxilio divino or auxilio 
Dei (ST I-II 109.1 and 109.3). Aquinas moreover holds that God is the origin or 
first cause of the virtues, since in him exist the exemplar virtues. St. Thomas, 
drawing from Platonic sources through Macrobius, divides the cardinal virtues 
into social, perfecting, perfect and exemplar virtues (cf. ST I-II 61.5). 
Nonetheless, Augustine is the key for explaining the Christian vision of God as 
being the exemplar, whom humans follow in order to “live aright” (bene 
vivimus). In God pre-exist the types of all good things. 
13 Cf. De verit. 14.10. 
14 God accords His gift by becoming present to us, by giving us the gift of 
grace through which He raises us into a new adoptive relationship with Himself. 
Cf. Eph 1:5f; ST I 20.2 ad 3, and ST I-II 110.1; “Et ideo procedit ipse in nos et 
dona ipsius: quia et dona ejus recepimus, et per eadem ad ipsum nos aliter 
habemus, inquantum per dona ejus ipsi Spiritui sancto conjungimur, per domun 
nos sibi assimilanti” 1 Sent. d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, s. 1; cf. ST I 43.5. 
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enkindling of the affections.”15 This “God-like form” given to the 
believer through grace is not something other than the perfecting of 
what God started in creating us.16 Humans are created toward God’s 
image in that we have an intelligent nature, comprised of both reason 
and will. We imitate God most completely when we emulate “God’s 
understanding and loving of himself.”17 
A second aspect of transformation in the image of God entails 
our being capable of receiving grace and capax Dei,18 as well as our 
active cooperation in using the grace granted through applying our 
intelligence, through freedom in judgment and through progression in 
self-mastery.19 The divine indwelling, as well as created grace and 
virtue, direct and attract us in our freedom to fully return to God.20 We 
however are not slavishly driven to believe, to hope or to love. Rather, 
we remain free. Insofar as it fulfills our human nature, Aquinas deems 
that we are freest when we choose to be in union with the one who 
fulfils us. The gifts of grace given to us—in which God becomes 
present to us in a new way—do not destroy our human nature.21 On the 
contrary, they enable us to do things that we otherwise would not 
(because of the deforming effects of sin) and to know and to believe 
things we otherwise would not (because of our intellectual limitations, 
ignorance and pride). 
                                                 
15 “Si autem quantum ad effectum gratiae, sic communicant duae missiones 
in radice gratiae, sed distinguuntur in effectibus gratiae, qui sunt illuminatio 
intellectus et inflammmatio affectus. Et sic manifestum est quod una non potest 
esse sine alia, quia neutra est sine gratia gratum faciente nec una persona 
separatur ab alia” ST I 43.5 ad 3. 
16 Cf. Gn 1:26-27; 1 Cor 11:7; Eph 4:24; Col 3:10. 
17 “homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicatur, 
secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei secundum quod intellectualis natura 
Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum 
quantum ad hoc quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat” ST I 93.4. 
18 Cf. ST I 12.1; ST I 12.4 ad 3. On human persons’ being capax Dei, see: 
ST I-II 3.8; ST II-II 2.3. 
19 Prima secundae, Prologue. 
20 Cf. 1 Sent. d. 14, q. 2, a. 2. 
21 “Super istum modum autem communem est unus specialis quo convenit 
naturae rationali, in qua Deus dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognoscente et 
amatum in amante” ST I 43.3. Thus in regard to the gift of faith, our intellect is 
not humiliated or made useless. Rather our mind is elevated to new heights. With 
new knowledge of God’s existence, provident plan and promises, we are attracted 
to God. He draws us to cooperate in our return through living out a well-formed 
faith, a lively hope and a burning love. 
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On the natural level, our intellect starts with the first universal 
principles to truth and our will begins with a natural tendency toward 
the good of reason. On the supernatural level, the Holy Spirit directs us 
into divine flourishing here and now insofar as we transform our 
intellects and rectify our wills.22 Thus, the Spirit shapes us according to 
the Beatitudes and the commandment of love, which encompasses all 
the others. In the infused virtues, God’s grace is the transforming agent 
and the fuller foundation through which reason works and the virtues 
are built. 
6.1.2. Acquired and Infused Moral Virtues: The Case of 
Fortitude 
As an infused virtue, fortitude according to Thomas involves a 
graced strength in difficulty to face fear and anxiety, especially in 
terms of death and destruction. Aquinas construes this virtue in the 
context of the theological virtues (especially friendship-love of God 
and neighbor), but also the life projects (circa ea quae sunt ad finem) 
that concern created things and that have personal and social extension. 
A series of more precise questions arises about the correlative exercise 
of acquired and moral infused virtues, which will also occasion a 
dialogue with resilience insights. How vulnerable is infused moral 
virtue when one has acquired vice? And do human beings exercise 
infused virtue normally with ease, promptness and pleasure? For 
Aquinas, charity is the heart of the solution to these questions. God 
infuses all the moral virtues into the believer, contemporaneously with 
faith, hope and charity.23 Through grace a person can exercise perfect 
virtue, not only infused charity, but also infused fortitude and 
temperance. However, such a person might at the same time have great 
difficulty and no pleasure in the infused moral virtue. 
Through well-developed acquired virtues, we normally act 
with ease, promptness and joy (and pleasure).24 These properties 
                                                 
22 Cf. ST I-II 62.3. 
23 Cf. ST I-II 65.3 and 65.4. 
24 “inde est etiam quod operationes ex habitu procendentes delectabiles 
sunt et in promptu habentur et faciliter exercentur, quia sunt quasi connaturales 
effectae” De verit. 20, 2. Also see SCG 3, 150, nr 7. As explained in chapter 
three, natural virtues (moral and intellectual) perfect the use of a human faculty. 
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underlie also well-established resilience qualities. Nevertheless, 
Aquinas recognizes that they are not always evident when someone is 
fatigued or ill. Furthermore although charity itself brings joy, one can 
find it difficult and pleasureless to do works of infused moral virtue for 
their own sake. As Thomas explains, “certain contrary dispositions 
remaining from previous acts” can inhibit someone from facility in 
moral matters.25 Indeed, we obtain and use infused and acquired virtues 
in different ways. Since we receive infused virtues without necessarily 
developing the underlying moral faculties rightly, we have to 
overcome past negative dispositions before we can gain the connatural 
ease, promptness and pleasure that come with perfect virtue.26 In 
resilience terms, this insight explains how infused virtues can 
comcommittantly exist with an acquired moral vulnerability. Yet for 
Aquinas, the infused virtues involve a source of strength that can 
overcome consistantly this moral weakness (eventhough the individual 
might suffer an internal struggle in the process). 
In the case of fortitude, Aquinas claims that: “sometimes it 
does not lie within human power to attain the end of one’s work, or to 
escape evils or dangers, since these sometimes press in upon us to the 
point of death.”27 In a state of intact nature (prelapsus state of original 
justice), we could achieve such a natural good, as well as the supreme 
good, by well-proportioned acts. In both cases now we need the help of 
grace in the infused virtues.28 For Aquinas, God’s help (auxilio Dei for 
                                                                                                          
When we arrive at a certain level of acquired virtue, we can manage our human 
capacities efficaciously. For example, through prudence, we can adjudicate the 
truth with facility and speed. The question remains whether these same qualities 
apply to the exercise of the infused virtues. According to R. Cessario, “The grace 
of the infused moral virtues shapes and energizes our human operative capacities, 
intellect, will, and sense appetites, so that a human person can act promptly, 
joyfully, and easily in those areas of human conduct that are governed by the 
Gospel precepts.” Cessario 1996, 5; cf. Cessario 2002, 200-205. 
25 “Et similiter habitus moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum 
difficultatem in operando, propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex 
praecedentibus actibus relictas” ST I-II 65.3 ad 2. 
26 Nevertheless, God in his divine pedagogy does extraordinarily grant 
pleasure in order to encourage one soul, or withdraw it in order to strengthen 
another. 
27 “Quod quidem excedit naturam humanam: quandoque enim non subest 
potestati hominis ut consequatur finem sui operis, vel evadat mala seu pericula, 
cum quandoque opprimatur ab eis in mortem” ST II-II 139.1. 
28 Cf. SCG 3, 150, ad 7. 
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natural virtue and grace for infused ones) underlies any goodness 
present in human acts, any goodness in the distinct types of fortitude. 
How does Aquinas understand the specifically theological 
dimension of infused fortitude? The virtues of faith, hope and charity 
establish this infused virtue’s context and finality. God directs us to 
our supernatural end through divinely bestowed theological virtues. 
Because of charity’s place therein, infused fortitude goes beyond the 
range of its acquired counterpart, in which human beings in our 
capacity as a citizens order our actions to the common good. Charity 
commands infused fortitude (and martyrdom), ordering it to the 
ultimate end. Infused fortitude’s very acts are formally acts of charity, 
since it takes its species formally from charity. However, it is not due 
to infused fortitude being formally an act of charity that infused and 
acquired fortitude specifically differ. Rather, they specifically differ 
because infused fortitude’s acts establish a mean ordered to the 
ultimate end, i.e. the object of charity.29 Furthermore, the rational 
means established by acquired and infused fortitude can vary. In the 
Sentences Aquinas specifies that “what is excessive according to the 
norms of civic virtue may be truly moderate, according to infused 
virtue; for example, that a man fast or offer himself voluntarily to die 
in defense of the faith.”30 
Aquinas argues that the theological virtues of faith, hope and 
charity parallel the natural principles of acquired virtue, in that they 
have infused habitus that are correspondingly proportioned to the 
acquired moral and intellectual virtues. The acquired moral and 
intellectual virtues do not themselves exactly match (or make 
superfluous) the theological virtues.31 Although we need faith, hope 
and charity to shape us to our supernatural end, to God, we also need 
the other “infused virtues in regard to created things, though as 
subordinate to God.”32 According to Aquinas, fortitude and the other 
                                                 
29 Cf. de virt. com. 10 ad 10. 
30 III Sent. 33, q. 1, a. 2 Sol. 4. ad 2. He also affirms the specificity of 
infused virtues in the ST: cf. ST I-II 63.4 corpus, ad 1 and ad 2. 
31 As Aquinas says: “tamen illae [habitus] non sunt proportionatae 
virtutibus theologicis. Et ideo oportet alias eis proportionatas immediate a Deo 
causar” ST I-II 63.3 ad 1. 
32 “Sed oportet quod per alias virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias 
res, in ordine tamen ad Deum” ST I-II 63.3 ad 2. 
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infused moral virtues of the emotions involve that through grace we 
progressively transform the dispositions related to the concerned 
emotions.33 Although reason and will participate, Aquinas holds that 
further dispositions proper to our emotions take new shape in infused 
moral virtue.34 The time needed to reorder our emotional dispositions 
involves added difficulty in the process. In the Summa theologiae, 
Aquinas inscribes his discussion of the virtue of fortitude in the context 
of the human need for grace. In the preceding philosophical and 
psychological discussions (chapters three, four and five), these 
theological dimensions were set a side. We shall now take them up and 
place them into context. 
6.1.3. Fear and Trials: Theologically Transforming 
Fortitude and Resilience 
Although Aquinas’ technical virtue-terminology is 
philosophical in origin, it is pervasively theological in content when he 
applies it to the infused virtue of fortitude, which he transforms 
theologically using the Christian tradition. He transposes Aristotle’s 
virtue theory and the definition of courage to involve not only the 
natural but also the theological dimensions of the virtue. He likewise 
employs Cicero’s insights on the structure, ordering, and political end 
of courage in order to establish its fulfillment in the act of martyrdom 
rather than in the act of facing death either in the political arena 
(Cicero) or on the battlefield (Aristotle). Because of this extension, 
beyond strictly politico-philosophical bounds, we cannot completely 
understand the depth of Aquinas’ general definition of fortitude 
without treating its principal act, martyrdom, as well as its relationship 
to related emotions, virtues and Gift of the Holy Spirit. In this section, 
I shall ask: how does Aquinas theologically transform fortitude? And 
how might resilience research offer insights at this level? As discussed 
                                                 
33 For Aquinas both the acquired and the infused virtues bring right 
ordering to the emotions. Thomas says that these virtues impress reason on these 
appetites (“appetitus recipit impressionem rationis”), cf. ST I-II 60.1. 
34 Another part of the Tradition focuses on the will in the infused moral 
virtues. For example, St. Bonaventure construes the infused moral virtues as a 
matter of will without any lasting effect on the development of our emotional 
dispositions (cf. Cessario 2002, 203; B. Kent 1995). 
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in chapter three, through fortitude humans manage fear and daring. 
Now I shall highlight major trains of thought on the correlation of fear 
and religion. This excursus will open the way for a more in-depth 
theological treatment of the matter in Aquinas’ thought and from a 
resilience perspective. 
Rich and varied reflections on the relationship of fear and 
religion are found throughout the history of thought. Certain thinkers 
posit that fear and other emotions have engendered religion and quests 
for God (or gods).35 On a more pragmatic level, some thinkers observe 
that religion produces and controls fear.36 William James, for his part, 
catalogues the variety of emotions involved in religious intention: 
“religious fear, religious love, religious awe, religious joy, and so 
forth.”37 However, negative interpretations of religion’s role in fear 
management include Freud’s reductionistic thesis considers religion as 
an immature response to coping with fear and helplessness.38 Other 
critiques claim that some types of religion are potentially detrimental 
to mental health, for example, by “creating anxiety and fear by beliefs 
in punishment (e.g. hell) for our evil ways.”39 Positive interpretations 
however are not wanting. Pargament speculates that religious faith 
reduces fear of death and aids in managing fear in general.40 Certain 
studies even suggest that potential health benefits ensue when religion: 
(1) reduces existential anxiety through cognitive explanations of the 
chaotic; (2) offers a sense of hope, meaning, and purpose, as well as a 
resulting sense of emotional well-being; or (3) solves, at least partially, 
the problem of mortality.41 Taking the negative interpretations as a 
                                                 
35 Lucretius held that “Fear begets Gods;” Hume thought that the first ideas 
of religion originate in concerns for life and human fear; Feuerbach construed 
“primitive” religion as exclusively focusing on frightful aspects of nature; some 
recent empirical approaches pose similar foundations (cf. Hood et al. 1996, 18-20 
and 9-13; Allport 1950, 161). 
36 Cf. Thomas and Carver 1990, 195. 
37 G. Allport 1950, 10-11. 
38 The illusion of God, as an ideal father figure who protects and controls 
(oedipal phase) is created in order to cope with the unpleasant details of reality 
and to reduce fears of helplessness (cf. Watts and William 1988, 27). 
39 Schumaker 1992, 3-4. 
40 Cf. Pargament, 1990, 797-8. 
41 Schumaker (1992, 3) furthermore offers a list of other potential health 
benefits from religion. 
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partial warning about the potential shortcomings of religion, and the 
positive as leads to develop, this study turns to Aquinas. 
Aquinas’ focus on the philosophical physiognomy of fortitude 
and its management of fear does not imply forgetfulness about 
theological finality and flourishing. He establishes fortitude’s 
theological dimension through the role that flourishing plays in 
managing fear. In this case, theological flourishing is the continual 
motive and end animating human life.42 It involves a cognitive, 
motivational and emotional coping tool. A contemporary question is 
whether fortitude needs to be linked with flourishing (and goodness), 
as we mentioned earlier. Aquinas affirms that a brave person does what 
is fittingly brave, while seeking eternal flourishing at the same time. 
Fortitude itself is good, but this virtue taken out of the context of our 
loving flourishing looses its fullest power to courageously face fearful 
obstacles and move us to act. For Aquinas, God remains the first 
mover, the efficacious center and the final end of fortitude.43 
Fortitude’s foundations are weakened, however, when fear of 
violent death dissuades us, when we deem physical life the highest 
value, or when pacifism at all costs rules our attitudes.44 A myth of 
terrestrial satisfaction, either in terms of wealth, goodness or 
flourishing, can offset the resilient endurance we need throughout 
life’s journey. It involves a forgetfulness of ultimate sources of 
flourishing and fear. On the contrary, when flourishing that is rooted in 
divine beatitude serves as a goal and motivation, fortitude counteracts 
the temptation to short change theologal flourishing for an apparently 
easier life. This type of courage connotes spiritual resilience, which 
does not construe human existence merely in physical terms. 
                                                 
42 Thomas gives a striking example of the influence of theological 
flourishing in the middle of his discussion of whether brave people act for the 
good of this habitus (cf. ST II-II 123.7). 
43 On the goodness of fortitude, Aquinas cites Aristotle (NE iii.10, 
1115b21-24). On the relationship between theological fortitude and flourishing, 
Aquinas draws from Augustine (De Trin. xiii.8: PL 42, 1022-1023). Besides 
Aquinas’ own simple affirmation, he (ST II-II 123.7 ob 3) quotes Augustine 
again: “fortitudo est amor omnia propter Deum facile perferens” de morib. eccl. 
xv, i, 15: PL 32, 1322. 
44 Cf. M. Forschner 1983, 33-34. 
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For a faith perspective, Aquinas recalls the Scriptural precepts 
concerning “fearing the Lord” (with filial rather than servile fear).45 He 
contrasts this type of fear with the Scriptural precept to not fear what is 
naturally fearful. We are not to excessively fear bodily death, the 
enemy and so on, in order to remain duly attached to the goods of 
faith, hope and charity.46 These instances demonstrate how the soul 
through ordinate relationships to fearful objects can manage fear, how 
it respects natural objects of fear, and how it can supersede them for a 
reason. 
When Aquinas describes how fortitude concerns fear and 
daring, once again he does not hide the theological dimension of 
fortitude. In quoting St. Gregory he reaffirms that as a special virtue it 
consists in “loving the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal 
reward.”47 This insight introduces the importance of testing, trials and 
tribulation that we overlook too quickly when examining fortitude only 
in terms of fear and daring. These realities illustrate a basic aspect of 
resilience and courage. In the midst of testing, we need to cope with 
adversity and to retain our own integrity. An important dimension of 
testing is to prove the strength and genuineness of the protagonist, 
while also being a means to establish further strength, faith and 
goodness. 
How might we enrich Aquinas’ teaching on theological 
fortitude with further Scriptural sources and with the resilience 
perspective? The way in which Scripture handles strength in weakness, 
and testing can serve as analogues (functional equivalents) for 
Aquinas’ treatment of fortitude as a general virtue.48 Aquinas mines 
                                                 
45 Cf. Psalm 127:1 cited in ST II-II 125.2 obj. 1. On Aquinas’ typology of 
fear and the Gift of fear, see: ST II-II 19.1-12. 
46 Cf. Matt 10:28; Ezek 2:6; cited in ST II-II 125.1 sc. 
47 “Huius mundi aspera pro aeternis praemiis amare” ST II-II 123.3 ad 1. 
48 The resilience and faithfulness of God’s chosen ones are tested time and 
again in the Old Testament: Adam and Eve (Gn 2:17), Abraham (Gen 22:1), the 
Exodus (Ex 15:25). They are proven, purified or strengthened by the ordeal. New 
Testament accounts of resilience in trial and testing include: the archetypal 
resilience in trial of Jesus Christ through his passion and death (John 12:27f; 
3:14f.); his paradigmatic resilience is a spiritual resilience that includes ontic, 
moral and salvific dimensions, and is only manifest in the resurrection. In turn the 
trials of the Church and that of Christians correlate with those of Jesus Christ. In 
one-way or another, everyone must pass through trials. Jesus Christ announces 
that those who follow him will face their own ordeals (cf. Mark 10:38f, Heb 
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Scripture but is necessarily selective. A wider look at Scripture 
identifies pertinent teaching concerning strength (as an analogue for 
both fortitude in general and resilience), strength in weakness (as a 
functional equivalent for moral virtue and moral resilience), as well as 
testing, trials and tribulation (which are especially akin to resilience). 
Scripture narratives illustrate that, excluding rare exceptions, humans 
are neither indefectible nor faultless. Indeed, a primary aspect of 
human experience is the testing that not only can reveal human 
vulnerability, but whose primary function (according to Aquinas) is 
both to show a person’s integrity and to serve in expanding spiritual 
capacities. Thus physical, psychosocial and spiritual types of resilience 
are uncovered through testing, trials and tribulations. Hardships can 
either test, prove and build up those involved, or tempt, distract and 
weaken them.49 Overcoming our fears in the midst of courageous 
action involves a strange strengthening of human weakness through 
trials. 
6.1.4. Strength in Weakness: A Test for Infused 
Fortitude and Spiritual Resilience 
Christian notions of strength, weakness and humility challenge 
a virtue approach to fortitude. Thomas takes this challenge as the place 
to examine how human and divine competences interact.50 Aquinas and 
the Christian Tradition’s conceptions of strength fly in the face of 
certain cultural standards. The very notion of God is put to the test in 
the humble Jesus Christ, who dies on a cross. Furthermore, Christian 
doctrines and practices relating to suffering and death have spawned 
numerous sometimes conflicting notions and practices that range from 
the glorification of suffering per se (dolorism), to the denial of any 
benefit from human effort. Critiques arise from certain philosophers 
                                                                                                          
10:32-9). The intended purpose and effect of testing is multiple: investigating the 
qualities and endurance of God’s servants; causing their improvement and 
development; and offering them a reward. 
49 This basic meaning of “experience” finds its etymological roots in the 
practical knowledge, skill or competence (peritia) drawn from trial or danger 
(periculum) once surmounted; cf. WEUD 1989, 501; OED 1998. 
50 Treating the thirteenth century debate about the importance of humility 
would help to further develop this theme. Cf. R. Gauthier 1952, 475 ff. L. H. 
Yearly 1971, 557-580.  
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(Nietzsche and Marx) and resilience researchers (Cyrulnik) who slight 
some manifestations of Christianity for promoting weakness and 
glorifying suffering. 
I shall examine how Aquinas’ treatment of the problematic 
Pauline adage, “strength in weakness,” might help to illustrate 
Christian fortitude, as well as spiritual resilience. Can we reconcile 
Thomas’ notion of virtue and fortitude with a Pauline conception of 
strength in weakness? Furthermore, how might insights about moral 
resilience and acquired fortitude enhance Aquinas’ theological 
conception of strength in weakness? 
The rather problematic Scriptural formula “strength in 
weakness” tests infused fortitude’s resilience. First, the enigma of 
strength in weakness is pertinent for Christian fortitude and education. 
This problem is poignantly posed through St. Paul’s Second Letter to 
the Corinthians (12:9) concerning “virtue being perfected in 
infirmity.”51 The Pauline text is so significant that Aquinas uses it as 
the first potential objection concerning whether fortitude can be a 
Christian virtue. 
Before addressing Aquinas’ interpretation, I would like to note 
several pertinent points of exegesis. First, according to J. Murphy-
O’Connor, Paul’s text refers to human weakness as the means whereby 
we acquire the power of God, rather than the virtue of fortitude per 
se.52 Secondly, considering the cultural milieu, according to T. Savage, 
Paul’s weakness refers to being conformed to the poor and vulnerable 
Christ, rather than to the self-exalting tendencies of the Corinthians.53 
This type of weakness does not mean that Paul was weak in practice, 
                                                 
51 As mentioned earlier, this translation of the Vulgate differs significantly 
from the RSV: “my power is made perfect in weakness.” 
52 According to J. Murphy-O’Connor (1990, 828), this weakness cannot 
only involve the general weakness of the human condition, but also that of 
individuals put in particular situations. In this context, Paul refers to the power 
that God accords him for his ministry, as well as the weaknesses that are 
obstacles to it (cf. 2 Cor 3:5-6). 
53 The Corinthians find fault with Paul in four areas: boasting (Paul refused 
to follow the cultural practice of boasting); physical presence (Paul’s physical 
demeanor was unimpressive); speech (unskilled, in an arena that prizes powerful 
and polished rhetoric); support (Paul would not accept monetary support; he lived 
a simple life and thus deprived the community of a reason to be proud of their 
generosity). Cf. Savage 1996, 54-99. 
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but rather that he understood that a minister of Christ will resist certain 
cultural pressures.54 Thirdly, Paul’s so-called weakness refers to his 
aptitude for apostolic adaptation and for glorifying the “power of God 
for salvation for everyone who has faith.”55 Paul does not exalt the 
divine power over the nothingness of mortals, but rather, he opposes 
the strength that human beings find in God versus the impotence found 
in being without God.56 Paul testifies to the strength that Christ’s Spirit 
works in the believer who is brought into God’s own fullness.57 Such 
strength unfolds in the midst of weakness and often does so through 
testing, the proving grounds for spiritual resilience. 
Aquinas, for his part, employs Paul’s text to affirm that 
Christian fortitude has human and graced dimensions. In the midst of 
the human capacity of fortitude, humans are weak and need continuing 
help from God. Aquinas interprets St. Paul as distinguishing 
weaknesses regarding the flesh (infirmitates carnis) from weaknesses 
of the mind (infirmitates animae). Aquinas’ spiritual interpretation 
goes beyond the literal text. The weaknesses of the flesh concern 
emotional and dispositional frailty; they are not physical debility per 
se. He does not want Paul read as encouraging spiritual weakness. 
                                                 
54 In this case, the Corinthian culture had exaggerated practices of boasting 
about one’s own importance, displays of physical presence, grandiose and 
abusive oratory and ostentatious wealth. This context bears light upon the 
antithesis of strength in weakness as in the rest of the series of dyads (antitheses) 
that Paul employs in 2 Corinthians: comfort experienced through suffering (ch. 
1); glory manifested through shame (ch. 3); life working in death (ch. 4); riches 
won through poverty (ch. 6); and finally power expressed through weakness 
(chapters 12 and 13). Cf. Savage 1996, 1, and 164-192. 
55 Romans 1:16. According to Paul, although faith is a gift (1 Cor 12:9), its 
strength varies: (1) Abraham “grew strong with respect of faith” (Rom 4:20); (b) 
Rom 12:3; (c) certain gifts are to be employed in proportion to faith (Rom 12:3); 
(d) faith is individuated (Rom 14:22; cf. Sampley 1995). 
56 Being without God is folly, while even the simple means that God 
employs is wisdom. As Paul says: “For the foolishness of God is wiser than men, 
and the weakness of God is stronger than men” (1 Cor 1:25). God’s method is 
clear: “God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise, God chose what 
is weak in the world to shame the strong, God chose what is low and despised in 
the world, even things that are not, to bring to nothing things that are, so that no 
human being might boast in the presence of God” (1 Cor 1:27-29; cf. Jos. 23:10; 
Lev 26:8; Phil 4:13). 
57 Paul’s teaching on the Spirit is clear in his letters to the Philippians and 
Ephesians, especially Phil 3:10f; Eph 3:14-19, and Eph 6:10-20. In order to fulfill 
his ministry in Christ, Paul has inner strength (2 Cor 4:6), the power of Christ 
dwelling in him (2 Cor 12:9),57 the resilience of Christ. 
396 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
Rather fortitude entails strength of spirit in handling weaknesses of the 
flesh. The strengths (virtues) of the soul that are thusly developed are 
patience or fortitude (in regard to bearing the infirmities of the body 
bravely) and humility (in courageously recognizing our own 
weaknesses and our need for social and graced support).58 In 
recognizing our weaknesses and need for grace in order to do good 
with consistency, we can be stronger in practicing the virtues, 
especially when the object of the virtue is supernatural. This type of 
graced-virtue in the midst of human weakness does not simply limit, 
but rather puts further demands on human efforts. 
In the debate on weakness, strength and humility some 
scholars have feared that Aquinas has completely missed St. Paul’s 
meaning of “flesh,” and has actually contradicted the sense of the 
Second letter to the Corinthians (12:9);59 other scripture scholars point 
to other meanings.60 The Pauline notion of strength in weakness is 
certainly at odds with a Pelagian understanding of Aristotelian virtue 
theory, especially of fortitude. The juxtaposition of these two notions, 
in Aquinas’ dialogue, does not yield a hybrid Pauline Aristotelianism 
or an Aristotelian St. Paul. Aquinas figures that he is respecting both 
Aristotle and Paul, and that the truth of each is both preserved and 
advanced. How does he do so? 
First, the Creator has endowed humans with natural capacities 
for good action and excellence, including the natural, acquired virtue 
of fortitude. Thomas nonetheless takes into consideration the 
disordering effects of original, personal and social (structural) sin. 
Second, God’s wisdom and strength is far beyond human strength, 
                                                 
58 Cf. ST II-II 129.3 ad 4 on the utility of recognizing one’s own faults 
(defectus proprios considerans). 
59 In particular, Congar (1974, 342) objects to Aquinas’ interpreting 
“infirmitas” as weakness in human sensibility (“sensibilité”). He says that: 
“‘Chair’ signifie en effet, pour S. Paul, la condition fragile de la créature: elle ne 
s’oppose pas à l’ésprit mais elle ‘désigne tout l’homme tel que le péché l’a fait’ 
(F. Prat).” Pinckaers (1996) also says that S. Paul has a different, synthetic way of 
describing the whole human person either as under the influence of the spirit or 
the flesh. 
60 The Jerusalem Bible and the Jerome Biblical Commentary (1968: 52:42) 
suggest that it refer either to a disease (with severe attacks, an “angel of Satan”) 
or persecution (from Israelites, his brothers “according to the flesh”). See also T. 
Savage’s (1996) interpretation presented above. 
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which depends on divine help to assure natural fortitude and on divine 
grace to receive infused fortitude and the Gift of courage.61 Aquinas 
presumes that grace builds up and brings completion to nature in 
infused virtues. On the one hand, the natural, acquired virtue of 
fortitude demands reason, while also being demanded by reason (it 
requires the prudent exercise of reason, while also protecting our 
reason from the sway of excess emotion). On the other hand, acquired 
fortitude underlies the psychological experience (pleasure), moral ease, 
and promptness that accompany infused fortitude. Nonetheless, 
according to Aquinas, acts of infused fortitude per se do not create a 
perfect acquired virtue of fortitude.62 When we have developed moral 
courage, infused acts of fortitude contemporaneously strengthen it. But 
when we do not have an underlying moral virtue, we experience the 
difficulty and a lack of promptness and pleasure in acts of infused 
fortitude. In a more direct response to this objection, Aquinas 
recognizes that the human person cannot be both weak and strong in 
the same way, at the same time. Therefore through fortitude (acquired 
and infused) the mind manages our own emotional weakness with the 
help of God, and through humility we recognize our limitations and 
need for God’s continued grace and, secondarily, for the assistance of 
others. 
Infused fortitude concerns fearful things that have a 
theological tenor, or the natural ones that attempt to cut us off from our 
theological goals. It sharpens our acquired capacities to act calmly in 
danger. However, an acquired virtue must provide a foundation with 
which the infused virtues confer a further measure to reason and an 
added surety to acts. Infused fortitude does not make the acquired 
virtue redundant; nor does acquired fortitude make infused fortitude 
                                                 
61 This distinction of natural and supernatural fortitude is not a simple one, 
for “the idea of grace perfecting nature coupled with the notion of the continuing 
presence of the supernatural end forces the recognition that no clear, simple, and 
neat distinction can be made between natural and supernatural activity” L. H. 
Yearley 1971, 578; see also M. Labourdette 1961-2, 15. 
62 Aquinas says that “actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant 
aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem” (ST I-II 51.4 ad 3; cf. 
de virt. com. 10 ad 19). In my thought, Aquinas holds that moral premeditation 
and posterior reflection, which accompany particular acts of infused fortitude, 
contribute to the development of acquired virtue. Aquinas does not address 
whether they undo acquired vice. 
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superfluous. Infused fortitude neither replaces human efforts to master 
fearfulness nor creates a full blown acquired virtue of fortitude without 
human habituation. Progress in the acquired virtue of fortitude, 
nonetheless, can find further support in the infused virtues of faith, 
hope and charity. Scriptural and other narratives, liturgy and 
hagiography, as well as contemporary struggles for peace and justice 
provide training grounds for learning to conquer fearful situations and 
to acquire fortitude.63 I suggest that Aquinas’ understanding of 
acquired and infused fortitude enrich a theory of moral and spiritual 
resilience. But his teaching on Christian fortitude includes martyrdom, 
which will pose further questions about spiritual resilience and 
vulnerability. 
6.2. Resilience in Martyrdom? 
If resisting human mortality is the criteria for resilience, then 
martyrdom will be nonsensical vulnerability. The pride of place that 
the NT and the Christian Tradition give to martyrdom can be 
disturbing, especially in view of the way in which Christ’s passion and 
death (martyrdom) is the archetype for charity.64 The key text for 
Aquinas in this regard is Jesus’ farewell discourse in the Gospel of 
John: “Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life 
                                                 
63 Indeed, both life and fiction instruct us in managing emotions in accord 
with virtuous goals. Children, youth and adults learn fortitude from the 
experiences of mothers and fathers, friends and the community at large. Aquinas 
did not develop a theory of narrative, nor do I pretend to do so here. For more 
developed theories of narrative and its relationship with virtue see: A. MacIntyre 
1981, S. Hauerwas 1981, P. Hall 1994, and so on. 
64 Although martyrdom has held an important place in the tradition from 
the beginning, Aquinas has a novel way of recognizing that the act of martyrdom 
is the supreme act of courage (cf. Congar 1974). Hauerwas (1993) poignantly 
highlights the significance of the differences between the traditions of Aristotle 
and Aquinas on fortitude (and martyrdom). In treating martyrdom, Thomas 
principally utilizes sacred Scripture and Patristic sources to illustrate his uniquely 
Christian notion. As will be seen, Aquinas employs a plethora of Scripture 
citations on martyrdom in questions 124 of the Secunda secundae, in which he 
cites the following (in order): Matt 5:10 (2x); Acts 1:8; John 15:13 (2x); 1 Cor 
13:3; Rom. 3:22; Rom 10:10; 1 John 3:16; Col 3:14; Phil 2:8; Heb 10:34; Heb ch. 
11; Job 2:4; 1 Peter 4:15-16; James 2:18; Titus 1:6; Rom 8:9; Gal 5:24. 
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for his friends.”65 The martyr fulfills the vocation of every Christian to 
holiness66 and is motivated by faith and truth, and by hope in promised 
life eternal.67 Indeed Thomas crowns fortitude by his discussion of 
martyrdom (ST II-II 124) that directly follows his initial question about 
fortitude. Martyrdom serves as the pinnacle of his Christian synthesis 
on fortitude. We shall ask: how Aquinas’ conception of Christian 
martyrdom might offer an archetype for spiritual resilience? And how 
might it resist critiques of it ultimate vulnerability? In so doing, we 
shall attempt to enrich Aquinas’ treatment of martyrdom with 
resilience insights, and offer them in return his vision of spiritual 
resilience. 
6.2.1. Martyrdom and the Virtue of Faith 
In demonstrating the pertinence of martyrdom for natural and 
theological fortitude, Aquinas draws upon the etymology of martus, 
which means witness (testis). He calls both upon Scriptural and 
Patristic sources to explain that martyrdom involves a witness to one’s 
faith in Christ,68 which finds its principal motivation in charity. Since 
the second half of the second century for Christians,69 the ‘martyr’ has 
referred to those who have witnessed with their lives (that is, at the 
cost of their physical lives) to the truth of the Gospel of Jesus Christ 
                                                 
65 John 15:13, which Aquinas cites on numerous occasions in this regard: 
cf. ST II-II 122.1 ad 1; ST II-II 124.3 (2x); ST II-II 140.1 ad 3. See also: 1 Cor 
13:3; 1 John 3:16; Col 3:14. 
66 Cf. Roman 1:17, 1 Cor 1:2; 1 Peter 2:9. Martyrdom is a sign of the 
holiness of the Church and a call for a reawakening of moral truth. It reproves 
those who transgress the law (cf. Wis 2:12) and who confuse evil for good, as 
Isaiah (5:20) says: “Woe to those who call evil good and good evil, who put 
darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for 
bitter!” (cf. VS no. 93) 
67 In the Book of Revelation (2:10), those who are about to suffer are 
encouraged as follows: “Be faithful unto death, and I will give you the crown of 
life.” 
68 Aquinas (in ST II-II 124.2 obj. 1) cites both Scripture (Acts 1:8) and a 
notable Patristic source (St. Maximus the Confessor, de natali S.S. Mart. 3, al. 
Serm. 88; PL 57, 708B). 
69 The technical distinction between “martyr” and “confessor” (one who 
suffered for Christ without dying from it) was not made until the second half of 
the 2cd century with the Martyrdom of Polycarp (cf. Louth 1998, 711). 
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and the coming Kingdom of God.70 The NT has several senses of the 
word “m£rtuj,” three of which are more central to Aquinas’ focus:71 (1) 
the active proclamation of personal experience, (2) the witness of one’s 
acts, including (3) the witness in giving one’s life. First of all, Biblical 
martyrs are more than simple eyewitnesses; they actively proclaim 
what they have seen and what they know. For example, the mission of 
the twelve apostles is to bear witness to the resurrection of Jesus 
Christ.72 Second, examples of the witness of one’s actions are found in 
Jesus Christ’s acts of healing, which testify to the veracity of his 
message as well as to his origin and his mission.73 Third, the ultimate 
test of martyrdom is the witness of one’s own life. Christ is thus the 
archetype for all Christian martyrs;74 he expresses what for Aquinas is 
                                                 
70 The NT martyrs witness to the world to come, to the Kingdom of God: 
e.g. the eighth Beatitude (Mat. 5:10), Jesus’ promise of paradise to the Good thief 
(cf. Luke 23:43), and both Steven (Acts 7:56) and John’s visions of heaven (Rev 
1:9). Cf. Heb 10:34; Louth 1998, 711. 
71 Furthermore, “m£rtuj” can have the sense of the juridical testimony of a 
person who has been present to a material fact, or a conclusion of a juridical 
operation. Cf. Spicq 1991, 969-974. 
72 Cf. Luke 24:48. As preacher-missionaries, they are personally identified 
with the cause that they preach. The testimony, they give before auditors (John 
19:35), is intended as true. In the face of false accusations, Paul defends the 
veracity of his witness: “We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because 
we testified of God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that 
the dead are not raised” (1 Cor. 15:15). Their witness is empowered by the Holy 
Spirit. Jesus promised to send the Spirit to speak through the mouth of those who 
give witness (cf. Mark 13:11; Acts 1:8). 
73 In the face of those who doubt his message, he presents these works as an 
indication of his credibility and relationship with the Father. In face of doubts 
about his miracles, Jesus says: “for the works which the Father has granted me to 
accomplish, these very works which I am doing, bear me witness that the Father 
has sent me” John 5:36; cf. John 10:25, 37-38. 
74 Jesus is the archetype of the martyr, above all in the Gospel of Luke, 
which describes the traits that henceforth define martyrdom (cf. 1 Tim 6:13; Rev 
1:5; 3:14; Augrain 1995, 723-4; Louth 1998, 712). He was born to render witness 
through his life (John 18:37) and death, which is possible not only because of his 
human condition, but also because of his obedience to the Father’s will. Paul says 
in his letter to the Philippians (2:8): “And being found in human form he 
humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross.” 
Furthermore, Christ is seen as the Suffering Servant foretold by Isaiah (53:11). 
His death is redemptive for the multitude (Matt 20:28); he is an expiatory Victim 
(Heb 9:12, 22). Like the prophets sent before him, Jesus resolutely marches 
toward Jerusalem, where it is fitting that a prophet die (Luke 13:33; 9:51). 
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the highest form of friendship-love, which lays down one’s own life 
for one’s friends.75 
Martyrdom shares the general characteristics of virtue 
(voluntariness and protecting the good of reason), as well as those of 
fortitude.76 Faith assures the content of a martyr’s witness and the 
vision of his goal.77 As Aquinas says citing Hebrews 11, “a martyr is so 
called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to 
despise things visible for the sake of things invisible”78 Although 
human beings naturally prefer to lose possessions and suffer pain 
rather than die, a martyr bears witness to the faith in the radical way 
that he subjugates visible goods to invisible ones. Thomas affirms that 
the perfect notion (ratio) of martyrdom requires that a man suffer in 
body unto death and that he does so for Christ’s sake,79 instead of any 
mere reason or truth. Witnessing to Christ can be done in word or any 
virtuous deed (including the avoiding of sin) provided that it refers to 
God or divine truth, which renders a virtuous deed a profession of 
faith.80 Aquinas draws upon Scriptural authority to establish this 
                                                 
75 Cf. John 15:13; ST II-II 124. 
76 These charactaristics are clear from its essence (firmness itself), as well 
as its end. While civic fortitude’s end is human justice; gratuitous fortitude’s end 
(fortitudo gratuita) is faith in the form of divine justice. Aquinas affirms that: 
“fortitudo gratuita firmat animum hominis in bono iustitiae Dei” (ST II-II 124.2 
ad 1), which he supports by citing St. Paul (Rom 3:22): “iustitiae Dei, quae est 
per fidem Iesu Christi.” On the place of faith in martyrdom, Aquinas (in ST II-II 
124.2) draws from the authority of: St. Maximus the Confessor (de natali S.S. 
Mart. 3, al. Serm. 88; PL 57, 708B) and St. Cyprian (whom St. Augustine cites in 
Serm. 311, al. De Div. 115.1: PL 38.1414). 
77 Cf. Heb 11:1-40; Rom 3:22. These virtues do not forestall a certain 
preparation that is useful when needing to face pleasures and suffering, as well as 
desires and fears. Christian witness is prepared according to Paul, for “those who 
belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires” (Gal 
5:24). 
78 ST II-II 124.4; cf. Heb 11 and 2 Cor 4:17-18. In this question Aquinas 
also quotes St. Maximus to affirm the martyrdom concerns dying for the faith. 
79 Even though there are many similitudes to martyrdom (Mary’s 
martyrdom, the martyrdom involved in slaying carnal desires, the fortitude 
involved in other hardships related to professing faith in Christ) the perfect notion 
of martyrdom involves physical death (cf. ST II-II 124.4). 
80 Aquinas says: “omnium virtutum opera, secundum quod referuntur in 
Deum, sunt quaedam protestationes fidei, per quam nobis innotescit quod Deus 
huiusmodi opera a nobis requirit, et nos pro eis remunerat.” (ST II-II 124.5; 
124.5 ad 1). Aquinas employs the tradition’s identification of the eighth Beatitude 
with martyrdom as the basis of justifying that in addition to faith, other virtues 
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necessary interrelation between word and deed.81 The key is that the 
martyr be Christ’s through doing virtuous deeds that are activated by 
the Spirit of Christ (cf. Rom 8:9). Thus he imitates Christ in avoiding 
sin (cf. Gal 5:24), in confessing faith and in doing good. Because of 
this wider understanding of witnessing to faith, Aquinas deems John 
the Baptist a martyr even though he suffered death for reproving 
adultery instead of an article of faith. This understanding of the 
interrelationship of faith and morals is crucial for the type of resilience 
expressed therein, as we shall discuss later. 
In looking at the fortitude engendered in Christian faith, we 
need to be careful not to construct a false dichotomy between reason 
and faith, by opposing a rational fortitude to either a courageous faith 
or a faith-inspired courage.82 In Aquinas’ perspective though, faith does 
                                                                                                          
pertain to martyrdom (cf. ST II-II 124.5 sc). Nonetheless, other hardships are 
associated with martyrdom and its similitudes. 
81 In this regard, Thomas (in ST II-II 124) employs not only the letter of 
James (2:18) but even St. Paul’s letter to the Romans (8:9 and 10:10). Aquinas 
finds no necessary animosity between faith and deeds. He can employ the 
Romans text without divorcing its teaching on justification by faith from its moral 
demands and exhortations. Aquinas also quotes, Titus 1:16 and Gal 5:24. 
Because of the needed interrelationship between witnessing to truth and virtuous 
deeds, confessing a simple truth of geometry or other speculative science is not a 
sufficient basis for Christian martyrdom (ST II-II 124.5 obj and ad 2). 
82 This dichotomy opposes two vertiginous extremes regarding faith. A fear 
of faith’s risks and unknowns accepts only experimental certitude and positive 
reason. On the contary, an overreaching confidence in the content of faith shuns 
any dialogue or relationship with the sciences. Within this confidence in faith, P. 
Secretan (1993, 311) discribes another bipolar opposition: “Deux oppositions 
dissemblables se dessinent : dans l’une, la foi quitte courageusement les 
certitudes du monde; dans l’autre, le monde paraît incertain par rapport aux 
certitudes de la foi.” Such a dichotomy results when the methodologies and 
reflections of philosophers and scientists too radically oppose those of 
theologians and martyrs. This opposition is dangerous, inasmuch as it assumes: 
(1) that reason is used only by the philosopher, and not by the martyr or 
theologian (who then would have faith without reason), (2) that one is lead to 
believe that philosophy does not depend on some belief (albeit a rational 
presupposition) that cannot be verified by reason, (3) that philosophy, unlike 
theology, does not use models, analogies and metaphors for understanding its 
object, or (4) that prudence is appropriate to reason and courage to faith. In being 
courageous and prudent about reason and faith, we need to keep in sight the 
limits and complementarity of both. God has taken the risk of employing human 
counterparts in faith. The gift of faith is received ad modus recipientis, but not by 
one person alone. Human limits are evident not only in individual persons, but 
also in communities at the sociological and moral levles Nonetheless, it is in the 
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not abandon reason but only the pretensions of unaided erroneous 
reason; and reason does not denigrate faith, but only realizes a 
relationship that does not do violence to human reason. Both reason 
and faith offer a corrective to each other’s proper pretensions.83 Such 
remedies are especially pertinent concerning the rational and faith-
issues operative in an act of martyrdom. It is important for 
understanding the role of charity in fortitude, martyrdom and spiritual 
resilience as well. 
6.2.2. Charity as its Unifier, Motivator and Greatest 
Expression 
As a pinnacle among the expressions of Christian virtue, 
martyrdom demands and expresses the unity of the virtues.84 The 
fortitude involved in martyrdom faces the danger of death for the sake 
of the good, the common good and the greatest good (God and our 
friendship with God), in a spiritual combat. It demands infused virtue, 
which can be supported (or not) by the person’s natural, moral virtue 
of fortitude. Aquinas construes charity and the infused virtue of 
martyrdom in terms of the threefold character and reception of infused 
virtue: its object is God; only God can infuse it; and its object depends 
on divine revelation.85 
                                                                                                          
community of persons, which is the Church, that there is assurance of the fullness 
of faith. 
83 First, in believing in God’s self-revelation, we can avoid the trap of an 
excessive confidence in reason, which estimates itself to be the source of a 
mundane salvation or to be adequate to dispel life’s mysteries. Second, in using 
one’s reason well, we can avoid the trap of an irrational faith that judges it does 
not need to reason in order to be faithful. Cf. Secretan 1993, 311-312. 
84 The unity involved surpasses the limits of human language to express 
such a dynamic reality. The balance of virtue, for Aquinas, is orchestrated by 
faith, hope and charity, instead of by fortitude or prudence per se (cf. Secretan 
1993, 314-315). While fortitude and prudence are indispensable in the context of 
the theological virtues, they nonetheless become prudent charity or courageous 
faith, and so on. Even if there is a certain transfer of meaning from the 
anthropological and the philosophical to the theological level, there is also some 
new quality of theological virtue that informs courage and prudence. In Christian 
moral and spiritual life, the infused virtues and fruits of the Holy Spirit have a 
moral dimension. 
85 Cf. ST I-II 62.1; ST I-II 63.3; ST I-II 65.3. 
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Charity’s two dimensions, friendship-love with God and 
neighbor,86 order the act and virtue martyrdom. The preeminence of 
love for God and neighbor specifies that the ultimate (self-fulfilling) 
purpose of one’s life is self-giving. This counter-intuitive and 
seemingly counter-resilient teaching is at the very center of Christ’s 
Gospel. One can only understand it in the context: of faith in His life, 
death and resurrection, of hope in His promises of resurrection and 
eternal life, and of charity. These theological virtues serve as the 
necessary basis for acts of infused fortitude and martyrdom.87 
The relationship of charity to martyrdom occasions various 
confusions. First how can an act that disregards natural love of one's 
body be resilient? Will not such a basic conflict inhibit even the loftiest 
motivation, and render senseless all natural optimism and strength?88 
Besides the natural inclination to preserve oneself, which would tend 
to offer resistance to putting one’s physical life in jeopardy, two 
motivators support the virtue of martyrdom. Charity is its chief and 
principal motivation (primum et principale motivum), while fortitude is 
its proper motivation (motivum proprium).89 These two virtues 
collaborate in a determinate fashion: charity commands martyrdom, 
fortitude elicits it. As in the case of all Christian virtue, without charity 
one has neither merit nor complete virtue, as St. Paul says: “If I should 
deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profits me 
nothing.”90 For Aquinas, martyrdom is not fully courageous in simply 
enduring forced death per se, for it must express the charity, which is 
the driving force and reason to endure such a hateful act. It is the 
                                                 
86 See ST II-II 27, 8, where Aquinas uses 1 John 4:21 to emphasize the 
interrelation of these two aspects of love: a love of neighbor, which includes that 
love of God as well as a love of God which includes love of neighbor. There is 
nonetheless an ordering in finality: that God be loved with one’s whole being—
principally since God is the source of love—and one’s neighbor be loved as 
oneself—secondarily, but with the important measure of one’s natural 
inclinations to self regard and protection (cf. ST II-II 184.3 and his sources Deut 
6:5, Lev 19:18, and Matt 22:40, and also ST II-II 26.3 and Ad Joan. ch. 4, lect. 4, 
with reference to Origen). 
87 Cf. ST II-II 4.3; de carit. 3 ad 13. 
88 Cf. J. Pieper (1966: 127) also asks such questions. 
89 Thomas says “ad actum martyrii inclinat quidem caritas sicut primum et 
principale motivum, per modum virtutis imperantis: fortitudo autem sicut 
motivum proprium, per modum virtutis elicientis” ST II-II 124.2 ad 2. 
90 1 Cor 13:3; cf. ST II-II 124.2 obj.2. 
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greatest love (John 15:13), the love of Christ that is victorious in the 
martyr, according to Aquinas.91 This charity puts the love of one’s life 
in a larger context. The natural inclination to preserve one’s physical 
life is drawn up within the spiritual inclination to preserve one’s life 
with God. Although natural abhorrence to death remains, faith, hope 
and charity provide the renewed object and motivation to pursue our 
ultimate flourishing. 
Martyrdom as the greatest expression of love poses another 
resilience problem. Is it not counter-intuitive and even counter-resilient 
to claim that martyrdom expresses greatness or perfection? Is it not the 
ultimate folly neither to fight nor flee if faced with a way out of death? 
In a seeming paradox, Aquinas directly acknowledges that life is the 
good of this present world that humans treasure most, and that death, 
especially a painful one, is most naturally shunned.92 In blatant 
opposition to one’s natural inclinations to preserve one’s own physical 
life and to hate pain and death, Aquinas claims that one still rationally 
reckons martyrdom the most perfect completion to human life. The 
suffering of death itself is the greatest perfection (although the species 
of the act is not praiseworthy itself). But inasmuch as death is directed 
to something else by its principal object and motivation, it takes on a 
deeper meaning. If human life is more than its physical manifestation, 
then there can something greater than preserving one’s body. 
Aquinas argues that the love of charity, as the principal 
motivation of martyrdom, not only brings perfection to the act of 
martyrdom,93 but that the act of martyrdom demonstrates the greatest 
proof of charity. Since death is so naturally despicable and life so 
naturally embraced, martyrdom can be the most perfect of human acts, 
as the sign of the greatest charity.94 If the primacy of charity is not 
                                                 
91 In this regard, Aquinas (ST II-II 124.2 obj.2; ST II-II 124.5) cites St. 
Maximus, Sermon 16; PL 57.708B. 
92 Aquinas directly addresses this problem several times in relationship to 
martyrdom in: ST II-II 124.3; and ST II-II 124.4 where he also quotes Job 2:4. 
93 Aquinas (ST II-II 124.3) cites St. Paul (Col 3.14): “caritas est vinculum 
perfectionis.” In the sed contra, Aquinas furthermore draws upon St. Augustine’s 
(de Sancta Virgin. 46.47: PL 40.424) authority to propose that martyrdom is even 
more perfect than virginity. 
94 Here Aquinas once again draws upon the teaching of Christ found in the 
Gospel of John 15:13 (cf. ST II-II 124.3). Furthermore, martyrdom is also a sign 
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recognized however, Christianity and the pride of place it apportions to 
martyrdom will appear glaringly anti-resilient, as sources of ultimate 
and fatal vulnerability. 
6.2.3. Martyrdom Defending the Good of Reason: Truth, 
Justice and Prudence. 
We can ask whether Aquinas’ conception of martyrdom 
conforms to the criteria of moral resilience: does it defend the good of 
reason and is it voluntary. I shall examine Aquinas’ teaching on truth, 
justice, patience and prudence in relationship with martyrdom in order 
to investigate its correlation with reason and moral resilience 
Martyrdom safeguards the good of reason in several ways, 
including justice as its proper effect. Aquinas argues that “martyrdom 
essentially consists in standing firmly to truth and justice against the 
assaults of persecution.”95 His source for this insight is the eighth 
Beatitude (Matt 5:10): “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for 
justice’s sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”96 This Beatitude 
not only serves to establish that martyrdom is a virtue, but also to 
identify certain of its principle qualities. Martyrdom demands that we 
remain firm in justice, as the habit of establishing the order of reason 
in human affairs.97 It involves the right endurance of suffering related 
to not committing injustice and to resisting injustice actively.98 This 
good of reason that we achieve through acts of justice is not only that 
                                                                                                          
of the greatest possible obedience, since through it one follows Christ who 
became “obedient unto death” (Phil 2:8; cited by Aquinas in ST II-II 124.3 ad 2). 
95 “Pertinet autem ad rationem martyrii ut aliquis firmiter stet in veritate et 
iustitia contra persequentium impetus” ST II-II 124.1. On the relationship 
between truth and justice, see: ST II-II 109.1-3. 
96 Aquinas (ST II-II 124.5 sc) calls upon tradition (a gloss) and St. Jerome’s 
commentary in linking the eighth Beatitude to the act and virtue of martyrdom. 
The differences in translation of “dikaiosÚnhj” (Matt 5:10) can reveal other 
profound theological matters that we cannot treat here for lack of space (e.g. the 
doctrine of justification). Aquinas’ interpretation centers on justice as an infused 
moral virtue. Aquinas’ Latin (Vulgate) text reads: “Beati qui persecutionem 
patiuntur propter iustitiam: quoniam ipsorum est regnum caelorum.” The Greek 
(Koine) reads: “Mak£rioi oƒ dediwmšnoi ›neken dikaiosÚnhj: Óti aÙtîn ™stin ¹ 
basile…a tîn oÙranîn.” Translations for “dikaiosÚnhj” (Matt 5:10) include: in the 
cause of right (JB), holiness’ sake (NAB), righteousness’ sake (RSV, KJV). 
97 Cf. ST II-II 123.12. Prudence of course aids justice and the other virtues, 
when it perfects reason. 
98 Cf. ST II-II 124.1 ad 3; ST II-II 124.5 ad 1. 
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of practical reason (prudence), but also includes that of infused 
speculative reason (faith). 
Aquinas also attests to the importance of patience drawing out 
other important moral, pedagogical and psychological features of 
martyrdom.99 He acknowledges that the chief act of fortitude found in 
martyrdom is endurance (sustinere) rather than initiative or 
aggressiveness (aggredi). St. Thomas defends martyrdom against 
possible misconceptions and objections about its being involuntary, 
illicit or presumptuous.100 First, martyrdom must be voluntary in order 
to be a moral act.101 Second, it is not suicide.102 Third, it demands some 
mental and emotional preparation. Such preparation may seem rash, 
even presumptuous. Aquinas however argues that it is virtuous to 
prepare oneself for martyrdom. The precepts of the Divine Law thus 
aid one to prepare one’s mind and heart to suffer martyrdom (animi 
praeparationem), when it is expedient.103 Preparation is especially 
helpful, since it is so difficult to “rightly endure sufferings that are 
unjustly inflicted,” as Aquinas says.104 We do not however find the 
most powerful source for martyrdom, the Spirit of Christ, in human 
training.105 Human self-preparation is necessary but not sufficient for 
                                                 
99 In regard to martyrdom and patience, Aquinas (ST II-II 123.6) cites St. 
Augustine’s sermon on St. Cyprian in Serm. 311, al. De Div. 115.1: PL 38.1414. 
100 Cf. ST II-II 124.1 obj. 1-3. 
101 The voluntary nature of martyrdom is problematic when considering the 
Holy Innocents as martyrs for Christ’s sake. Even though St. Hilary attributes the 
glory of martyrdom to children of such a young age, Aquinas following 
Augustine recognizes that they merit this glory not for the voluntary aspect of 
their death, but rather due to their suffering in the place of Christ. It is by God’s 
grace that they attain what others do through collaboration with their own wills. 
Cf. ST II-II 124.1 obj/ad 1; and ST II-II 124.4 ad 4. 
102 Augustine attests that certain women martyrs during persecution seemed 
to have illicitly killed themselves. Aquinas resists any association of martyrdom 
with suicide, yet claims that these women are fittingly honored. Cf. ST II-II 124.1 
ad 2; ST II-II 64.5; ST II-II 64.1 ad 2. 
103 The theme of preparing the soul for martyrdom in several places: ST II-
II 124.1 ad 3; ST II-II 124.3 ad 1. I shall address this further at the end of this 
chapter. 
104 “In debita sustinentia passionum iniuste inflictarum” ST II-II 124.1 ad 
3. 
105 Cf. Acts 1:8; Gal 5:24; which are cited respectively in ST II-II 124.2 
obj.1; and ST II-II 124.5 ad 1. Furthermore, Aquinas mentions another source of 
strength for the martyr. In De verit. 13. 3 ad 9, he draws from Augustine’s 
insights to explain that a “sprinkling” of divine glory (i.e. a non-beatific vision of 
God’s essence) enables the martyrs to live temperately, justly, bravely, and 
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martyrdom. We shall raise this topic again in terms of the model that 
Christ showed in facing his own fear and death, and in terms of the 
pedagogical function of the precepts related to fortitude and its 
associated virtues. 
In addition to defending the good of reason by standing firm in 
truth through the virtues of justice and patience, infused fortitude and 
martyrdom also indispensably draw upon prudence. Common 
language, however, often opposes fortitude and prudence: for 
martyrdom or fortitude is seen as an audacious recklessness or 
imprudent boldness; and since prudence is often conceived of as a 
spineless caution or self-serving protectionism. However, far from 
being contrary virtues, fortitude and prudence positively correlate in a 
way particular to their objects, effects and causes. Aquinas expresses 
the interrelation of fortitude and prudence as perfect virtues in two 
ways.106 First as general properties they need each other in order to 
habitually do the good well.107 Aquinas describes that prudence’s 
qualities overflow into other virtues inasmuch as prudence directs and 
guides them.108 
Thomas differentiates prudence and fortitude according to their 
determinate matters.109 Prudence pertains to the proper functioning of 
                                                                                                          
prudently when faced with temptations. Cf. St. Augustine, De genesi ad litteram, 
XII, 26 (PL 34:476). 
106 Cf. ST I-II 65.1. 
107 Aquinas (ST I-II 61.4 obj. 1; cf. ST I-II 65.1) cites St. Gregory’ (Moral. 
xxii, 1) testimony to their interdependence: “prudentia vera non est, quae iusta, 
temperans et fortis non est; […] nec fortitudo integra, quae prudens, temperans 
et iusta non est.” 
108 Cf. ST I-II 61.4 ad 1. Furthermore, the human being who seeks 
perfection, by rectitude of will directs every virtue in its appropriate matter; cf. de 
virt. com. 5, 23. 
109 “Alii vero, et melius, accipiunt has quatuor virtutes secundum quod 
determinantur ad materias speciales” ST I-II 61.4. Here he is referring to 
Aristotle, NE ii.7, 1107a33ff or vi.13, 1144b36ff; cf. ST I-II 61.3 and ST I-II 65.1. 
Furthermore, Aquinas repeatedly differentiates fortitude, prudence and the other 
cardinal virtues, based on the Book of Wisdom (8:7) and St. Gregory the Great’s 
Moralia in Job (xxii.1; and ii.49); cf. ST I-II 61.4; ST I-II 63.3; ST I-II 65.1; ST II-
II 47.4 sc; de virt. com. 5, 23; and so on. He (ST I-II 61.4 sc) even employs 
Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xi) who describes the four cardinal virtues as “ex 
ipsius amoris vario affectu.” In ST I-II 65.1, Aquinas cites Augustine De Trin. 
VI.4, in this same vein. 
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reason, and fortitude to that of the irascible faculty.110 Nonetheless, in 
martyrdom they interact since their determinate matters depend on 
each other for perfect virtue. In particular, prudence as being in the 
cognitive power informs fortitude.111 Prudence overcomes the illusions 
that threaten courage. In order to bring a framework to courage, 
prudence must measure well the objective danger and the resources on 
hand.112 It quantifies the fragility and strength found in those around us 
and in ourselves. It calculates what we shall gain or lose in acting and 
not acting in a particular way.113 
Aquinas’ moral analysis of infused fortitude and martyrdom 
not only respects moral resilience, but also pushes it to its logical limit. 
A perfect moral expression of our intellectual powers of reason and 
will demand other criteria than the good of reason and a good will. We 
can absolutely trust neither our brave reactions nor isolated acts of 
fortitude. Only the prudent person can be brave on a consistent basis. 
Human fragility and vulnerability demand infused fortitude and 
prudence in order to adjudicate the fitting type of witness and acts that 
might lead to martyrdom. The question of martyrdom’s criteria leads 
Aquinas to turn to Chirst as the archetype for managing fear and death. 
                                                 
110 Aquinas, following Aristotle, identifies the subject of the virtue of 
prudence as the faculty of reason, and fortitude as the irascible faculty in the 
following places: ST I-II 61.2; ST I-II 66.1; ST I-II 85.3; De malo 4 ad4; de virt. 
gen. 12.25; In Meta. lect. 20.1064. 
111 Cf. de carit. 3.13; ST I-II 61.4; ST I-II 66.1; In Eth. Book 10, lect. 12.  
112 If one takes his courage to be all the strength needed (physical, 
psychological, communal) to overcome the adversary, one can be heartily wrong. 
The courageous stature of a person or a whole community might be necessary but 
not sufficient. We can render a desperate situation all the more disastrous, by the 
illusion that alone we shall save the world. As Secretan says (1993, 300-1): 
“Croire que le courage efface dangers et menaces est l’illusion du courage, et 
c’est contre cela que doit intervenir la prudence.” 
113 When discussing whether we should reckon military prudence a part of 
prudence, Aquinas says that “executio militiae pertinet ad fortitudinem: sed 
directio ad prudentiam, et praecipue secundum quod est in duce exercitus” ST II-
II 50.4 ad 3. Counter examples for these interrelations also suggest themselves. 
The vice of “impaviditas ex sua specie corrumpit medium fortitudinis,” but in 
respect of its causes it can oppose prudence or wisdom (ST II-II 126.2 ad 2). In 
like manner, our lack of love or lack of humility can cause the vice of 
fearlessness. 
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6.2.4. Fear in Christ as the Archetypal Model of 
Martyrdom 
A study of St. Thomas’ treatment of Christ’s agony, passion 
and death specifies the place of fear in Christ and in Christian 
martyrdom.114 Of more than passing interest, the experience of fear in 
Christ has ontological and moral, Christological and soteriological 
ramifications. How might a focus on the ontological and moral 
domains of fear in Christ illustrate better how He is an exemplar for 
Christians in handling fear and for martyrdom?115 How might these 
insights apply to Christian resilience? 
Although Aquinas’ analysis of fear in Christ relies extensively 
on his prior treatment of the passion of fear,116 Thomas’ basis for 
discussion is positive—the Gospel of Mark’s account of Christ’s 
suffering in the garden of Gethsemane, which testifies that: “Jesus 
began to fear and to be greatly troubled.”117 This quote is the only 
record of Christ’s fear in the Gospels. Its straightforward simplicity has 
nonetheless spawned opposing interpretations that Aquinas aims to 
integrate by adding a further nuance concerning Christ’s fear: in short, 
he affirms that Christ experienced fear, but not in a way that would 
deprive him of his rational use of his faculty of reason. This simple 
                                                 
114 In ST III 15.7, Thomas asks: Utrum in Christo fuerit timor? 
115 As important as the management of fear is for fortitude, it is curious to 
find that Aquinas does not directly discuss fear in his treatise on martyrdom (ST 
II-II 124). This absence does not mean that martyrdom does not face fear. Rather 
it is typical of Aquinas’ dialectical method and intent to minimize repetition. The 
context is clear. His treatment of martyrdom is situated in the larger context of the 
treatise of fortitude, which extensively addresses fear, and of the earlier treatise 
on the passion of fear (ST I-II 41-44). Aquinas treats fear and daring in ST II-II 
123 (on fortitude), ST II-II 125 (on fear), ST II-II 126 (on fearlessness), ST II-II 
127 (on daring), and extensively through other parts of the whole treatise on 
fortitude (ST II-II 123-140). 
116 His sources are Scriptural (Mark 14:33; Prov 28:1), Patristic (St. 
Hilary’s De Trin. X.10; Damascene De Fide Orthod. III.23; and Jerome, Com. in 
Matt IV.26 and 27) and philosophical (Aristotle Rhet. II.5). 
117 Aquinas (ST III 15.7 sc) cites the Vulgate (Mark 14:33): “Coepit Iesus 
taedere et pavere.” The RSV reads: Jesus “began to be greatly distressed and 
troubled.” P. Gondreau (2000, 396) laments a “regrettable omission” in Aquinas’ 
not making more explicit reference to this text in his argumentation. Gondreau 
rightfully remarks that further use of the only extant record of Christ’s fear 
amplifies the argument with more existential vigor. 
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nuance, which applies to moral resilience, needs further explanation in 
order to appropriate insights for fully Christian resilience. 
Jesus Christ in his human nature experienced fear as the body 
“naturally retreats” (naturaliter refugit) from a perceived future evil. 
Moreover, during the agony in the garden, Jesus experienced in effect 
two other types of fear. Fear proper moved him inasmuch as he still 
had a glimmer of hope that he might not have to suffer death. 
Furthermore, he experienced sorrow when realizing that it was 
inevitable.118 His fear was precipitated and exacerbated by the 
proximity of the evil (malum propinquum), being deserted by his 
friends (cf. Mk 14:37), and his foreknowledge of the physical torment 
that lay ahead.119 
According to Thomas however, Jesus did not experience fear 
due to ignorance concerning the source, timing or certainty of the 
death that he was facing. Jesus Christ did not confront his terror as one 
would a strange sound in the night. Aquinas is keen to deny that there 
was any ignorance in Christ,120 or any need for learning from 
experience. The claim of perfect knowledge, and perfection in general, 
demonstrates Aquinas’ tendency to attribute glorified and exalted 
status to Christ’s psychology, rather than an itinerant one with the 
developmental need of acquiring human knowledge through 
experience.121 Does Thomas’ perspective here diminish Christ’s 
humanity and capacity to serve as a model for resilience? 
                                                 
118 “Sic igitur timor potest considerari quantum ad duo. Uno modo, 
quantum ad hoc quod appetitus sensitivus naturaliter refugit corporis laesionem, 
et per tristitiam, si sit praesens; et per timorem, si sit futura” ST III 15.7; cf. Mk 
14:35. 
119 Cf. Lk 22:43-44. To illustrate Christ’s natural or spontaneous fear and 
aversion to death, Aquinas distinguishes between the voluntas ut natura (desiring 
by natural instinct, a “timor naturalis”) and voluntas ut ratio (desire as modified 
by reason, or “timor cogitationis”). In this regard, see P. Gondreau’s (2000, 293-
300; 397-8) excellent discussion on Aquinas’ use of Damascene in relation with 
Maximus Confessor, Peter Lombard, Hugh of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales and 
Bonaventure. 
120 Aquinas affirms that Christ had full knowledge even of future events 
(cf. ST III 15.7; where he cites Damascene De fide orth. III.23), because Christ 
was not subject to the fomes of sin (which include ignorance) and because of his 
human nature’s union with the Divine hypostasis (cf. ST III 15.3 corpus and ad 2, 
where he cites John 1:14). 
121 Such development is reflected in Heb 5:8: “Although he was Son, he 
learned obedience through what he suffered” (cf. Phil 2:7). Concerning the 
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Aquinas affirms that Christ experienced fear not just as a 
natural repulsion to death, but also within his choice to not evade his 
foreseeable death, to accept the “cup” that is offered, to do the Father’s 
will. In responding to the objection found in Proverbs (18:1), “the just, 
bold as a lion, shall be without dread,” Aquinas explains that Christ’s 
fear did not compromise his rational judgment. In this regard, Aquinas 
introduces St. Jerome’s distinction between a pure passion (perfecta 
passio) and a propassion.122 While a pure passion has the postlapsus 
tendency to derange reason, a propassion involves an emotional and a 
rational apprehension of the source of evil without the blurring of 
reason or the inhibiting of the will. Christ is able to will freely to 
follow the Father’s plan that He continue His mission, while fully 
realizing the fearfulness of the death to be imposed upon him by those 
who oppose him. He did so with an unmitigated imperium of reason 
and will. The realism of Christ’s psychosomatic experience of fear 
meets the criteria of Aquinas’ Christology and soteriology, which 
demands that Christ be fully human and fully divine.123 It also provides 
a basis for imitation in Christian resilience. 
Aquinas does not contradict himself when he transforms 
Greco-Roman notions of fortitude into Christian martyrdom. This 
transformation simply demonstrates how human wisdom is extended 
through a fuller wisdom, which is based on divine revelation, informed 
by a life of grace and expressed through faith, hope and charity. It also 
demonstrates a larger sense of resilience. On an initial reading of 
Aquinas’ account of fortitude, the evolution of the arguments might 
seem anything but theological. Fortitude, as the virtue that most 
properly deals with the fear of death in battle for the common good, 
seems restricted to the military arena. Nonetheless, the basic definition 
                                                                                                          
debate on Aquinas and the knowledge of Christ see the bibliography found in: J.-
P. Torrell 1994, 394-409 and 1999, 1:135-49; and P. Gondreau 2000, 385, 405-
414. 
122 Aquinas (ST III 15.7 ad 1) argues: “iustus dicitur esse absque terrore, 
secundum quod terror importat perfectam passionem, avertentem hominem a 
bono quod est rationis. Et sic timor non fuit in Christo: sed solum secundum 
propassionem. Et ideo dicitur quod coepit Iesus pavere et taedere [Mk 14:33], 
quasi secundum propassionem, ut Heironymus exponit [Com in Matt. IV.26:37].” 
123 This admission of Christ’s vulnerability to pain, suffering and fear, also 
avoids any doubt of docetism in Aquinas’ position. Cf. ST III 15.7 ad 2 and ad 3; 
P. Gondreau 2000, 399. 
Theological Transformation of Fortitude and Resilience 413 
of fortitude, when seen in the context of the whole treatise involving 
the ultimate fortitude needed for martyrdom, provides a wider basis to 
understand theological fortitude. Aquinas not only uses warfare in a 
wider sense to include the situation of private persons in everyday 
struggles, but also of the martyrs who “have been made valiant in 
battle.”124 
Christ thus serves as an example for martyrs, who meet similar 
ontological and moral situations of fear. Is he also thereby a model for 
resilience? Aquinas’ claim that Christ is the exemplar for all virtue125 
suggests that he is the model for resilience as well. But what type of 
resilience? Notwithstanding the martyrs in ancient Israel,126 martyrdom 
takes on a new meaning rooted in the experience of Jesus Christ. When 
we open the resilience concept to this faith perspective, we must root 
Christian resilience not only in Christ’s passion and death, but also in 
hope in his resurrection. The Christian martyr imitates Christ and 
participates in his salvific work.127 Jesus foretells that, like himself, his 
followers will be persecuted and put to death.128 This type of resilience 
involves that: we face fear and remain strong in our faith in God; we 
hope in the eventual fruitfulness of the evident loss; and we are drawn 
on by charity even for those who persecute us. 
6.3. The Gift of Fortitude and the Beatitude of the Just 
In martyrdom, the spiritual dimension of Christian fortitude 
and resilience reaches a peak, but is not exhausted. Aquinas surpasses 
his treatment of fortitude as a natural virtue or an infused virtue (in the 
                                                 
124 “Fortes facti in bello,” which Aquinas quotes in ST II-II 123.5 ad 1 and 
ST II-II 124.2. It is from Hebrews 11:34 , which was in Aquinas’ time the Epistle 
for the Mass of the martyrs SS. Fabian and Sebastian. 
125 According to L.-B. Gillon (1959), the theme of Imitatio Christi is 
neither very present nor explicit, although not absent in Aquinas’ works (cf. 
Congar 1974: 344). Aquinas’ approach in the Summa differs from other 
approaches, such as Thomas a Kempis’ Imitatio Christi and the spirituality of the 
devotio modera. Inasmuch as its style is more analytical, it demands a re-
synthesis in order to more fully draw out such a theme. 
126 For example, Eleazar, the seven brothers and their mother martyred 
under Antiochus (2 Mac 6-7). 
127 Cf. ST II-II 124.5 ad 1; Gal 5:24. 
128 Jesus announces in the Gospel of John (15:20): “‘A servant is not 
greater than his master.’ If they persecuted me, they will persecute you.” Cf. John 
12:24. 
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case of martyrdom) in his teaching on fortitude as a Gift of the Holy 
Spirit, in relation to the Beatitude of those who hunger and thirst for 
justice and in the precept of fortitude. Thomas is consistent here with 
his vision of the possibility for human participation in the divine life 
through knowledge and affection of the Word of Christ and through 
the Holy Spirit’s prompting, sanctification and strengthening.129 Such 
divine participation has practical implications in each believer and the 
Church. It begins with knowledge of God and His providential plan 
through the virtue of faith; it seeks the accomplishments of its 
promises through hope; and it culminates in the friendship with God 
and neighbor through charity. Nonetheless these theological virtues 
call upon the interrelated infused and moral ones, and the sevenfold 
Gift of the Holy Spirit. In different ways, all the virtues and Gifts are 
useful; not a one of them is redundant.130 However, the diversity of 
their origin and exercise raises a host of challenges for more restricted 
notions of resilience. 
6.3.1. The Gift of Fortitude 
Before treating the Gift of Fortitude, I shall treat the Gifts of 
the Holy Spirit in general. Afterward, we shall ask how resilience 
enhances Aquinas’ perspective and vice versa. The sevenfold Gift of 
the Holy Spirit is not a secondary element in Aquinas’ moral theology, 
nor is it unimportant for human and spiritual resilience. Nonetheless, it 
raises difficulties concerning its relationship to moral agency and to 
virtues in general. First, for Aquinas this sevenfold Gift concerns how 
the Holy Spirit moves our minds and hearts. Through these Gifts the 
Holy Spirit prompts the human person, who is disposed to be perfected 
in this way.131 Such a conception of the Gifts raises a difficulty for 
                                                 
129 It is difficult to overestimate the importance that Aquinas places on the 
Holy Spirit’s role in Christian life (cf. ST I-II 106.1; 108.1-2), as was previously 
discussed in terms of the New Law of grace. 
130 On Aquinas’ teaching concerning the acquired and infused virtues and 
the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, see: R. Cessario 2002; M. Sherwin 2001; J. Porter 
1992. 
131 Aquinas (ST II-II 139.1) argues “dona respiciunt motionem animae a 
Spiritu Sancto.” The Gifts of the Holy Spirit require a more perfect disposition 
than the virtues (cf. ST I-II 68.1-2). The provisional and imperfect state of the 
virtues (including the theological ones) helps to explain further the need for the 
Gifts of the Holy Spirit, not only in order to exercise the virtues and to be more 
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conceptions of voluntariness and responsibility, which permit no 
external influences. Aquinas’ larger sense of voluntariness however 
specifies that an external influence does not necessarily diminish 
human autonomy. This insight recalls Aquinas’ teaching on the dual 
principle of human movement: internal (reason and will) and external 
(God and human teachers),132 which I treated in chapter two. In 
particular, when the external source is reliable and contributes to the 
goals of true liberty (freedom for excellence), then it even assists and 
completes human agency in its moral quest for flourishing, truth and 
goodness. As contributing to human perfection, a prompting of the 
Holy Spirit leads human moral agency without diminishing it. 
Secondly, a Gift of the Holy Spirit does not oppose a human 
virtue, nor does a human virtue oppose a Gift, for Aquinas. A human 
virtue perfects a human capacity in doing something well, while a Gift 
refers to a cause of the action.133 Virtues are interior principles that lead 
people towards happiness. The Gifts bring greater perfection to the 
virtues. They add a further docility to the movements of the Spirit. It is 
thus that morality can become the life according to the Spirit. The 
domain of human virtue is that which is natural for us to do through 
reason. The domain of the Gifts is a spiritual sensibility, an instinct 
(instinctus) of the Holy Spirit in both the reason and will that adds 
further perfection through being more certain (since the act is informed 
by a “principle higher than human reason”), and more sure (since one 
is disposed to follow the inner promptings of divine instinct).134 
                                                                                                          
responsive to the motion of the Holy Spirit in general (cf. ST I-II 68.1-3), but in 
particular to give us a better mode of knowledge, and more well formed 
affections in the whole of life. According to J. Pieper (1966, 134-141), the Gift of 
the Holy Spirit constitutes a third degree of perfection in fortitude; the other two 
being political and purgatorial fortitude. 
132 Cf. ST I-II 9.4 and ST I-II 9.6. Here Aquinas follows a work attributed 
to Aristotle called the De bona fortuna. Concerning the many problems with this 
text see: Th. Deman 1928, 38-58; E. D. O’Connor 1974, 142-7. 
133 Cf. ST I-II 68.1; ST I-II 63.3.  
134 Aquinas innovates while drawing heavily from the tradition. His 
primary sources include: Isaiah (11:2-3), St. Gregory the Great, St. Augustine, as 
well as Aristotle. In an extraordinarily long corpus concerning the Gifts of the 
Holy Spirit (ST I-II 68), St. Thomas addresses diverse erroneous positions. He 
concludes by saying: “his qui moventur per instinctum divinum, non expedit 
consiliari secundum rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem 
instinctum: quia moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana. Et hoc est 
quod quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam sint 
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Aquinas’ original contribution to the theology of the Gifts is twofold. 
First, they are superhuman dispositions (habitus) of human agency, 
proportionate to our supernatural calling.135 Second, in the Prima 
Secundae, Aquinas explains this mode in terms of the prompting 
(instinctus) of the Holy Spirit.136 The Gifts are thus dispositions to be 
open to the Holy Spirit, as well as promptings of the Spirit; nonetheless 
they interrelate with the virtues (as habitus) in the search for goodness, 
truth and happiness. If one admits the moral dimension of the Gifts of 
the Holy Spirit (which some philosophers and psychologists find 
difficult), then one can welcome a further source of resilience. What 
does this insight mean in the case of fortitude? 
The Gift of fortitude addresses human suffering. It supports 
humans in managing to keep our eternal perspective and grounds us in 
God (first cause and last end), while facing suffering, either as a 
present evil or the toil needed to accomplish some good. We can 
examine this instinct, as a graced disposition to follow the lead of the 
Spirit, in two types of situation. First, it can elevate human fortitude, 
however this construction does not involve putting one block on top of 
another. Rather it entails an extension, a transformative completion, the 
coming to blossom of the image of God at the very core of our 
humanity when facing fearful situations. Second, it can even function 
without the naturally developed disposition or habitus needed for a 
mature moral virtue of fortitude. This idea can cause some 
psychologists or positive scientists to raise their eyebrows, and ask 
what could be the source of such an act. However, would they discredit 
                                                                                                          
actus virtutum” (ST I-II 68.1 corpus). Aquinas here claims to be in agreement 
with others (quidem), who include Philip the Chancellor, St. Albert the Great, St. 
Bonaventure. We cannot address here the many debates that Aquinas’ teaching 
has precipitated, for example concerning whether through scientific exegetic 
analysis Isaiah (11:2-3) alone could support the his doctrine on the Gifts of the 
Holy Spirit, which we cannot address here. Cf. S.-Th. Pinckaers 1995, 26, E. D. 
O’Connor 1974; M-M.. Labourdette 1957. 
135 Thomas introduces this position in his commentary on the Sentences 
and never abandoned it. 
136 Aquinas’ teaching has become the most common Catholic position on 
the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. Pope Leo XIII in Divinum illud munus (9 May 1897) 
cites his doctrine on the Gifts. Furthermore the CCC (1266, and 1830-1) follows 
this teaching closely, which does not distinguish the gifts for the spiritual elite, 
but as basis for the everyday moral agency of Christian life. Cf. E. D. O’Connor 
1974; G. Lafont 1998. 
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all outside influences and relationships that aid a person to act well? 
Through instruction, discipline and suggestion, instructors, family and 
friends can encourage particular acts as well as the development of 
dispositions. The Gift (as the influence of God’s relationship with us) 
goes beyond the present limits of our personal natural habitus, as does 
the impact of a friend who influences us to be courageous when we 
otherwise might well let fear control our activities. The Gift per se 
does not create a natural disposition, although it strengthens already 
existing ones. A good act facilitated by the Gift serves as a further 
basis to develop human fortitude and undo opposing cowardliness. 
How does Aquinas distinguish the Gift of fortitude from the 
virtue? The firmness of mind (quandam animi firmitatem) denoted by 
the virtue of fortitude, as either a general virtue or a special one (when 
concerning difficulties in facing death), involves a mode that is proper 
and connatural to human beings in accomplishing arduous efforts and 
in enduring grievous evil.137 Through the Gift of fortitude however the 
Holy Spirit prompts the human mind to persist in order to attain the 
sought for end and to avoid threatening perils.138 Such persistent 
strength is not always naturally possible, especially when faced with 
the fear of death. In particular the Holy Spirit strengthens the mind by 
infusing confidence (1) about God’s bringing us to everlasting life—
the end of all good deeds, (2) about God’s releasing us from all perils, 
and (3) by expelling any fear to the contrary.139 Even though God 
(through the Holy Spirit) is present in every moment of goodness, 
including all courageous acts, the Gift of fortitude comes as a 
completion, not a destruction of human nature and efforts. The Holy 
                                                 
137 Cf. ST II-II 139.1; ST II-II 123.2; ST I-II 61.3. 
138 The Gift of fortitude is given with and directed by the Gift of counsel in 
enduring evils and accomplishing any good work (cf. ST II-II 139.1 ad 3; Bowlin 
1996, 414). The truly courageous people act knowingly. The knowledge given 
through the Gifts of fortitude (and counsel) differ from fortitude untouched by 
grace, which does not have the same indications of our final end, of God’s 
wisdom and will for us (cf. ST I-II 68.2; ST I-II 68.4 ad 3). 
139 Aquinas explains: “Sed hoc operatur Spiritus Sanctus in homine, dum 
perducit eum ad vitam aeternam, quae est finis omnium bonorum operum et 
evasio omnium periculorum. Et huius rei infundit quandam fiduciam menti 
Spiritus Sanctus, contrarium timorem excludens” ST II-II 139.1. Although the 
virtue of fortitude perfects the mind in enduring perils, it does not give 
confidence that all dangers will be overcome, as is the case for the Gift of 
fortitude (cf. ST II-II 139.1 ad 1). 
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Spirit moves us further in the general strength of each virtue, as well as 
in specific acts of fortitude and the martyr’s witness.140 It thus promotes 
a spontaneous living of Christian resilience, the life of the Spirit. 
This spontaneity nonetheless does not exclude an intense 
struggle at the level of human habitus, because of vice, the lack of 
virtue and the effort needed in developing virtue. The work of the 
Spirit, through a person’s willing cooperation with the grace of God, 
can assure action that is fitting for salvation, even though everyone 
does not have the same natural ease, promptness and joy (moral 
maturity) in their use of intellect, will and emotion. The tricky issue of 
the co-existence of natural vice or under-developed virtue, with 
infused virtues and supernatural Gifts is critical for spiritual resilience. 
Aquinas’ moral theology gives some key insights into understanding 
how the theological resilience of infused virtues and the sevenfold Gift 
of the Holy Spirit can assure salvation, even in the face of overcoming 
the effects of a human vice, the lack of natural capacities or struggles 
in maturation. Acts of theological resilience at the same time 
strengthen pre-existing natural dispositions, which involve separate 
efforts to develop through the steps of debutante, progress, self-
mastery or maturity.141 
6.3.2. Fortitude and the Beatitude of the Just 
In addition to the sevenfold Gift of the Holy Spirit, Aquinas 
recognizes that the Beatitudes play an integral role in moral theology 
and in fortitude. He construes the Beatitudes as fruits or perfect acts of 
both the virtues and the Gifts, and as such they cap Christian 
resilience. In the accomplishment of the Beatitudes, we move (1) from 
what virtue inclines us toward according to the measure of reason, (2) 
to what the Gifts inspire according to the higher measure of the Holy 
Spirit. In this regard, Aquinas follows Augustine’s principal ordering 
of the virtues, the Gifts, and the Beatitudes,142 even though their 
                                                 
140 This couragesous strength includes and is grounded in the theological 
virtues of faith, hope and charity; cf. Ad Eph. Ch. 3 Lec. 4 p 140. 
141 Cf. ST I-II 51.4; ST I-II 63.3; ST I-II 63.4; III Sent. 33, q. 1, a. 2; and q. 
1a. 3. 
142 In his influential commentary on the Sermon on the Mount (De 
Sermone Domini in monte. PL 34), Augustine is the first to correlate the 
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approaches differ.143 Aquinas explores the nature of how the 
Beatitudes, Gifts and virtues interrelate, and draws upon a host of 
sources144 in a classic Patristic moral interpretation of the Beatitudes as 
tracing a series of virtues leading to the Kingdom: poverty and 
humility, docility (or meekness), justice, mercy, purity and peace. 
The spiritual progression among the Beatitudes leads to purity 
of heart, the will for peace and even the witness of martyrdom as their 
summit. Aquinas ties this movement to the search for flourishing; he 
views the Beatitudes as Christ’s response to the question of human 
flourishing. Although St. Thomas introduces many insights and 
nuances on flourishing throughout the first five questions of the Prima 
Secundae (as we discussed in chapter two), that so-called treatise on 
beatitude seems curiously incomplete. S.-Th. Pinckaers has argued that 
the treatise does not end there (ST I-II 1-5), but rather culminates with 
the question on the Beatitudes (ST I-II 69) as well as the questions 
concerning the New Law (ST I-II 106-8).145 This spiritual progression 
                                                                                                          
Beatitudes, the Gifts and the petitions of the Pater. In doing so, he reworks their 
division and order. This innovation is motivated by the Patristic Tradition’s 
affinity for finding seven a symbol of plenitude. Prior to Augustine, writers 
customarily recognized only six petitions in the Pater. Augustine identifies the 
petition on temptations as distinct from that on evil. Likewise, he finds seven 
Beatitudes in Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount (unlike St. Ambrose who finds an 
eightfold division in Matthew, and unlike the Gospel of Luke’s fivefold division). 
Cf. Pinckaers 1995, 145-6; 1998b, 46-8; O’Connor 1974, 90-2. 
143 This discipleship is not slavish, but rather an expression of Aquinas’ 
spirituality and morality. Augustine’s perspective relies extensively on his own 
experience, quest for flourishing and desire for God. Aquinas seeks these 
realities’ source and their interconnection in action; cf. ST II-II 121.2. 
144 Aquinas especially draws on the following sources in his treatment of 
the evangelical Beatitudes (in the ST I-II 69.1-4): the Gospels of Matthew and 
Luke; St. Augustine and St. Ambrose, Isaiah (ch. 11) and St. Paul; as well as the 
philosophical categories of Aristotle (cf. Pinckaers 1998b, 44-45). Pinckaers 
(1997a, 25-6) deems the Secunda pars a type of commentary on the Beatitudes 
and the Sermon on the Mount. 
145 Pinckaers (1998b, 42-3) argues that the treatise on flourishing (ST I-II 1-
5) is only completed with the question on the Beatitudes (ST I-II 69) for two 
reasons: (1) Thomas correlates the virtues, Gifts and Beatitudes, and (2) Aquinas 
does not consider the Beatitudes to be habitus, but rather perfect acts. A complete 
treatment of flourishing should even include Aquinas’ discussion of grace (ST I-II 
109-113). Furthermore, the concrete realization of post-lapserian human 
participation in beatitude needs to consider not only the most pertinent virtues 
(esp. charity, cf. ST II-II 23-46), but also Aquinas’ treatment of redemption and 
the sacraments in the Tertia Pars. 
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illustrates Christian resilience; it becomes evident in the way in which 
Aquinas treats how the Beatitudes correlate with the virtues and the 
Gifts. 
How does Aquinas relate fortitude (as acquired and infused 
virtues and as a Gift) to the Beatitude of the just: “Happy those that 
hunger and thirst for what is right: they shall be satisfied”?146 Although 
the ordering is Augustine’s, the approach is Aquinas’. Augustine, in 
his Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, explains that fortitude is 
becoming of those who hunger and thirst for justice, since it involves 
toil in order to enjoy true goods and to avoid being trapped in our love 
of material things. Aquinas confirms this interrelation while arguing 
that this match is fitting since fortitude is about difficult things (arduis) 
and this Beatitude is about very difficult things involved not only in 
works of justice (virtuous deeds), but in doing them with an insatiable 
desire designated by the Beatitude’s phrase, “hunger and thirst for 
justice/what is right.”147 Aquinas interprets “justice” as the universal 
justice involved in all virtuous deeds,148 and “desire” as including the 
charity at the root of each virtue and Gift.149 Furthermore, he signals 
that patience (in enduring evils) and longanimity (regarding long 
delays and accomplishing good actions) are the related fruits.150 
Thomas explains that the Beatitudes in general are not only acts, but 
                                                 
146 Matt 5:6 (JB). The RSV reads: “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst 
for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied.” Cf. ST II-II 139.2. 
147 When discussing whether the Beatitudes are suitably enumerated, 
Aquinas—following Augustine—also makes this match based on the motive 
(motiva) that it is principally fortitude of soul that moves one to hunger for the 
works of justice: “ad esuriendum autem iustitiae opera, praecipue movet animi 
fortitudo” (I-II 69.3 ad 3). Nonetheless, Aquinas draws other relationships 
between the Gifts, virtues and Beatitudes. For example, following St. Ambrose’s 
commentary on the St. Luke’s list of Beatitudes, he matches them according to 
the likeness of matter (conformitas materiae), which he divides according to 
human faculties. Thus, he assigns the Gift of fortitude to the Beatitude of the 
meek, explaining that: “mititas autem ad fortitudinem, dicit enim Ambrosius, 
super Lucam [6:22] quod fortitudinis est iram vincere, indignationem cohibere, 
est enim foritudo circa passiones irascibilis.” 
148 Aquinas (ST II-II 139.2 ad 1) follows St. John Chrysostom (Super 
Matth. Hom. 15.4: PL 57.227) and Aristotle (NE III, 1129b14-19). 
149 Cf. ST II-II 139.2 ad 2; ST II-II 23.8 ad 3; ST I-II 68.4 ad 3. 
150 Cf. ST II-II 139.2 ad 3. While the Beatitudes are the virtues and Gifts in 
act; they nonetheless relate to the fruits of the Spirit, which are the flourishing of 
the spiritual life possible on earth (cf. ST I-II 70.3). 
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also rewards,151 which fulfill the desires that underlie them on a higher 
plane. Thus, the Beatitude of those that hunger and thirst for justice 
involves already a certain fulfillment in terms of patient persisting in 
the face of difficult labor, persevering to the end, resisting invading 
evil and accomplishing the difficult good. Aquinas demonstrates an 
expression of fortitude (that I deem typical of Christian resilience), 
which finds deeper foundations and fuller expressions in the sevenfold 
Gift of the Holy Spirit and the Beatitudes. 
6.3.3. Precepts of Fortitude and its Development 
Given that law and precepts are principles external to moral 
action, it might seem extraordinary to address the place and resilience-
effect of the precepts concerning fortitude (and its annex virtues) after 
the related Gift and Beatitude. Nonetheless, the topic and this ordering 
are that of Aquinas, and for good reason. The New Law, as consisting 
chiefly in the grace of the Holy Spirit,152 has not only an external, but 
also an internal character. First, temporally it is an external principle of 
human agency that becomes internal inasmuch as through the infused 
virtues and Gifts of the Holy Spirit it yields a spiritual spontaneity. 
Spiritual spontaneity, expressed in the practice of virtues and Gifts, 
comes from the interior. It grows out of the natural inclinations, is 
further moved by the Holy Spirit (through created grace) and is 
confirmed by reason and will.153 Created in the image of God, human 
beings have this internal principle of motion, within which the Holy 
Spirit works without destroying human autonomy. In particular, the 
spontaneity of the New Law inscribed in our hearts serves the human 
development of virtue and attainment of happiness, through the 
inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who acts as master for the attentive 
                                                 
151 Cf. ST I-II 69.3. 
152 Cf. ST I-II 106 1-2; ST I-II 108.1. The grace of the Holy Spirit received 
by the Christian in the New Law works through the form of faith, hope and 
charity, with the tools of Scripture and the Sacraments. 
153 It comes both from the internal movement of the human person and the 
involvement and presence of the Holy Spirit. Here again Aquinas (ST I-II 106.1) 
follows Augustine who says: “Quae sunt leges Dei ab ipso Deo scriptae in 
cordibus, nisi ipsa praesentia Spiritus Sancti?” De Spiritu et Lettera, C. 21: PL 
44.222. 
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disciple.154 It serves acquired virtue inasmuch as we act freely and 
knowingly (even through understanding only after the fact that we 
have acted in accord with an inspiration). Such reflective and free acts 
are bases for further actions and for the development of habitus. 
Secondly, even though one can distinguish the precepts of the 
Old and New Law,155 they both lead to flourishing and serve growth in 
virtue, insofar as they assist the process whereby the prescribed good 
becomes second nature.156 Precepts are about acts of virtue, as Aquinas 
repeatedly says (ST II-II 124.1 ad 3). Thus he can say external that law 
is a first step in forming the debutante in the combat against sin and in 
reforming vices, as discussed in regard to education in fortitude. The 
precepts of the New Law, which are efficacious through the Gifts of 
the Holy Spirit and grace, aid in assuring good and prompt action. 
These good acts lead to growth in virtues and have friendship-love 
with God and with neighbor as their ultimate end. 
St. Thomas frames the different precepts of fortitude according 
to their source, for example according to human laws or to Divine 
Law. He draws chiefly from Scriptural sources in addressing the 
precepts of fortitude.157 As is the case for all precepts, Scriptural 
precepts direct people to the end established by the lawgiver. The end 
to which the Divine Law directs human beings is to adhere to God 
(through friendship-love with God and with neighbor). Thus, precepts 
of fortitude direct the mind and heart (anima) to God and neighbor. 
Aquinas cites Deuteronomy 20:3-4 to illustrate how a divine precept of 
fortitude works. Even in the midst of fearful situations, God’s word 
and presence can give one strength, confidence and ease when 
                                                 
154 Cf. Pinckaers 1995, 17ff and 400 ff., and Pinckaers 1999. 
155 According to Aquinas (ST I-II 108-109), the New Law is stronger than 
positive law or the old law: (1) for the New Law mobilizes a further action; (2) in 
the quality of participation, for the person desires and attempts to live more fully; 
(3) in a deeper response, since it is a response of the heart; (4) in constancy, since 
it is the Spirit’s constancy that is operative. 
156 Cf. ST I-II 99.2; ST I-II 107.1. Scripture frequently associates 
flourishing and law: e.g. Psalm 1: “Happy the man [...] who delights in the law of 
the Lord and meditates on his law day and night” (cf. Ps 35: 27-28; Jos 
1:8;Pinckaers 1989). 
157 Cf. ST II-II 140.1-2, in which Aquinas quotes the following Scriptural 
passages: Deut 20:3-4, Matt 11:12; 1 Peter 5:8-9; James 4:7; Matt 10:28. 
Furthermore, he draws from St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great. 
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realizing that God will fight the enemy. The archetypical NT precept is 
that of Christ: “Fear not; it is I.”158 These words are more than moral 
exhortation, when they are freely accepted in grace and thereby 
become morally efficacious.159 
The promises of both the Old and New Testament serve in 
understanding the motivation of fortitude. Aquinas follows Augustine 
(contra Faust. iv) in adjudicating that the OT involves temporal 
promises, while the NT entails spiritual ones. Likewise the battles are 
of different sorts. The OT teaches how to fight a bodily contest, while 
the NT instructs us how to fight spiritually in order to possess eternal 
life. 
We can ask whether focusing on the spiritual battle is less 
resilient than focusing on the bodily one: Is it not an anti-resilient 
tendency to focus exclusively on the spiritual? Does not everyone have 
to face challenges to human nature including physical ones? Aquinas 
recognizes the centrality and primacy of the spiritual aspect of doing 
battle and living aright.160 Nonetheless he confirms that we also have to 
prepare ourselves to confront the fear involved in bodily death.161 The 
general message of these precepts is threefold: to fear not (neither 
spiritual nor physical dangers), to resist evil (from the devil, others and 
self) and to hold firm in faith. Once again, Aquinas’ approach is an 
ordered one; the precepts lead from what is more manifest to what is 
less so. The intention of the law and the lawgiver aims at making 
humans virtuous. In this vane, the precepts of fortitude are less direct 
than the precepts of the Decalogue, while leading to rich, yet less 
obvious aspects of Christ’s teaching: (1) that even the dangers of 
bodily death are not to be excessively feared; and (2) that the highest 
                                                 
158 In the resurrection appearance, Jesus Christ says: “Do not be afraid” 
(Matt 28:10, RSV). To Peter who is starting to sink while walking on the water, 
he says: “Take heart, it is I; have no fear” (Matt 14:27, RSV).  
159 In Aquinas’ categories, the passage from moral exhortation to moral 
action involves both divine grace and a person’s intelligent will (necessary for 
freedom, but not sufficient for consistency and surety). Although God’s words 
are efficacious in the moral realm as a necessary condition, when they are taken 
to heart they become the basis for a voluntary human act.  
160 Thomas (ST II-II 140.1 ad 1) cites three Scriptural passages to bolster 
his case: Matt 11:12; 1 Peter 5:8-9; James 4:7.  
161 In this regard, he cites: Matt 10:28; cf. ST II-II 140.1 ad 1. 
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form of virtue is the friendship-love that lays down one’s life for one’s 
friend.162 
Aquinas faces a problematic distinction attributed to sacred 
Scripture in regard to the virtues associated with fortitude, some of 
which are promoted by precepts and others by counsels.163 First, there 
are precepts for the virtues of patience and perseverance. Precepts are 
fitting in regard to what is more difficult, for it is easier to know what 
to do in general concerning lesser hardships and toils.164 Second, there 
are counsels for magnanimity and magnificence, since they belong to 
the genus of fortitude only because of the greatness in their respective 
matters.165 Furthermore, Aquinas distinguishes between affirmative and 
negative precepts. The precepts of patience and perseverance are 
affirmative, while those of fortitude are (primarily) negative.166 
Aquinas clarifies that “although affirmative precepts are always 
binding, they are not binding for always, but according to place and 
time.”167 As in the case of the precept for martyrdom, this type of 
affirmative precept involves a preparedness of mind (praeparationem 
animi) to act when it is appropriate.168 Negative ones can be more 
concrete, while the affirmative ones must remain more general. 
Aquinas fittingly finishes his reflection on the precepts of 
fortitude and the whole treatise on fortitude by affirming that because 
of the greatness of danger associated with fortitude, we must proceed 
with caution without fixing particular determinate responses ahead of 
                                                 
162 Cf. ST II-II 140.1 ad 3; ST II-II 122.1 ad 1; John 15:13.  
163 Cf. ST II-II 140.2 sc. 
164 Cf. ST II-II 140.2 ad 2 and ad 3. 
165 “Ea autem quae pertinent ad excellentiam magis cadunt sub consiliis 
perfectionis quam sub praeceptis necessitatis” ST II-II 140.2 ad 1.  
166 Cf. ST II-II 140.1 ad 2. 
167 “Praecepta affirmativa, etsi semper obligent, non tamen obligant ad 
semper, sed pro loco et tempore” ST II-II 140.2 ad 2. 
168 “Et ideo sicut praecepta affirmativa quae de patientia dantur, sunt 
accipienda secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet homo sit paratus ea 
adimplere cum opus fuerit” ST II-II 140.2 ad 2. Aquinas interprets the martyrdom 
precepts in the NT, which literally applies in certain cases, to pertain in general to 
a preparation of the mind and heart for martyrdom. Aquinas cites Rom 10.10 and 
1 John 3:16 as examples of precepts concerning martyrdom in ST II-II 124.3 ad 
1; cf. 124.1 ad 3; I-II 108.1 ad 4. Aquinas cites Rom 10.10, and 1 John 3:16 as 
examples of precepts concerning martyrdom in ST II-II 124.3 ad 1; cf. 124.1 ad 3. 
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time about what we should do.169 In order to aid us to acquire stable 
virtuous dispositions and perform good acts, he intends that these 
precepts should not infringe upon the creativity and spontaneity of the 
virtues at the practical level. This insight verifies the flexibility 
promoted in his conception of resilient fortitude. 
                                                 
169 Aquinas says: “quod fortitudo […] est circa maxima pericula: in quibus 
cautius est agendum, nec oportet aliquid determinari in particulari quid sit 
faciendum” ST II-II 140.2 ad 3. However, in the less extreme cases involving 
minor hardships and toils, it is easier to know in general (and through the help of 
positive precepts) what to do in order to act with patience and perseverance; cf. 
Congar 1974, 339. 

 Chapter Seven. 
A Theological Dimension of Resilient Initiative-taking? 
Our theological reflections on human initiatives and divine 
purpose lead us to wonder about the variety of goals that humans 
pursue and the strength we need to accomplish them. How do everyday 
(natural) hopes and fundamental (theological) hope interact in human 
initiatives? Does hope for honor and excellence conflict with or 
underlie spiritual resilience? As in the case of fortitude, Aquinas 
establishes a specifically Christian apex for initiative-taking virtues. It 
involves a type of excellence that is akin to sanctification and humble 
magnanimity. 
I did not fully explain this theological dimension of initiative 
while treating the theological transformation of fortitude and 
resilience. In this section, I shall examine the virtues and emotions of 
initiative and constructive resilience. I explore their potential 
theological extension. First, I address issues related to infused 
greatness and initiative, as specified in constructive projects and 
generosity, and in great intentions and plans. Then I concentrate on the 
theological honor and excellence needed to plan, motivate and 
complete projects that have their source and finality in God. 
7.1. Infused Greatness and Initiative: Theological 
Dimensions of Magnificentia and Magnanimitas 
In addressing St. Thomas’ treatment of theological initiative, 
we shall examine human and divine projects in terms of virtues and 
resilience. First, I shall explore infused magnificence and generosity. 
How does Aquinas’ understanding of these virtues correlate with 
resilience insights? Second, how does his conception of theological 
magnanimity and theologal hope display resilience insights particular 
to the Judeo-Christian tradition? Finally, I shall investigate his input on 
the spiritual vulnerability that causes and results from failed initiatives. 
This juncture of the study raises several problems of 
vocabulary and definition. On the one hand, we have borrowed some 
the terms from non-Christian cultures. However, Aristotle or Cicero’s 
vision of the virtuous human can seem so tightly bound with Greek 
and Roman culture that we find it difficult to imagine it pertaining to 
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the humble Christ, and large segments of the Christian tradition, in 
particular the monastic perspective of fleeing the snares of the world 
(fuga mundi). On the other hand, we have the problem of applying 
resilience to a theological domain. In particular, the psychosocial 
sciences’ use the concepts of hope, hopelessness, optimism and 
pessimism with great fluidity. Their meanings can imply more or less 
strictly philosophical or psychological foundations, and are neither 
always inclusive nor exclusive of religious senses. For example, 
resilience research employs hope and optimism (as well as confidence 
or trust) as a resilience capacity with differing import. Furthermore, 
resilience research does not necessarily attain the deepest levels of 
spiritual causality. We must make any appropriations in this 
theological study with due respect for the research; we must identify 
the insights and their promise promise, then apply them with due care. 
7.1.1. Humility and Greatness in Human Agency 
Many writers have queried about the Christian character of 
magnanimity and magnificence. Aquinas’ treatment of these virtues 
has seemed difficult to stomach for some people, especially when read 
with his indebtedness to Aristotle in mind. It can invoke a sense of 
“greatness of spirit” and “grandeur of project” with which few 
contemporary people feel at ease. At first glance, these virtues might 
evoke the prejudices of an epoch which is neither Christian nor post-
modern, let alone that of a 21st century entrepreneur or refugee child. 
Such notions of aristocratic greatness seem more akin to the imagined 
greatness of a Greek hero, a Roman senator or a Renaissance architect. 
We can even imagine it being personified in a Nietzschean 
übermensche,1 or an English gentleman of yesteryear. 
These misgivings denote the lines of debate on magnanimity 
and humility in Christian agency. With these suspicions on the table, I 
should recall that before Aquinas and his master St. Albert the Great,2 
                                                 
1 Nietzsche seems alarmed at the way in which greatness had disappeared 
in the 19th century, when he says that “people [...] are becoming smaller and 
smaller” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra 1954, 169; cited in Curzer 1991, 150; cf. 
Congar 1974, 339-40). 
2 Albert integrated the Aristotelian notion of magnanimity into Christian 
theology. Nonetheless, Albert’s solution is different from that of Aristotle and 
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there was a propensity among theologians to make a mystical 
transposition whereby they identified magnanimity either with 
theological hope or humility.3 This position results in identifying the 
magnanimity of the philosophers with Christian humility and the 
magnanimity of the politicians with Christian hope. However, both 
cases empty the Christian ideal of human greatness, at least according 
to R.-A. Gauthier.4 Aquinas avoids such pitfalls, according to Y.-M. 
Congar, when trying to give full recognition to human nature and 
collaboration, without depreciating divine initiative and efficacious 
grace.5 By so doing, Aquinas emphasizes the grandeur of human hope 
and enterprise in efforts at innovation. He admires those who realize 
projects that fully employ human energies and capacities.6 
But does St. Thomas succeed in capturing the spirit of the 
Christian tradition or does he lead it astray? Gauthier has said that 
Aquinas’ doctrine on magnanimitas reconciles the “diviniste” 
spirituality of the Fathers with a humanist spirituality; that it produces 
a spirituality, which is typically for the lay person who is engaged in 
the world, searching God mediately through human beings and 
creation.7 Congar for his part suggests that magnanimity has the first 
place of the virtues and commands all the others on the level of 
personal life, as social justice does for community life,8 without 
                                                                                                          
Aquinas (at least as he formulated it in his Summa de bono, written between 
1244-8; Albert changed his position during a course on the NE between 1268-
70). Inthis early position, Albert affirms with Aristotle that magnanimity is a 
virtue, distinct from fortitudo, and concerns having a soul big enough to 
undertake the conquest of a great object, like honor. Albert however reverses 
Aristotle’s ordering of virtues concerning honor, by according great honors to 
Aristotle’s unnamed virtue (Albert’s mavortia, which concerns great honors due 
to those in charge of public affairs), and according little honors to magnanimity. 
Thus we have a complete contradiction, which eliminates the idea of greatness 
from magnanimity (cf. Gauthier 1951, 307-9, and 492). 
3 St. Bernard and St. Bonaventure for example supported a certain mystical 
transposition of magnanimity, as theologians suspicious of Abelardian and 
Aristotelian humanism (cf. Gauthier 1951, 282-29, 317-8). 
4 Cf. Gauthier 1951, 295. 
5 Cf. Congar 1974, 340. 
6 Congar (1974, 340) says: “En fait, la magnanimité englobe une grandeur 
de l’espoir humain, un esprit d’entreprise qui ne craint pas d’innover ni de 
risquer, une réalisation par l’homme des énergies qu’il sent en lui.” 
7 Cf. Gauthier 1951, 496. 
8 Cf. Congar 1974, 341. 
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deprecating the primacy of theological love and Christian humility. 
Such suggestions do not offer final conclusions, but rather directions 
for further debate on the relationship of Aquinas’ notion of 
magnanimity and initiative with humility and resilience research.9 
We shall start with two questions: what is the range of 
magnanimity for Aquinas? Does it have the same scope as Aristotle’s 
great-souled man? We find that Aquinas widens his notion not only in 
social, but also theological directions. For Aquinas, magnanimitas 
involves giving one’s whole attention (tota ejus intentio) to the good of 
others and God.10 This socio-theological vision is a long stride from the 
purported self-absorption charged to Aristotle’s version; it also 
demonstrates that in important regards, Aquinas’ notion of greatness 
has less to do with Aristotle’s than is commonly thought. At the very 
center of his virtue of great deeds and virtue theory in general, Aquinas 
intends an attentional style that is akin to the incentive rather than 
anxiety type, as mentioned earlier in the psychosocial research.11 
Indeed for Aquinas, the focusing of one’s whole attention on common 
and divine goods is not a source of anxiety, but rather the result of a 
liberating movement that draws forth excellence. To maintain that this 
insight involves an incentive attentional style suggests another 
potential characteristic of spiritual resilience: that social and divine 
goals serve as incentives to focus and accomplish our tasks. 
Magnanimity mobilizes our resources, calms the fear of failure 
and converts us in natural hope. Regarding the theological virtue of 
hope on the contrary, magnanimity is a result of being converted in 
                                                 
9 Indeed, in addition to employing Cicero and Aristotle, Aquinas proposes a 
synthesis of sources whose diversity of insight on magnanimitas makes it even 
more difficult to identify a contemporary name for this virtue (or group of 
virtues). Diverse notions of greatness, for example, modify the import of 
magnanimous acts. Thus for Cicero, it is a greatness in self-confidence and being 
worthy of honor by acting for the public good; for the fathers of the Church, its 
source and end is divine greatness; for St. Albert, it entails the great scope of 
theological hope, for St. Bonaventure, it involves a greatness in being humble; for 
the voluntarist, it is a greatness in doing the will of God; for Descartes, a 
greatness in generosity; for Nietzsche, a greatness in striving for excellence above 
and beyond the crowd, even above and beyond morality. Cf. M. Dixault 1996, 
596. 
10 Aquinas’ In Eth. 4, 10, 779. 
11 Cf. Wilson and Gottman 1996, 194-5. 
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hope, as we shall discuss shortly.12 Christian daring and confidence 
harness a restrained aggressiveness, a specifically Christian reasoned 
standard of action. Aquinas not only specifies that magnanimity 
involves the correct judgment of reason, due deliberation and foresight 
in general,13 he follows the exacting requirements of the Christian 
tradition that demands one to overcome aggressive behavior toward 
strangers and to love hostile enemies. This teaching seems repugnant 
to the human evolutionary tendency to protect oneself and one’s gene 
pool. But can a theological perspective justify it through a larger sense 
of struggle and survival? 
Christian teachings on pardon, non-aggressiveness and love of 
enemies have made Christians appear soft in the eyes of certain 
critiques. A case in point is Freud, whose critique of Christianity’s 
stance on aggression rings loud. He takes aim at a Christian 
preoccupation with self-sacrifice in the form of love for neighbors, 
strangers and enemies. His criticisms attack what he believes is the 
Christian underestimation of aggressive human nature. Unconstrained 
by natural affections, humans tend to be hostile to strangers, according 
to Freud. The Christian is overly exposed to the aggression of others. 
Without using the term “resilience,” he basically judges Christianity to 
be unresilient to human hostility and aggression.14 How does Aquinas’ 
approach stand up to Freud’s critique? 
Aquinas’ teaching on the virtues of magnanimity, hope, 
courage and martyrdom bring a response to this critique and a 
corrective to this view of Christian passivity. The Christian is called to 
lay down one’s life for one’s friend, because it is in doing so that we 
not only can defend the weak and promote social justice (rather than 
simple self-interest), but also participate in Christ’s salvific work of 
building up the Kingdom of God. Aquinas promotes a profound notion 
of human social nature. He does not deny the inclination for self-
protection, but recognizes that it interacts in the larger context of other 
                                                 
12 According to J. L. Bruguès (1984, 47-58), the theological virtue of hope 
supports the virtues of courage and magnanimity, if they exist; otherwise it incites 
them to develop. 
13 On daring and attack arising from hope, see: ST I-II 45.2; ST II-II 123.3 
ad 3; and NE 1116b 23. On the precepts relating to hope and fear see: ST II-II 22. 
14 Cf. S. Freud 1961, 57; D. Browning 1999, 134. 
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inclinations toward family-life, society and Church, as well as seeking 
truth, goodness and flourishing. Are not these tendencies even more 
powerful in the long run? A further rebuttal of Freud’s claim that 
Christians are under-protected from natural hostility is Aquinas’ 
position on just wrath.15 Rather than being absolute, the counsel to turn 
the other cheek to insult has its limits. Action, empowered by a just 
wrath, must correct certain types of wrong, as we shall discuss more 
shortly. 
Humility is endemic to Aquinas’ approach to Christian 
greatness and initiative. Insofar as human beings are neither their own 
creator nor completely self-sufficient, they need the assistance of 
others (human and divine) and must put trust in them. The resources 
for this confident hope that we can triumph involve: (1) recognizing 
the real dimension of our own strengths and resources, (2) observing 
friends’ capacity to aid us and other sources of help, and (3) believing 
in promises of divine assistance.16 This third area, divine help, is the 
heart of Aquinas’ teaching on humility, even though it applies to the 
other two areas as well. Indeed even when we have self-confidence, 
Aquinas reminds us that “a person hopes in himself, yet under God 
withal,”17 and that our natural hope is also a “confidence in God.”18 
Consequently, a person must have confidence not only in himself, in 
other human beings and in society, but above all in the assistance and 
promises of God.19 It is fitting to recall the importance of the 
interaction of the virtues and the Gift that render us docile to the 
guidance of the Holy Spirit. Confidence derives its strength of hope 
from these sources, in which one must believe while lacking personal 
control of them. This point demonstrates the non-Pelagian nature of his 
position, and invites a further examination of the related virtues. 
                                                 
15 On anger and Christian action, see ST II-II 123.10; ST I-II 46.5; ST II-II 
136.2 ad 1; ST II-II 157 (meekness and anger); ST II-II 158 (the vice of anger). 
16 Cf. ST I-II 45.3; ST II-II 129.6 ad 1. 
17 “Spes qua quis de Deo confidit, ponitur virtus theoligica, ut supra [ST II-
II 17.5; and ST I-II 62.3] habitum est. Sed per fiduciam quae nunc ponitur 
fortitudinis pars, homo habet spem in seipso, tamen sub Deo” ST II-II 128.1 ad 2. 
18 De virt. com. 1, 12. 
19 ST II-II 129.6 ad 1. Such confidence applies not only to the infused moral 
level and the promises involved in the theological virtue of hope, but also on the 
natural level. 
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7.1.2. The Theological Measure of Magnificentia and 
Generosity 
Anthropological studies, as reported in the previous chapter, 
suggest that conspicuous consumption and altruistic giving can 
promote the survival advantage of an individual and his gene pool. I 
have argued that Aquinas’ views on generosity and magnificence offer 
a larger moral and metaphysical framework to adjudicate efforts at 
self-giving and wealth sharing. Now I shall situate these comments in 
his theological view on magnificence and generosity. In so doing, I 
shall test and appropriate resilience insights. 
Aquinas’ treatment of magnificentia avoids the risk of a 
narrow anthropocentric self-sufficiency, by considering human virtue 
as a participation in divine power and purpose.20 He construes the 
fullness of magnificence according to its theological and social 
content. The magnificent person is not egocentric, but rather 
recognizes that “one’s person is little in comparison with that which 
regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large.”21 
Once again, humility marks Thomas’ notion of greatness and society. 
Human works are ordered to an end, the greatest of which is 
the honor of God. Wherefore we enact magnificence’s greatest work 
with reference to divine honor and glory. Aquinas denotes a unity to 
great works that are intended not only to glorify God, but also to 
sanctify human beings.22 He recognizes that we must measure the 
                                                 
20 He says: “virtus humana est participatio quaedam virtutis divinae” ST II-
II 134.1 sc; where he quotes Ps. 67:35 [68:34] and thus marks the theological 
dimension of a discussion that we might otherwise take as merely philosophical. 
21 “Quod autem pertinet ad personam uniuscuiusque, est aliquid parvum in 
comparatione ad id quod convenit rebus divinis vel rebus communibus”ST II-II 
134.1 ad 3. 
22 Aquinas takes his queues on the relationship between magnificence, 
glory and sanctification from Scripture. From St. Jerome’s Vulgate, he quotes the 
Book of Exodus (15:11), “Magnificus in sanctitate,” as well as the Psalm (95:6), 
“Sanctitas et magnificentia in sanctificatione eius” (Cf. ST II-II 134.2 obj. 3). 
Thomas’ insight stands, even though contemporary Scripture scholarship offers 
us translations without the term “magnificentia.” The RSV reads: “Who is like 
thee, O Lord, among the gods? Who is like thee, majestic in holiness, terrible in 
glorious deeds, doing wonders?” (Ex 15:11; RSV) and “Honor and majesty are 
before him” (Psalm 95 [96]:6). He even employs Aristotle, who likewise 
considers the chief object of magnificence to concern God, namely expenditure 
for divine sacrifices; cf. NE ii.5, 1122b19-23; 33-35, which he cites in ST II-II 
134.1 ad 3. 
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greatness of human action in the world in regard to its effects on 
human holiness and religion.23 Aquinas aligns his notion of 
magnificence to the measure of holiness whose chief effect is directed 
to religion, the worship of God and the sanctification of the human 
community for God’s glory.24 
These theological considerations about religious practice raise 
a question about the self-esteem and human agency mentioned earlier 
in regard to resilience. How might religion and spirituality enhance or 
degrade both self-esteem and self-efficacy? Resilience studies suggest 
that enhancement of self-esteem and social competence comes from an 
internalized religion, whose role in self-valuation and agency involves 
providing meaning, purpose, identity, self-realization and motivation. 
When faced with denigration or great efforts, religion can thus affirm 
us in our (faith-established) origin and purpose, as well as by offering 
resources to overcome difficulty in both internal and external forums.25 
Negative experiences of religion, on the contrary, can have adverse 
emotional and anti-social effects, and an extreme emphasis on human 
decrepitude can negatively impact self-esteem and efficacy.26 
Aquinas teaching on the centrality of the virtue of religion and 
its place in magnificence affirms the basis for an internal type of 
religious practice. According to resilience research, such an internal 
type of religion correlates with increased self-esteem and self-efficacy. 
We cannot take these qualities as synonymous with sanctification. Yet 
they might involve a significant resilience effect of the meaning and 
purpose that an active religious relationship with God and neighbor 
confirms. 
Aquinas’ view of magnificence though is not simply a question 
of religious worship and its internal resilience effects on its 
practitioners. It concerns a social agenda tied to the betterment of our 
neighbor’s situation. In this regard, although Aquinas takes many cues 
                                                 
23 Aquinas develops this connection between holiness and the virtue 
religion in ST II-II 81.8. 
24 “Et ideo magnificentia coniungitur sanctitati: quia praecipue eius 
effectus ad religionem, sive ad sanctitatem, ordinatur” ST II-II 134.2 ad 3. 
25 Cf. Lösel 1994, 8-12; Meyer and Lausell 1996, 129; Chamberlain and 
Zika 1992, 139; Pargament et al. 1990, 793, and 814-6; Thomas and Carver 
1990, 195ff. 
26 Cf. Meyer and Lausell 1996, 129. 
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from Cicero, the range of the virtues of magnificence and generosity 
(liberalitas) is vastly different for the Roman philosopher. Cicero does 
consider that human nature has a universal scope. Nonetheless, his 
conception of the commonweal involves a different hierarchical 
ordering of responsibilities and reciprocities: family, city-state and 
then universe, foreigners falling in this latter category.27 Moral 
obligation first demands to render practical services to our country and 
then to our parents.28 Private property29 is not owed to others, according 
to Cicero, for “the resources of individuals are limited and the number 
of needy is infinite, this spirit of universal liberality must be regulated 
[...] in order that we may continue to have the means for being 
generous to our friends.”30 For Cicero, generosity (liberalitas) as an 
aspect of justice is very tightly bound by the limits of his political 
program. 
Aquinas’ Christian conception of neighbor, generosity and 
magnificence prophetically calls us to reconsider the relationship that 
we have with our own resources and our relationships with others. This 
reconsideration includes a special respect and love not only for the 
least among us, but also for our enemies.31 Aquinas construes an ordo 
                                                 
27 In the optic of extending justice to the foreigner, that is, of Stoic caritas, 
Cicero explains that the foreigner is owed a very limited fare: water, fire, and 
honest counsel—whatever is common property. 
28 Moral social obligations are ordered between common citizenship, 
kinship, friendship, love of country (cf. Off. I.53-59), which is only surpassed by 
the “first duty to the immortal gods” (which is mentioned in a second list, cf. Off. 
I.160); cf. McNamee 1960, 45-6; Griffin 1991, xxiii. 
29 Here we see Cicero’s social conservatism. He even identifies one of 
justice’s two principal functions as promoting the proper use of private and 
common property (the other being to prevent iniuria, or unprovoked aggression; 
cf Off. I.20; Long 1995, 240).  
30 Off. I.52. Even though being far from the Christian vision of charity, this 
stoic vision is employed by St. Augustine and other Christian thinkers to illustrate 
that the eternal law is known to all. That is, to illustrate Romans 2:14-15: “When 
Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law 
to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that what the 
law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness 
and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them.” For a further 
discussion see MacIntyre 1988, 152-3. 
31 As mentioned before, Aquinas’ great acts, which are “beneficent, 
generous and grateful,” look like loving one’s neighbor (ST II-II 129.4 ad 2; cf. 
Aristotle Rhet. 1366b17; Horner 1998, 433 and fn. 106). 
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caritatis, an ordering of love.32 Nevertheless, this ordo calls for a sense 
of responsibility that involves that we cannot rest while others are still 
in need. Indeed, our lives flourish when we give glory to God, sanctify 
ourselves, while generously doing good to our neighbors who are in 
need. In generosity and magnificence, we intellectually adjudicate 
(prudence) that so much is inadequate (stinginess), more is appropriate 
(generosity), and beyond is extravagant (largesse). However, for 
Aquinas greatness goes hand in hand with humility, which invites us to 
learn from Christ’s magnificence and generosity, while being meek 
and humble in action. 
In sum, we cannot separate Aquinas’ fundamental definitions 
of magnificence and generosity from their larger context, which 
indicates a moral and spiritual type of survival that is akin to spiritual 
resilience. In this case, one must construe the use of money and 
possessions in relation to the other virtues that direct them to the 
Divine good (God’s glory), the good of others (the common good and 
justice) and to one’s own excellence (sanctification and justice). In 
particular, the virtues of religion, justice, fortitude, temperance and 
prudence necessarily support works of magnificence and generosity, 
and weigh them in a different measure than pure physical survival.33 
Ultimately, Aquinas identifies a spiritual basis for these virtues, which 
yield a spiritual wealth, survival and resilience.34 
7.1.3. Infused Magnanimity 
How can Aquinas’ teaching on the infused virtue of 
magnanimity benefit from resilience insights? Does a notion of infused 
magnanimity utterly muddle up Greek philosophical and Christian 
theological images of greatness and divine assistance? First, we need 
to ask whether Aquinas’ doctrine of magnanimity has a theological 
dimension. Numerous authors have disputed whether Aquinas’ moral 
theory is theology, philosophy or both. In passing, I have already 
distinguished between the virtue of magnanimity’s focus on the 
passions of hope and despair, and the theological virtue of hope. This 
                                                 
32 Cf. S. J. Pope 1994. 
33 Cf. ST II-II 117.6. 
34 Cf. ST II-II 117.1 ad 1; Luke Ch.12. 
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distinction does not however necessarily negate the possibility of two 
types of magnanimity, one philosophical and another theological. In 
establishing the latter in the writings of Aquinas, I intend to illustrate 
another aspect of spiritual resilience in initiative-taking, the way in 
which the theological builds up the philosophical through unexpected 
turns. Aquinas conception of magnanimity would thus differ from 
Aristotle’s in other significant ways. We have already seen how 
Thomas extends the Philosopher’s notion of greatness by affirming in 
his Commentary on the NE that the magnanimous person’s “entire 
attention is concerned with the goods of the community and God.”35 
But Aquinas’ position goes further. 
Inasmuch as magnanimity concerns managing hope, despair 
and daring in life’s foremost projects, we employ this virtue to seek 
human flourishing, which for Aquinas ultimately aims at a theological 
reality. As an acquired virtue, magnanimity develops as we train our 
passions of hope and daring that we experience in relation to important 
goals. Acquired magnanimity achieves that which is great in every 
virtue; it moves towards a harmonious development that is not only 
physical and psychological, but also spiritual. Although morality 
involves living according to right reason, Christians seek more than the 
natural moral virtues. Indeed, right reason informed by faith involves a 
further participating in divine reason and Providence. 
Infused magnanimity involves reason informed by faith36 and 
grace infused by God.37 In establishing the shape and texture of 
magnanimity, the theological virtues aid us to identify another rational 
mean that appropriate our theological end. Through the grace received 
at baptism, the Christian possesses the infused virtue of magnanimity, 
by an infused proximate disposition. Thereby we are disposed to 
                                                 
35 “Sed tota ejus intentio est circa bona communia et divina” In Eth. 4, 10, 
779. 
36 He calls it “secundum regulam rationis divinitus informatae” (De malo, 
8, 2). 
37 In addition to different sources, acquired and infused magnanimity differ 
according to their object’s formal aspect. They involve different species, because 
they rationally relate to their object in specifically different ways (one is the mode 
of human reason, the other reason informed by faith). Aquinas explains this 
distinction through the example of temperance in ST I-II 63.4 in the article 
entitled: “Utrum virtus quam acquirimus ex operum assuentudine, sit eiusdem 
speciei cum virtute infusa?” 
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practice the act of magnanimity, “if it were competent to him 
according to his state.”38 If we have a great opportunity, grace can 
dispose us to great acts that even exceed our past experiences. 
Nonetheless, infused magnanimity invites spiritual training. 
In addition to being concerned for physical development, the 
Christian knows through grace that the body requires the special 
training of spiritual discipline (penance and mortification).39 This need 
for development applies to all domains. All our faculties have been 
wounded by sin and need to be healed from the tendency to evil. The 
Christian magnanimous person does not simply strive for fulfillment of 
his personality within the limits of his postlapsus condition, but rather 
he seeks the graced-filled restoration of his wounded personality, and 
more. He discerns true greatness, which for the Christian is found in 
following Christ.40 The infused virtues make for a greatness that God 
can work in us. This greatness can even be in disproportion to our 
strength.41 With the infused virtue of magnanimity, we measure our 
own capacities (strengths), and having found them to be adequate, in 
the context of grace, undertake great and difficult theological works; 
such is the case with the acquired virtue on the natural level. They both 
suppose the strengths that the subject possesses in our human, 
connatural way. 
The theological form of magnanimity, however, according to 
Aquinas, “makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in 
consideration of the Gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is 
endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect 
works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, 
                                                 
38 Aquinas says: “Sed secundum principia virtutum, quae sunt prudentia et 
gratia, omnes virtutes sunt connexae secundum habitus simul in anima existentes, 
vel in actu vel in propinqua dispositione. Et sic potest aliquis cui non competit 
actus magnanimitatis, habere magnanimitatis habitum: per quem scilicet 
disponitur ad talem actum exequendum si sibi secundum statum suum 
competeret.” ST II-II 129.3 ad 2. 
39 Thus the body becomes ever more an instrument of reconciliation and 
grace, instead of an instrument of sin. This progress involves being conformed 
into the image of the body of the Crucified-One. This new ideal is concerned with 
growth and calls for the training involved in penance and reconciliation. 
40 Cf. Gauthier 1951, 348-9. 
41 Infused virtues and the Gifts can outstrip the individual’s strength; thus 
Thomas says that the Gift of Fortitude is not limited by the natural conditions of 
the subject (cf. In III S., 34, 1, 2; Gauthier 1951, 354).  
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such as science or external fortune.”42 We strive to deserve honor, even 
though we do not “think much of the honor accorded by man.”43 This 
attitude helps us neither to fall away from God’s Gifts, nor to do wrong 
on account of seeking human honors. Such magnanimity completes 
humility, which “makes us honor others and esteem them better than 
ourselves, insofar as we see some of God’s Gifts in them.”44 We need a 
great soul in order to follow the resilient Christ through conversion, 
attempting to live the Beatitudes, being docile to the Spirit, remaining 
faithful to our baptism, and proclaiming ourselves disciples of God. 
Greatness’ principal purpose is theologal hope: the wait and 
expectation for entry into divine beatitude, which shakes up our lives, 
by conferring an unexpected perspective.45 Magnanimity mobilizes all 
the resources of hope in the greatest enterprises. It involves a spiritual 
resilience that strengthens us to affront the inevitable risks and perils 
and even awakens in us distaste for failure. The related spiritual 
resilience processes become clearer in the following discussion on 
when the interaction between our hopes, human and divine. 
7.1.4. The Theologal Virtue of Hope 
The energy of the passions of hope and daring empowers the 
virtues of initiative, as described in chapter four. Although the 
underlying passion of hope is related most directly to everyday hopes, 
is it not also related to the most fundamental human hope, the 
                                                 
42 ST II-II 129.3 ad 4. “Magnanimitas igitur facit quod homo se magnis 
dignificet secundum considerationem donorum quae possidet ex Deo: sicut, si 
habet magnam virtutem animi, magnanimitas facit quod ad perfecta opera 
virtutis tendat. Et similiter est dicendum de usu cuiuslibet alterius boni, puta 
scientiae vel exterioris fortunae.” 
43 “Et hoc modo magnanimitas est circa honorem: ut videlicet studeat 
facere ea quae sunt honore digna, non tamen sic ut pro magno aestimet 
humanum honorem” ST II-II 129.1 ad 3. 
44 “Sed humilitas alios honorat, et superiores aestimat, inquantum in eis 
aliquid inspicit de donis Dei. [...] Et sic patet quod magnanimitas et humilitas 
non sunt contraria, quamvis in contraria tendere videantur: quia procedunt 
secundum diversas considerationes” ST II-II 129.3 ad. 4. Instead of Aristotle, 
Aquinas draws here upon Psalm 14:4 concerning the just man who “honors them 
that fear the Lord.” This theological perspective demonstrates the reverential 
bearing of both magnanimitas and humility for Aquinas. See also ST II-II 161.1 
ad 3. 
45 Cf. Bruguès 1991, 252. 
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theological level? Aquinas treats two virtues of hope that are in some 
way both grounded in the passion of hope, and that are both active 
elements in spiritual resilience. We need to ask: how does Aquinas’ 
treatment of the theological virtue of hope inform our understanding of 
human agency? And how can considerations of resilience insights on 
agency and pathways enrich it? 
Without presenting a complete treatise on theologal hope, I 
shall trace its principal elements in order to complete our study of 
initiative and resilience in Aquinas’ Christian perspective. As already 
mentioned, Thomas specifies that hope’s object is a good that lies in 
the future and that it is difficult but possible to attain. This view of 
hope seems almost synonymous with a resilience trajectory, one that 
seeks the agency and pathways to attain the future goal. The virtue of 
hope as a natural virtue (magnanimity) is rooted in human desire, and 
manifest in the longing for flourishing. For Aquinas, however, it is 
impossible with one’s own natural capacities to attain the vision of 
God, or even to hope in Him. The human person is not self-sufficient, 
and human natural inclinations point beyond themselves for their 
fulfillment.46 The dialectic of hope, which is rooted in natural desire, 
passes through trials before finding the fulfillment of all its 
fundamental longings in God. God makes known his promises to bring 
us at the end of time (eschaton) to complete beatitude; it is only 
through the means of grace in the present that we can truly begin to 
hope theologically.47 According to Aquinas, God alone can make us 
fully happy.48 
Hope as a supernatural virtue “makes one sphere of human 
activity to be good and to reach one of the rules it is supposed to 
                                                 
46 Our being drawn to God is a first and principal element (this is the 
psychological aspect of hope). This intentional attaining of God is imperfect 
desire. Aquinas distinguishes the theological virtue of hope from simple desires 
by its second element, confidence in divine help, which implies an actual 
inherence and spiritual contact with God (cf. de Spe 1, ad 6). Divine help is the 
formal object of the theological virtue of hope, and confidence in God its formal 
element. 
47 Cf. S.-Th. Pinckaers 1995a, 313-317; and 1978, 165-177; LG no. 48d. 
48 God must provide his free and supernatural help in the form of the “light 
of glory” and the graces that lead one to the beatific vision. Cf. ST I-II 5.5; ST II-
II 17.4. 
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reach.”49 This hope is not an emotion, but a habitus of the spirit; that is, 
its subject is not the sense appetite, but the intellective appetite, the 
will (voluntas).50 Hope finds its roots in the human person being 
created in the image of God.51 Although it is expressed in a primitive 
form through the natural desire for communion with God and the rest 
of creation, and through the other spiritual inclinations, hope is 
properly a virtue of the will, which is situated in a spiritual sentiment 
of hope (beyond the emotion of hope).52 
Hope is a theological virtue when its principle object is God 
and the eternal flourishing that he offers us, according to Aquinas.53 
The secondary object of theological hope is divine assistance, which is 
necessary to attain eternal flourishing.54 The arduous nature of the 
object of hope has several implications though.55 God as the object of 
hope makes theological hope a theological magnanimity, as seeking to 
attain the greatest (and most difficult) good, which is God. Divine 
assistance as an object of hope moreover makes it a theological 
humility, as recognizing our absolute dependence on God’s help. 
Although divine assistance figures as the secondary object of hope, it 
is principal as its first efficient cause.56 In liaison with the virtues of 
charity and faith, hope furthermore offers a unitive link with God, 
                                                 
49 “spes est virtus, cum faciat actum hominis bonum, et debitam regulam 
attingentem” ST II-II 17.1; cf. ST I-II 40.1. 
50 “Quamvis spes, de qua nunc loquimur, non sit passio, sed habitus 
mentis” ST II-II 17.1 ad 1; ST II-II 18.1. 
51 Cf. Gn 1:26-27; 1 Cor 11:7; Eph 4:24; Col 3:10; ST I 93.4; ST I 12.1; ST 
I 12.4 ad 3; ST I-II 3.8; ST II-II 2.3; GS 12.  
52 The rational appetite of the will naturally follows the moral good as 
presented by reason in the measure that it is our good (limited to what we can 
accomplish for ourselves). There is no need for virtue at this level (cf. ST I-II 
56.6; de virt. com. 5; Gauthier 1951, 320) of voluntary hope, which has a natural 
rectitude not needing a virtue to manage it (cf. ST II-II 22.1 ad 1; and in III Sent., 
d. 26, qu. 2, a. 1, ad 2). In its imperfection (concerning things that are not 
possessed) it is not a virtue like natural virtues (subject simply to human powers). 
Rather, it surpasses virtue that is proportionate to humans, calling upon the 
strength of God (cf. ST I-II 62.3 ad 2, which cites 1 Cor. 1:25: “The weakness of 
God is stronger than me”). 
53 Thomas says: “virtus aliqua dicitur esse theologica ex hoc quod habet 
Deum pro objecto cui inhaeret” ST II-II 17.6. Furthermore he adds: “proprium et 
principale obiectum spei est beatitudo aeterna” ST II-II 17.2. 
54 Cf. ST II-II 17.5 ad 3. 
55 Cf. ST I 59.4 ad 3. 
56 Cf. ST II-II 17.4; ST I-II 40.7; Pinckaers 1978a, 226-230. 
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bringing about a personal relationship with God as source of absolute 
goodness and help toward blessed flourishing.57 
Faith precedes hope, since the hoped-for good must be made 
known and appear possible, and since faith manifests the hoped-for 
good of eternal life, parousia and resurrection, as well as the means 
that makes them possible for us, the divine help.58 The belief in God’s 
existence, power and promise to save must come before we start to 
hope in partaking in these goods. Although of a volitional and affective 
nature, hope’s certainty is derived “from faith’s certitude found in the 
cognitive power.”59 This certitude entails a certain moderation or 
measure, not as if one could have too much hope, but rather we must 
avoid presumption and despair.60 
Aquinas views charity’s relationship to hope in two different 
ways. First, hope is prior to charity. For, “hope can initiate one into 
charity to the extent, namely, that one hoping to be rewarded by God 
becomes inspired to love him and observe his precepts.”61 Such hope is 
a type of imperfect love of another, since it loves “something not for 
its own sake, but as it brings some good.”62 Hope precedes charity, as 
the imperfect anticipates the perfect. Secondly, hope follows charity in 
a sequence of excellence. Indeed, “with the advent of charity hope is 
rendered more perfect, since we are most of all inclined to be hopeful 
                                                 
57 “Caritas ergo facit hominem Deo inhaerere propter seipsum, mentem 
hominis uniens Deo per affectum amoris. Spes autem et fides faciunt hominem 
inhaerere Deo sicut suidam principio, ex quo aliqua nobis proveniunt” ST II-II 
17.6. 
58 In ST II-II 17.7, Aquinas uses St. Paul (Hebrews 11:6) as an authority, 
“He who comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those 
who seek him.” 
59 “Et sic etiam spes certitudinaliter tendit in suum finem, quasi participans 
certitudinem a fide, quae est in vi cognoscitiva” ST II-II 18.4. 
60 Aquinas says “sed quantum ad ea quae confidit aliquis se adepturum 
potest ibi esse medium et extrema, inquantum vel praesumit ea quae sunt supra 
suam proportionem vel desperat de his quae sunt sibi proportionata” ST II-II 
17.5 ad 2: cf. ST II-II 20-21. 
61 “Spes introducit charitatem, inquantum aliquis sperans remunerari a 
Deo accenditur ad amandum Deum, et servandum praecepta ejus” ST II-II 17.8. 
62 “Imperfectus amor est quo quis amat aliquid, non secundum ipsum, sed 
ut illud bonum sibi ipsi proveniat” ST II-II 17.8. 
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when we have friends to rely upon.”63 Here the perfection of charity’s 
form purifies hope, which is imperfect in comparison to charity. 
Another corrective and guide for hope in initiative-taking 
comes from the Gift of the fear of the Lord; this Gift is commensurate 
with the theological virtue of hope and comes to the aid of the infused 
virtue of magnanimity. Aquinas distinguishes two types of fear 
concerning our relationship with God: servile fear, and filial or chaste 
fear. Servile fear incites us to convert to God and remain close to him 
through fear of punishment.64 Filial fear involves our fearing to offend 
God and is indicative of a filial relationship.65 To illustrate how filial or 
chaste fear is rooted in affection and love, Thomas employs St. Paul’s 
image of adoptive sonship through which we call out “Abba Father,” 
and a spousal image of chaste union.66 Aquinas emphasizes that this 
second type of fear regards God neither as a source of punishment nor 
“of moral fault, but as a goal from which separation as a consequence 
of fault is to be avoided.”67 The Fear of the Lord supports hope. This 
Gift is not rooted in self-love, but rather charity. It does not fear the 
loss of what we hope to obtain by divine help, but rather our own 
disregard of God’s help. 
Filial fear and hope interrelate and perfect each other.68 During 
this life, as in the case of hope, such filial fear becomes more intense 
                                                 
63 “Et ideo, adveniente charitate, spes perfectior redditur, quia de amicis 
maxime speramus” ST II-II 17.8. 
64 See ST II-II 19.2. Such subjection of servant to master is rooted in the 
master’s authority, instead of charity. Rather the love of self causes servile fear, 
which is “timor servilis ex amore sui causatur, quia est timor poenae, quae est 
detrimentum proprii boni” ST II-II 19.6. Nonetheless, in a sense different from 
that found in servile fear, “timor poenae potest stare cum charitate, sicut et amor 
sui” ST II-II 19.6. 
65 As Aquinas (ST II-II 19.2) says: “si autem propter timorem culpae, erit 
timor filialis, nam filiorum est timere offensam patris.” 
66 “Unde timor filialis et castus ad idem pertinent, quia per charitatis 
amorem Deus pater noster efficitur, secundum illud Rom. 8, 15 Acceptistis 
spititum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus: Abba, Pater; et secundum 
eamdem charitatem dicitur etiam sponsus noster, secundum illud 2 ad Cor. 11, 2, 
Despondi vos uni viro virginem castam exhibere Christo” ST II-II 19.2 ad 3. 
67 “timor servilis et timor filialis non habent eamdem habitudinem ad 
Deum; nam timor servilis respicit Deum sicut principium inflictivum poenarum; 
timor autem filialis respicit Deum, non sicut principium activum culpae, sed 
potius sicut terminum a quo refugit separari per culpam” ST II-II 19.5 ad 2. 
68 “timor filialis non contrariatur virtuti spei. Non enim per timorem 
filialem timemus ne nobis deficiat quod speramus obtinere per auxilium divinum; 
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with the increase of charity.69 They are also accompanied by an 
increase in confidence in God’s grace, which draws us ever closer to 
God through our theological projects. This process explains how fear is 
rooted in love (emotion), how the Gift of fear is rooted in charity 
(virtue), and how in fortitude and magnanimity we are neither driven 
by fear or fearlessness per se. A courageous and great-spirited person 
resists excessive fear of evil moving us into that evil and separating us 
from God. Moreover, quoting Ecclesiasticus, “he that feareth the Lord 
shall tremble at nothing,”70 Aquinas explains that the love of God also 
involves the reverse side, a type of fear of the ultimately dreadful 
thing, the loss of that love. 
Even if Christian hope chiefly concerns eternal flourishing as 
the good we seek and the divine assistance needed in attaining it, this 
virtue also concerns other objects of our prayers, and the lesser 
subordinate ends of everyday actions.71 These ordinary hopes, the 
natural dimension of family, friends and society, concern the good 
human ends of life and mobilize a large part of our day. Work, family 
and community involve plans that elicit hopes for their 
accomplishments. Resilience research has demonstrated the utility of 
hope, for example, for the displaced refugee. It is important for the 
refugee to have hope in some possible future and way to achieve it: 
reunion with family, return to homeland, establishment in a new 
community, health and social security and so on. But often they need 
to establish a new source of hope. At the natural level, this type of 
hope common sense. One seeks the agency and pathways to attain a 
goal. On the spiritual level, ultimately (for the Christian) this search for 
hope must turn inside and look beyond, for a new interior and 
                                                                                                          
sed timemus ab hoc auxilio nos subtrahere. Et ideo timor filialis et spes sibi 
invicem cohaerent et se invicem perficiunt” ST II-II 19.9 ad 1. 
69 Cf. ST II-II 19.10. 
70 Aquinas cites Ecclesiasticus 34:17 (34:14, RSV) in ST II-II 126.1 and In 
symb. apost art. 5; cf. Pieper, 1966, 126-7. 
71 According to Aquinas, we can face real and imagined situations of 
confronting death with humble and hopefilled confidence that is based in prayer. 
In commenting on St. Paul’s letter to the Philippians (4:5-6; Ad Phil. lect. 4.1), 
Aquinas notes that we should cast aside anxiety, since we can have confidence 
that “the Lord is at hand” and the He will provide everything that is necessary (cf. 
Matt 6:25), when we ask in prayer (cf. 1 Pet 5:7). This confidence does not dispel 
our need to be diligent (cf. Rom 12:8) in seeking what we lack. 
A Theological Dimension of Resilient Initiative-taking? 445 
fundamental source of hope that grounds everyday ones. Indeed, 
ordinary hopes find their fuller meaning when rooted firmly in 
fundamental hope, for hoping in God renders hope active by confident 
prayer in God and by transformed action. 
According to Thomas, we can achieve the act of hope, which 
reaches God, neither through personal effort nor through the help of 
other creatures, but only through God’s infinite power. Nonetheless, 
we continue to seek secondarily the help of other human beings, the 
saints and angels, as instrumental sources or subordinate agents of 
assistance, both regarding our fundamental hope and our everyday 
ones.72 This theological perspective illustrates the interplay between 
theological hope and infused magnanimity, as well as the natural virtue 
of hope and the emotion of the same name. In resilience terms, 
theological hope secondarily serves to bolster natural efforts. Inasmuch 
as it also strengthens hope as an emotion and magnanimity as the 
natural virtue of hope, it is instrumental in all spiritual resilience that 
reaches natural levels of human agency. 
7.2. Theological Honor and Excellence 
Spiritual resilience and vulnerability revolve around initiatives 
that seek greatness and humility, honor and excellence and that can go 
to extremes in several ways. Aquinas’ synthesis of related virtues 
walks a steady mean between excesses. His structuring of the virtues 
nonetheless raises further questions about the Christian character of his 
moral theory, inasmuch as it apparently (at least structurally) gives a 
superior place to magnanimity and magnificence than to humility. 
Does a diminished place for humility in Thomas’ virtue theory 
undermine the Christian tenor of his moral theology and render it 
vulnerable? In particular, does his attempt to save a place for honor 
and excellence weaken Christian humility?73 In this section, I shall 
                                                 
72 Cf. ST II-II 17. 2, ad 2; and ST II-II 17.4. 
73 Indeed Aquinas’ solution to the issue of initiative-taking attempts to 
integrate Aristotle and Cicero’s insights on magnanimity, with the Christian 
Tradition’s notion of glory and honor. He addresses the polemic raised by 
Aristotle’s two readings of magnanimity. The first gives primacy to the idea of 
greatness; here magnanimous people would consider themselves as worthy of 
great things, through greatness in each virtue, only doing what is great. The 
second gives primacy to the idea of honor; here magnanimous people act 
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investigate the way in which Aquinas’ emphases on honor, excellence 
and meekness seek both to avoid impasses that spell vulnerability for 
Christians and to promote a Christian resilience. 
7.2.1. Fallen Greatness: False Hopes and Misplaced 
Excellence 
Aquinas’ virtue approach identifies dispositional 
vulnerabilities that we acquire when seeking great and small initiatives. 
False hopes, presumption and despair sidetrack us from our goals. 
Misplaced honors, glory and excellence lead us astray. Such failures 
promote vulnerability and underlie risks at natural and spiritual levels. 
In this section, I shall revisit and enhance Aquinas’ notion of 
enterprising activities and the way in which they employ honor, glory 
and excellence.74 Outlining the risks of vainglory or misplaced 
excellence in initiative demonstrates Aquinas’ Christian measure. The 
theological dimension of initiative-taking, magnanimity and hope is 
clarified further in his treatment of other excesses that undermine it: 
namely false hopes, presumption, despair and timidity. 
Glory and honor motivate human actions, as outlined in 
chapter four. Aquinas is aware not only of the positive side of honor, 
but also how vainglory can make us vulnerable and weak. We 
sidetrack ourselves from important and ultimate goals by desiring 
things unworthy of us, by overestimating their value. Although we 
                                                                                                          
properly concerning the object of honor. According to Gauthier (1951, 302-4, a 
Christian focus limited to the first reading risks aspiring to greatness, not in order 
to assure that mankind dominate the world per se, but in order to restore lost 
human greatness with the intention of returning it to God. Taking the Aristotelian 
texts in this way adds to the Abelardian influence to make magnanimity the virtue 
that presides over our seeking to participate in our own perfection. A Christian 
focus limited to the second reading risks seeing magnanimity as a casuistry of 
glory and honors that one need flee from inasmuch as they take us from God, and 
that one need search for inasmuch as they serve to give God glory. Instead of 
assuring human domination over the world, this perspective assures the human 
itinerary toward God. Taking the Aristotelian texts in this way can destroy the 
Abelardian influence in Aquinas’ synthesis, reducing magnanimity to a precise 
question of casuistry. 
74 Aquinas expands his considerations of natural initiative. He takes 
inspiration from Aristotelian and Abelardian sources, as well as from Biblical and 
Patristic texts. Thomas’ synthesis outstrips the Philosopher’s Greek conception of 
magnanimity as excellence of the moral and intellectual virtues in action. 
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might not consciously place a temporal good over an eternal one, the 
neglect of ultimate goods can effectively exaggerate our attachment to 
worldly ones. Furthermore, when seeking human glory, as if it had 
eternal consequence, we desire honor from unreliable sources. These 
sources can redirect our time and energy in wasteful ways. Moreover, 
for Aquinas, glory has a purpose. When we do not use it for the 
common good or do not acknowledge its ultimate source, we employ 
glory without proper respect for its due end. Aquinas deems that we 
should use glory to honor God and to aid our neighbor spiritually.75 
Aquinas distinguishes spiritual risks when humans misuse 
honor from spirtual benefits when we use it well. Vainglory especially 
opposes charity either concerning the matter in which we glorify 
ourselves (personal wisdom, strength and riches), or the intented use of 
glory.76 Nonetheless, Thomas affirms the importance of recognizing 
“the things that are given us from God,” and the utility of letting them 
be known to others.77 Even God seeks to be glorified for our sake, since 
we need to know God’s glory and to glorify God in order to attain 
flourishing.78 Likewise, human beings should seek honor for the good 
of other people and in order to glorify God aright.79 True glory (gloria 
vera) is promised from God for good works, and in turn serves to 
encourage them.80 Aquinas thus specifies that human praise and glory 
are not to be desired in themselves, but can be useful in four ways:81 to 
glorify God, to edify our neighbor, to persevere in goodness and to 
better ourselves. This spiritual utility is also based upon humanity’s 
social nature: the goods of our relationships with God and others. 
                                                 
75 Cf. ST II-II 132.1. 
76 Cf. ST II-II 132.3. 
77 In his argument on utrum appetites gloriae sit peccatum (ST II-II 132.1), 
Thomas quotes Augustine in warning about the danger of loving praise (amorem 
laudis). Nonetheless, Aquinas finds that Scripture (notably 1 Cor 2:12, Matt 5:16 
and Psalm 4:3) recognizes glory’s positive purpose. 
78 Aquinas (cf. ST II-II 132.1 ad 1) quotes Augustine’s Commentary super 
Joan. tract 58, 3 (re: 13:13); PL 35, 1793. 
79 In this regard, Aquinas quotes Matt 5:16: “That they may see your good 
works, and give glory to your Father who is in heaven” (RSV). Cf. ST II-II 132.1 
ad 1. 
80 Aquinas (ST II-II 132.1 ad 2) supports this teaching by citing Rom 2:7 
and 2 Cor 10: 17-18. 
81 Cf. ST II-II 132.1 ad 3. 
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Presumption also causes dispositional risks revolving around 
the use and abuse of our capacities. According to Aquinas, 
presumption strictly concerns striving for great deeds that are not 
proportioned to our abilities (virtutes, facultas, potestas).82 Since divine 
reason orders nature, human reason and action ought to imitate 
creatively the order that God has established in nature. Through 
prudence and wisdom, we scrutinize the commensurability of planned 
action and the agent’s power to accomplish it.83 Each person being 
endowed and educated differently face actions more or less adapted to 
them, at different moments in their natural and spiritual developments. 
Through difficult activities that push us beyond the limits of previous 
experience, we can become capable of more or we can fail. The muscle 
stretched to, but not beyond, its limit becomes even stronger, all things 
being equal. The human intellect is likewise sharpened through its 
exercise in particularly difficult domains. Even a non-devastating 
failure can be a source of further growth and resilience. 
According to Aquinas, we have a natural inclination to strive 
for more, as well as to remain within the limits of our capacities. When 
presumptuous, we overstep our boundaries. Aquinas gives several 
examples. First, it is only presumptuous to endeavor advancing 
towards perfect virtue, when one does not possess the means. In 
theological matters, we need not only personal ability, but also God’s 
assistance. Thus St. Paul, while not considering himself to be already 
perfect, “strains forward” to the things that were before him, because 
Christ has strengthened him to do so.84 According to Thomas, it is 
fitting to think and do good (cogitare et facere bonum) and to 
accomplish virtuous deeds (ad aliquod opus virtuousum faciendum) 
with confidence in God’s assistance.85 Second, it is presumptuous to do 
                                                 
82 According to Aquinas, a mismeasure is found in presumption. It is “quasi 
contra ordinem naturalem existens, quod aliquis assumat ad agendum ea quae 
praeferuntur suae virtuti” ST II-II 130.1; cf. ST II-II 130.2. 
83 “Hoc autem communiter in omnibus rebus naturalibus invenitur, quod 
quaelibet actio commensuratur virtuti agentis, nec aliquod agens naturale nititur 
ad agendum id quod excedit suam facultatem” ST II-II 130.1. 
84 Aquinas (ST II-II 130.1 ad 1) says that Paul (Phil. 3:13) was “continually 
advancing forward” (per continuum perfectum). The context of this passage is 
Paul’s longing to be “found in Christ,” to “obtain the righteousness from God that 
depends on faith,” to share in Christ suffering and resurrection. Cf. Phil 3:12-14. 
85 Cf. ST II-II 130.1 ad 3. 
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what becomes God to do, to have inordinate confidence in divine 
mercy, or to seek glory without merit.86 Nonetheless it is not 
presumptuous, but rather timid and un-resilient, not to strive to be 
united to God in reason and will. Likewise, we fall into vulnerable 
timidity, if we neither trust in divine forgiveness for those who seek 
pardon87 nor attempt the great things that are within our reach. On the 
contrary, through pride, we cling too resolutely to a false opinion about 
our incompetency, even refusing to obey divine commands88 or accept 
the worthiness granted by a divine grace.89 
Despair, furthermore, destroys initiatives. As hope is driven by 
love, so despair is produced through fear, which causes one to 
conclude that the future arduous good is impossible to attain.90 Such 
fear overrides hope at natural and spiritual levels. Aquinas says, that in 
order to exclude despair, we need to properly adjudicate our goal of 
flourishing as an arduous good (a spiritual good) that is possible. To 
overcome despair demands that we both nurture our desire and our 
hope for the spiritual good of flourishing, and that we exclude sources 
of despair: impurity, laziness and depressive sadness. These sources of 
despair all hinder in some way the perception and attainment of 
flourishing.91 
Insofar as fortitude and magnanimity (as the acquired virtue of 
hope) are natural virtues, their impulses spring from the hopes born of 
the irascible part of the soul. However, insofar as hope is a theological 
virtue, it does not primarily concern the emotions, but the will 
(voluntas); and its object is God and divine assistance. The promises 
and the difficulty that ground theological hope serve growth, moral 
agency and development of this virtue: hopes, human and divine. What 
is the distinguishing factor that enables such spiritual progress? For 
Aquinas, this spiritual resilience and growth demands the interaction of 
                                                 
86 Cf. ST II-II 21.1. 
87 Cf. ST II-II 130.1 ad 2; ST II-II 130.2 ad 1. 
88 ST II-II 133.1 ad 3. Following Gregory (Pastor. I, 7: PL 77, 20 D), 
Aquinas cites the example of Moses who avoids the double temptation of pride: 
undertaking a great task without some trepidation; and not refusing to do a 
difficult task commanded by his Creator. 
89 Cf. ST II-II 133.1 ad 4. 
90 Cf. ST I-II 40.4; ST I-II 45.2; and ST II-II 20.1-4. 
91 Cf. ST II-II 20.4. 
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both God’s grace and human conscious action that Aquinas 
differentiates in terms of virtues, Gifts and Beatitudes. Hope plays vital 
roles in this spiritual resilience. Highlighting the developmental aspect 
of hope and the place that God’s promises play therein, Origen says: 
“That it may do this, that is, that the soul may become capable, the 
Lord our God as it were holds His promises out of our reach; He does 
not withdraw them. He so withholds them that we may stretch 
ourselves towards them. We strain, and therefore we grow. And so we 
grow, that we may reach what He promised us.”92 This citation 
collected by Aquinas, emphasizes the divine pedagogy that is active in 
Thomas’ virtue theory, and serves as a transition to the investigation of 
the place of honor, great deeds and excellence in initiative-taking and 
spiritual resilience. 
7.2.2. Theological Virtue Guiding Honor 
As mentioned earlier, Aquinas’ treatment of magnanimitas 
attempts to overcome an apparent conflict concerning the use of honor 
and excellence as criteria for action. The question in the theological 
realm becomes whether Aquinas’ anthropology breaks down in front 
of particularly Christian virtues like humility. Can we use acquired 
magnanimity, conceived in terms of honor and excellence, as a basis 
for infused magnanimity without deforming the Christian tradition in 
the process? Will it render the Tradition vulnerable to itself? 
For Aquinas, theological magnanimity parallels martyrdom, 
which is the apotheosis of courage. Fortitude’s correlation with 
martyrdom does not degrade it, but puts it in the perspective of the 
highest possible form that we can only understand theologically. 
Natural magnanimity similarly tends toward theological fulfillment, 
although it is marked by a double absence. “Ordinary magnanimity” 
(the mean between philotimia and aphilotimia concerning ordinary 
honors) remains nameless. Likewise, theological magnanimity 
(concerning great acts which merit honor from God) has no name.93 
                                                 
92 Aquinas’ Catena aurea, 17th Sunday after Pentecost, vol. 4.7, Origen 
6.1. 
93 We might call this virute theologal magnanimity only inasmuch as we 
distinguish it from the theological virtue of hope; it would also then correlate with 
theological magnificence. Cf. ST II-II 129.3 ad 2. 
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Through the natural virtue, we have the disposition toward managing 
our emotions of daring and our acts in the face of greatness well.94 It 
involves a life of excellence. In order to understand how such 
excellence relates to Christian resilience, we need to explore Aquinas’ 
theological perspective on honors and human agency. 
Aquinas finds several reasons why the virtue of magnanimitas 
is absolutely about the proper use of a particular type of honor, “the 
best use of the greatest thing,” as he says. However, we must 
understand even this natural virtue in terms of his overall theological 
project. In particular, he analyzes three aspects of magnanimity’s 
relationship with honors: (1) the reasons for honor and its source, (2) 
the people who are honored and the hierarchy of honors, as well as (3) 
the social purpose of honor. 
Honors for Thomas are due attestation of a person’s virtue.95 
As individualistic as Aquinas’ definition of honor might seem to some 
interpreters, honor is a social and theological reality. Honor is the 
reward that others give for being virtuous; it is public recognition for 
goodness.96 As attestations of virtue, honors are the best of external 
things. His conception follows, yet substantially contrasts Aristotle’s 
conception of magnanimity.97 For Aquinas and the Christian Tradition, 
honor as an objective recognition of one’s excellence does not 
                                                 
94 For Aquinas, we can have this disposition without the opportunity for a 
great act (or great honor). He specifies that the honors due to magnanimous acts 
aim at the hope of excellence in acts (cf. Labourdette 1962, 29). 
95 Aquinas says that “honor testificationem quandam importat de 
excellentia alicuius” (ST II-II 103.1), and “honor est [...] protestatio de 
excellentia bonitatis alicuius” (ST II-II 103.2). He contrasts this operative 
perfection with entitative perfection, which is the source of a different type of 
honor. 
96 As Aquinas says: “honor importat quandam reverentiam alicui 
exhibitam in testimonium excellentiae eius” ST II-II 131.1; cf. ST II-II 103.1 and 
103.2. 
97 In particular, Aquinas reforms Aristotle’s magnanimous man by turning 
five objectionable qualities of Aristotle’s magnanimity toward more positive 
qualities (cf. ST II-II 129.3 obj 5). Moreover, he addresses the problem of self-
absorption by focusing on the magnanimous man’s great actions, and in terms of 
a theologically grounded humility and a general respect for other humans as 
created in the image of God (cf. ST II-II 129.3 ad 4; Horner 1998, 435). 
Furthermore, Aristotle stresses the importance of external goods (including being 
honored at social level) more than either the Stoics or Aquinas (cf. Horner 1998, 
421 and fn. 34 and 35). 
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primarily come from society, but rather it is ultimately from God. 
Indeed, God alone attests truly and completely to the worth and honor 
of our dispositions and acts. Such impartial and just recognition credits 
the virtuous person, whom society unjustly condemns, but also goes 
hand in hand with Christian humility. Although honor is good, the only 
adequate reward for being virtuous is flourishing rather than honor per 
se.98 
Aquinas has a twofold typology of honor. Honor is offered 
either to God (latria) or to the best people (dulia). The ancient and 
medieval worlds acknowledged an ordering of goods. Aquinas’ 
hierarchy of goodness ultimately focuses the magnanimous person’s 
interest on the life of grace.99 We need to return all true human honors 
(dulia) in the form of praise, veneration and adoration (latria) to God, 
who is present even in human virtues. Indeed, God is the principle 
source of human excellence, which Aquinas deems something divine 
in human garb.100 On the contrary, ambition neither recognizes 
proximate and ultimate sources of one’s excellence nor returns this 
honor to its due sources, especially the divine one. 
Aquinas describes honor’s purposes. Honor motivates our acts, 
as a final cause. We do or avoid things in order to attain honor or to 
shun shame.101 Honor can thus aid in controlling our concentration, 
efforts and emotions. Moreover, it has a social function, as an 
efficacious cause of action. Aquinas remarks that we should use God-
given qualities of excellence to benefit others in two ways: we can aid 
them directly with outstanding acts, and we can use the recognition for 
such acts to further benefit others.102 Although such human honor is 
                                                 
98 ST II-II 131.1 ad 2. That is unless we understand by honor the glory that 
is given to God, the source of beatitude. 
99 Cf. ST II-II 129.1; ST II-II 103.3. Furthermore, for Aquinas honor is due 
to someone because of real virtue or excellence. God is first and best, therefore 
honor is first of all due to God (cf. ST I-II 129.2). 
100 Aquinas puts it this way, “id secundum quod homo excellit, non habet 
homo a seipso, sed est quasi quiddam divinum in eo. Et ideo ex hoc non debetur 
principaliter sibi honor, sed Deo” ST II-II 131.1. 
101 Cf. ST II-II 129.1. 
102 Aquinas says, “secundo considerandum est quod id in quo homo 
excellit, datur homini a Deo ut ex eo aliis prosit. Unde intantum debet homini 
placere testimonium suae excellentiae quod ab aliis exhibetur, inquantum ex hoc 
paratur sibi via ad hoc quod aliis prosit” ST II-II 131.1. 
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clearly not an ultimate source of good or flourishing, it is nonetheless a 
real good.103 
Although honor is important, it is only a secondary object of 
magnanimity for Thomas. Honor involves positive exchange with a 
social sphere. In the Christian context, magnanimity ultimately 
manages personal and social honor in order to glorify God and to 
advance the salvation of the world (sanctify human beings). His 
Christian conception of flourishing demands not only that we attain 
friendship with God, but also that we glorify God. The search for 
eternal flourishing is not only great in itself, but also informs the 
typically great difficulties in virtuously managing more mundane 
honors and shame. This virtue makes every virtue even greater, since it 
engages them in the perspective of seeking to be worthy of honor from 
God, and in returning any honor to God. It even makes the acts that 
Aquinas construes as great to look like loving God and one’s 
neighbor.104 This work of Christian virtue constitutes a primary 
source and finality for Christian resilient action. Christian resilience 
then is especially apparent in the great and excellent action involved in 
the seemingly contradictory Christian excellence of meek magnanimity 
and magnanimous humility, which we shall now treat more 
extensively. 
7.2.3. Christian Excellence: Meek and Humble 
Magnanimity 
These insights on doing great deeds and using honor well do 
not exhaust the spiritual dimension of seeking excellence in Aquinas’ 
perspective. Rather, he completes the doctrine on excellence with the 
Christian virtues of humility and meekness, as well as the Beatitude of 
the meek. This excellence in the form of a meek and humble 
magnanimity refocuses the question of whether Christianity promotes a 
type of vulnerability. How can the meek and humble person 
consistently accomplish difficult or important feats? In this section, I 
argue that meekness and humility are integral aspects of Christian 
                                                 
103 Cf. ST II-II 131.1 ad 3. 
104 Cf. ST II-II 129.4 ad 2; Aristotle Rhet. 1366b17; Horner 1998, 433 and 
footnote 106. 
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excellence, provide correctives to possible abuses regarding initiative, 
and actually promote human and social flourishing and a typically 
Christian resilience. 
Aquinas integrally correlates magnanimity (and fortitude) with 
three aspects of meekness (mansuetudo), (1) as an evangelical 
Beatitude: “Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth” (Matt 
5:5), (2) as a fruit of the Holy Spirit (Gal 5:23) and (3) as a virtue.105 
Thomas’ virtue theory relates such Beatitudes to virtues, as complete 
acts relate to dispositions to act; they both relate to fruits, which 
involve delight in the graced act. As a moral virtue, meekness develops 
a disposition (habitus) of subjecting the emotion of anger to reason.106 
As a Beatitude, meekness is a graced act of the virtue bearing the same 
name. As a fruit of the Holy Spirit, it involves delight taken in such a 
meek act. How do these aspects of meekness concern theological 
magnanimity and Christian resilience? 
Thomas highlights the necessity of meekness for magnanimity 
through the passion of anger, which we might otherwise overlook. 
Through magnanimity, we deal with arduous goods that can engender 
vengeance or anger, and blind us to our rational project, even our 
ultimate goal. A particular challenge arises from the nature of anger.107 
Anger can aid proper and prompt action, as was previously 
mentioned.108 Anger also needs to be carefully controlled. Meekness 
restrains the onslaught of anger and vengeance by mitigating this 
passion.109 The impetuosity of anger comes from its clouding our free 
judgment of truth, according to Aquinas. The virtue of meekness 
involves an excellence, albeit a restricted one (quandam excellentiam), 
                                                 
105 Aquinas deems meekness as a virtue, a Gift and a Beatitude (cf. ST II-II 
157.2 ad 3). Aquinas (and Augustine) also associate the Beatitude of meekness 
with the Gift of piety and the Petition of the Our Father: “thy kingdom come.” 
106 Thomas calls upon the authority of Seneca (De Clementia II.5) and 
Aristotle (NE iv.5) in regards to clementia and mansuetudo here (ST II-II 157.2) 
and often throughout the four articles of question ST II-II 157. 
107 Aquinas (ST I-II 46.5) follows Aristotle (NE iv.11 1126a30-31) in 
saying that revenge is in a way more natural to man than meekness since it is 
natural, as a rational being, to resist things that are hurtful. 
108 Cf. ST II-II 123.10.  
109 Clemency (clementia) concurs with meekness by moderating 
punishment (cf. ST II-II 157.1). Thomas classifies meekness and clemency as 
virtues associated with temperance, since they retain vehement emotions (cf. ST 
II-II 157.3). 
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among the virtues that resist evil inclinations, since it guards our self-
possession. Highlighting meekness’ theological import, Thomas 
furthermore emphasizes how it directs our minds to the knowledge of 
God, self-possessed mitigation of anger and consistency with truth.110 
Meekness especially establishes a new balance and focus for 
aggressive or attack (aggredi) movements of the emotions, of which 
anger is one of the most powerful. In particular, meekness harnesses 
anger for a Christian response to overcoming injustices and other 
hardships. It describes an aspect of resilience that is both human and 
led by the example of Christ. 
Aquinas also includes the Christian notion of humility in 
initiative and magnanimity. It is curiously a particular dimension of 
spiritual and Christian resilience. Aquinas construes humility and 
magnanimity as a sort of dual virtue (duplex virtus) that addresses 
arduous goods (boni ardui).111 An oft-overlooked hermeneutical 
                                                 
110 Aquinas expresses the theological framework for understanding the 
proper use of anger in the words of Augustine: “rectus amor omnes istas 
affectiones rectas habet. Metuunt enim peccare, cupiunt perseverare, dolent in 
peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis” (de civ. Dei., XIV, 9, 1: PL 41, 413; quoted 
in ST I-II 24.2 sc, and cited at the beginning of ST II-II 123.10). These are 
spiritual goals that support the formation of a fuller notion of fortitude.  
111 Cf. ST II-II 161.1. Before going further though, a historical note is in 
order. Thomas participates in the thirteenth century controversy over the relation 
of magnanimitas and humilitas (Cf. S.-Th. Pinckaers 1995a, 228, and 2002, 8; Y-
M. Congar 1974, 345-6; B. Kent 1995, 51-2, 72-74). His position differs both 
from the radical Aristotelians of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris and 
from eminent theologians like St. Bonaventure. Part of the reason for this 
dissimilarity is the different use and appreciation of sources. Drawing on 
Scriptural and Patristic writers as their primary sources, both Aquinas and 
Bonaventure share the essentials and figure as part of the Catholic theological 
tradition, unlike the radical Aristotelians. Nonetheless, the two theologians 
illustrate two sub-traditions, shaped not only by how they structure their 
theological sources, but also by the philosophical sources they employ. In 
particular they differ in the ways they interpret Aristotle’s thought. 
The writings of Aristotle and his principal Arab commentators, Averroes 
and Avicenna, were translated into Latin and were being introduced into 
Scholastic theology in the thirteenth century. St. Albertus Magnus, Aquinas’ 
teacher, was instrumental in this rediscovery of Aristotle. Aquinas builds upon 
Albert’s work and innovatively uses Aristotle as a primary source in his moral 
and theological inquiry. Drawing from the wisdom of Aristotle was not popular 
with everyone. Aquinas was rebuked for not using more Patristic writers in his 
works, and after his death some of his positions were even condemned as 
Aristotelianizing “errors” (cf. Gauthier 1951, 295-371; J.-P. Torrell 1996; S.-Th. 
Pinckaers 2002; B. Kent 1995). 
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principle for Thomas’ treatise on the virtue of humility can be found in 
the sed contra of its first article, “whether humility is a virtue.”112 He 
starts the treatment of humility with a Scriptural and Patristic reference 
to Jesus Christ’s admonition: “Learn from me, because I am meek, and 
humble of heart.”113 The position of such a quote in Thomas’ scholastic 
approach, as well as its content is highly significant. It serves as a 
narrative background and provides content for reading the whole 
treatise. This admonition is not simply an extrinsic rhetorical nicety, 
but rather a metaphysical and moral basis for Christian agency, 
according to Aquinas. It demands that one reread even the 
philosophical references to Aristotle (or Cicero) in the light of the 
Gospel narrative.114 Such a theological appraisal is not always made.115 
                                                                                                          
Both Thomas and Bonaventue oppose certain doctrines of the radical 
Aristotelians. And they both critique and integrate the Philosopher’s thought in 
their own theology. Bonaventure considers these virtues to belong essentially to 
the rational part of the soul. On the contrary, Aquinas, while acknowledging the 
role of reason and will in these virtues, recognizes more fully the emotional bases 
involved. St. Bonaventure (1221-74) and Aquinas’ differences can be illustrated 
in terms of the way in which these two great contemporaries developed their 
Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. St. Bonaventure does not 
build a theology of virtue; he is less virtue-centric than Aquinas (whose 
Commentary on the Sentences is already based on the virtues, although only a 
sketch of his later works). In Bonaventure’s conception, virtues like fortitude 
reside in the part of the soul that is controlled by the rational (cf. Com. on the 
Sent. III, 33, 3). They are virtues of the will. For Aquinas, a moral virtue, like 
fortitude, resides in the sensible appetite, and needs to be considered in the 
context of the Gift of Fortitude. For a sympathetic and nuanced reading of 
Bonaventure and his development, see B. Kent 1995. 
Not having the space to trace Bonaventure’s positions on magnanimitas and 
humilitas, I shall content myself with drawing from Aquinas’ treatment of these 
two virtues. Aquinas compares and interrelates magnanimity and humility in the 
following places: ST II-II 123.1 ad 1; ST II-II 129.3 ad 4; ST II-II 161.1 ad 3; Ad 
Mat. 5:16; de vert. com. 12, 26. 
112 Cf. ST II-II 161.1 sc. Likewise, at the very beginning of his treatment of 
the virtue of fortitude, Thomas acknowledges the importance of the virtue of 
humility in responding to St. Paul’s understanding of virtue as being perfected in 
infirmity (2 Cor 12:9). Humility assures that we acknowledge our weaknesses 
and infirmities (infirmitas) of body, in order that fortitude’s strength of mind 
(fortitudo mentis) bear them bravely. We need to understand this reference to 
humility in its theological context (cf. ST II-II 123.1 obj 1 and ad 1). 
113 Aquinas (ST II-II 161.1 sc) quotes the Gospel of Luke (1:48), through 
the commentary of Origen (Hom 8 in Luc.: PG 13.1821A; PL 26.236C). 
114 Thomas’ close association with Aristotle and a philosophical structuring 
of the virtues in general has attracted several critiques of Aquinas’ teaching, and 
limited such a wider interpretation. Attacks target the distance between 
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Aquinas’ response to the question about the way humility and 
magnanimity interrelate (as presented in the Summa theologiae) has 
sometimes been interpreted as abstract philosophy that has the 
following content. In controlling the impulses that arduous goods 
provoke, we would need a twofold virtue: first, humility which 
restrains the mind from immoderately tending to things that are too 
high (in excelsa), and second, magnanimity which strengthens the 
mind against despair and urges it to pursue what reason rightly dictates 
is truly good.116 The rest of Aquinas’ treatise would seem more 
philosophical than theological, and would be summarized as such: (art. 
2) humility is essentially in the appetite itself, as suppressing excessive 
hope, (art. 3) it does not demand us to necessarily subject ourselves to 
other people, and (art. 4) it is chiefly about restraining the passion of 
hope and is associated with the moral virtue of temperance. This 
philosophical dimension is Thomas’, but it is not the entirety of his 
teaching. 
When looking deeper, in the light of the Lukan passage and the 
other Biblical citations, another interpretation of Aquinas’ teaching on 
humility comes alive. His articulation of humility depends on more 
than its philosophical citations and arguments. It necessitates a 
                                                                                                          
Aristotle’s conception of magnanimity and Christian humility. They critique his 
associating humility with the virtue of temperance, which limits: humility’s focus, 
its pride of place among the virtues and its integration of Scriptural teaching (cf. 
S.-Th. Pinckaers 1993, 442; 1995a, 228; Torrell 1996, 41; and discussions with 
M.-L. Ardoin). 
115 On the one hand, M. Nussbuam’s reading of Christian humility is 
completely incompatible with magnanimity. She holds that they are competing 
conceptions of one and the same thing. The term greatness of soul “implies in its 
very name an attitude to one’s own worth that is more Greek than universal.” A 
Christian, she continues, “will feel that the proper attitude to one’s own worth 
requires understanding one’s lowness, frailty, and sinfulness. The virtue of 
humility requires considering oneself small, not great.” (Nussbaum 1988, 38; 
cited in D. McInerny 1997, 79). On the other hand, A. MacIntyre (1999, xi) 
attests to a major difference between Aristotle and Aquinas concerning these two 
virtues. He says: “I was struck by this [difference] when reading a prayer 
composed by Aquinas in which he asks God to grant that he may happily share 
with those in need what he has, while humbly asking for what he needs from 
those who have, a prayer that in effect, although not by Aquinas’s own intention, 
ask that we may not share some of the attitudes of Aristotle’s megalopsychos.” 
116 Cf. ST II-II 161.1. Aquinas’ argument and references to previous 
treatises (I-II 23.2 and ST I-II 61.2) seem to indicate that the article is only 
addressing a moral virtue. 
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theological content and prime referent. Humility’s tempering of 
presumptuous hope and immoderate self-confidence denotes our 
subjection to God, even as the Son is subjected to the Father in an 
ordered love. As Thomas says it chiefly involves “divine reverence, 
which shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is 
competent to him according to the position in which God has placed 
him.”117 This type of humility involves adoptive filiation, which has 
searching social features. 
The theological content and pedagogy of Aquinas’ approach to 
humility need to be more explicitly distinguished from that of 
Aristotle. That is not the major point however. The deeper emphasis is 
that humility adds a corrective to great and self-confident efforts. It 
recognizes the ordering of creation, redemption, human initiatives and 
social goods. The resilience of humility in particular involves a 
perspective on divine help and ultimate goals. This vision of Christian 
humility is not the weak sort critiqued by Nietzsche, but rather an 
exuberant one that follows Christ who dares to walk where even the 
strong would not tarry. This humility is a self-referential and other-
respecting movement. To humble oneself according to Aquinas 
involves acknowledging our weaknesses and social needs, acclaiming 
God’s greatness, and calling upon God as the source of grace and hope 
for all that is great and perfect (perfectum).118 This Christian excellence 
in meek and humble form involves a type of resilience that we 
acknowledge as a gift from God, which at the same time is at risk due 
to personal infirmity and social injustice.119 This meek excellence 
motivates a typically Christian constructive resilience that finds its 
                                                 
117 Cf. ST II-II 161.2 ad 3. Thomas follows Augustine who understands 
humility as poverty of spirit, while ascribing it to the Gift of filial fear whereby 
we revere God (he cites Augustine’s De Serm. Dom. in Monte I.4,11: PL 
34,1234). Also see the earlier treatment of this Gift and its relationship with the 
theological virtue of hope (cf. ST II-II 19.1-12). Lastly, humble people as the 
Letter of James (4:6) illustrates obtain grace from God, who conversely resists the 
proud (cf. ST II-II 161.5 ad 2). If more space permitted, this analysis could treat 
Thomas’ other theological, Biblical and Patristic arguments and references, and 
in particular his objections to St. Benedict’s division of humility into twelve 
degrees (cf. ST II-II 161.6). 
118 Cf. ST II-II 161.1 ad 4; cf. SCG III.97. 
119 Cf. ST II-II 129.3 ad 4; D. McInerny 1997, 80. 
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standard for excellent initiative in Christ as the rule for thought, 
intention and deed. 

 Chapter Eight. 
Theological Dimension of the Virtues of Enduring 
“Through patience we have peace both in prosperous and adverse times.”1 
Is there a specifically Christian response to pain, suffering and 
sorrow? For Aquinas, the infused virtues of patience and perseverance 
distinctly offer Christian criteria and models. They involve necessary 
dispositions for Christian maturity in the face of adversity. These 
infused virtues should not be confused with the acquired virtues of the 
same names, even though they can strengthen already existing acquired 
virtues. 
In this section, I shall explore the St. Thomas’ Christian 
understanding of these virtues. Nonetheless, we must recall our 
previous discussions on his typology of sorrow and suffering, his 
natural virtue approach to them and the psychosocial input on pain, 
suffering and loss. First, I shall examine a theological dimension found 
in the infused virtues of patience and perseverance, long-suffering and 
constancy, and contrast them with their opposing vices. In exposing 
the rich contour of patience and perseverance, Aquinas interprets the 
Biblical and Patristic tradition with well-structured philosophical-
theological reasoning. Nonetheless, patience and perseverance are not 
abstract concepts. For Thomas, God’s patience, as expressed through 
Christ, serves as the archetype for a Christian response to suffering. 
Indeed, Christ’s life, death and resurrection function as the model, not 
just for meditation, but above all for imitation. 
Secondly, I shall examine Aquinas’ theology on how grace 
informs emotions, reason and will, for a Christ-like relationship to 
suffering and evil. In particular, the theological virtue of hope, the Gift 
of knowledge, the fruit of patience and the Beatitude of mourners, all 
constitute a Christian type of patience and perseverance.2 
                                                 
1 “Per patientiam pacem habemus et in tempore prospero et adverso” 
Aquinas, in ora. dom. pet. vii. 
2 One finds this notion of “virtuous sorrow” in Aquinas’ discussion of 
Utrum tristitia possit esse bonum honestum? (ST I-II 39, 2). The Sermon on the 
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Third, I shall investigate the development of patience and 
spiritual resilience in terms of Thomas’ Christian anthropology, in 
particular through his notion of virtuous sorrow, and moral and 
spiritual progress. I thus ask: How do these virtues outline a type of 
spiritual resilience concerning resisting and persisting? And what do 
resilience insights drawn from psychosocial sciences concerning pain, 
suffering and resisting offer to enhance Aquinas’ theological approach 
to actively enduring hardship and waiting for the accomplishment of 
the good? 
8.1. Infused Patience, Perseverance and Resilience 
8.1.1. Aquinas on Patience, Grace and Human Nature 
In order to enrich Aquinas’ understanding of enduring and 
resisting with resilience insights, we shall first explore his approach to 
infused patience and perseverance. Thomas masterfully addresses the 
dynamics of patience in the Summa theologiae, using both 
philosophical and theological sources.3 He starts his treatment of 
patience by affirming that patience is a gift of God, and a quality 
attributed to God.4 This Scripturally-based insight serves to furnish the 
theological inspiration without which we cannot understand Aquinas’ 
treatise. 
                                                                                                          
Mount, in particular the Beatitude of mourners, which serves as the sed contra to 
the question, informs his notion of virtuous sorrow. 
3 Although the principal sources—not only in quantity—are Scripture and 
St. Augustine, the philosophical foundation is significant. Aquinas uses the 
following sources for ST II-II 136 (in order of frequency): Scripture (subtotal: 
14): Isa 49:10; Rev 7:16; Eccl 5:16; Gal 5:22; 2 Co. 7:10; Eccl 30:25; Jas 1:4; 
Luke 21:19; Ps 61:6; 1 Cor 13:4; Rom 5:5; Eccl 5:4; Rom 2:4; Prov 13:12; St. 
Augustine (subt. 9): De Trin. 14, 9; de Pat. ch. i (twice) and ii and iii and iv 
(twice) and v; De Civ. Dei 14; De Morib. Eccl. xv; Ep. cxxxviii (ad Marcellius); 
St. Gregory the Great (subt: 3): Hom. 35 in Ev. (twice); Moral. 22; Aristotle 
(subt: 2): NE i, 8; ii, 6; Cicero (subt: 2): Rhet. II.54 (twice); Opus Imperfectum 
(falsely ascribed to Chrysostom): on Matt 4,10; Origen (or gloss of P. Lombard): 
ad Rom 2:4; Prosper: Sent. 811. Usage rather than frequency determines the 
importance of these citations. Not all citations are on the same footing. For 
example, quotes used in the sed contra have a certain priority; Aquinas uses them 
as superior authorities serving to enlighten the arguments (cf. S. Pinckaers 2002). 
4 In the first sed contra (ST II-II 136.1 sc), Aquinas quotes Augustine’s de 
Patientia (I; PL 40.611). 
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When Aquinas asks, “whether it is possible to have patience 
without grace,” he poses a question he does not directly ask of any 
other virtue associated with a cardinal virtue, except for perseverance.5 
He straightforwardly answers that we are not able to have true patience 
(vera patientia) without the help of God. Many writers have heatedly 
debated the meaning of true patience and the implications of his text. 
Does vera patientia concern both acquired and infused patience? If 
yes, does true patience involve both a natural-graced and supernatural-
graced patience? It is worthwhile to broach this important issue.6 Some 
authors hold that Aquinas does not think that (true) patience exists 
without the help of grace.7 Others hold that he thinks humans exercise 
a natural virtue of patience through their own nature and effort; this 
patience would be a moral, non-infused virtue.8 The discussion 
revolves not only around the notion, object and act of patience per se, 
but also that of the type of grace involved. 
These questions of grace, virtue and the quality of agency are 
not indifferent for resilience. In the Christian perspective, grace 
establishes the basis for spiritual resilience that cannot be measured or 
quantified, as can external acts. We necessarily presuppose a 
conception of human nature in any treatment of grace. The correlation 
of grace and nature, as discussed previously, offers insights in the way 
that, for Thomas, persons and communities rely on God’s help 
consciously and unconsciously, for ordinary development and 
patience, as well as for extraordinary resilience and perseverance. 
                                                 
5 Cf. ST II-II 136.3; and ST II-II 137.4. Thomas explains grace’s 
foundational role for human action in his treatise on the necessity of grace (I-II 
109.1-10), which serves as a reference for his texts on specific virtues. See the 
tenth article “Utrum homo in gratia constitutus indigeat auxilio gratiae ad 
perseverandum?” Cf. E. Gilson 1946, 93. 
6 According to Lottin (1942-60, III:186), the debate on the natural-
supernatural and acquired-infused aspects in virtue started with Aquinas, since 
prior to him thinkers made such distinctions, but the reasoning for this 
differentiation and interrelation was not yet an issue. 
7 Cf. M. Labourdette 1962, 44; E. Gilson 1946, 93-104; M. Spanneut 
1984b, 452. 
8 Cf. Delhaye 1984, 247; Noble 1932, 296; J. van der Meersch 1925, 
VI.2:1578; E. Vansteenberghe 1932, XI.2:2248-49. In regards to some of these 
authors, Gilson (1946, 102, fn 1) says: “On dirait que la nature thomiste, irriguée 
et fécondée en tous sens, même comme nature, par la grâce divine, tend à se 
naturaliser sous la plume de nos contemporains.” 
464 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
How does Aquinas understand and promote the management 
of sorrow, grief and waiting through patience and perseverance? 
Aquinas explores the necessity of grace and what it would mean to 
have natural patience by asking: “Is it possible to have patience 
without grace?”9 An important reference point in reading this question 
is the authoritative wisdom that he quotes in the sed contra, which 
runs: “It is written (Ps. 61:6): From Him, i.e. from God, is my 
patience.”10 It is easy to understate the importance of this passage and 
its placement. For Aquinas however, the sed contra generally serves as 
a source of light, which refracts in different variants and intensities 
throughout the rest of the article and question. In this regard, the 
richness of the quote’s larger context needs to be recalled. Indeed 
Psalm 61 (62) is one of the psalmist’s most powerful expressions of 
trust in God. Not only does the psalmist express his trust in God in the 
face of harassment by enemies, vv. 2-5 (1-4), but he also invites the 
community to follow his example of trusting God, rather than human 
vanity, wealth and power, vv. 6-10 (5-10). The full message of the 
quotation announces the tone of the response that Aquinas intends. 
Aquinas dialectically presents objections to a Christian 
understanding of grace, nature and patience. He poses a Pelagian 
objection, which claims that in following their rational natures and 
without grace, those who are evil can patiently suffer for the sake of an 
evil purpose.11 Those who seek a good goal, thanks to their rational 
nature, should be all the more able to suffer patiently without grace. 
Aquinas responds saying that even though it is reasonable to suffer evil 
for some good, there are two drawbacks to doing so. First, the 
inclination of reason towards the goal constantly prevails only in 
integral human nature, but not in our present, weakened (lapsarian) 
                                                 
9 This question (ST II-II 136.3) is placed in the middle of Aquinas’ 
discussion on patience (ST II-II 136.1-5). The other related articles are: whether 
patience is a virtue (art. 1); whether it is the greatest of virtues (art.2); whether it 
is a part of fortitude (art. 4); and whether it is the same as longanimity (art. 5). 
10 “Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo: Ab ipso, scilicet Deo, patientia 
meo” (ST II-II 136.3). This version of the Vulgate Psalm 61:6 (62:5 JB) is 
translated in different ways: “Rest in God alone, my soul! He is the source of my 
hope” (JB); “For God alone my soul waits in silence, for my hope if from him.” 
(RSV); “verumtamen Deo retice anima mea ab ipso enim praestolatio mea” (BS, 
iuxta Hebr.). 
11 Cf. ST II-II 136.3 obj1 and ad1. 
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state of nature. Second, in this condition the concupiscible inclination 
makes human beings more prone to follow its desires than reason, in 
bearing evils for the sake of present pleasures rather than for future 
goods. “True patience” on the contrary endures evils for the sake of 
future goods (bona futura) that we desire in accordance with reason.12 
Even though Aquinas’ argument seems to mean that we might 
be truly patient in a particular situation, it also indicates that we are not 
able to assure our own consistent true patience. He says: “man is more 
prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence 
delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to 
come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this 
that pertains to true patience.”13 While recalling the limitations of the 
present human condition, what he clarifies in this text is simply three 
criteria for the virtue of true patience: (1) endurance of evil (object); 
(2) for the sake of future goods (final end); and (3) desired in 
accordance with reason (mediate end--circa ea quae sunt ad finem). 
We must see these issues in the fuller context of divine grace’s 
interaction with human nature and of the particular “goods to come.” 
He addresses another objection concerning the criteria for true 
patience. It claims that non-believers have true patience, since while 
not in the state of grace they abhor sinful evils more than bodily ones, 
and in some cases have patiently endured many hardships rather than 
                                                 
12 Aquinas uses the terminology “vera patientia” or “est vere patientiam” 
only in ST II-II 136.3, where he carefully addresses Augustine’s De patientia that 
uses these terms all throughout. Aquinas moreover is aware that these adages 
exist in a sermon of St. Cyprian, which is quoted in the Catena Aurea (Vol 2.1, 
Part 2, 346; On the Advantages of Patience, PL 4.621). 
13 “Et ideo pronior est homo ad sustinendum mala in quibus concupiscentia 
delectatur praesentialiter, quam tolerare mala propter bona futura quae 
secundum rationem appetuntur, quod tamen pertinet ad veram patientiam” ST II-
II 136.3 ad 1. Aquinas contrasts delighting in a present pleasure, from desiring 
the future good (cf. De pat. xvii). Gilson (1946, 100) argues in this regard that 
both Aquinas and Augustine deny that there can be a natural patience, i.e. 
patience without grace. We could accept this position, if “bona futura” only 
refers to the future goods promised through the Gospel, which are beyond human 
reach without sanctifying grace, and if he refers to true, perfect and complete 
supernatural or infused virtue of patience (not the social virtue of patience). 
Aquinas, respecting the best of Augustine’s insights, deems that God sustains 
natural activities through another type of gift, auxilio divino. Distinguishing 
gratia and auxilium divinum as two types of gift, allows us to respect both the 
natural and supernatural orders. 
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betray their country.14 Aquinas answers that such social virtues—
human beings acting well in human affairs—are commensurate with 
human nature and concern natural goods only.15 Social virtues, 
whereby someone behaves well in human affairs, spring from human 
nature, which is social.16 They are acquired in civil life and have the 
civil good as their end, i.e. acquired moral virtues.17 They are possible 
without sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), but not without the 
help of God (auxilio Dei).18 This latter type of gift (auxilium Dei) 
assures the realization of the good commensurate to human nature, and 
even though such divine help is from God, the human effect can 
nonetheless be called human natural virtue, since it is within human 
nature to commit such acts. Further treatment of Aquinas’ typology of 
graced patience will not only distinguish acquired and infused patience 
better, but help to understand spiritual resilience as well. 
8.1.2. Types of Patience 
Aquinas argues that human beings need God’s gifts at two 
levels: (1) for doing natural good (acting well); and (2) for the healing 
of broken human nature (justification) and supernatural acts of virtue 
(such as the infused virtue of patience).19 These two levels concern 
                                                 
14 Cf. ST II-II 136.3 obj.2/ad2. 
15 Cf. ST I-II 61.5; Pinckaers 1976, 255-273. 
16 Aquinas speaks of these social or human virtues (politicae or humanae) 
earlier in his Summa theologiae, where following Macrobius, he distinguishes 
them from two other types of human virtue: purgative and perfect virtues. The 
purgative or cleansing virtues (purgatoriae) pertain to acting in accord with 
divine realities, especially by contemplating them: “quaedam sunt virtutes 
transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium” (ST I-II 61.5). The virtues 
of the pure souls (purgati animi), “sunt virtutes iam assequentium divinam 
similitudinem” (ST I-II 61.5). Both these virtutes purgatoriae and purgati animi 
have citizenship and the good of the city of God as their goal (cf. ST I-II 61.5 sc; 
III Sent. 33, 1, 4 ad 2). In these discussions, a fourth type of virtue (exemplar 
virtues) concerns God.  
17 Thomas says: “homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus 
humanis gerendis” ST I-II 61.5; and “quod acquisitae dirigunt in vita civili; unde 
habent bonum civile pro fine” III Sent. 33, 1, 4, co; cf. III Sent 33, 2, 3. 
18 Cf. ST I-II 109.2. 
19 Aquinas distinguishes five effects of grace in supernatural acts: “Sunt 
autem quinque effectus gratiae in nobis: quorum primus est ut anima sanetur, 
secundus est ut bonum velit; tertius est ut bonum quod vult, efficaciter operetur; 
quartus est ut in bono perseveret; quintus est ut ad gloriam perveniat” ST I-II, 
111.3. 
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moral and spiritual resilience, as we shall see. First, Thomas’ Theo-
centric anthropology posits that human beings are marked by the 
image of the divine Creator, who is the source of their being and co-
origin of their perfections.20 He says: “human nature needs the help of 
God as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever.”21 All good, 
even natural good, comes from, is possible through and returns to God. 
Aquinas affirms the continuing goodness of creation and the efficacy 
of divine exemplar virtues (virtutes exemplares).22 No natural good can 
be separated from God, who is the source and final goal for creation. In 
this context, we need to recall Aquinas’ distinction between two types 
of moral virtues, acquired and infused.23 
Second, in the present human state, grace is needed to heal 
deformed human nature, which is now more prone to follow proximate 
concupiscible desires rather than the future, promised goods. Human 
beings cannot fulfill all that is possible through human nature, 
although they are able by their natural endowments to act well or to 
                                                 
20 God continually creates and sustains grace in the life of the believer. God 
creates and recreates each human person through grace. “Et secundum hoc etiam 
gratia dicitur creari, ex eo quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, idest in novo 
esse constituuntur, ex nihilo, idest non ex meritis; secundum illud ad Ephes. 2, 
[9]: Creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis” ST I-II 110.2 ad 3. Cf. ST I 93.1-9. 
21 This position holds for both human integral and fallen states. “Secundum 
autem utrumque statum, natura humana indiget auxilio divino ad faciendum vel 
volendum quodcumque bonum, sicut primo movente” ST I-II 109.2. Aquinas calls 
upon the authority of St. Paul (Rm 9:16) and Augustine (De Corrept. et Gratia 
ch. 2: PL 44, 917) in illustrating how God’s grace is that source of every good 
thought, wish, love or act. Furthermore in ST I-II 109.1 sc, Aquinas calls upon 
Augustine (in one of his later works, Retract. I, 4, 2; PL 32, 589) to affirm that 
sinners also can know many truths—“potest multos etiam non mundos multa 
scire vera.” 
22 Through these virtutes exemplares, God “directs us to himself” (ST I-II 
62.1 ad 2). Exemplar virtues pre-exit in God, as Aquinas says: “Oportet igitur 
quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt 
omnium rerum rationes” (ST I-II 61.5; cf. SCG. I.54, I.92, and ST I.93; III Sent., 
33, 1, 4). Aquinas employs both Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1, referring to 
Plotinus and Plato) and St. Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. 6, n. 9-10; PL 32, 1314-
1315) as sources for this position on exemplar virtues. 
23 Acquired moral virtue entails behaving well in regards to human affairs 
(cf. ST I-II 63.2). While infused moral virtue pertains to the spiritual life, 
“secundum quam homo est civis civitatis Dei, et membrum corporis Christi, quod 
est Ecclesia; et haec quidem civilitas in futuro non evacuabitur, sed perficietur” 
III Sent. 33, 1, 4, sol.; cf. ST I-II 63.2-4. On the difference between “human 
virtues” and Gifts infused by the Holy Spirit, cf. ST I-II 63.3; and ST I-II 68.1. 
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attain some particular, natural goods, such as: building homes, planting 
vineyards and having friends, as Aquinas specifies. “Yet [human 
nature] cannot do all the good natural (connaturale) to it, so as to fall 
short in nothing; just as a sick man can of himself make some 
movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of 
one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured.”24 Thus in 
addition to needing divine help (auxilio divino) for the capacity to 
perform well any good action, one needs grace (gratia gratum faciens) 
in the form of infused moral virtues to heal human inconsistency and 
thus, even only in the realm of social virtues, approach true, consistent 
and complete natural patience. 
In its integral state, human nature needed the assistance of 
sanctifying grace in order to be conformed most completely to the 
image of the Creator. All the more so now, true patience as an infused 
virtue counts on God’s completing and purifying grace. This need for 
grace is also true for the theological virtues of faith, hope, love and the 
other infused virtues. The question remains whether there is an 
acquired true patience without grace. 
Aquinas’ treatment of patience makes two original points:25 
that natural virtue needs God’s help (in order to act well); and that it 
also requires sanctifying grace in order to heal the deformities in 
human nature and for acts of theological and infused virtue. Laboring 
to demonstrate the harmonious relationship of human and revealed 
wisdom, Aquinas acknowledges two types of patience, one a natural 
acquired moral virtue and the other an infused moral virtue. The 
                                                 
24 “potest quidem etiam in statu naturae corruptae, per virtutem suae 
naturae aliquod bonum particulare agere, sicut aedificare domos, plantare 
vineas, et alia huiusmodi; non tamen totum bonum sibi connaturale, ita quod in 
nullo deficiat. Sicut homo infirmus potest per seipsum aliquem motum habere; 
non tamen perfecte potest moveri motu hominis sani, nisi sanetur auxilio 
medicinae” ST I-II 109.2; cf. ST I-II 109.5. 
25 While remaining faithful to Augustine’s central insights, Aquinas’ 
treatment of patience goes beyond them. A difference springs from these two 
theologians’ approaches to doing theology and perspectives on society in general. 
Augustine emphasizes how true virtue opposes the pride endemic in the Roman 
pagan society of his time, especially the philosophical circles that he had 
frequented, where pagan pride manifests itself in the rejection of Scripture (he is 
also battling Pelagian errors). Aquinas on the contrary lives in another epoch and 
approaches pagan sources in a more conciliatory way, without the same bellicose 
rhetoric. 
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question remains whether they both merit the Augustinian appellation 
of true patience. 
In order to understand the two types of patience more fully, it 
is perhaps useful to compare how they parallel two types of 
flourishing. First, limited flourishing is possible in the present life. 
Second, complete flourishing is beyond our experiences at present, and 
further dependent on God for its realization.26 Moreover, in the present 
life, there are two additional types of flourishing: (a) there is the 
incomplete flourishing achieved through various natural human 
activities;27 (b) there is an imperfect participation in happiness, which 
is possible through the theologal life of the infused virtues.28 At 
present, both natural patience and infused patience are incomplete 
(from the human side), and they participate differently in sources of 
strength and vision as well: one that is in the measure of this world, the 
other that participates in the security and completeness of the next. 
In parallel with this typology of patience, can it be said that 
there are two types of resilience? This perspective indicates that 
resilience as a natural good is empowered by God through natural 
means (as auxilio Dei). As a supernatural good, spiritual resilience is 
likened to infused virtue insofar as the object of its act, its finality or 
future good, and its rational means (informed by faith) are theological 
in tenor. These distinctions are a tentative theological application to 
resilience research and theory. They propose an understanding of 
spiritual resilience in terms of virtue, which is within the realm of 
theological reflection rather than strictly external scientific 
observation. These questions of the typology of patience, flourishing 
and resilience leave unanswered questions about the purpose of 
patience and resilience, to which we turn. 
8.1.3. Patience, Its Purpose and Motivation 
What is the end of these types of patience and resilience? Can 
we further distinguish them according to their purpose(s)? Aquinas 
clarifies his position on patience’s purpose by raising another objection 
                                                 
26 Cf. ST I-II 69.2; Pinckaers 1984, 80-94. 
27 Cf. ST I-II 2.1-8; 5.1-8. 
28 Cf. ST I-II 69.2 corpus and ad 3; Pinckaers 1995a; R. Cessario 1996, 2-5. 
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to the need for grace in patience. It claims that often people without 
grace go through much pain and trouble in order to regain their own 
bodily health.29 If the good of the soul is even more important, why 
cannot someone without grace endure many difficulties and much 
suffering in order to regain one’s health and well-being? This position 
seems common sense. We can apply this insight to the typology of 
resilience as well. If the stakes are so important—complete flourishing 
and health—why cannot people achieve spiritual resilience on their 
own? 
Aquinas responds to this Pelagian argument by affirming that 
to seek the soul’s supernatural good (salus animae) is itself on a 
different level than the seeking of bodily health (sanitas corporis). 
Salvation requires supernatural love while health requires natural love. 
Sanctifying grace is already operative in our concern for our salvation. 
Aquinas clarifies this point further in his treatment of the working of 
prevenient grace, which describes how we desire the good of salvation 
before it is possessed.30 Moreover, it is interesting to note how Aquinas 
here distinguishes the acts of natural and supernatural patience. He 
applies the word patience (patientia) only to the realm of salvation, but 
uses tolerantia malorum (the tolerance of ills and evils) instead when 
referring to the enduring of difficulties in view of regaining bodily 
health. This distinction seems to illustrate: (1) that the object of “true 
patience” is the eternal flourishing and the fulfillment of the Gospel 
promises needing the help of God, that comes in sanctifying grace; and 
(2) that natural patience is the tolerantia malorum, which we sustain 
by natural love although neither consistently nor completely.31 
                                                 
29 Cf. ST II-II 136.3 obj. 3. 
30 Cf. ST I-II 111.3. Someone in sin cannot but place an obstacle to grace, 
except through the assistance of prevenient grace; cf. SCG, III.160; Ad Joan. 
1.10, 206 and 1.4, 644. Prevenient grace does not prevent (or force) but rather 
enables someone to take a free decision for faith, cf. Ad Eph. 5.5. In regards to 
prevenient grace, Aquinas finds sources in St. Augustine De natura et gratia 
xxxi; Rm 11:6 and 6:23. 
31 H.-D. Noble (1932, 296) says: “La patience vertu naturelle n’est pas 
autre chose que le stoïcisme, l’endurance calme devant les aspérités et les 
souffrances de la vie. On voit des hommes qui supportent avec un admirable 
courage des souffrances très grandes, uniquement pour des motifs humains, 
d’ailleurs très légitimes; [...] Cette patience ne procède point de l’amour 
surnaturel, si elle n’a que ces motifs humains.” 
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Aquinas argues that this virtue becomes intelligible when we 
realize that someone will only patiently suffer through an ill for the 
sake of some good goal.32 Indeed, we will not patiently bear difficulties 
for the sake of something that we perceive as evil itself. Aquinas 
understands that those who do evil, who act for a bad end, 
misrepresent that end as a good. More than a simple epistemological 
mistake, it can result from a gradual accumulation of moral errors. In 
the hierarchy of goods, we will suffer evil for some greater goods, and 
we will do without some lesser goods even when their lack causes 
sorrow and demands patient endurance. The first type of good is more 
powerful since it enables us to bear some evil. It has a certain absolute 
character. For Aquinas, the good of grace (and the desire not to lose it) 
exemplifies this first type of good, which allows us to both suffer evil, 
and endure patiently the sorrow of doing without other secondary 
goods. 
Aquinas argues that if we prefer the good of grace to other 
lesser, natural goods it is because of charity. He thus recognizes that 
the infused virtue of patience has God as its source (in sanctifying 
grace—gratia gratum faciens) and as its final cause. In this 
fundamentally theological perspective, Aquinas deems that inasmuch 
as patience, at least indirectly, has as its end the future glory and 
flourishing that God alone grants, such patience depends upon 
sanctifying grace,33 and insofar as it concerns not wanting to lose the 
good of grace (bonum gratiae), it depends on the grace of charity, 
through which we love God above all things.34 Indeed, acts of patience, 
as well as of fortitude and all other virtues, are only meritorious if they 
                                                 
32 Cf. ST II-II 136.3; and Augustine’s argument about only suffering for 
some pleasure in De pat. iv.  
33 Thomas says in the SCG (III.151) “Forma per quam res ordinatur in 
aliquem finem, assimilat quodammodo rem illam fini: sicut corpus per formam 
gravitatis acquirit similitudinem et conformitatem ad locum ad quem naturaliter 
movetur. Ostensum est autem [cap. praec.] quod gratia gratum faciens est forma 
quaedam in homine per quam ordinatur ad ultimum finem, qui Deus est. Per 
gratiam ergo homo Dei similitudinem consequitur. Similitudo autem est 
dilectionis causa: omne enim simile diligit sibi simile [Eccli. xiii, 19]. Per 
gratiam ergo homo efficitur Dei dilector.” 
34 Aquinas says “Unde manifestum est quod patientia, secundum quod est 
virtus, a caritate causitur: secundum illud I ad Cor 13, 4: ‘Caritas patiens est’” ST 
II-II 136.3; cf. ST II-II 23.4 ad 2; ST II-II 186.7 ad 1; ST I-II 65.3 ad 1. 
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are done out of charity.35 Another effect of charity in the act of patience 
is excellence in bearing hardships.36 
Although Aquinas clearly holds that it is impossible to have 
the patience based on charity without the help of actual grace,37 he also 
affirms that even when sanctifying grace and the theological virtue of 
charity are absent every good human act in the realm of social virtues 
entails another gift from God (auxilio Dei), as we have stated. It seems 
to me that the natural political or social virtues involved in building 
homes, farming fields, and having friends must then involve a natural 
patience, with the help of God (auxilio Dei) appropriate for natural 
goods. However, does Aquinas construe it as a “true” natural 
patience?38 The question seems clarified by the principle that a natural 
                                                 
35 When addressing whether charity or another virtue is the principle of 
merit, Aquinas says: “Similiter etiam actus patientiae et fortitudinis non est 
meritorius nisi aliquis ex caritate haec operetur; secundum illud 1 ad Cor. 13,[8]: 
Si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi 
prodest” ST I-II 114.4 ad 3. 
36 In discussing Christian perfection, Thomas says, “patientia dicitur 
habere opus perfectum in ordine ad caritatem: in quantum scilicet ex abundantia 
caritatis provenit quod aliquis patienter toleret adversa, secundum illud Rom. 8 
[35]: Quis nos separabit a caritate Dei? Tribulatio? an angustia? etc.” ST II-II 
184.1 ad 3; cf. Jas 1:4. 
37 ST II-II 136.3. “Manifestum est autem quod caritas non potest haberi nisi 
per gratiam: secundum illud Rom. 5, (5): Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus 
nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Unde patet quod patientia non 
potest haberi sine auxilio gratiae.” 
38 In my reading, Aquinas does not clearly resolve this problem in question 
ST II-II 136, because he has already done so in ST II-II 23.7. According to Gilson 
(1946, 104), however, there is a “natural virtue of patience without grace,” but no 
true natural patience. Gilson would have us think that Aquinas strictly follows 
Augustine, who is not unaccustomed to say that true patience only pertains to that 
which is inspired and sustained by charity. Gilson interprets Thomas as affirming 
that true patience is supernatural patience alone. E. Gilson (1946, 104), says 
“Qu’il y ait une vertu politique naturelle, non d’ailleurs sans un secours de 
grâce, soit, mais une vertu naturelle ‘de patience’, il n’en est pas ici question.” 
This comment might only refer to the infused virtue of patience (cf. ST II-II 136.3 
ad 1). 
In adjudicating this issue, we need to ask what Aquinas intends by 
“goods to come” (bona futura). Do they refer to the goods of social virtues as 
well, or only to strictly supernatural goods and ends? Aquinas’ use of bonum 
furturum (bona futura) needs to be considered in the larger context of his ST and 
the whole of his thought. In the ST, we find several examples were he makes a 
comparison between temporal goods and the goods to come (ST II-II 36.2: “ad 
bona futura”), or between present things and invisible goods to come (ST II-II 
124.4: “ad futura et ad invisibilita bona”). In his other works a marked example 
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virtue can be true, even though it is incomplete.39 Calling lesser, natural 
human goods “true patience” need neither diminish the primacy put on 
charity-based patience, which finds its ultimate source and final cause 
in God’s patience,40 nor disregard charity as the foundation of infused 
social virtue.41 
This typology of patience suggests a parallel for resilience: we 
acquire a resilience that is in the measure of our natural capacities 
(though not possible with consistency and completeness unless we are 
healed and strengthened by sanctifying grace); we receive a spiritual 
type of resilience that outstrips our natural capacities and needs the 
grace of the theological virtues, in order to know, to motivate and to 
hope to attain its theological object(s). 
8.1.4. The Patience of God expressed through Jesus 
Christ 
This discussion demands a fuller examination of Aquinas’ 
approach to the theological sources and manifestations of patience, in 
order to explain how the patience of God as expressed in Christ serves 
as the source and model of patience for others. Thomas’ theological 
and Christological exploration of patience can serve in turn to enhance 
Christian resilience, which entails that we understand suffering through 
faith and that we endure with charity and hope. 
                                                                                                          
is in the Exp. Job, where he distinguishes temporal goods from future spiritual 
rewards (Ch. 2, p. 95) and from goods of the soul (Ch. 27, p. 325). 
39 In his discussion of “Utrum sine caritate possit esse aliqua vera virtus” 
(ST II-II 23.7), Aquinas concludes: “Si vero illud bonum particulare sit verum 
bonum, puta conservatio civitatis vel aliquid huiusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, 
sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum.” Cf. ST II-II 136.3 ad 
1. M. Labourdette (1962: 44) holds that “il y a une vertu naturelle de patience 
mais qu’on ne peut acquérir sans la guérison de la grâce et les confortations de 
la vertu infuse de patience.” 
40 Aquinas affirms this insight with support of Scripture (Ps. 61: 5) and St. 
Augustine (De Patientia, i). 
41 In addition to ST II-II 136.3 ad 1 (of which we are speaking), Aquinas 
discusses “true patience” in the following places: (1) in Sent. 33, 3, art iii, no. 
343, he says “Unde Gregorgius (Hom. 25 in Evang., n. 4; L. 76, 1261): ‘Vera 
patientia est mala aliena,’ id est ab aliis illata, ‘aequanimiter perpeti’;” and (2) in 
Aquinas’ Catena Aurea, we find other texts to which he was familiar, like St. 
Cyprian’s Sermon (Fourth Sunday of Lent, 2.12, Sct. 1, Pt 2, p. 346). 
474 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
Aquinas’ Scriptural commentaries42 illustrate how the blessing 
of God’s patience expresses divine mercy and charity, which serve as a 
final cause for human action.43 God’s patience is made known so that 
sinners may turn to God, believe in Christ and come to eternal life.44 
God patiently (yet actively) waits45 in the face of the evil that we suffer 
and that we do, of the good that we do not accomplish, and in 
anticipation of our participating more fully in God’s own good. In 
particular, God’s merciful patience is the means that God offers human 
beings to participate in the redemption wrought by Jesus Christ.46 
                                                 
42 Examination of this fuller patience requires exploring Aquinas’ works on 
patience, beyond the question devoted to it ST II-II 136. The comprehensiveness 
of his notions of the virtues is exhausted neither in his philosophical sources, nor 
his systematic theological analyses, like that of the ST in which he outlines basic 
concepts without always fully articulating them. Indeed, he unfolds insights, 
images and descriptions in a less systematic way in his commentaries and 
reportationes on Scripture, the Pater and the Credo, as well as other loci of his 
ST. 
43 Aquinas in commenting on the final cause of God’s blessing (Eph 2: 7) 
relates that it is through God’s mercy that God is patient with sinners (cf. Ad Eph. 
cap. 2 lect. 2; cf. cap. 3 lect. 2). 
44 Cf. Ad Eph. cap. 2, lect. 2 (Eph 2:4-7); Aquinas uses 1 Tim 1:15 to 
illustrate how divine mercy and patience is the final cause for human conversion. 
Also see: Ad Rom. cap. 2, lect. 1 and 2 (Rom 2:4 and 7), where Aquinas 
illustrates this point further with reference to Ps 7:11-12; 2 Pet 3:9 and 3:15. 
45 “Patience” and “waiting” are metaphorically attributed to God, only 
inasmuch as we can intelligibly predicate these time-bound images to God’s 
simplicity and eternity. The waiting of God is especially problematic in the 
context of the suffering of the innocent and the just at the hands of the unjust. 
Patience or long-suffering does not entail that God suffers in the human sense of 
suffering. Aquinas employs the authority of Augustine who says: “quod patientia 
Dei praedicatur non in hoc quod aliquod malum patiatur, sed in hoc quod 
expectat malos ut convertantur” De Pat. i, quoted in ST II-II 136.5 obj. 1, where 
Aquinas also refers to Eccl 5:4: “Altissimus patiens redditur est.” Furthermore, it 
is interesting to note that Aquinas slightly modified Augustine’s De Pat. when he 
used it in the ST II-II 136.1 sc: “Virtus animi quae patientia dicitur, tam magnum 
Dei donum est ut etiam ipsius qui nobis eam largitur [qua malos ut corrigantur 
expectat] patientia praedicetur.” Aquinas dropped the bracketed part of 
Augustine’s definition. Cf. Ad Mat. cap. 17, no. 2; and I Sent. 30, 1, 2, ad 2.  
46 Thomas explains the soteriological fruit of divine patience in his 
commentary on Romans 2:4, “An divitias bonitatis eius et patientiae et 
longanimitatis contemnis” which he also quotes in: ST II-II 136.5 sc; ad Rom cap. 
2, lect. 2 (Rom 2:4). The whole plan of salvation and reconciliation, worked 
through Christ, is an expression of God’s patience; as Aquinas says: “ex parte 
Christi qui pro nobis mortem sustinuit, fuit immensa caritas, quae facit 
passionem ex parte patientiae Deo acceptam: et sic per ipsam sumus 
reconciliati” III Sent. 19, 1, 5, ad 3. 
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Jesus’ patience offers us a model of well-ordered suffering and 
sorrow. Aquinas establishes three criteria in order that Christ’s passion 
and death serve as an efficacious exemplar: the reality of his suffering, 
its voluntariness and its conformity to reason.47 
Aquinas holds that Jesus Christ really suffered and experienced 
sorrow,48 with moral and soteriological ramifications. Neither Jesus 
Christ’s union with the Father and the joy of His divine contemplation, 
nor His perfect virtue kept Him from feeling human sadness.49 Aquinas 
illustrates this by quoting Matthew (26:38): “My soul is sorrowful 
even unto death.”50 Jesus Christ was capable of joy and sorrow, since 
the divine Word, the second person of the Holy Trinity, assumed 
human nature. 
Aquinas distinguishes between a passion and propassion,51 in 
order to explain that Jesus had a true experience of sadness, which was 
rightly affected by the object, without unreasonable resultant action.52 
Jesus Christ’s experience of sorrow and suffering was a propassion and 
not a disordered passion.53 This difference does not make His sorrow 
                                                 
47 Thomas says: “Et ideo Christus, ut satisfaceret pro peccatis omnium 
hominum, assumpsit tristitiam maximam quantitate absoluta, non tamen 
excedentem regulam rationis” ST III 46.6 ad 2. 
48 In addition to a human intellect and will, Christ had a human sensitive 
appetite or sensuality; cf. ST III 18.2; SCG IV.8, IV.32, and IV.35. 
49 Cf. ST I-II 59.3; and ST III 15. 6. 
50 Aquinas quotes this passage as the authority (of the sed contra) quoted in 
his article on “whether there was sorrow in Christ” (ST III 15.6 sc; cf. ST I-II 59.3 
sc). In the Comp. Theo. (ch. 232 ff.), Aquinas asks what suffered in Christ? He 
responds that the Word of God, Christ suffered in His soul, not only in His lower 
reason, imagination and body. Gondreau (2000, 373-88) skillfully addresses 
Aquinas’ position on Christ’s sorrow in the Tertia pars (ST III 15.6). 
51 In general, passion can have as its object what is unlawful to do, or it can 
forestall the judgment of reason. A propassion however does not hold sway over 
the soul and its functions. Aquinas says: “ut passio perfecta intelligatur quando 
animo, idest rationi, dominatur; propassio autem, quando est inchoata in 
appetitu sensitivo, sed ulterius non se extendit” ST III 15.4; cf. ST III 15.6 ad 2.  
52 Cf. ST III 46.5-8; and III Sent. 2, 3, co. 
53 In the III Sent 15, 2, 2, co, Thomas says: “sed in Christo nunquam 
surgebat motus tristitiae nisi secundum dictamen superioris rationis, quando 
scilicet dictabat ratio quod sensualitas tristaretur secundum convenientiam 
naturae suae; et ideo non fuit in eo tristitia rationem pervertens, nec fuit 
necessaria, sed voluntaria quodammodo.” Furthermore in the ST (III 15.6 ad 1 
and ad 2), Aquinas explicitly responds to the Stoics. He distinguishes well-
ordered and inordinate management and experiences of passion, which are 
explained by the Stoics in terms of proper sorrowing, which pertains to the 
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radically different (human experiences of sorrow do not necessarily 
hinder reasonable action) nor does it diminish what He suffered (for 
He suffered immensely).54 The difference concerns consistency, not 
type. His were moral acts. Aquinas distinguishes Jesus suffering as a 
“propassion” since in experiencing His own passion and death, and in 
sorrowing for the plight of others,55 He was not deflected from His 
mission, which involved knowledge, freedom and surety, that is, a 
moral act. 
In facing great suffering and trials, even his own death, with 
tranquility of mind, Jesus Christ has become an example of patience, 
manifesting the patience of God the Father. The example of Christ is 
especially efficacious since He knew He would suffer death and 
torture, as a result of proclaiming the Gospel of salvation for all 
humankind, in accord with the plan and will of the Father. Christ did 
not voluntarily will His death and passion per se; however He did 
chose them as ordained to the end (voluntaria in ordine ad finem), the 
redemption of humankind.56 Jesus suffered for a purpose. He did not 
search human glory. Rather, He knew His destiny, His glory to be 
revealed in the future, and that the path to the redemptive 
manifestation of this glory was His passion and humiliation.57 
Moreover, Aquinas specifies that when needing patience when faced 
with persecution, we in a more general sense also follow Jesus Christ’s 
example through gentleness.58 Patience demands such gentleness in 
order to not perturb right judgment and to withstand persecution. 
                                                                                                          
apprehending, through the sensitive appetite, of bodily or exterior evils without 
disturbing reason. 
54 “circa mortem Christi, commendantur patientia et constantia ipsius qui 
mortem est passus: et tanto magis, quanto mors fuit abiectior” ST III 51.2 ad 1. 
55 Cf. ST III 15.6; and ST III 46.6. 
56 “Et hoc modo mors Christi et eius passio fuit, secundum se considerata, 
involuntaria et tristitiam causans: licet fuerit voluntaria in ordine ad finem, qui 
est redemptio humani generis” ST III 15.6 ad 4. 
57 Cf. ad Joh. cap. 7, lect. 1 no. 1019, where Aquinas reinforces his 
commentary referring to Luke 24:26 and Rom 8:18. Aquinas (ST III 15.6 sc) 
quotes Ambrose who says: “Ut homo, tristitiam habuit: suscepit enim tristitiam 
meam. Confidenter tristitiam nomino, qui crucem praedico” De Trin. ii, Al., de 
Fide ad Gratiam., ii, 7. 
58 Aquinas’ commentary reads: “Generale, quod debet habere qui vult 
disputare, est quod sit mansuetus. [...] Est enim mansuetudo virtus compescens 
ab ira, quae perturbat judicium rationis, quae necessaria est in quaestione et 
judicio veritatis. Matth. 11:29: ‘Discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde.’ In 
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St. Thomas employs Romans 15:5 in order to explain that the 
mercy and consolation of God is made manifest in the suffering of 
Jesus Christ, who serves as an example for us when we must face some 
suffering or evil.59 Thomas explains that Jesus Christ 
gave an example of patience, a virtue that prevents sorrow 
from overwhelming man in time of adversity; the greater the trials, the 
more splendidly does the virtue of patience shine forth in them. 
Therefore an example of perfect patience is afforded in the greatest of 
evils, which is death, if it is borne without distress of mind.60 
This model is especially clear in His enduring passion on the 
cross. Aquinas says: “If you seek an example of patience, you will find 
it in its highest degree upon the Cross.”61 
Aquinas sees the passion and cross of Jesus Christ as the 
exemplar not only of the virtue of patience,62 but of all virtues.63 
Illustrating that patience is not a static virtue, but mobile, dynamic and 
                                                                                                          
speciali autem debet habere, respectu superiorum, docilitatem; respectu 
persecutorum, patientiam; respectu falsorum doctorum, correctionem” II ad 
Timoth., cap. 2, lect. 4 (2 Tim 2:24-25). 
59 Cf. Ad Rom. cap. 15, lect. 1; Luke 22:42; Ps 93:19; 1 Pet 1:11; Job 13:15; 
2 Cor 1:3. 
60 “Quantum ad patientiam uero, que in aduersis tristitiam hominem 
absorbere non sinit, quia quanto sunt maiora aduersa, tanto magis in hiis relucet 
patientie uirtus : unde in maximo malorum quod est mors, perfecte patientie 
datur exemplum, si absque mentis turbatione sustineatur.” This quote continues: 
“quod de Christo propheta predixit dicens Ys. liii,7 ‘Tamquam agnus coram 
tondente se obmutescet, et non aperiet os suum’” Comp. Theo. 1, 2, 227. 
Elsewhere, in the context of discussing the virtues and the Gifts of the Holy 
Spirit, Aquinas says: “in passione Christi praecipue a sanctis proponuntur nobis 
imitanda caritas, humilitas, patientia, quae sunt virtutes, et magis quam sapientia 
et scientia, quae sunt dona” III Sent 34, 1, 1 co; cf. ST I-II 68.1. 
61 Aquinas argues “Si queris exemplum patientiae, excellentissima in cruce 
inventitur. Patientia enim ex duobus magna ostenditur: aut cum quis magna 
patienter suffert, aut cum ea suffert quae vitare posset, et non vitat” In symb. 
apost. art. 4. He adds in the ST (III 15.6 ad 4): “Et hoc modo mors Christi et eius 
passio fuit, secundum se considerata, involuntaria et tristitiam causans: licet 
fuerit voluntaria in ordine ad finem, qui est redemptio humani generis.” 
62 Cf. ST III 46.4; where Aquinas, in discussing the passion of Christ, 
identifies how the length of the cross itself symbolizes Christian longanimity. He 
finds this insight in Augustine, de Gratia Vet. et Novi Test. 140, 120, 26. 
63 He says: “Nullum enim exemplum virtutis abest a cruce” In symb. apost., 
art. 4. In addition to patience, he also specifically mentions how Jesus Christ’s 
passion serves as an example of charity, humility, obedience and contempt of 
earthly things. In sym. apost. art. 4. He also deems the Blessed Virgin Mary and 
the saints as exemplars of virtue (In sal. ang.). 
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fruitful, his commentary on the Apostle’s Creed quotes the letter to the 
Hebrews: “Let us run by patience to the fight proposed to us; looking 
on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith, who, having joy set before 
Him endured the cross, despising the shame.”64 Christ for His part 
shows that being set on the reward of joy and future glory with the 
Father enabled Him to endure the cross. It is the promised joy of 
eternal life and glory with God the Father (as final cause) that makes 
the passion and death of Jesus Christ comprehensible, and in turn 
makes possible following His example in offering one’s life for others, 
in martyrdom and other self-giving acts.65 The “cloud of witnesses” 
mentioned in the Letter to the Hebrews (12:1) serves participatively as 
active examples sharing spiritual consolation and, showing how they 
were able to run the race more freely and surely by having laid down 
the weight (burden) of sin and earthly desires. Thomas also affirms that 
Paul and the “cloud of witnesses” serve as models of following 
Christ’s suffering.66 
In sum, by patiently enduring the dangers of death and other 
types of suffering, we enter into the life of glory. It is thus that Aquinas 
interprets what it means to “always carry in the body the death of 
Jesus” (2 Cor 4:10), to always be in His patience.67 Aquinas recognizes 
that such fullness of patience as found in Christ must be rooted in 
charity; that is, the fullness of patience entails how we support evil and 
                                                 
64 “Per patientiam curramus ad propositum nobis certamen, aspicientes in 
autorem fidei et consummatorem Iesum, qui, proposito sibi gaudio sustinuit 
crucem confusione contempta” Heb 12:1-2, as quoted in In symb. apost., art. 4. 
The RSV translation: “let us also lay aside every weight, and sin which clings so 
closely, and let us run with perseverance (ØpomonÁj) the race that is set before us, 
looking to Jesus the pioneer and perfecter of our faith, who for the joy that was 
set before him endured (Øpšmeine) the cross, despising the shame” (Heb 12:1-2) is 
also quoted by Aquinas in his commentaries Ad Phil. cap. 2, lect. 1; and ad Thes. 
cap. 1, lect.1. 
65 Cf. Ad Heb. cap. 12, lect. 1. Thomas mentions the patience of martyrs in 
numerous places including: ST II-II 124.2 ad 3; I 19.9 ad 1; I 22.2 ad 1; ST I-II 
102.4 ad 8; ST I-II 114.4 obj. 3. 
66 Cf. I ad Thess cap. 1, lect. 1, (1 Thess 1:6); Ad Heb. cap. 12, lect. 1 (Heb 
12:1); Cf. I ad Thess. cap. 2, lect. 2 (1 Thess 2:6-10 ); and II ad Thess. cap. 3, 
lect. 1 (2 Thess 3:5); Ad Rom., prologus.  
67 “Consequenter cum dicit, Semper mortificationem Jesu Christi in corpore 
nostro circumferentes, subdit rationem hujus patientiae. [...] Et ideo dicit, quod 
ideo pericula mortis et passiones patienter sustinemus, ut perveniamus ad 
gloriosam vitam” II ad Cor. cap. 4, lect. 3. 
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suffer difficulties following His example of self-giving love for God 
the Father, for humanity (our neighbors) and for all creation.68 
8.1.5. Persisting to the End in Christ: The Virtue of 
Perseverance 
Aquinas’ treatment of the infused virtue of perseverance is 
quite akin to that of patience, and his sources are philosophical, 
Patristic and Scriptural.69 Aquinas does not construe perseverance as 
merely a human natural virtue through which we complete acts 
important for this life, such as building, planting, familial and 
friendship relationships. We express two types of perseverant act 
according to two types of ends: a specific work and one’s whole life. 
Some acts cannot find completion until the end of life. For example, 
the dispositions of faith, hope and charity concern the fulfillment of 
our entire life, so that we persevere until the end. This distinction 
between perseverance as a habitus and as two types of act allows 
Aquinas to explain Augustine’s dictum that “no one can be said to 
have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death.”70 
Thomas explores the specifically Christian dimension of 
perseverance by asking whether it needs the help of grace. As with the 
                                                 
68 In his commentary on 2 Thess 3:5, Aquinas calls on a large number of 
Scriptural sources to support this insight (II ad Thess. cap. 3, lect. 1). “Sed opera 
non sunt bona, nisi directe in finem caritatis. 1 Tim. 1,5: ‘Finis praecepti est 
caritas de corde puro, et conscientia bona et fide non ficta.’ Item nec patientia nisi 
per Christum. Luc. 21,19 ‘In patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras.’ Mat. 
5,11 ‘Beati eritis cum maledixerint vobis homines, et persecuti vos fuerint, et 
dixerint omne malum adversus vos, mentientes, propter me.’ Et ideo dicit, Et 
patientia Christi, idest tolerentia malorum propter Christum, vel ad exemplum 
ejus. 1 Pt. 2,21 ‘Christus passus est pro nobis, vobis relinquens exemplum, ut 
sequamini vestigia ejus.’” 
69 Aquinas dialogues with the following sources on the virtue of 
perseverance (ST II-II 137) and on the vices opposed to perseverance (ST II-II 
138), listed in order of frequency: Aristotle (subt: 15): NE ii.3; ii.4; vi.8; vii.7 
(eight times); vii.8; vii.9 (three times); Augustine (subt. 7): De Persever. I.1; I.6 
(twice); De Lib. Arb ii.19; Tract. In Joan. lxxix.14; De Correp. et Grat. xi.11; 
xi.12; Scripture (subtotal: 5): Deut 28:56; Wis 5:7; Mat 24:13; Rom 5:15; 1 Cor 
6:9-10; Cicero (subt: 5): De office. I.20; Rhet ii.53; ii.54 (three times); 
Andronicus (Chrysippus) (subt. 2): Definit. III.578 (twice); St. Gregory the Great 
(subt: 1): Moral. 31.45; Isadore (subt: 1): Etym. X.213-214; Macrobius (subt. 1): 
In Somn. Scip. i.8. 
70 “nullus potest dici perseverantiam habere quandiu vivit, nisi perseveret 
usque ad mortem” De Persever. i; quoted in ST II-II 137.1 obj. 2. 
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virtue of patience, Augustine is the authority on the necessity of grace. 
He quotes Augustine as saying: “We hold that perseverance is a gift of 
God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ.”71 Aquinas agrees, 
explaining two ways that someone needs grace in persevering. First, he 
considers the habitus of perseverance as an infused virtue, and 
therefore as needing the gift of habitual grace (dono habitualis 
gratiae). Second, he considers the act of perseverance as enduring in 
the good until the end of life, which needs not only the gift of habitual 
grace, but also another gratuitous gift of God.72 Aquinas explains that 
the habitual grace of the infused virtue of perseverance does not take 
away the human capacity to choose otherwise than what is good. Even 
when the free will is repaired (healed), it is still changeable. While our 
free will is capable of persevering, it so happens that it is not in our 
power to accomplish alone our plan or choice to persevere. As Aquinas 
says: “for it is often in our power to choose, but not to accomplish.”73 
In his discussion on the necessity of grace, Thomas discusses 
three ways that we need grace to persevere in good. First, as a habitus 
of the mind, through perseverance we are disposed to resist the 
pressures of sadness and sorrow that sidetrack us from the good we 
intend to accomplish. Secondly, we need a particular intention to 
remain attached to the good until the end (in finem). Both these types 
of perseverance are infused in us along with grace. Aquinas remarks 
that we need this type of habitual grace for the other virtues,74 and to 
heal wounded human nature. Although through justifying grace God 
redeems us and heals our minds (mentis), we need habitual grace that 
assists in the progressive recovery of the integrality of human nature, 
and informing our intellects that are burdened by ignorance.75 Thirdly, 
through perseverance, we abide in the good until the end of life. The 
grace of justification is not adequate. We need God’s continuing 
assistance in habitual grace in order to resist evil and persist in the 
                                                 
71 “Asserimus donum Dei esse perseverantiam, qua usque in finem 
perseveratur in Christo” De Persev. I; quoted in ST II-II 137.4 sc. 
72 Cf. ST I-II 109.10. 
73 “plerumque enim cadit in potestate nostra electio, non autem executio” 
ST II-II 137.4. 
74 Thomas (I-II 109.10) says: “Et utroque istorum modorum, perseverantia 
simul cum gratia infunditur sicut et continentia et ceterae virtutes.” 
75 Cf. ST I-II 109.9. 
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good. As Thomas observes, we need “divine assistance guiding and 
guarding us against attacks of the passions.”76 
Aquinas addresses a false and static notion of perfection and 
passivity. He recognizes the humble nature of virtue, which as a 
habitus inclining us to specific acts of excellence, must always be 
confirmed by the will. Therefore, even if we can consider that someone 
has the virtue of perseverance, as Aquinas does, “it does not follow 
that a person who has the habitus of virtue uses it unchangeably until 
death.”77 We are vulnerable because of our own status as voyagers. 
Complete and stable resilience is not assured by a singular resilient act, 
it needs to be progressively won. We need the special help of God’s 
gratuitous grace, through which we actively persevere in faith and 
hope, which are the guides for spiritual resilience.78 
Aquinas’ approach to the scripture-based precept of fortitude 
illustrates further that his notion of perseverance is not simply 
philosophical. This precept plays a pedagogical role in developing the 
disposition and preparing for acts of perseverance.79 Following 
Augustine,80 the precept is understood as a means for us to learn to 
persevere in order to gain eternal life. Indeed, the promise of the 
eternal flourishing serves a key role in understanding and motivating 
final perseverance. Thomas distinguishes the promises and effects of 
both the Old and New Testament teaching. When confronted with 
                                                 
76 Concerning the third type of perseverance, Aquinas says: “Alio modo 
dicitur perseverantia continuatio quaedam boni usque ad finem vitae. Et ad talem 
perseverantiam habendam homo in gratia constitutus non quidem indiget aliqua 
alia habiltuali gratia, sed divino auxilio ipsum dirigente et protegente contra 
tentationum impulsus” ST I-II 109.10; see also ST I-II 109.9 and ST II-II 137.4. 
77 “Quia tamen habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, non est 
necessarium quod habens habitum virtutis immobiliter utatur eo usque ad 
mortem” ST II-II 137.4 ad 1; cf. ST I-II 49.3 sc; ST I-II 50.1 ad 1; ST I-II 50.5. 
78 Cf. ST II-II 137.4 ad 2 and ad 3; where Aquinas quotes Augustine de 
Corrept. et Gratia 12, 34-35 (PL 44.937): “Sed nunc praedestinatis per gratiam 
Christi non solum datur ut perseverare possint, sed ut perseverent.” 
79 St. Thomas (cf. ST II-II 140.2 obj. 1) construes the following Scripture 
passages to involves precepts of perseverance: “He who endures to the end will 
be saved” (Matt 10:22); “Therefore, my brethren, be steadfast, immovable, 
always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that in the Lord your labor is 
not in vain” (1 Cor 15:58); “It is for discipline that you have to endure” (Heb 
12:7). 
80 Thomas (ST II-II 140.1 ad 1) cites Augustine’s anti-Manichean, contra 
Faust. IV.2; PL 42.217-8. 
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physical and especially mortal danger, Aquinas affirms that the NT 
teaches us to do spiritual battle, not only physical battle, as in the OT. 
In effect he interprets the violence mentioned in Mt. 11:12 to mean a 
spiritual struggle: “In the New Testament, men were to be taught how 
to come to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually.”81 In 
such spiritual battle we need to overcome the fear of death and to 
persevere until the end.82 
Another aspect of this spiritual battle is the resisting and 
enduring that pertains more specifically to perseverance. In various 
Epistles, Aquinas finds precepts of resistance, which are most 
connected with resisting evil and the devil.83 Such resisting, at first 
glance, might seem negative. Practically speaking however, it is quite 
positive. It entails holding firm to something or someone. According to 
1 Peter 5:9,84 resisting the devil involves standing firm in faith and 
keeping friendship with God. Perseverance is to “stand fast in the 
Lord” (1 Thess 3:8); this virtue also serves as a source of fortitude and 
perseverance for others.85 
This positive resisting recalls Augustine’s insight that Aquinas 
makes his own. Patience, which is first the patience of God expressed 
in Christ, is the gift of active waiting. We sometimes push the human 
side of waiting and resisting to extremes, and enact unnecessary 
damage. Is such patience and perseverance a type of unresilient 
vulnerability? In Aquinas’ theological perspective, what can seem to 
be folly (e.g. martyrdom, generosity or social justice) can involve 
following the model of Christ and participating in his salvific act 
through patience and perseverance. Once again the difference between 
virtue and true folly is its rational measure. Acts of patience and 
perseverance are neither un-purposeful nor unreasonable acts of 
                                                 
81 “In novo autem instruendi fuerunt homines qualiter, spiritualiter 
certando, ad possessionem vitae aeternae pervenirent: secundum illud Matth. 11, 
[12]: Regnum caelorum vim patitur, et violenti diripiunt illud” ST II-II 140.1 ad 
1. 
82 Aquinas (ST II-II 140.1 ad 1) quotes Matt 10:28, “Fear ye not them that 
kill the body.” 
83 In this regard, Aquinas (ST II-II 140.1 ad 1) quotes 1 Pet 5: 8-9: 
“Adversarius vester diabolus […] cui resistite fortes in fide;” and Jas 4:7: 
“Resistite diabolo, et fugiet a vobis.” 
84 Aquinas quotes 1 Peter 5:9 in ST II-II 140.1 ad 1. 
85 Cf. I ad Thess. lect. 3.1. 
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suffering. The reason informed by faith, that guides our acts of 
patience and perseverance, proves to be Aquinas’ criteria for spiritual 
resilience. 
Aquinas’ treatise on the cardinal virtue of fortitude treats 
patience and perseverance last, in less space and with fewer articles.86 
Do these two virtues, which have such significance for spiritual 
resilience, get short shrift? Being last is not in this case a depreciating 
quality but rather a teleological one. Patience and perseverance are 
more central to the highest form of fortitude that is martyrdom.87 They 
involve resisting sorrow and remaining strong in the pursuit of good, in 
Christ, until the end of our lives, especially when it means following 
him through a martyr’s death or being ready to do so.88 This ultimate 
dimension of the Christian life, persisting unto the end in Christ, spells 
the parameter of Christian resilience. We need now to pursue further 
Aquinas’ treatment of these virtues through consideration of the 
theological supports and development of patience and perseverance. 
8.2. Theological Supports for Patience 
In continuing to enhance our notion of spiritual resilience 
through Thomas’ works on patience, we need to keep in mind the 
importance accorded to the patience of God the Father, the example of 
Jesus Christ, as well as patience’s related Gifts, Beatitudes and fruits of 
the Holy Spirit, the latter of which we shall now explore. All these 
elements contribute to a progressive fullness of patience for Aquinas. 
My thesis is that beyond the two types of patience already explored 
(natural and infused patience), Aquinas articulates the way that 
                                                 
86 He writes a total of 3 questions and 11 articles on patience and 
perseverance, versus 7 questions and 25 articles for magnanimity and 
magnificence, and 5 questions and 25 articles for the virtue of fortitude itself and 
its principal act, martyrdom. 
87 Although Aquinas does not go so far as to say that martyrdom is an act of 
patience rather than fortitude, he does deem that martyrdom is chiefly about 
fortitude’s movement of endurance, which is expressed in patience and 
perseverance (cf. ST II-II 124.2 obj and ad 3; ST II-II 123.6). On patience, 
Aquinas quotes St. Cyprian and St. Augustine in ST II-II 124.2 in order to 
appreciate the way in which we can praise the martyr’s patience (and faith). 
88 Secondly, Aquinas has already made his case for the cardinal virtue of 
fortitude and the analysis of its related emotions. Therefore, he develops patience 
and perseverance without repeating the foundations established earlier in the 
treatise nor forgetting the perseverance needed in martyrdom. 
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patience progresses as a disposition and is enacted through these 
further theological sources. These theological resources enrich our 
understanding of spiritual resilience as well. A parallel between 
patience and fortitude serves as an illustration. Fortitude finds its 
fulfillment in martyrdom: where one proves true to God, witnessing to 
the Gospel of Jesus Christ, even while being put to death for the cause 
of truth, goodness and justice. In Thomas’ analysis of patience, we find 
a similar progression and transformation of a conception of virtue that 
we can no longer simply deem a Stoic virtue of resistance. Infused 
patience is completed by the perfection of the infused virtue of hope, 
and the Gift of fortitude; it is further perfected in the fruits of patience 
and longanimity and the Beatitudes. 
8.2.1. Hope as a Source of Patience 
Aquinas says that the “hope set on the living God, who is 
Savior of all, especially of those who believe,” gives the reason 
motivating all of life, especially in the midst of sorrow and toil.89 How 
can we enrich our awareness of resisting resilience through the role 
that hope plays in patience? For Aquinas, the promise of the life to 
come, as the final cause, inspires hope that underlies our patience in 
labor; likewise, this patience serves to fuel Christian hope. Patience is 
pertinent not only in the waiting for the accomplishments of the hoped 
for promises, but in actively doing what is fitting in the mean time. As 
the letter to the Hebrews says: “For you have need of endurance 
[Øpomon», patience], so that you may do the will of God and receive 
what is promised.”90 This promise is eternal life and a sharing in the 
true glory of God.91 Aquinas explains that confidence in these rewards 
inclines us to handle sadness patiently, without exceeding what is 
reasonable, both in regards to suffering evil and waiting for the loved 
goods.92 
                                                 
89 1 Tim 4:10. Cf. I ad Timoth. cap. 4, lect. 2. 1 Tim 4:7-8 (in regards to 
training in piety or godliness) and also 2 Tim 2:6 (concerning hard work and 
rewards), and Ad Eph. cap. 2, lect. 2 (concerning final cause). 
90 Heb 10:36 (RSV). Ad Heb. cap 10, lect. 4. Cf. Ad Eph. cap. 4, lect. 1 (Eph 
4:2), where the quote illustrates why we rightly avoid impatience. 
91 Cf. ST II-II 132, 1 ad 2; Rom 2:7; 2 Cor 10:17-18. 
92 Cf. Ad Heb. cap. 10, lect. 4 (Heb 10:35-36). 
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In his second letter to the Corinthians, Paul illustrates the 
interrelationship between patience, hope and consolation: “If we are 
afflicted, it is for your comfort and salvation; and if we are comforted, 
it is for your comfort, which you experience when you patiently endure 
the same sufferings that we suffer. Our hope for you is unshaken; for 
we know that as you share in our sufferings, you will also share in our 
comfort.”93 Aquinas says that this consolation, granted to Paul, is 
effective for others not only in being a means of consolation and 
salvation, but also in expressing the ordering of this consolation toward 
salvation. In patiently enduring as Paul did, we demonstrate patience in 
adversity as well as the fruit, which comes from this patience. This 
fruit is hope in eternal life. As Aquinas says in his commentary on 2 
Corinthians: “From the suffering which the saints of God sustain for 
Christ springs forth their hope for eternal life: and the cause of this 
hope is the knowledge that as you have shared in our suffering, so you 
shall share in our consolation; that is eternal life.”94 The fullness of the 
graced virtue of hope is completed when it becomes embodied in the 
believer’s experience of patience and perseverance in the face of the 
inevitable and unavoidable suffering and waiting that one must face 
while being true to Jesus Christ, in word and deed. 
Hope is a key in Paul’s understanding of how God strengthens 
the local churches against tribulation.95 Aquinas interprets Paul’s 
teaching on hope to be eschatological and Trinitarian. This hope allows 
us to patiently support adversity, with the joy inspired by the Holy 
Spirit;96 it is based on the promises made known through Christ and his 
resurrection, which all lead us to God the Father.97 The hope that we 
                                                 
93 2 Cor 1:6-7 (RSV). 
94 “Nam ex passionibus quas sustinent sancti Dei pro Christo, consurgit eis 
spes vitae aeternae: et causa spei hujus est, quia sumus scientes, quia sicut estis 
socii nostri in passionibus, eritis socii et consolationis; idest vitae aeternae” II ad 
Cor. cap 1, lect. 3 (2 Cor 1:6-8). In this regard, he also quotes: Rom 5:3; 2 Tim 
2:11; 1 Pet 4:14; and St. Gregory the Great. Cf. Ad Eph. cap. 4, lect. 1 (Eph 4:1-
4). 
95 Cf. 1 Thess 1:1-8; 2 Cor 1-11. 
96 In I ad Thess. cap. 1, lect. 1 (1 Thess 1:3-6), Aquinas refers to the 
plenitude of the Holy Spirit’s works among Christ’s followers who suffer: Acts 
2:4; Acts 5:41; Acts 10:44; Heb 2:4; Matt 10:20; Jas 1:2. 
97 Cf. I ad Thess. cap. 1, lect. 1 (1 Thess 1:3); where Aquinas argues in the 
light of the following Scripture quotes: 1 Thess 4:9; Rom 12:12; Jas 5:2; 1 Pet 
1:3; Matt 6:1; Heb 6:19.  
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have, in the midst of trial, tribulation and suffering has to be based 
both in faith, which gives meaning to tribulations and expresses itself 
in good works,98 and in charity, which endures and through which good 
works abound.99 Observance of the law or human works alone 
separated from hope (as well as faith and charity) are inadequate for 
recognizing the sources and ends that inform, motivate and empower 
patience. 
We shall now recall the resilience research on hope and 
optimism, outlined in chapter four, particularly the significance of 
having plans for the future, and of hope’s cognitive and social 
dimensions. The passion and virtues of hope express modalities of 
resistance that further specify Aquinas’ typology of patience and 
perseverance. Hope and despair can involve either active or passive 
resistance to suffering. Thomas’ typology and language of patience 
provide a counter narrative to a misconstrued notion of patience that 
would promote a blind passivity and receptivity that effectively means 
violence and oppression to minorities, women and children.100 In the 
latter case, passive resisting spells defeat. It involves an inactive 
submission to oppression, abuse and the like. This passivity can arise if 
we construe the evil or difficulty to be so powerful and permanent that 
it excludes any hope for evading or repulsing it; then we become 
depressed, immobilized and even stupefied by it.101 This type of 
                                                 
98 Cf. Ad Gal. cap. 3, lect. 2 (Gal 3:4); Jas 2:26. In his commentary on Gal 
3:4, Aquinas’ translation of Scripture reads passi estis; contemporary translations 
(RSV, NAB) translate the original—™p£qete—in the sense of “experienced” 
instead of “suffered.” In his Commentary on Galatians (3:4), he points out how 
patient suffering is either in the perspective of faith and thus also of eternal life, or 
it is vain: “quia haec sustinuistis ut perveniretis ad vitam aeternam. Rom. 5,3: 
‘Tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia autem probationem; probatio vero spem; 
spes autem non confundit.’ Unde si praecluditis vobis aditum vitae aeternae, 
deserentes fidem, quaerentes conservari carnalibus observantiis, sine causa, idest 
inutiliter, passi estis: et hoc dico, si tamen sine causa.” Ad Gal. cap. 3, lect. 2 
(Gal. 3:4), where he also cites Rom. 5:3. 
99 Cf. I ad Thess. cap. 1, lect.1 (1 Thess 1:3); 1 Cor 13:15; 1 Thess 4:9. 
100 The Christian virtue tradition, which Aquinas represents so well, does 
not promote misogyny or child-abuse by neglect. It furnishes ample conceptual, 
motivational and communal means to resist abuse and rape, battery and 
oppression in terms of virtues that must accompany patience: fortitude and 
initiative-taking virtues, chastity and martyrdom, prudence and justice, and so on. 
Cf. Todd Whitmore 1999. 
101 Cf. ST I-II 37.2. 
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defeated patience, where we simply suffer the present hardship as 
inevitable, lacks all redeeming qualities. It involves a vulnerable 
passivity. 
On the contrary, according to Aquinas, if the evil that we are 
suffering is not strong enough so as to deprive us of all hope of release 
or of conquering it, then the depression of body and mind is relative. It 
might involve a systemic (genetic and connatural) effort at group-
preservation and self-conservation, which is a type of active passivity 
that waits for the prudent moment to repulse the evil. At theological 
level, faith informs us that the final victory is God’s, hope motivates us 
through his promises. At natural level, prudent hope needs to render 
patience creative and ready for timely action. Without a plan and desire 
for resolving the problems on hand, we would have to simmer (stew) 
in our suffering or simply bend to oppression. Prudent hope provides a 
basis for patience and resilience at two levels: first a cognitive re-
appreciation of hardship and potential release or resolution (meaning), 
and second a volitional resolve to wait for and persist in the promised 
good (motivation). It also assures that Christian patience does not 
passively give into neglect, oppression or violence. 
8.2.2. Patience in Gift, Beatitude and Petition 
We can enhance our understanding of resisting resilience 
further through examining the way in which Aquinas associates 
patience with the Gifts, Beatitudes and fruits of the Holy Spirit as well 
as the petitions of the Pater Noster. He treats patience as both a 
specific virtue and a transversal quality (or a general virtue of Christian 
life) because of the way that patience and human sorrow interrelate and 
help us to understand the theological dimension of patience. Thomas’ 
articulation between pertinent Gifts, Beatitudes and fruits of the Holy 
Spirit and petitions to Christian patience invites two diagnostic 
questions.102 Does a theological type of patience simply add a further 
                                                 
102 Aquinas once again uses Augustine’s insightful correlation of the Gifts, 
Beatitudes and petitions of the Pater noster, found in the latter’s Commentary on 
the Sermon on the Mount. In regards to knowledge, mourning and the third 
petition, Augustine says: “Si scientia est qua beati sunt qui lugent, oremus ut fiat 
voluntas eius: quia sic non lugebimus” De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11, 38, PL 34, 
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motivation to philosophical patience (Stoic apatheia)? Or does it 
further specify the virtue, adding a Christological or theological 
measure? 
Thomas attributes patience to the third Beatitude: “Blessed are 
they that mourn; for they shall be comforted.” The relationship 
between mourning, comfort and patience is neither a free association 
nor a phenomenological progression nor a developmental stage 
analysis. Aquinas has a profound theological and metaphysical 
understanding of this interrelationship. It is too simple to observe (even 
by definition) that comfort can only follow suffering or sorrow. In 
more than an observation about temporal progression, Aquinas 
explains that the promised comfort is not received without having to go 
through internal suffering or sorrow.103 In the Summa theologiae, he 
follows Paul in holding that the Beatitude of mourners is grounded in 
charity and reflects the sorrow that is due to being in the body and 
absent from the Lord.104 
In his commentary on this Beatitude, Aquinas distinguishes 
three types of mourning that parallel three types of consolation.105 First, 
we sorrow because of sin, both our own and others’; “for if we mourn 
those who have died physically, we should all the more mourn those 
who have died spiritually.”106 Second, we mourn because of having to 
live actually in a distressing condition, as well as in longing for our 
heavenly homeland. Third, we mourn worldly pleasures inasmuch as 
they distract us from coming to and remaining in Christ.107 Aquinas 
                                                                                                          
1286. Aquinas quotes it in ST II-II 83.9 ad 3 and uses Augustine’s insights and 
ordering through out the ST and in the Collatio in orationem dominicam. 
103 Cf. Matt 5:5; ST I-II 69.4; Pinckaers 1995a, 141-163. 
104 Cf. 2 Cor 5:8; ST II-II 28.1 obj. 2 and ad 2. 
105 Cf. Ad Mat. cap. 5-2. Aquinas’ Lectura on the Gospel of Saint Matthew 
seems to have been written in 1269-70. Even though the passage that concerns us 
here (Matt 5:5) is authentic, a good deal of the rest of the commentary of the 
Sermon on the Mount in the currently circulated printed texts is instead by Peter 
of Scala (cf. Torrell 1996, 339). 
106 “Primo pro peccatis non solum propriis, sed etiam alienis: quia si 
lugemus mortuos carnaliter, multo magis spiritualiter” Ad Mat. cap. 5-2. He 
holds that once someone had committed sin, refraining from further sin is not 
sufficient or satisfactory in itself. 
107 Thomas says, “Tertio, secundum Augustinum, pro luctu quem habent 
homines de gaudiis saeculi, quae dimittunt veniendo ad Christum” Ad Mat. cap. 
5-2. 
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offers St. Paul as a model of resisting worldly distractions from 
distancing us from Christ. He quotes the letter to the Galatians (6:14) 
in order to demonstrate how Paul does not seek the approval of others, 
nor worldly pleasures, but rather the glory of the cross of Jesus Christ, 
through which as he says “the world has been crucified to me, and I to 
the world.” This patient resisting transforms mourning into comfort 
through a union with Christ’s suffering and glory. 
Aquinas identifies three types of consolation that parallel each 
group of mourners. First, those who mourn sin will receive the 
remission of sin as the effect of contrition and faith. Next, those who 
mourn the delay of heaven and the presence of misery receive 
consolation through the hope of eternal life. Thirdly, those who mourn 
worldly pleasures while the world rejoices receive consolation through 
divine charity. For when someone mourns the lack of a desirable thing, 
being given something greater more than suffices. Thus it is the Gift of 
the Holy Spirit, divine charity, which brings joy to our hearts.108 
Mourning is transformed into comfort and eventually into joy, through 
the working of the theological virtues that underlie the life described in 
the Beatitude of the mourners. 
Aquinas goes so far as to claim that this Beatitude of mourning 
inclines us to develop virtuous moderation in regards to being 
sorrowed, or even deliberately choosing sorrow in order to promote 
some good thing. This inclination can happen in two ways. First 
through a virtuous disposition, we gain a certain control and consistent 
right ordering of the concupiscible passions. Through experience and 
education we acquire the capacity to comprehend their functioning and 
to use (enjoy and suffer) them moderately. As for the emotion of 
sorrow, Aquinas addresses both the virtue of patience and “virtuous 
sorrow” (tristitia honestum), which positively orient mourning or 
sorrowful situations; later we shall discuss them in the terms of 
education and progress.109 
Second through the Gift of knowledge, we can achieve a 
heightened type of sorrow, for we come to know more fully the effect 
                                                 
108 In this regard, Aquinas quotes the Gospel of John 6:20 (RSV): “your 
sorrow will turn into joy.” cf. Ad Joan. cap. 2, 1-9, where he also quotes Rom 
8:18. 
109 Cf. ST I-II 69.3. 
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of our actions and the magnitude of the social situation, and also the 
way to participate in Christ’s salvific works. In regards to the Gift of 
knowledge, Augustine says: “Knowledge befits the mourner, who has 
discovered that he has been mastered by the evil which he coveted as 
though it were good.”110 Aquinas explains how right judgment about 
creatures entails the knowledge that we can be led astray from God, 
when creatures are mistakenly judged to be the last end and true good 
for humankind.111 The Gift of knowledge assures, in turn, an 
appropriate sorrowing for past errors, as well as the related consolation 
promised in the flourishing, “which begins in this life, and is perfected 
in the life to come.”112 It is thus that the Gift of knowledge has a 
practical effect in the active life, by directing the operative act of the 
Beatitude of mourning.113 The knowledge of a sinful condition even 
serves as the principal motive for the Beatitude of mourners: “whereby 
man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to 
Eccles. 1:18: ‘He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow.’”114 But 
this sorrow leads to joy in that, through faith, it merits eternal 
consolation. As Aquinas says: “the sorrows of the present life lead us 
to the comfort of the future life. Because by the mere fact that humans 
mourn for their sins, or for the delay of glory, they merit the 
consolation of eternity.”115 Contrition for sin and hopeful anticipation 
                                                 
110 “Scientia convenit lugentibus, qui didicerunt quibus malis vincti sunt, 
quae quasi bona petierunt” De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4; PL 34, 1234; quoted in 
ST II-II 9.4 sc. 
111 Aquinas also notes how the third beatitude’s right judgment and sorrow 
about evil committed relates to both the Beatitude of poverty and the Gift of fear 
of the Lord, “quo homo se retrahit a cupiditatibus et delectationibus mundi” (I-II 
69.3 ad 3). These Gifts dispose the human faculties to be more readily obedient to 
the Spirit’s promptings (cf. ST I-II 68.1). 
112 “Et ideo in hac beatitudine ponitur luctus pro merito, et consolatio 
consequens pro praemio. Quae quidem inchoatur in hac vita, perficitur autem in 
futura” ST II-II 9.4 ad 1. In this same regard: “Unde quod dicitur, Beatus vir qui 
corripitur a Domino, pertinet ad beatitudinem luctus” ST I-II 69.3 ad 4 
113 Cf. ST I-II 69.3 ad 2, and Ad Mat. cap. 5.2. 
114 “Ad lugendum autem movet praecipue scientia, per quam homo 
cognoscit defectus suos et rerum mundanarum; secundum illud Eccle. 1,18: ‘Qui 
addit scientiam, addit et dolorem.’” ST I-II 69.3 ad 3; cf. ST II-II 19.12; and ST I-
II 69.3 ad 2. 
115 “Et utroque modo luctus praesens ad consolationem futurae vitae 
perducit. Quia ex hoc ipso quod homo luget pro peccatis, vel pro dilatione 
gloriae, meretur consolationem aeternam” ST I-II 35.3 ad 1. Aquinas also relates 
humility with the third Beatitude—“Blessed are they that mourn; for they shall be 
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of God’s promises result from this gift, and in turn are the formal 
reason for its merit. 
In his homily on the Pater Noster,116 Aquinas recognizes how 
the third petition—“Let thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven”—
helps to explain the third Beatitude’s relation to patience in a threefold 
manner. First, the Beatitude of mourning manifests the desire for 
eternal life (cf. Ps. 120:5). This sorrow is especially present among the 
saints, whose mourning becomes accidentally a longing for death,117 
which would naturally be avoided. Second, those who will to keep the 
commandments are in sorrow, because of the difficulty for the body of 
the implied discipline (cf. Ps. 126:6). Third, we sorrow because of the 
sins of the body; such sorrow has an expiating effect (cf. Ps. 6:6). In 
this commentary on the Pater moreover, he associates the Beatitude of 
peacemakers and the Gift of wisdom with patience. Through the Holy 
Spirit, believers are incited to pray and thereby obtain a certain 
blessedness of peace and trust even in the midst of difficulty and 
tribulation. For it is through patience that we are able to be at peace in 
prosperity and in adversity.118 
8.2.3. Patience as a Fruit of the Holy Spirit 
Aquinas’ analysis of patience-related moral agency and grace 
does not stop with his correlation of the virtues, Gifts, Beatitudes and 
petitions. He completes the Augustinian schema by explicating the 
nature and typology of the fruits of the Holy Spirit. Various scholastic 
attempts at including the fruits within this theological framework were 
                                                                                                          
comforted” (Matt 5:5, RSV)—in order to illustrate how “contemnentibus mundi 
gaudia promittuntur consolationes caelestes, secundum illud Matth. 5,5.” ST II-II 
161.5 ad 3. Aquinas’ reflection is based also on Matt 6:19-20. 
116 In orat. dom., art. 3. The collatio in orationem dominicam is a homily or 
catechetical instruction on the Pater Noster. It is thought to date from the last 
period of his life (1272-73); cf. Torrell 1996, 266, 358. 
117 Cf. 2 Cor. 5:8. It is primarily and essentially a longing for the realization 
of the fullness of beatitude. 
118 “Et ideo Spiritus Sanctus per donum sapientiae facit nos petere: et per 
hoc pervenimus ad beatitudinem ad quam ordinat pax, quia per patientia pacem 
habemus et in tempore prospero et adverso” In orat. dom. art. 7; cf. art. 6. In 
articles 6 and 7, Aquinas addresses respectively the petitions of the Pater Noster 
on temptation and evil, and how patience is crucial for them both. 
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already afoot preceding Aquinas.119 Instead of a historical investigation 
though, I shall examine his notion of the fruits of the Holy Spirit in 
view of identifying insights into resilience outcomes that they might 
offer. 
The Gifts, Beatitudes, petitions of the Pater and fruits of the 
Holy Spirit (Gal. 5:22-3) are not neat, non-overlapping theological 
concepts, for St. Thomas. He distinguishes the fruits according to 
formal, yet flexible rationale; they are types of goods enjoyed,120 which 
complete and signfy the flourishing of the spiritual life, as it is possible 
on earth.121 He includes the fruits of the Holy Spirit in his moral 
theology, employing the images of seeds, trees, flowers and fruit from 
a number of Scriptural metaphors to suggest the nature, growth and 
goal of these acts.122 
Aquinas identifies the different senses of “fruit,” the meaning 
of which he transfers from material to spiritual realities. Even though 
we either produce or gather fruit, not all that is produced or gathered is 
fruit. Virtuous human operations proceed from reason and will; such is 
the case both for acquired and infused virtues, the latter of which 
involve the fruit of reason and will informed by faith, hope and charity. 
The spiritual sense of fruit connotes that which is last and gives 
pleasure. As Thomas argues: “man’s fruit is his last end (ultimus 
hominis finis) which is intended for his enjoyment.”123 The fruits 
involve the effect of the Holy Spirit on the human organism.124 Both 
the infused virtues and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit participate in 
producing fruitful acts. In particular, fruits spring forth through the 
                                                 
119 The fruits of the Holy Spirit had been included in the works of St. 
Bonaventure (In III Sent. 34.1.1.1), and St. Albert the Great, who makes them a 
higher perfection (In III Sent. 34.1), transforming the ascending order proposed 
by Philip the Chancellor (virtues, Gifts and fruits together, Beatitudes; cf. Summa 
de bono; cited in Lottin 1942-60, III.363; cf. E. D. O’Connor 1974, 103). 
120 Cf. ST I-II 70.3 ad 4. 
121 Cf. ST I-II 70.3; ST II-II 139.2 ad 3. 
122 Aquinas takes these images for his treatment of the fruits in the ST (I-II 
70) from the following sources: Gal 5:22-3; Matt 12:33; Wis 3:15; John 4:36; 1 
John 3:9; Eccl 24:23; Rm 6:22; Isa 27:9; Matt 13:23; Rev 22:2. 
123 “Et secundum hoc, fructus hominis dicitur ultimus hominis finis, quo 
debet frui” ST I-II 70.1. 
124 He specifies that “Si vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem 
virtutem, quae est virtus Spiritus Sancti; sic dicitur esse operatio hominis fructus 
Spiritus Sancti” ST I-II 70.1, where Aquinas draws his insight from 1 John 3:9. 
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virtues as sweetness and delight (suavitas et dulcedo) and through the 
Gifts as being their “last and congruous products.”125 
Aquinas classes both the Beatitudes and the fruits of the Holy 
Spirit as acts of the infused virtues and the Gifts. While the Beatitudes 
and the fruits resemble each other in being something ultimate and 
delightful, the Beatitudes alone connote something perfect and 
excellent.126 Aquinas follows the Scriptural tradition of his time in 
enumerating twelve fruits of the Holy Spirit,127 in contrast to the nine 
fruits named in critical editions of Paul’s letter to the Galatians 
(5:22).128 
                                                 
125 “Patet ergo ex dictis quod fructus spiritus dicuntur opera virtutum, et 
quia habent in se suavitatem et dulcedinem, et quia sunt quoddam ultimum 
productum, secundum convenientiam donorum” Ad Gal. cap. 5, lect. 6. In the ST 
(I-II 70.1 ad 2), Aquinas emphasizes that this type of pleasure in an ultimate thing 
formally concerns virtuous deeds. We rejoice in them because of their goodness, 
which is formally good although not the ultimate goodness. We do not rejoice in 
them as if they were a final cause of delight. God alone merits being delighted in 
for his own sake. God is our final goal and delight. Aquinas quotes St. Ambrose 
(de Parad. 13.6; PL 14.308B) in affirming that virtuous deeds are refreshing 
fruits “quia suos possessores sancta et sincera delectatione reficiunt.” 
126 However, even though the Beatitudes can be deemed fruits, not all fruits 
can be deemed Beatitudes. Because of the Beatitudes’ central and final 
perspective in the moral and spiritual life, Aquinas construes the fruits of the 
Holy Spirit as subordinated to the Beatitudes (cf. ST I-II 70.2). Since the concept 
of fruits includes both fruits of life everlasting and those belonging to the present 
life, the concept of the Beatitudes entails a greater perfection than that of the 
fruits or even of virtuous activity (cf. ST I-II 70.2 corpus and ad 2; ST I-II 69.1 ad 
1). 
127 Thomas employs the Glossa ordinaria, which contained the following 
twelve fruits: caritas (charity), gaudium (joy), pax (peace), patientia (patience), 
longanimitas (long-suffering), bonitas (goodness), benignitas (kindness), 
mansuetudo (mildness), fides (faithfulness), modestia (modesty), continentia 
(self-control) and castitas (chastity). This twelve-fold tradition was the only one 
that Thomas knew; with further modifications it has persisted in theology and 
catechesis. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC 1832) list twelve fruits 
with slight variation in order and content. Aquinas attributes twelve fruits to 
Paul’s text in Gal 5:22 (cf. ST I-II 70.3, and Ad Gal. cap. 5, lect. 6). He 
nonetheless quotes (in ST I-II 70.4) Augustine’s commentary on Gal 5:22-3 (n. 
51; PL 35.2141-2142), in which the latter does not articulate twelve fruits, in 
particular Augustine refers to longanimitas and not patientia. 
128 Various discrepancies in the recensions of the fruits are due to: the 
various Latin translations of Scripture, errors in recopying Biblical manuscripts 
and perhaps even efforts to reinforce other references to the Spirit. These 
additions might be due to the custom of glossing a text by adding synonyms 
between the lines. A scribe might have mistaken the interlinear gloss for the 
original text (cf. E. D. O’Connor 1974, 148). According to C.-A. Bernard (1964, 
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St. Thomas explains that patience is fittingly called a fruit of 
the Spirit even though it entails the contact with a painful object. 
Indeed “the fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something 
to delight in.”129 The operation of not being overcome by sorrow and 
difficulty is not the fruit of patience itself; rather this fruit is a result 
that follows upon such a virtuous operation.130Aquinas closely 
associates the fruits of patience and long-suffering,131 and describes 
how they correlate with the fruits of charity, joy and peace. These five 
are inward perfections, with social rather than individualistic 
overtones. Charity, joy and peace more directly concern good,132 
                                                                                                          
1571-2), another theory speculates that the additions were made in function of the 
mystical connotations of the number twelve and the important reference in the 
book of Revelation (22:2), to “the tree of life with its twelve kinds of fruit.” 
The Greek NT text (K. Aland, 1983), standard critical translations like 
the RSV, as well as the Vulgate name nine Fruits of the Holy Spirit in Gal 5:22. 
The Glossa ordinaria (used by Aquinas) contains patientia in addition to 
longanimitas (makroqum…a), mansuetudo in addition to fides (p…stij) and castitas in 
addition to continentia (™gkr£teia). Cf. E. D. O’Connor 1974, 148-9. 
129 Aquinas observes “quod ipsum quod est in tristitiis non perturbari, 
rationem delectabilis habet” ST I-II 70.3 ad 3; and “Et praecipue quantum ad hoc 
quod per patientiam animus praeservatur ne obruatur tristitia” ST II-II 136.1 ad 
3. 
130 When discussing whether charity is a virtue, he responds: “quod 
delectio non importat operationem, sed aliquid consequens ad operationem; 
unde, cum virtus sit operationis principium, delectatio non ponitur inter virtutes, 
sed inter fructus, ut patet Galat. 5,22: ‘Fructus autem spiritus est caritas, gaudium, 
pax, patientia’” De car. art 2, 12. 
131 Unlike Aquinas’ Latin translation of Gal 5:22, which lists two separate 
fruits, patientia and longanimitas, the Vulgata (1975) only gives longanimitas, 
and the original Greek only makroqum…a, which is variously translated in this 
context as: “patience” (RSV and JB) or “patient endurance” (NAB).  
132 He addresses these fruits in the traditional order, starting with charity 
(caritas). As an appetite’s first natural inclination is toward its end (the good 
loved, in the case of emotions and will), so the first fruit is charity, “in qua 
specialiter Spiritus Sanctus datur, sicut in propria similitudine, cum et ipse sit 
amor” ST I-II 70.3; cf. Rom 5:5; and ST I 37.1. The Gift and presence of the Holy 
Spirit is source of this and all the fruits, which according to Aquinas incline us to 
remain in God. Aquinas (I-II 70.3) draws this insight from Rom 5:5, 1 John 4:16. 
It is well developed in Prima pars (ST I 38.2), where Aquinas draws further from 
Augustine’s de Trin (iv.20 and xv.24) as well as Aristotle’s Top. (iv.4) in order to 
argue that the Holy Spirit is the first Gift, from which the particular Gifts and 
Fruits are portioned out. In turn, the fruit of joy (gaudium) springs from the 
presence of the thing loved, the actual presence of God, so that it connotes the 
“fruition of charity.” While the fruit of peace (pax) denotes both not being 
disturbed by external things and how our desires, our “restless desires” (desiderii 
fluctuantis) as he says, come to rest in the object; peace entails the adequacy and 
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whereas patience and longanimity face evil. In particular, the Holy 
Spirit leads a person to firmly face the evil that disrupts peace, by 
giving patient endurance in adversity. Concerning the evils that disturb 
joy, the Holy Spirit grants long-suffering; thus we can resist being 
broken by the delay in obtaining the loved object.133 References to the 
fruit of patience and suffering should not be taken in a passive and 
self-destructive tendency;134 their association with the virtue of 
fortitude and its aspect of aggredi (virtues of initiative) entail that this 
patience is not an end in itself, but serves a larger purpose. 
For Aquinas, to know the fruit involves that we know the tree, 
its needs and potential. Aquinas correlates the fruit with the nature of 
the tree. If the tree produces something against its nature, it is an 
oddity instead of a fruit. Likewise, the works of vice are against nature 
(as a deformation of nature), while the works of virtue are connatural 
to the human tree.135 How might Aquinas’ metaphor of fruit serve to 
enhance the resilience perspective, and be enhanced in the process? In 
order to identify and promote resilience we have to understand the 
nature, needs, potential and goals of the rational agent and community. 
In the case of a good that we cannot yet attain or only with difficulty, 
patience-phenomena involve acquired and infused supports that help 
us to cope with the hardship, to conserve ourselves under destructive 
pressures and to persist toward the goal amidst delays. Aquinas helps 
us to understand how theological patience is a fruit of the human 
                                                                                                          
perfect enjoyment of the present object, and so connotes “the perfection of 
charity” (cf. ST I-II 70.3; and Ad Gal. cap 5, lect. 6). 
133 These fruits involve two dispositions, when faced with difficulties. He 
claims: “In malis autem bene se habet mens quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, ut 
non perturbetur mens per imminentiam malorum: quod pertinet ad patientiam. -- 
Secundo, ut non perturbetur in dilatione bonorum, quod pertinet ad 
longanimitatem: nam carere bono habet rationem mali, ut dicitur in V Ethic. 
[1131b 21-24]” ST I-II 70.3; cf. ST II-II 136.5; ST II-II 139.2 ad 3; Ad Gal. cap. 
5, lect 6. 
134 In an earlier division used in his Commentary on the Sentences (III Sent. 
34, 1, 5, co), Aquinas notes how the fruit of patience can be associated with the 
Beatitude of those who suffer persecution, as well as with the Gift of fortitude; 
since patience assures an unbroken spirit when facing the difficulties found in 
persecution and all those concerned with the fullness of fortitude. 
135 ST I-II 70.4 ad 1. We could explore this principle in light of genetic 
sciences and gene engineering, which might contribute to speculative theology 
insights on the inheritability of the effects of ancestors’ positive and negative acts 
(e.g. the effects on temperament and on the pre-conscious/unconscious).  
496 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
person and community, through the working of the Holy Spirit. 
Theological supports to patience result from revelation and grace: 
hope, the Beatitudes, the Gifts and the fruits of the Holy Spirit. They 
are thus not observable in the same way as non-spiritual resilience 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, Aquinas’ theological anthropology 
illustrates the human and spiritual nature, needs and finality that 
produce resisting and persisting resilience. His view of theological 
patience and perseverance demonstrate a rich (though non-verifiable) 
way to depict spiritual resilience. 
8.3. Development of Patience and Spiritual Resilience 
Christian conceptions of patience and suffering must face 
challenges that arise from certain resilience and psychosocial insights. 
These challenges are especially evident when investigating the 
development of patience. Aquinas construes the development of 
patience and perseverance, as mentioned concerning virtues in general, 
neither as a merely human nor as a merely divine effort. Indeed 
Aquinas holds internal and external aspects of reality together in his 
understanding of these resisting and persisting virtues. Pain, suffering 
and temptation are exclusively neither external nor internal. At this 
point, we shall ask: what is Aquinas’ developmental approach to 
patience? How does his treatment of patience stand up to charges that 
Christianity creates vulnerable, passive agents? Can resilience insights 
in turn strengthen a virtue perspective in this regard? These questions 
lead us to explore Thomas’ conception of virtuous sorrow, patience 
and moral progress in dialogue with resilience insights. 
8.3.1. Virtuous Sorrow 
Aquinas’ typology of patience and fortitude recalls his 
previously mentioned typology of sorrow. Since pleasure and pain can 
be of a bodily or spiritual nature—the latter relating more primarily to 
the effect on the soul136—the brave and patience person can experience 
both spiritual joy and spiritual sorrow or pain at the same time.137 On 
the one hand, one experiences spiritual sorrow at the thought of 
                                                 
136 Cf. ST I-II 23.4; ST I-II 31.1; ST I-II 35.1. 
137 Cf. ST II-II 123.8; see also ST I-II 31.3-5. 
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physical death or pain. We also suffer spiritually through the 
knowledge of spiritual death or evil. The nature of bodily pain on the 
other hand has a great number of sources, and is capable of making us 
insensible to other realities, like the spiritual joy given through a 
virtuous act. On the physical level, pain is stronger than pleasure and 
that which leads to death causes the greatest pains to the mind, the 
greatest fears.138 On the spiritual level, however, the virtue of fortitude 
and patience itself works to prevent bodily pain from completely 
overcoming reason. Indeed one experiences spiritual joy when 
achieving virtue or attaining the end at which virtue aims.139 This end 
implies the love of God and neighbor, and complete flourishing.140 God 
grants spiritual joy by raising the soul above the blinding effect of 
spiritual sorrow and bodily pain, to the Divine things that give delight. 
Strategies for overcoming spiritual sorrow or pain involve the 
framework of the virtues. First, in order that endurance be the virtue of 
patience rather than hardness of heart (duritia), one must aim at some 
good—we do not rejoice in the suffering itself.141 The virtuous spiritual 
sorrow (bonum utile) that expresses a virtuous good involves a 
sorrowing according to a right measure of reason and will.142 Such 
virtuous sorrow is compatible with the joy of charity, “insofar as a man 
grieves for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, 
either in us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.”143 More 
                                                 
138 Cf. ST II-II 123.11. 
139 Concerning joy in the midst of the virtue of courage, in ST II-II 123.8 
obj 2, Aquinas cites Gal 5:22.  
140 This type of joy is manifest in Aquinas’ reference (ST II-II 123.8) to the 
Maccabean martyr Eleazar (2 Mac. 6:30). When asking whether the brave person 
delights in his act, Aquinas explains that one can be supported by spiritual joy in 
the act and end of virtue, as well as experience spiritual sorrow because of the 
thought of losing his life and the pain involved.  
141Cf. ST II-II 136.1 ad 2 from a quotation of St. Augustine, De patientia ii. 
142 Cf. ST I-II 39.2; ST I-II 39.3; and ST I-II 59.3. 
143 “Et ideo ex hac parte gaudium caritatis potest habere permixtionem 
tristitiae: prout scilicet aliquis tristatur de eo quod repugnat participationi divini 
boni vel in nobis vel in proximis, quos tanquam nosipsos diligimus” ST II-II 28.2. 
In asking the question as to whether one can have both the joy of charity and 
sorrow, he distinguishes two types of joy. One type, which is more excellent, 
involves rejoicing in the Divine good considered in itself (ST II-II 28.2). Since 
such joy’s object is perfect, so is the resulting joy; neither this object (God), nor 
the resulting joy permit an admixture of sorrow (Cf. Phil 4:4). The other type is 
the joy of Charity as our participation in the Divine good. Such a participative joy 
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than being simply compatible with it, virtuous sorrow is both informed 
by charity, which directs our perception of evil, and strengthens our 
resolve to reject evil. Furthermore, virtuous sorrow emanates from 
charity inasmuch as living charity does not just react to such emotion, 
but is constitutive of the virtuous character that further orders the 
appetites toward the true good of the Gospel, so that we sorrow 
differently with charity than without it. 
Both St. Paul and the book of Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) serve 
Thomas’ illustration of sorrow’s power to debilitate the human spirit 
and even to kill it.144 In his second letter to the Corinthians, Paul 
distinguishes two types of sorrow that can be likened to two types of 
patience. God uses the first type of grief, sadness or sorrow to bring 
someone to repentance, to return to God.145 This type of virtuous 
sorrow produces spiritual benefits in two ways. Through it, we shun 
things that are in themselves evil; for example sin, past, present and 
future. Paul describes how the grief (or virtuous sorrow) that he 
provoked in the members of the community in Corinth served in their 
repenting and restoring good relations with him.146 Such sorrow is 
useful not only in avoiding the evil of future sin, but also in repenting 
for sins already committed. Moreover, through virtuous sorrow, we 
spurn occasions of evil, for example particular disordered relations 
with temporal goods.147 Indeed we can become too attached to temporal 
goods, loving them inordinately and thereby being distracted from our 
ultimate goal. 
A second type of sadness, a worldly grief, brings destruction 
and death, since it depresses the soul through a present, experienced 
evil.148 The virtue of patience resists this type of sorrow, and embraces 
                                                                                                          
can be hindered by anything contrary to the Divine good (anything in us or in our 
neighbor), and therefore can be experienced at the same time as sorrow. 
144 In ST II-II 136.1, Aquinas illustrates this point using 2 Cor 7:10 and 
Eccl 30:25. 
145 Cf. ST II-II 136.5; ST I-II 37.2 ad 1; ST I-II 39.3; 2 Cor 7:10-11. 
146 Cf. 2 Cor 7:9, quoted in ST I-II 39.3. 
147 Quoting scripture, Aquinas claims that: “Et secundum hoc, tristitia de 
bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis: sicut dicitur Eccle. 7,3: ‘Melius est ire ad 
domum luctus quam ad domum convivii: in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur 
hominum’” ST I-II 39.3. 
148 Aquinas’ Latin translation of 2 Cor 7:10 reads (ST II-II 136.1): “Saeculi 
tristitia mortem operatur.” The RSV translation is: “For godly grief produces a 
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the first, inasmuch as graced sorrow is a catalyst for repentance, 
conversion and returning to God. Aquinas furthermore distinguishes 
two sorts of graced sorrow that correspond to natural and infused 
patience. 
The virtuous good of sorrow rectifies other disordered 
relations to sorrow, for example, since inordinate sorrow is an obstacle 
to flourishing. Aquinas argues that: “Although in this unhappy abode 
we participate, after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and 
love, yet the unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect 
participation in the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a 
man grieves for the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a 
participation of the Divine good.”149 Sorrow is neither chosen as a good 
in itself nor as an end in itself. Indeed we do not choose evil as the 
source of sorrow. Nonetheless, we desire the good end and good 
object, rather than any associated evil. “And thus Christ’s death and 
passion were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although 
they were voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the redemption of 
the human race,”150 according to Thomas. As is evident in the Beatitude 
concerning those who mourn, there can be a salutary connection 
between present sorrowing and flourishing, the fullness of which God 
alone offers in the world to come.151 
Aquinas discusses how devotion to Christ (the practices of 
meditation and prayer) has both the effect of joy and sorrow and thus 
contributes to establishing virtuous sorrow. He says that it is “evident 
that the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary 
                                                                                                          
repentance that leads to salvation and brings no regret, but worldly grief produces 
death.” Cf. ST I-II 37.4 sc, which refers to Prov 17:22; Prov 25:20; Eccl (Sir) 38, 
19. 
149 “quamvis in incolatu huius miseriae aliquo modo participemus divinum 
bonum per cognitionem et amorem, tamen huius vitae miseria impedit a perfecta 
participatione divini boni, qualis erit in patria. Et ideo haec etiam tristitia qua 
quis luget de dilatione gloriae pertinet ad impedimentum participationis divini 
boni” ST II-II 28.2 ad 3. 
150 “Et hoc modo mors Christi et eius passio fuit, secundum se considerata, 
involuntaria et tristitiam causans: licet fuerit voluntaria in ordine ad finem, qui 
est redemptio humani generis” ST III 15.6 ad 4. 
151 Cf. Matt 5:5; ST I-II 39.2 sc; as discussed earlier. 
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and accidental effect is that ‘sorrow which is according to God.’”152 In 
meditation one comes to recognize that “in the consideration of 
Christ’s Passion there is something that causes sorrow, namely, the 
human defect, the removal of which made it necessary for Christ to 
suffer; and there is something that causes joy, namely, God’s loving-
kindness to us in giving us such a deliverance.”153 The sorrow and joy 
related with the suffering and salvation wrought through Christ’s 
passion, death and resurrection offer a school of virtuous, Christ-like 
sorrow and joy. Jesus Christ’s passion and the sorrow that he felt in his 
life and especially during his agony, serve as an example of education 
in patience. Knowing the suffering that he would confront, Jesus 
prepared himself. Thomas suggests that we do the same through a 
virtuous sorrow that prepares the mind and is part of a larger spiritual 
and moral progress, and we might add, spiritual resilience. 
8.3.2. Development of Patience and Spiritual Resilience 
The resilience research identifies a typology of suffering that is 
often built on non-normative and non-empirical foundations, which 
underlie psychosocial and moral theories about developmental 
pathways for the management of suffering. For example, Freud’s 
viewpoint on suffering and religion figures largely in contemporary 
psychosocial theories and in the challenges that they pose to Christian 
conceptions of patience. Freud, in general, critiques the forces of 
civilization and religion that socialize, redirect and sublimate human 
instinct. He speculates that while the instincts of life (eros) and death 
(thanatos) need to be controlled and ordered, a repressive society’s 
over-control produces neurosis and needless suffering. In regards to 
Christianity, he finds that the principle “love your neighbor as 
yourself” is not only over-controlling, but also psychologically 
                                                 
152 “Et sic patet quod ad devotionem primo et per se consequitur 
delectatio: secundario autem et per accidens tristitia quae est secundum Deum [2 
Cor. 7:10]” ST II-II 82.4. 
153 “in consideratione passionis Christi est aliquod quod contristet, scilicet 
defectus humanus, propter quem tollendum Christum pati oportuit [Luke 24:25]; 
et est aliquid quod laetificet, scilicet Dei erga nos benignitas, quae nobis de tali 
liberatione providit” ST II-II 82.4 ad 1. 
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impossible and thus not ethically binding.154 This negative assessment 
touches the Christian conception of patience at its heart. 
Freud’s position is not self-evident, nor substantiated by 
empirical findings. D. Browning assesses Freud’s position as simplistic 
and unscientific, while he offers at the same time a self-critique of 
Christianity, seeking to correct the oppression and exploitation 
experienced by such groups as women and minorities in the name of 
self-sacrifice and patience. Browning’s criteria identify notions of self-
esteem that specify more resistant manifestations of self-giving and 
that indicate pathways for developing patience. He distinguishes self-
abnegation from truly appropriate forms of self-giving in the name of 
our neighbor.155 Browning thus takes one step toward enhancing the 
idea that undifferentiated physical pain or psychological suffering is an 
inevitable aspect of individual triumph over hardship156 and of 
Christian self-understanding. Although challenging goals demand 
effort and often pain to achieve them, not all suffering is necessary or 
appropriate. Christian self-esteem and self-awareness is not simply 
equated with undifferentiated pain and self-giving; rather it is 
necessary to include notions of both appropriate pain avoidance and 
self-giving, and to distinguish social and theological goals. 
Such insights might well not only be carefully transferred to 
experiences like disability, loss of friendship or employment, but also 
to more specifically spiritual and religious domains. However, more 
specialized resilience research further clarifies the relationship between 
patient suffering and spirituality or religion. According to Garbarino 
and Bedard, the key to addressing problems of trauma, suffering and 
evil is found in recognizing the multidimensional nature of the human 
person. In particular, they speculate that spirituality aids in overcoming 
such adversity because of its awareness that humans are more than 
physical beings, and that their spiritual existence has a certain 
primacy.157 As mentioned in chapter two, studies have indicated that 
religion can: (1) work as a coping mechanism, with reports of “lower 
                                                 
154 Cf. S. Freud 1961; D. Browning 1987, 46ff. 
155 Cf. D. Browning 1987, 160. 
156 Cf. Radke-Yarrow 1990, 114. 
157 Cf. Garbarino and Bedard 1996, 470. A materialist conception of 
humanity engenders other notions of resilience. 
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levels of reported pain and greater happiness,”158 and (2) be beneficial 
to health by providing “a reassuring fatalism” enabling humans to 
withstand better suffering and pain.159 It can also provide protection 
through the development of faith and religious practice inasmuch as 
they offer a means of finding goals, purpose and meaning in life, 
especially in the face of suffering and death, but also when confronted 
with the degradation of notions of self-esteem and self-efficacy.160 The 
religious community can also provide support, as can the clergy who 
have traditionally served a caring function.161 This input concerning the 
interaction between spirituality and patient management of suffering, 
pain and adversity can now be put in dialogue with Aquinas 
formulation of these issues. 
Aquinas bases his notion of how patience develops upon the 
dynamic interrelation between human inclinations, emotions and 
virtues, on the one hand, and grace and the sevenfold Gift of the Holy 
Spirit, on the other. For Thomas, the development of patience is a 
question of training, discipline, encouragement, character and progress. 
One of the keys to growth in the fullness of Christian patience is 
personal training in God’s ways, a being trained by God and others. In 
this regard, both docility (as discussed earlier) and piety are important. 
It is interesting to see how Aquinas handles the words of Paul: “Train 
yourself in godliness; for while bodily training is of some value, 
godliness is of value in every way, as it holds promise for the present 
life and also for the life to come.”162 Aquinas underlines the importance 
of the training of the affections and senses through practices like 
abstinence, fasting and almsgiving, which can serve as efficacious 
remedies. But he makes it clear that such training has eternal value 
only if it is rooted in charity. When informed by charity, godliness or 
piety is useful in every way. It abolishes sin, promotes good, and 
receives God’s special mercy.163 
                                                 
158 Cf. Pargament 1990, 797-8. 
159 Cf. Schumaker 1992, 3. 
160 Cf. Lösel 1994, 8-12; Meyer and Lausell 1996, 120. 
161 Cf. W. V. D’Antonio and J. Aldous 1983, 15-16, 106. 
162 1 Tim 4:7-8 (RSV). 
163 Cf. I ad Timoth. cap. 4, lect. 2. 
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Patience develops through discipline, and conversely is a 
necessary means to receive discipline. Thomas recognizes the place of 
both human and divine discipline, which both are rooted in charity, for 
we do not discipline children unless we love them.164 However, divine 
discipline is more complete in its duration (eternal life) and end 
(sanctification). Aquinas puts divine filiation and discipline in the 
context of the Church as the mother, whose spouse is God.165 
Recognizing that human senses and thoughts can be prone to evil, 
Aquinas underlines the necessity of discipline to correct such 
tendencies. The discipline administered to children medicinally directs 
them toward good and away from disordered tendencies. As medicine 
can be bitter and painful in facilitating the desired healing, so 
discipline can require traversing sorrow or pain before arriving at its 
fruit, which is peace and joy.166 
Patience, for St. Thomas, also has a social function tied to 
aiding others in spiritual and moral growth. Indeed education takes 
patience and perseverance, which for Aquinas not only avoids doing 
evil ourselves, but also reprimands patiently a neighbor who has done 
evil.167 Our concern and caring for a neighbor include a learned and 
holy rebuking or admonition. In this regard, Aquinas quotes Paul: 
“Reprove, entreat, rebuke in all patience and doctrine.”168 We do not 
only need patience in education, we also need a sense of timeliness, 
which considers how the suggested correction will affect the person: 
whether it will be counterproductive; whether another time would 
                                                 
164 “Ergo si punit, non odit: sed ejus punitio ordinatur ad bonum, quia 
loquitur vobis tamquam filiis” Ad Heb. cap. 12, lect. 2 (Heb 12:7). 
165 “Filius autem proprie dicitur qui est ex legitimo patre. Mater nostra est 
Ecclesia, cujus sponsus est ipse Deus” Ad Heb. cap. 12, lect 2 (Heb 12:8). 
166 He emphasizes that the letter to the Hebrews admonishes us neither to 
neglect the discipline of the Lord, nor to grow impatient of it, but rather to 
persevere in it so as to attain the promised fruit. “Verba autem auctoris ponit 
dicens : Fili mi noli negligere disciplinam Domini; et subdit rationem ibi, Quem 
enim diligit Dominus, castigat. In auctoritate vero prohibet duo : quia prohibet 
odium disciplinae et impatientiam ad ipsam. [...] Non negligere enim, nec etiam 
fatigari sub disciplina, non est aliud quam in disciplina perseverare” Ad Heb. 
cap. 12, lect. 2 (Heb 12:5 and Heb12:7 and Heb 12:11.). 
167 This type of directive patience and perseverance would not be very 
popular in societies where tolerance of differences, including evil done by others, 
is more important than sharing and progressing in the common good. 
168 2 Tim 4:2; quoted in ad Eph cap. 5, lect. 4; where he also cites Eccl 
(Sir) 17:12. 
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better serve the effort; and how other people involved might be 
influenced.169 Lastly, we should conjugate patience with sweetness and 
initiative-taking virtues in order to correct the dangers associated with 
patience, which are hardness of heartand passivity.170 
Chapter five introduced other strategies for managing sorrow 
and pain whose theological dimension we can now examine. For 
example, Aquinas construes the sympathy that consoles the sorrowing 
neighbor in terms of charity or friendship-love.171 Concerning the 
pleasure of the contemplation of truth that calms pain and sorrow, 
Aquinas says: “In the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the 
contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness.”172 Truth-
inspired joy lightens physical pain and psychological sorrow inasmuch 
as it puts us in touch with divine sources of strength, comfort and 
flourishing.173 
In this regard, Aquinas attends to the pedagogical functions 
and evangelical bases that the precepts of patience and perseverance 
have in handling pain and suffering and in developing these virtues. 
Being prepared for suffering, difficulty and adversity is key to the 
virtue of patience. The precepts of patience174 assist the proper 
                                                 
169 In this regard, Aquinas quotes Augustine insights found in De Civ. Dei, 
I, 9 (PL 41, 22). 
170 Cf. J.-L. Bruguès 1984, 47-58. 
171 Although Aquinas draws here from Aristotle’s insights on the role 
friend’s play in comforting the sorrowing, he integrates theological insights from 
the experiences of St. Augustine, St. Paul and the suffering Job. Cf. ST I-II 38.3 
corpus and ad 2; Aristotle, NE ix.11, 1171a 29-30 (cf. Aquinas, in Ethic. lect 13.). 
St. Augustine’s Confessions (viii.4 and iv.9) are an important source, but other 
parallels are found in Aquinas’ commentaries. For example, Aquinas recognizes 
that Paul will be consoled in his suffering if the Ephesians respect his wish for 
them to stay united; cf. Ad Eph. 4. lect 1; In Job 2, 2, 16, lect. i; Ad Rom. 12, lect. 
3. 
172 “Et ideo homines ex contemplatione divina et futurae beatitudinis, in 
tribulationibus gaudent” ST I-II 38.4. 
173 Aquinas draws upon St. Augustine, upon the letter of James and upon 
the martyr Tiberius in order to bring Christian tradition and experience to support 
this phenomenon. Cf. Augustine, Soliloq. 1, 12; Jas 1: 2; and the martyr St. 
Tiburtius (Dominican breviary, 11 August), which Thomas cites in ST I-II 38.4. 
174 Thomas (ST II-II 140.1) identifies the following Scriptural bases for 
precepts of patience: “Accept whatever is brought upon you, and in changes that 
humble you be patient.” Eccl (Sir) 2:4 (RSV); “By your endurance you will gain 
your lives.” Luke 21:19 (RSV); “rejoice in your hope, be patient in tribulation, be 
constant in prayer.” Rom 12:12 (RSV). He finds precepts of perseverance in: Matt 
10:22; 1 Cor 15:58; Heb 12:7. 
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formation and execution of this virtue. These precepts of the Divine 
Law have the purpose of directing the mind to God. Aquinas argues 
that it is fitting to have precepts of obligation concerning both patience 
and perseverance,175 which involve the preparedness of mind. Aquinas 
says that this preparedness for patience concerns being ready to 
withstand both things that are done and said against us.176 Although we 
ought to be prepared to turn the other cheek if necessary, Aquinas 
explains that we are not always bound to do so, and furthermore that 
we should be prepared also to be impatient in certain cases. 
When being physically attacked or verbally reviled, it may not 
be expedient to remain patient, according to Thomas. He gives two 
reasons why we should not always withstand either being attacked or 
reviled (as Jesus did not in John 18:23). First, we must respect the 
good of the attacker or reviler, since correction may serve the good 
purpose of assisting that person out of error.177 Second, we must 
consider the good of other people who might be not any less 
concerned: indeed when the common good is endangered, a country 
fights against its enemies;178 or when a wrong reflects on God or on the 
Church, one should right the wrong in order to avoid undue scandal,179 
or when remaining silent to slander against public figures will hinder 
                                                 
175 In particular, he claims that we need these precepts, since “Afflictiones 
autem et labores praesentis vitae pertinent ad patientiam et perseverantiam non 
ratione alicuius magnitudinis in eis consideratae, sed ratione ipsius generis. Et 
ideo de patientia et perseverantia fuerunt danda praecepta” ST II-II 140.2 ad 1. 
176 He explains: “Praecepta autem patientiae in his quae contra nos fiunt, 
sunt in praeparatione animae habenda, sicut Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. 
in Monte [i.19], exponit illud praeceptum Domini, ‘Si quis percusserit te in una 
maxilla, praebe ei et aliam’: ut scilicet homo sit paratus hoc facere, si opus fuerit; 
non tamen hoc semper tenetur facere actu” (ST II-II 72.3). The Scriptural text (in 
italics) quoted by St. Thomas is an amalgam of Matt 5:39 and Luke 6:29. In the 
same passage, Aquinas explains the similar preparedness needed in being patient 
when facing revilement. “Tenemur enim habere animum paratum ad contumelias 
tolerandas si expediens fuerit” ST II-II 72.3. Augustine’s notion of preparedness 
of mind (“secundum praeparationem animi” De serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) is 
also quoted by Aquinas in ST II-II 140.2 ad 2; and ST II-II 72.3. Cf. St. Gregory 
the Great, Hom. in Euc., hom. XXXV, 1 (PL 76, 1259 BC). 
177 Cf. ST II-II 72.3; where Thomas cites: John 18:23; Prov. 26:5; cf. St. 
Augustine, de corrept. et gratia. 
178 Aquinas quotes Augustine’s letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii): 
“praecepta patientiae non contrariantur bono reipublicae, pro quo conservando 
contra inimicos compugnatur” ST II-II 136.4 ad 3. 
179 Cf. ST II-II 108, 1 ad 4; ST II-II 72.3; ST II-II 140.2 ad 2. 
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the moral and spiritual progress of others, we should correct 
detractors.180 Aquinas does not hold that the virtue of patience entails 
always being “patient,” in the sense of being passive in front of every 
adversity or evil. The virtue of patience also involves being prepared to 
be impatient; in that case, we call upon the virtues of fortitude and 
initiative empowered by righteous anger. 
Freud’s critique of a certain notion of Christianity falls short of 
Thomas. Indeed Aquinas’ strategies for managing pain and sorrow, 
and his interpretation of the precepts of patience and perseverance 
underlie a fuller conception of what it means to manage pain and 
sorrow. They demand an action readiness and hardiness that Freud did 
not grasp. Furthermore, Aquinas offers further insights on moral and 
spiritual progress in patience that further enhance a notion of Christian 
resilience. 
8.3.3. Patience in Moral and Spiritual Progress 
Experiences of suffering and patience are testing grounds for 
spiritual progress and for spiritual resilience. However, psychosocial 
methods often inhibit research from addressing theological treatments 
of suffering and patience. For this reason, Thomas’ observations on 
theological patience serve to complete the dearth of input from the 
psychosocial sciences at this level.181 In this section, I shall call more 
upon Aquinas’ Scriptural commentaries, which provide us with 
narrative images from the Tradition as well as more philosophical and 
theological concepts to explicate pathways toward growth in spiritual 
patience. 
Aquinas interprets spiritually the wines served at the wedding 
feast in Cana, in his Commentary on the Gospel of John. He illustrates 
how the bitter feeling of sorrow, and the need to manage it patiently, 
must be kept in the perspective of moral and spiritual progress, and the 
sweetness of salvation. He notes that sorrow is a characteristic of the 
first stages of this progress, while sweetness comes with the delights, 
                                                 
180 Cf. ST II-II 72.3, where Aquinas quotes St. Gregory’s Hom. IX super 
Ezech (bk I, hom. 9, n. 18: PL 76.877D. 
181 His insights are all on the same level as psychosocial sciences. Although 
his spiritual hermeneutics is rich in experience, they are not based on empirical 
studies. 
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joy and glory to come. Christ did not serve the tastiest wine first, but 
rather proposes a way that is bitter and hard. It is only when we make 
progress in faith and teaching that we become more aware of the 
sweetness.182 This spiritual progress involves the patient management 
of the sorrow and tribulations, measured against the joys that come 
through following Christ and being supported by the Holy Spirit.183 
Aquinas notes that sorrow results when due progress is not 
achieved in ourselves and in others. Such is the sorrow that Paul feels 
because of the actions of the Ephesians (Gal. 4:20). Paul is sorrowed 
and ashamed since they have turned from good to evil, according to 
Aquinas, who says: “For since a son is a thing of the father, and a 
disciple as such is a thing of his master, a master rejoices in the good 
he sees reflected in him and glories in it as though it were his own. 
Conversely, he is pained at evil and is ashamed.”184 This same concern 
of a father or a mother for the child, and a master for the disciple is 
found in the discipline exacted by God, who intends that believers 
grow in their stature as God’s children. Aquinas thus speaks of needing 
patience in correction, quoting Proverbs: “My son, do not despise the 
Lord’s discipline or be weary of his reproof, for the Lord reproves him 
whom he loves, as a father the son in whom he delights.”185 
                                                 
182 Aquinas affirms that: “Item in mundo isto amaritudines et tribulationes 
patiuntur omnes qui pie volunt vivere in Christo. Joan. 16,20: ‘Amen amen dico 
vobis, quia plorabitis et flebitis vos’ etc. Sed in futuro delectationes et gaudia 
suscipient: unde et sequitur: ‘Tristitia vestra vertetur in gaudium.’ Roman. 8,18: 
‘Existimo, quod non sunt condignae passiones hujus temporis ad futuram 
gloriam, quae revelabitur in nobis’” ad Joan, Ch. 2, lect.1-9. 
183 Aquinas discusses furthermore three degrees of spiritual progress in 
charity (ST II-II. 24.9): beginning (practice of discipline), progress (progress in 
virtues) and perfection (maturity in freedom). Cf. Pinckaers 1995a, 359-374. 
184 “nam cum filius sit res patris; et discipulus, inquantum hujusmodi, res 
magistri; magister gaudet de bono quod videt in eo relucere, quasi de bono 
proprio, et gloriatur; et e converso de malo dolet et confunditur. Unde quia isti 
mutati erant de bono in malum, Apostolus confundebatur inde.” Ad Gal. cap. 4, 
lect. 6; furthermore in this regard, Aquinas refers to Eccl (Sir) 22: 3. 
185 Prov 3:11 (RSV). Aquinas says: “debemus ei patientiam in 
castigationibus, Proverb 3, 11: ‘Disciplinam Domini, fili mi, ne abjicias’” (In 
orat. dom. Intro). In regards to correction and admonition, Aquinas also relies on 
St. Augustine’ Admonition and Grace (De Correptine et Gratia), which he 
quotes in the ST (I-II 109.2; II-II 72.3; II-II 137.4), De verit. (6.3) and De car. 
(art. 12). 
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Thomas highlights the significance, place and utility of 
affliction and temptation in regard to growing in patience. First, the 
human person is directed toward patience through adversity. He 
reasons that God made all creation good, according to nature. But if we 
suffer evil and adversity or confront some punishment (poena), we 
should believe that the difficulty or punishment is from God; however 
not as if God willed the blameworthy evil deed. “Because no evil is 
from God, except that which is ordained to good; and therefore if every 
punishment that humans suffer is from God, it should be endured 
patiently. For punishments purge sins, humble the guilty, and lead the 
good to love God.”186 Thus through patient endurance of evils and 
affliction, we can recognize that even such difficulties can be a way to 
know and love God more fully. We must recall though the need to 
discern prudently punishment from oppression and violence. 
St. Paul’s letter to the Romans (5:1-5) contains one of the most 
important texts describing the relationship of suffering and patience to 
faith, hope and charity. Aquinas uses this text on numerous occasions 
in order to illustrate the relationship of trials to patience.187 One of the 
reasons for the consequence of this text is the context of grace, which 
serves as a foundation for understanding patience and hope. Through 
grace, we have peace with God the Father, faith in Jesus Christ and 
hope of sharing future glory, the glory of God, in which we already 
participate through such hope. Aquinas notes that it is the strength of 
this hope that permits someone to endure difficulty and even bitter 
                                                 
186 “Nam licet omnis creatura sit a Deo, et ex hoc sit bona secundum suam 
naturam; tamen si in aliquo noceat, et inferat nobis poenam, debemus credere 
quod illa poena sit a Deo; non tamen culpa: quia nullum malum est a Deo, nisi 
quod ordinatur ad bonum: et ideo si omnis poena quam homo suffert, est a Deo, 
debet patienter sustinere. Nam poenae purgant peccata, humiliant reos, 
provocant bonos ad amorem Dei. Job 11,10: ‘Si bona suscepimus de manu 
Domini, mala autem quare non sustineamus?’” in sym. apost. art. 1. This 
discourse on patience is in the context of Aquinas identifying five goals in human 
life. The other four involve: knowing God, giving thanks, using creation aright 
and recognizing human dignity. 
187 In addition to the commentary Ad Rom. cap. 5, lect. 1, Aquinas also 
quotes Rom 5:3 in: II ad Cor. cap. 1, lect. 3; Ad Gal. cap. 3, lect. 2; I ad Timoth. 
cap. 4. lect. 2; Ad Rom. cap. 12, lect. 2; De verit. 2, 28, 8 sc 2; IV Sent. 15, 1, art. 
4; In Isaiam 11; In orat. dom. art. 7; In Psalmos 24:12. 
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medicine for the sake of the hoped for glory or healing.188 Thus we can 
rejoice not only in the hope of future glory, but also in present trials, 
which open the way to this glory.189 
This perspective on suffering is possible because of the faith, 
which enables us to know “that suffering produces endurance [Øpomon», 
patience], and endurance produces character [dokim¾], and character 
produces hope” (Rom 5:3-4, RSV).190 The suffering is not the efficient 
cause of the patience, but is the matter and occasion for exercising 
patience.191 Aquinas explains that patience and character192 both precede 
and result from suffering. They are both the condition for enduring it 
and the effect of the trial endured. The result is a hope that has been 
tried, is firm and will not disappoint. The source of this confident hope 
is God’s love, which God the Father manifests through the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ, and through the Gift of the Holy Spirit. 
Aquinas notes that it is an expression of love, when we suffer in the 
service of God.193 
In the context of affirming how Jesus Christ’s passion has 
freed us from the power of the devil, Aquinas observes that we can be 
bothered by temptation either as merited from our own guilt (a result 
of our own evil actions) or in order to test us and to put patience into 
practice.194 In this second regard, both Abraham and Job are examples 
                                                 
188 “Qui enim vehementer aliquid sperat, libenter sustinet propter illud 
etiam difficilia et amara; sicut infirmus, si vehementer sperat sanitatem, libenter 
bibit potionem amaram, ut sanetur per ipsam” Ad Rom. cap. 5, lect. 1 (Rom 5:3). 
189 Aquinas (Ad Rom. cap. 5, lect 1) refers here to Acts 14:22 and Jas 1:2. 
190 The JB translates dokim¾ as “perseverance,” which has the advantage of 
expressing the completeness of the quality acquired. 
191 “quorum primum est tribulatio, de qua dicitur, quod tribulatio 
patientiam operatur: non quidem sic quod tribulatio sit ejus causa effectiva, sed 
quia tribulatio est materia et occasio exercendi patientiae actum. Rom 12,12: In 
tribulatione patientes” Ad Rom. cap. 5, lect. 2. Elsewhere, Aquinas affirms the 
utility of difficulty to cultivate patience; cf. Ad Eph. cap. 4, lect. 1. 
192 In the Latin translation of St. Paul’s letter to the Romans used by 
Aquinas, probatio is used to translate dokim¾. Dokim¾ literally means “the quality 
of being approved” through a test, trial or ordeal, and hence it is also translated as 
“character” (RSV) or “perseverance” (JB). Aquinas’ commentary on probatio (Ad 
Rom. cap. 5, lect. 2) employs James 1:3 in developing the notion of how the 
testing of one’s faith produces patience. 
193 Cf. Ad Rom. cap. 12, lect. 2.  
194 This statement concerns the temptation of the devil: “quod hoc quod 
homines in rebus et personis affligit, vel est ex merito culpae ipsorum, vel ad 
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of those who have suffered temptation in order to show others their 
patience in resisting evil and doing good.195 In his commentary on the 
book of Job, Aquinas uses the image of gold being tested and made 
manifest by fire, in order to illustrate why Job’s patience and virtue in 
general is put to the test in order to be a source of witness for others. In 
commenting on Job (23:10), “He will prove me like gold which passes 
through fire,” Aquinas says: “just as gold does not become true gold 
but its genuineness is manifested to men as a result of the fire, so Job 
has been proved through adversity not so that his virtue might appear 
before God but so that it might be manifested to men.”196 
Aquinas correlates the development of patience with Paul’s 
teaching on corporal mortification (Col. 3:5-17).197 Aquinas interprets 
Paul’s directional metaphor, to seek what is above, as meaning 
focusing on Christ, the Kingdom of God, a restored life of justice, a 
justified relation with God (Mt. 6:33); these are the greatest goods 
(summa bona) and give order to all earthly goods. In order to integrate 
this finality, that “our desire must be on him,”198 we must put to death 
earthly ways, the old nature and its practices. We must die to evil ways 
and mortify our carnal desires. Aquinas highlights that his is a life-
giving rather morbid perspective. Taking off the old, demands putting 
on the new way of life, and being “renewed in knowledge after the 
image of its creator” (Col. 3:10).199 Patience, forbearing others and 
                                                                                                          
probationem justorum, et exercitium patientiae ipsorum; et non est ex 
insufficientia passionis Christi” III Sent. 19, 1, 2, ad 2. 
195 Aquinas says: “Sic tentavit Deus Abraham, Gen. 22, et Job. Et Deus 
saepe immittit tribulationes justis, ut dum patienter sustinent, appareat virtus 
eorum et virtute proficiant” In orat. dom. pet. 6. 
196 “sicut aurum non fit verum aurum ex igne sed eius veritas hominibus 
manifestatur, ita Iob per adversitatem probatus est non ut eius virtus appareret 
coram Deo, sed ut hominibus manifestaretur” In Job, cap. 23, ln. 160-172. 
197 Cf. Ad Col. cap. 3, lect. 1 and 2. 
198 “desiderium nostrum debet esse ad ipsum” Ad Col. cap. 3, lect. 1; with 
references to Matt 24:28 and Matt 6:21. 
199 Paul says that as God’s chosen ones, we must put on “compassion, 
kindness, lowliness, meekness, and patience, forbearing one another and, if one 
has a complaint against another, forgiving each other, as the Lord has forgiven 
you, so you also must forgive. And above all these put on love, which binds 
everything together in perfect harmony.” Another key to such an education is 
found in the continuation of this text. “Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly, 
teach and admonish one another in all wisdom, and sing psalms and hymns and 
spiritual songs with thankfulness in your hearts to God. And whatever you do, in 
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forgiveness are all tools specifically fit for facing adversity, when we 
need to remain rooted in the love of God and the rectitude of justice 
(patience), to endure others’ weaknesses (forbearance) and to pardon 
their offenses (forgiveness).200 Such virtues are the result of charity at 
work in the mortification of sinful and enlivening of good activities. 
Aquinas’ commentary on the Lord’s Prayer explicitly notes 
the import of patience for transforming tribulations into something 
good. Aquinas recognizes that all who want to live in Christ will suffer 
tribulation or temptation (2 Tim 3, 12) and that the Lord’s Prayer 
teaches us to pray more specifically not to be led into temptation. 
Aquinas emphasizes that this petition does not request a life without 
temptation, but rather that we do not consent to the inevitable 
temptations experienced. For temptation gives the opportunity of 
receiving the crown of eternal life (Jas 1:12; Rom 5:3), of finding the 
liberty of the children of God, (in ora. dom. pet. vi.), and of itself being 
transformed into untold good (in ora. dom. pet. vii). Aquinas says that 
it is God who frees us from temptation and evil, works consolation, 
and converts situations of temptation and tribulation into something 
good. 
We shall note one last cognitive, or rather sapiential point. 
Aquinas argues that God demonstrates his wisdom by freeing us from 
evil and by converting tribulations into something good: “This is a sign 
of the greatest wisdom, because wisdom orders evil toward the good 
through patience, which is realized through tribulations.”201 In 
particular, the Holy Spirit, working through the Gift of wisdom, makes 
us ask to participate in the transformation of tribulation. Thus, we 
cooperate in acquiring the patience needed to become mature children 
of God. This type of intelligent patience is an all-weather virtue; as 
Aquinas says: “through patience, one has peace both in prosperity and 
                                                                                                          
word or deed, do everything in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God 
the Father through him.” Col 3:16-17 (RSV). 
200 Cf. Ad Col. cap. 3, lect. 3. 
201 “Liberat ergo Deus hominem a malo et tribulationibus, eas in bonum 
convertendo; quod est signum maximae sapientiae, quia sapientis est malum 
ordinare in bonum; et hoc fit per patientiam, quae habetur in tribulationibus” In 
orat. dom. pet. vii. 
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adversity.”202 The emphasis on the cognitive dimension of wisdom 
terminates this renewed reading of Aquinas on the place of patience in 
moral and spiritual progress. Thomas provides numerous insights on 
patience that enhance spiritual resilience. Now we shall offer some 
broader concluding remarks. 
                                                 
202 “et ideo Spiritus sanctus per donum sapientiae facit nos petere: et per 
hoc pervenimus ad beatitudinem ad quam ordinat pax, quia per patientiam 
pacem habemus et in tempore prospero et adverso: et ideo pacifici dicuntur fillii 
Dei, qui sunt similes Deo, quia sicut Deo nihil nocere potest, ita nec eis, quia nec 
prospera nec adversa” In orat. dom. pet. vii. 
 Chapter Nine. Conclusions: 
Resilience Research and the Renewal of Moral Theology 
“You understand that your faith is only put to the test to make you patient, but 
patience too is to have its practical results so that you will become fully 
developed, complete, with nothing missing” James 1:3-4 (JB).1 
The central question that I have asked in this book is: What do 
the psychosocial sciences offer for the renewal of St. Thomas Aquinas’ 
virtue theory concerning the management of difficulty (fortitude and 
its related virtues)? 
The bridge that allows us to relate the psychosocial sciences 
and St. Thomas’ virtue theory is difficulty, and precisely, human 
resilience in the face of difficulty and adversity. I have defined 
resilience as the individual human and social capacity to cope with 
difficulty, to resist destruction under hardship and to construct 
something positive out of an otherwise negative situation. 
Both the virtue of fortitude (with its associated virtues) and 
resilience relate to difficulty. Both fortitude and resilience (as 
resourcefulness for coping, constancy and constructing) contribute to a 
fundamentally positive perspective that counters an excessive focus on 
brokenness, vice and the effects of sin and psychopathology. 
In this book, I have posed the leading question in terms of 
three further queries concerning: human anthropology, natural virtue 
and theological virtue. 
First, how might psychosocial resilience research enrich St. 
Thomas’ moral anthropology? 
Second, how might a dialogue between Aquinas and 
psychosocial sciences enhance our understanding of the natural virtues 
that face difficulty, namely fortitude with its related virtues? 
                                                 
1 The letter of James 1:4 is a quote often used by Aquinas, in many of his 
scripture commentaries (11 different ones) and in his ST in the following places: 
I-II 61.3 obj. 3; I-II 66.4 obj 2 and ad 2; II-II 136.2 obj. 1 and ad 1; II-II 184.1 
obj. 3 and ad 3; as well as in de virt. com. 5, 1 obj. 14 and 5, 4 obj. 12 
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And third, how might this dialogue deepen our understanding 
of theological fortitude and its associated virtues and Gift of the Holy 
Spirit? 
Resilience research presents itself as a promising, yet 
challenging, dialogue partner for the virtues associated with difficulty. 
On the promising side of the dialogue, I have demonstrated that 
psychosocial sciences offer insights to bolster the philosophical 
anthropology that underlies Aquinas’ virtue theory. Moreover, they 
offer insights about the natural and theological virtues related to 
fortitude. 
In terms of a conclusion, I shall first reiterate resilience and its 
perspective. Second, I shall recall the methodological issues that this 
project involves. Third, I shall summarize the major findings at which I 
have arrived. I shall conclude with some suggestions for future 
research and a critical appraisal of the project. 
9.1. The Resilience Perspective 
The resilience perspective and research offer insights into 
human resources used to manage difficulty. It identifies sources of 
human coping, self-conservation and construction in difficulty. The 
source of the metaphorical image of resilience is found in the plasticity 
of metal. Originally resilience refers to physical resistance to 
deformation; for example, when resilient, a metal bar flexes but neither 
breaks nor remains bent. 
Second, researchers have more recently applied the resilience 
concept to psychosocial domains. They have inquired into the 
psychological and sociological mechanisms that offer protection, 
coping and buffering in adversity; as well as those that oppose risk, 
stress and vulnerability. 
Thirdly, thinkers have started to look for sources of resilience 
in the philosophical and spiritual domains—the later of which are of 
special interest for deepening our understanding of Christian virtue. On 
philosophical and theological levels, resilience involves the ethical, 
spiritual and religious processes that render humans capable to cope 
actively with difficulty, resist deformation of competencies, and 
construct from the unfavorable situation using spiritual resources. 
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Through a meta-analysis of resilience findings on 
temperament, emotions, cognitive and volitional processes, I have 
inductively identified resources and strategies that support resilience 
outcomes. In turn, I have brought the insights borne of the 
psychosocial research on difficulty into a critical and constructive 
dialogue with Aquinas’ understanding of anthropology, virtue theory 
and Christian virtues 
9.2. Method 
Methodology is the bane of any interdisciplinary research, 
including a moral theology that seeks to remain theological while 
integrating other sciences (part one). Moral theology, when following 
Aquinas’ example, brings the theological tradition of the Church into 
dialogue with the best sciences on human nature and moral agency. His 
theology (in general, and his moral theology, in particular) 
incorporates the major scientific findings (and theories) of his time 
with synthetic flare, philosophical insight and theological purpose. I 
have proposed that his dialogue between moral theology and other 
sciences is not over; it can profitably include the psychosocial 
resilience research. 
What advantages might the integration of psychosocial 
sciences on resilience bring to moral theology? In this book, I have 
made the case that we can employ resilience research to contribute to a 
more robust philosophical anthropology, to clarify moral analysis, and 
to continue a renewal in moral theology. This project requires that we 
distinguish the methods and content not only of moral theology and 
philosophy (especially ethics), but also of various psychosocial 
sciences. 
The various domains of resilience research—psychology, 
developmental theories social sciences and evolutionary theory—offer 
insights into human nature and moral agency (the natural virtues, 
especially those that concern the management of adversity). But they 
do not form, in and of themselves, a larger coherent anthropological 
framework. That is the work of theology aided by philosophy. 
I have suggested that moral theology draws resources from 
descriptive, normative and theological sciences in order to formulate 
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its philosophical anthropology. But the ordering of these sciences is 
not indiscriminate. 
We do not pretend that moral theology simply acquires the 
accumulated “scientific” status of the scientific study with which it 
dialogues. That is, we avoid a naturalistic approach that directly draws 
ethics from psychosocial sciences. 
In dialoguing with the psychosocial sciences, I have had to 
make methodological choices in addressing the question: how can we 
respect the research parameters of other sciences (the distinct 
psychosocial sciences), while honoring the one in which we primarily 
navigate (namely moral theology)? I have rejected different facile 
methods: consequentialist models, disclosure models, bricolage 
models, as well as concordat models. Rather, we have followed the 
method of Aquinas, while employing insights from S. J. Pope’s 
“critical appropriation model.” 
Aquinas accords a tertiary, but important, place to 
philosophical (and other scientific) arguments and observations in 
doing moral theology. These sciences are not on the same level as 
Scripture and Tradition, but they provide “extrinsic and probable” 
arguments for understanding human agency. This ordered approach 
does not denigrate the input that descriptive sciences can bring at the 
level of human agency, but it puts them in a larger normative and 
theological context. 
I thus construe moral theology as the examination of human 
agency employing the tools of empirical, clinical and philosophical 
sciences, while providing a philosophical anthropology that integrates 
theological principles and reflection on the moral life. Although 
descriptive resilience findings themselves do not establish norms 
(which would entail a naturalist fallacy), they do offer the basis for 
philosophical reflection on a virtue-based approach to moral 
adjudication, norms and freedom. 
In short, I have claimed that a dialogue with resilience insights 
(coming from descriptive sciences) enriches Aquinas’ virtue-based 
ethical theory and moral theology at the level of its philosophical 
anthropology. I have demonstrated how they can apply to his 
understanding of finality and flourishing, of emotions in moral 
development and of virtue education. But the major part of the work 
Resilience Research and the Renewal of Moral Theology 517 
has focused on how the psychosocial sciences can enrich our 
understanding of the virtues associated with hardship. What are this 
work’s findings? 
9.3. Findings 
In the second and third parts of this book, I apply the basic 
resilience findings more directly to the concrete instances of courage 
and its related virtues. 
In Part Two, I investigate the natural virtue of fortitude in 
dialogue with resilience research. I ask how ethicists can employ 
Aquinas’ anthropology, enriched by psychosocial insights on 
resilience, to identify a moral type of resilience. 
In Part Three, I investigate theological virtues in the light of 
resilience insights. I ask how Aquinas’ moral theology in dialogue with 
resilience research can identify a spiritual type of resilience. 
9.3.1. Fortitude and Moral Resilience 
On the level of natural virtue, fortitude and the virtues related 
to initiative taking (aggredi) and endurance (sustinere) illustrate a type 
of moral resilience. Among the virtues, fortitude is the most obvious 
dialogue partner with psychosocial resilience research—both sides 
concentrate on the human response to adversity, and the place that fear 
and daring play therein. 
Psychosocial research, for its part, highlights fear’s utility and 
purpose in resilience, as well as that of temperament (e.g. timidity and 
audacity). Research describes the neurological, physiological and 
psychological interactions that underlie fear-related emotional, 
cognitive and motivational dispositions. 
This research enriches Aquinas’ analysis of fear. In particular, 
his model of thought can incorporate the physiological and 
neurological considerations of cognition, motivation and emotion 
without reducing the human experience to the biophysical level. His 
experiential and realist metaphysical teaching on the natural virtue of 
fortitude constructively adds to our understanding of human agency in 
difficulty. It provides a wider philosophical and psychological 
foundation to appreciate moral agency in the midst of fear. 
518 Resilience and Christian Virtues 
For Aquinas, we master or succumb to fear in the practice of 
fortitude, which demands foreseeing threats and hardships and learning 
from failures. He contributes a richer type of moral resilience. In 
particular, he treats fortitude developmentally and expounds a 
philosophical psychology of fear and daring with a social analysis of 
struggle, death and the common good. His treatment of fortitude, 
which manages fear and daring, provides a philosophical basis to 
approach moral resilience. On a normative level, his typology of 
fortitude aids us to comprehend more fully moral responsibility and 
resilience. 
9.3.2. Initiative and Constructive Resilience 
Aquinas recognizes the specific place of initiative-taking 
(aggredi) in the face of difficulty. Sometimes we can attack or confront 
the source of adversity in order to overcome or change it. His notions 
of the virtues of initiative (magnanimitas and magnificentia) offer a 
type of constructive resilience (within the larger natural virtue of 
fortitude and its moral resilience). 
Resilience research, for its part, highlights the role of optimism 
and generosity in human initiatives. These qualities are important since 
we confront arduous projects through the energy of the emotions, 
especially of hope and daring. Resilience research in particular shows 
how we harness daring in confident acts through our capacities to 
concentrate. 
Aquinas construes initiative-taking in terms of a series of 
virtues grouped around magnanimitas and magnificentia, which aim to 
master the use of the emotions of hope and daring. His approach to 
initiative focuses on the natural virtue of hope (what he calls 
magnanimitas). This virtue of initiative manages temperament traits, 
emotions and motivations in order to overcome hardship in attaining 
the good (bonum arduum). In hope-filled agency, Aquinas affirms that 
(a desire and understanding of) excellence leads us to act for more 
worthwhile ends than does a motivation based on honors alone. 
Nonetheless, he accents the place of both honors and excellence in 
providing a further normative framework for a virtue of initiative that 
seeks to avoid vainglory and ambition. 
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Resilience research and Aquinas’ reflections enrich each other 
to offer a nuanced typology of the natural virtue of hope. In this 
enriched view, to overcome the difficulty involved in constructive 
human acts, we need not only concentration and hope, but also a drive 
for flourishing and excellence. This type of natural hope and daring 
risk-taking underlies constructive resilience. 
9.3.3. Endurance and Resistant Resilience 
For Aquinas, in order to resist more consistently the 
destructive effects of adversity, we need to master the emotions and 
dispositions that underlie endurance (sustinere). According to him, we 
endure loss, suffering and pain through the virtues of patience and 
perseverance. 
The resilience perspective aids us to appreciate and supplement 
Aquinas’ typology of the virtues and vices that concern endurance-
responses to adversity. In particular, research on resilience phenomena 
concerning the management of sorrow and waiting adds insights to 
Aquinas’ moral theory. For example, it aids us to understand moral 
progress and the role that patience and perseverance play in managing 
sorrow, pain and suffering. In dialogue, Aquinas and the resilience 
research collaborate in a richer notion of the virtuous endurance that 
we might call resistant resilience. 
9.3.4. Fortitude and Resilience Transcended 
In part three, I addressed how grace transforms the virtue of 
fortitude for Aquinas. What can we say about his understanding of the 
theological completion and elevation of natural virtue? Does it offer a 
model of theological fortitude that resilience research can enrich at its 
own level? 
I have argued that Aquinas’ theological vision of the 
transformation of natural fortitude has radical implications for the way 
in which spiritual resilience transcends moral resilience. Thomas’ 
conception of the theological tenor of fortitude (as an infused virtue, an 
act of martyrdom, the Beatitude of the just, and the Sevenfold Gift of 
the Holy Spirit) specifies a type of Christian resilience. 
Aquinas—following St. Augustine—recognizes that the 
Christian tradition emphasizes the Gift of the Holy Spirit, the 
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Beatitudes (and the rest of the Sermon on the Mount) and the Precepts 
of the Our Father (Pater Noster) in spiritual agency. In regards to 
fortitude, he holds that humans participate in divine hardiness through 
(1) their openness to the Gift of fortitude, (2) their acts aimed at the 
Beatitude of those who hunger and thirst for justice, and (3) their 
following the inspiration of the precept of fortitude. 
As an infused virtue, fortitude illustrates a type of resilient 
agency that participates in divine strength, in the midst of human fear, 
trials and weakness. Furthermore, Aquinas’ conception of Christian 
martyrdom offers an archetype for spiritual resilience, based upon 
friendship-love and justice. It resists critiques that claim that 
Christianity nurtures vulnerability. 
9.3.5. Constructive Resilience Transcended 
Aquinas’ conception of grace that operates through virtues of 
initiative-taking opens the way for understanding a theological 
dimension in resilient initiative. Indeed, the theological extension of 
constructive resilience and of initiative-taking virtues illustrates the 
roles that being honorable and seeking excellence (involved in human 
initiatives and divine purpose) play in spiritual resilience. 
Aquinas’ moral theology displays a particularly Christian type 
of resilience through the infused greatness and initiative specified in 
constructive projects and generosity (including acts of adoration and 
religion), and in great intentions and plans that find their inspiration in 
the Gospel. He affirms that we evoke theological honor and excellence 
in order to plan, motivate and complete projects that have their source 
and finality in God. This type of initiative involves interdependence, 
meekness and humility, while seeking to honor God and serve others. 
9.3.6. Resistant Resilience Transformed 
Aquinas gracefully articulates the theological difference 
involved in infused patience and perseverance, which illustrate the 
stamina of spiritual resilience. This theological extension of resistant 
resilience, modeled on the virtues of endurance illustrates further ways 
to manage pain, suffering and loss. 
For St. Thomas, theological patience and perseverance, long-
suffering and constancy find their source in God’s patience, as 
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expressed through Jesus Christ, who serves as the archetype for a 
Christian response to pain and suffering, including the ultimate and 
extreme instances that we all need to face, especially near death. 
Aquinas identifies other theological developments that support 
patience. Grace completes and elevates emotions, reason and will 
through resisting and overcoming the difficulties that punctuate our 
way to our ultimate good. This grace involves a theologically informed 
hope that permeates daily work as well. It enables our reception of the 
Gift of knowledge, and makes possible acts inspired by the Beatitude 
of the mourners and the fruit of patience. These theological movements 
extend patience and perseverance and illustrate a way to resist 
suffering and evil. 
On the developmental level, Aquinas’ theological approach to 
enduring hardship and waiting for the attainment of good can 
transform psychosocial resilience insights on pain, suffering and 
resisting. As an indispensable element, we have to integrate our own 
experience, which is based on our experience of God through the 
theological virtues of faith, hope and love. At the same time, the 
experience of others—especially those who have resiliently overcome 
difficulty—offer us food for thought and a model for resilient 
behavior. Nonetheless, the level of supernatural, or graced virtue 
cannot find empirical or statistical corroboration. Aquinas’ (and our) 
theological reflections on the life of grace involve the non-empirically 
verifiable, lived experience of the Catholic Tradition (Scripture, 
Patristic, Mystic and Liturgical sources). 
9.4. Concluding Remarks 
What are the possibilities for future research in the dialogue 
between the psychosocial sciences? Much remains to be done at the 
levels of anthropology, ethics and moral theology. I will only focus on 
one area for lack of space. 
There is a promise in the renewal of Christian anthropology 
based upon a dialogue with positive psychology, rather than on 
psychopathology alone (that is, rather than a focus on abnormal 
psychology per se). More extensive research on the application of 
Christian virtue theory in clinical settings and through empirical 
studies might help us to better articulate the deeper teachings of the 
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Tradition on human nature and agency, especially concerning human 
flourishing, freedom and responsibility in pursuit of the good. It might 
help us to better integrate the bio-physical, psychosocial, ethical and 
spiritual dimensions of the human person and society into every effort 
at promoting health and overcoming illness, developing virtuously and 
overcoming vicious tendencies, as well as living in community 
towards a hope that is eschatological. 
This method—and that of Aquinas—holds that truth is one. 
The truths about human resilience can help us better understand human 
virtues that face hardships. Nonetheless, resilience findings are shaped 
by the researcher’s worldview and anthropology. Resilience itself—as 
if it were a pure phenomenon of survival, taken outside of a larger 
context—would dangerously promote survival at any cost. The type of 
surviving and thriving that we promote is the issue. We can avoid 
reductionistic tendencies, if we believe that resilience is more than 
material survival of the fittest. 
We have therefore confidently sought to avoid the shortfalls of 
interdisciplinary methods that simplistically revamp major elements in 
moral theology based on the psychosocial sciences’ tentative theories 
and empirical findings. We have limited the use of resilience insights 
in moral theology to a hierarchical dialogue about human nature and 
agency. 
We do not intend to limit Aquinas or Catholic moral theology 
to any reductionist research method, but to suggest that Aquinas’ virtue 
theory offers us a model for ordered interdisciplinary dialogue that 
renews moral theology in general, while contributing to a more robust 
anthropology. 
Our contemporary understanding of Aquinas and of Catholic 
moral theology is in a process of renewal. We are struggling to escape 
under-specified or misdirected ideas of human nature that either reduce 
humans to our biophysical-neurological bases or to our psychosocial 
tendencies and interactions. We furthermore seek to overcome (1) 
exaggerated notions of rules and duty that eclipse the primacy and 
influence of faith, hope and charity, as well as (2) narrowed notions of 
virtue that recognize neither the wounds of sin nor the transforming 
effects of grace. In turn, following the leads of Aquinas’ anthropology 
provides us a larger ethical and theological context than is possible in 
Resilience Research and the Renewal of Moral Theology 523 
reductionistic or non-integrated psychosocial sciences alone. In this 
regard, Aquinas’ natural law approach to moral norms and pedagogy 
offers guidelines and a framework for human resilience; moreover, his 
approach to the New Law of grace and the infused virtues offers a 
fuller understanding of spiritual resilience. 
Aquinas offers us a vibrant realist, metaphysical model of 
moral theology. He offers more as well. His reflections on natural and 
graced-life faced with adversity contain invaluable insights, but they 
cannot be understood without hermeneutical effort. They serve as a 
valid basis for dialogues with our contemporary experiences and with 
research on resilience that aid the ongoing renewal in moral theology 
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